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 3 
Context 
 
 
Scientific management was the first attempt to systematically treat management and process 
improvement as a scientific problem. With the advancement of statistical methods, the approach was 
improved and referred to as quality control in 1920s and 1930s. During the 1940s and 1950s, the body 
of knowledge for doing scientific management evolved into Operations Research and management 
cybernetics. In the 1980s the subject was studied as total quality management, in the 1990s re-
engineering.  
 
Evidence-based medicine (EBM) is an attempt to more uniformly apply the standards of evidence 
gained from the scientific method, to certain aspects of medical practice. Specifically, EBM seeks to 
apply judgments about the inductive quality of evidence, to those aspects of medicine which depend on 
rational assessments of risks and benefits of treatments (including lack of treatment). According to the 
Centre for Evidence-Based Medicine, "Evidence-based medicine is the conscientious, explicit and 
judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients." 
(Strauss 2005) 
 
Evidence-based design is a process used by architects, interior designers, facility managers, and others 
in the planning, design, and construction of commercial buildings. An evidence-based designer, 
together with an informed client, makes decisions based on the best information available from 
research and project evaluations. This is a method applicable to many types of commercial building 
projects, but is uniquely suited to healthcare because of the unusually high stakes and major issues of 
safety and improved clinical outcomes. A natural parallel and analog to evidence-based medicine, it is 
currently being used in the healthcare industry to help convince decision-makers to invest the time and 
money to build better buildings - and realize strategic business advantages as a result. 
 
Evidence based healthcare management (EBHM) refers to using research evidence in making 
management decisions. Defined narrowly it describes using evidence from randomised controlled trials 
investigating the effectiveness of clinical therapies and procedures in management decisions (for 
example, whether to add or discontinue a therapy in a service or revise guidelines). For example 
evidence about the effectiveness of models of service (case management or team work), or about 
changes to organisation (changing skill mix or merging two organisations) or about new financing 
arrangements (e.g. primary care purchasing), or about public health or health promotion programmes. 
This accommodates a more flexible concept of evidence of effectiveness which can include the 
opinions of stakeholders if gathered using accepted systematic methods.  
 
The word effective is sometimes used in a quantitative way, "being very or not much effective". In 
strict epidemiological language, 'efficacy' refers to the impact of an intervention in a clinical trial, 
differing from 'effectiveness' which refers to the impact in real world situations Therefore, what is 
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effective is not necessarily efficacious, and what is efficacious is not necessarily efficient. Performance 
measurement is the process of assessing progress toward achieving predetermined goals, while 
performance management is building on that process adding the relevant communication and action on 
the progress achieved against these predetermined goals (Bourne, M.,Franco 2003) 
 
Dr Muir Gray is Director of the National electronic Library for Health and of the National Screening 
Committee, and Project Manager for the National Public Health Network Project. He was also 
instrumental in setting up the Centre for Evidence-Based Medicine in Oxford, which has played a 
leading role in promoting and supporting the teaching and practice of evidence-based medicine 
worldwide. In Muir Gray's view the evidence based philosophy is widened to health care as a whole. It 
is concerned with groups of patients and populations rather than individuals.  
 
The first key author in the area of practical application of researched best practice by  managers in 
healthcare in England was Hamlin, a Principal Lecturer at the University of Wolverhampton (Hamlin 
2001). His paper presents arguments in support of evidence-based healthcare management, drawing on 
organisationally based empirical research, set within an NHS Trust Hospital in the UK. The research 
focuses on identifying the criteria of managerial effectiveness applying at the middle and front line 
management levels of the organisation, using critical incident technique and factor analysis methods.  
The findings suggest the existence of generalised criteria of managerial effectiveness, supporting the 
notion of the ‘universally effective manager’.  
 
Other notable authors in this area include Karen Davis who has made comparison studies of the 
functioning of health policy in Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to 
understand the incentives, rewards and penalties that might make players in a health system allocate 
resources efficiently (Davis 2007). Jo Boufford was former head of the Kings Fund, an influential 
English research organisation in the field of health policy and upon her move to New York University 
to head up the Wagner Faculty on Healthcare policy she wrote about “Teaching Evidence Based 
Healthcare (Boufford 2003). Kovner and Sklar both write for the AHRQ, part of the American 
government Department of Health and Human Services, on Evidence Based Healthcare Management 
 
There are alternatives to Evidence Based Healthcare Management (EBHM) but they are not universally 
acceptable. Pfeffer (Sutton and Pfeffer 2005)  notes the problems and benefits of trying to draw 
conclusions from the alternative to EBHM of simple comparison or benchmarking, to arrive at the 
perceived best healthcare model.  “You can use uncritical emulation and its business equivalent: casual 
benchmarking.  Both doctors and managers look to perceived high performers in their field and try to 
mimic those top dogs’ moves.  I am not damning benchmarking in general – it can be a powerful and 
cost-efficient tool. Yet it is important to remember that if you only copy what other people or 
companies do, the best you can be is a perfect imitation.  So the most you can hope to have are 
practices as good as, but no better than, those of top performers – and by the time you mimic them, 
they have moved on.  
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The OECD Health Project has run for four years, embracing nearly a dozen studies including policies 
on human resources, new and emerging health-related technology, and long term care, and private 
health insurance, cost controls in health care and waiting times for elective surgery, along with research 
on measuring income-related equity of access to care.   In effect the project highlights the dilemma that 
the evidence and the policy in healthcare management are in conflict over how to improve the effective 
application of resources.   The first findings of the Health Project were published in May 2004 at a 
first-ever meeting of OECD Health Ministers, in the ambitiously-titled report Towards High-
Performing Health Systems.  The final chapter in the report looks at “increasing value for money in 
health systems” – and is forced to dismiss many of the stock neoliberal policies: cost sharing; the 
purchaser-provider split; decentralisation; payment by results (activity based systems of payment); and 
competition between providers are all found wanting, while contracting out (privatisation) of support 
services is given only the most fleeting and uncritical attention, ignoring any considerations of quality.  
 
This study will concentrate the practical elements of the research on the East Midlands NHS.  
 
The National Health Service (NHS) is the "public face" of the three publicly funded health care 
systems of Great Britain (Northern Ireland does not use the title) and the full title of the national public 
health service for England.The NHS provides the majority of healthcare in England, from general 
practitioners to Accident and Emergency Departments, long-term healthcare and dentistry. It was 
founded in 1948 and has become an integral part of English society, culture and everyday life: the NHS 
was once described by Nigel Lawson, former Chancellor of the Exchequer, as "the national religion". 
Private health care has continued parallel to the NHS, paid for largely by private insurance, but it is 
used only by a small percentage of the population, and generally as a top-up to NHS services. NHS 
services are largely "free at the point of delivery", paid for by taxes; the NHS's budget for 2006–07 is 
£96 billion.  Employing over 1.3 million people, the NHS is the largest employer in Europe and one of 
the largest employers in the world, (believed to be third or fifth, according to different commentators). 
 
The East Midlands is one of the regions of England and consists of most of the eastern half of the 
traditional region of the Midlands. It consists of the combined area of Derbyshire, Leicestershire, 
Rutland, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire and most of Lincolnshire. Its main settlements are 
Nottingham, Leicester, Lincoln, Derby, Northampton, Mansfield and Chesterfield. Leicester is 
officially the largest city in the region, although the largest conurbation is the Nottingham Urban Area. 
For the purposes of this study the East Midlands represents a significant border for the division of 
delegated responsibility of the Department of Health. NHS East Midlands provides strategic leadership 
to NHS organisations in the counties of Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, 
Nottinghamshire and Rutland. These organisations have a total NHS budget of £4.1bn, and serve a 
combined population of 4.3 million.  
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There is a structure, albeit an informal one, for the implementation of management research in the 
National Health Service. The National Institute for Health Research was created in 2006 “to create a 
health research system in which the NHS supports outstanding individuals, working in world class 
facilities, conducting leading edge research focused on the needs of patients and the public”. The NIHR 
is a virtual organisation, which provides a new framework for the Department of Health to work with 
its key partners involved in the different elements of NHS research. .West Midlands Health 
Technology Assessment Collaboration between universities and academic groups mostly based at the 
University of Birmingham, United Kingdom. It produces reviews and evaluations for a variety of 
national and regional clients, undertakes methodological research on health technology assessment, and 
provides training in systematic reviews and health technology assessment. The Service Delivery and 
Organisation (SDO) Research and Development Programmed aims to produce research evidence 
directed at improving the organisation and delivery of health services, and to promote the uptake and 
application of that evidence in policy and practice. The SDO Programme is one of the National 
Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Programmes 
 
 The Cochrane Collaboration is an international not-for-profit organisation that helps people make well 
informed decisions by preparing, maintaining and promoting the accessibility of systematic reviews of 
the effects of health care interventions. The major product of the Cochrane Collaboration is its database 
of systematic reviews. Most reviews are prepared by health care professionals and published in the 
Cochrane Library. The activities are supported by staff in Cochrane Centres around the world. .Centre 
for Reviews and Dissemination (CRD) was established in 1994 to provide the United Kingdom's 
National Health Service (NHS) with important information on effectiveness of treatments, delivery and 
organization of health care. A Sibling organization of the United Kingdom Cochrane Centre and is part 
of a network of academic departments and research centres at the University of York concerned with 
teaching, research and consultancy in health and public policy.  
 
 
 
. 
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2. Research proposal and justification 
 
Health care is one of the biggest industries of all; with a global health spend in excess of $3 trillion 
annually.  With many traditional manufacturing industries in decline, ‘reforms’ to health care systems, 
aimed at opening up a growing share of public health care budgets and insurance funds to private 
providers, have become the talking point of policy-makers in many countries.  But the truth is that 
health is a tremendously valuable good to the individual, and this is what is behind growing health 
demands.  The more affluent we become, the more we value our health. Within that context what role 
does Evidence Based Healthcare Management play? 
 
I wish to consider the willingness to take an evidence-based approach – and to use any bad news it 
brings as a stimulus for improvement.  In the influential Good to Great (2001), US author Jim Collins 
labels ‘level 5 leadership’ as the ability to combine individual competence with unwavering resolve to 
confront the facts head on, fierce ambition (for the organisation) and personal modesty.  All these are 
needed because once the evidence is assembled; the only way of creating a customer-orientated 
organisation is to make it face the customer. Paradoxically, the only way for leaders to gain control of 
the system is to give up the idea of controlling people through authority and hierarchy (the leader-
facing organisation) and enable customers and frontline workers to jointly reconfigure the system to 
deliver what customers. As Robert Pfeffer and Jeffrey Sutton note in Hard Facts, Dangerous Half-
Truths and Total Nonsense: Profiting from Evidence-Based Management (2005), if decision are made 
on facts, then everyone’s facts must be equal, but you don’t need ‘transformational leaders’ to do it.  
 
A drive for EBHM does make the manager understand what is not known about ‘best practice’. The 
NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement and the Integrated Service Improvement Programme, 
which sponsor the Learning from Practice database, invited Paul Pisek, a respected international 
consultant on innovation and complexity, to challenge expectations and use of ‘best practice’ material.  
Pisek maintained that Best practice searches typically uncover only successful case studies; negative 
experiences are under-reported. The reader won’t know if others have done the same things and had 
poor results. All you can truthfully say is: "There is evidence that when this practice was implemented 
successfully it resulted in improvement, but we don't know how often it can be implemented that 
successfully.” If you can create a similar context to the best practice site (the nature of relationships, 
power, eagerness to learn etc.) you have a reasonable chance of getting best practice results. But the 
fact is that one can never know if a given practice is 'best' in another context until one works with it in 
that context. When the inevitable disappointment associated with overstated potential occurs, it often 
leads to questioning the sincerity of the efforts of leaders in the field. Eager new leaders then come 
along who, despite thinking they can get it right, face the same patterns that contributed to their 
predecessors' 'failure'. There is no real learning and the best practice guide on whatever becomes the 
next performance lever will likely repeat the same process. There is therefore real merit in 
understanding EBHM as a tool to management decisions. 
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For the purposes of my study my audience and cohort will be NHS Senior Management and above.  
Senior management is generally a team of individuals at the highest level of  NHS management who 
have the day-to-day responsibilities of managing a division of the local heath economy that will 
typically be 2000 people and/or a +£40 million budget.. There are also higher levels of responsibility, 
such as a board of directors and those who run the Department of Health that focus on managing the 
senior management (instead of the day-to-day activities) of the business and they will be the audience 
and cohort also
 9 
3. Literature Review 
 
3.1 Policy and Practice 
 
The NHS has three major challenges – how to motivate its staff to deliver world class service; how to 
organise itself to give frontline staff resources (buildings, money, leadership) they require in that task, 
and how to employ the right technology to do that as effectively as possible.  Leadership that is not up 
to date in terms of the best thinking in all of these areas will make good but less an optimal decisions.  
Just as clinicians require the right new drugs, technology and equipment to deliver the products (patient 
care) that our taxpayers demand, the executives of the NHS must have the same or equivalent tools in 
their box of solutions. 
 
As a publically funded body shouldn’t the public want decisions about the NHS made on the best 
evidence possible? Not necessarily so. Recent Institute for Public Policy Research/Ipsos Mori survey 
work indicates that only around a quarter of the public thinks that the availability of drugs and 
treatments should be determined by cost and effectiveness (Brooks 2006).  There is simply little public 
recognition that resources are limited and that choices must be made. There are legitimate concerns 
about the cost and effectiveness of new drugs and treatments, and about the role of private companies 
in stimulating demand for their products, and these require a robust and transparent regulatory 
response. We certainly need a system that allows a rational pattern of expenditure rather than focusing 
disproportionate resources on specific treatments when they hit the headlines.   
 
Muir Gray has said “management in health care is a young discipline without the trappings and 
traditions of medicine. Is it, though, more of an art than a science? Resistance to change may be less, 
but the increased rigour required could be much greater. Furthermore, in management and policy 
making the anatomy of a decision is very different from a clinical intervention. Deciding whether to 
invest in a further cardiothoracic centre in a health region or to move five vascular surgical units to one 
site, even if evidence were available, is a complex process. It can involve managers, professionals, 
local interest groups, politicians, the media, and the public. At times, social systems will undermine the 
science. For example, how often have we seen a decision changed late in the day by a bravura 
performance in committee, based on emotion?” The National Institute for Clinical Effectiveness 
(NICE) has been created to help to create a more evidence based climate and to avoid the emotive 
response noted by Gray.  The work that NICE is involved in attracts the attention of many groups, 
including doctors, the pharmaceutical industry, and patients. NICE is often associated with 
controversy, because the need to make decisions at a national level can conflict with what is (or is 
believed to be) in the best interests of an individual patient, and because there is an inherent need for 
rationing in the NHS. From an individual's perspective it can sometimes seem that NICE is denying 
access to a potentially life-saving treatment. NICE has been criticised for its over-reliance on evidence-
based medicine, which it is argued privileges certain kinds of econometrically derived types of studies 
over others. NICE has also been criticised for being too slow to reach decisions. Some of the more 
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controversial NICE decisions have concerned beta-interferon for multiple sclerosis, imatinib (Glivec) 
for leukaemia, and trastuzumab (Herceptin) for breast cancer. The process aims to be fully independent 
of government and lobbying power, basing decisions fully on clinical and cost-effectiveness. There 
have been concerns that lobbying by pharmaceutical companies to mobilise media attention and 
influence public opinion are attempts to influence the decision making process. A fast-track assessment 
system has been introduced to reach decisions where there is most pressure for a conclusion. 
 
 
Evidence-based medicine categorizes different types of clinical evidence and ranks them according to 
the strength of their freedom from the various biases that beset medical research. For example, the 
strongest evidence for therapeutic interventions is provided by randomized, double-blind, placebo-
controlled trials involving a homogeneous patient population and medical condition. In contrast, patient 
testimonials, case reports, and even expert opinion have little value as proof because of the placebo 
effect, the biases inherent in observation and reporting of cases, difficulties in ascertaining who are an 
expert, and more. Evidence-based healthcare management is an emerging movement to explicitly use 
the current, best evidence in management decision-making. Its roots are in evidence-based medicine 
and as such is a quality movement to apply the scientific method to management practice 
 
Pfeffer notes that there is a poor correlation between “Evidence Based” practice which the NHS 
requires of its doctors and “Evidence basis” management which the NHS does not require.  “We have 
just suggested no less than six substitutes that managers, like doctors, often use for the best evidence – 
obsolete knowledge, personal experience, specialist skills, hype, dogma, and mindless mimicry of top 
performers – so perhaps it is apparent why evidence-based decision making is so rare.  At the same 
time, it should be clear that relying on any of these six is not the best way to think about or decide 
among alternative practices  
 
3.2 Theory 
 
A fit with management theory 
 
In its broadest sense EBHM describes using any “acceptable evidence” to make better informed 
management and policy decisions. Such evidence could be a survey of opinions about the likely value 
of a change or new policy, or an internal data gathering project to collect service statistics and assess 
their validity for informing a decision.  
 
There are Critics of EBHM  who say lack of evidence and lack of benefit are not the same, and that the 
more data are pooled and aggregated, the more difficult it is to compare the patients in the studies with 
the patient in front of the doctor — that is, EBHM applies to populations, not necessarily to 
individuals. In The limits of evidence-based medicine Tonelli (2001) argues that "the knowledge gained 
from clinical research does not directly answer the primary clinical question of what is best for the 
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patient at hand." Tonelli suggests that proponents of evidence-based medicine discount the value of 
clinical experience.   
 
Niedzwredzka, Walshe, Hewison (2003) identify a dilemma: Evidence Based Healthcare Management 
is not feasible because of policy constraints, lack of time, lack of data, lack of skills, ineffective 
dissemination and access to evidence. PCTs might instead try to borrow commissioning techniques and 
data management from the insurance sector, and local commissioning might be handed to supermarkets 
in return for a large share in the profits. The proposal that the pursuit of Evidence Based Management 
in Healthcare is itself based on prejudice not evidence.  ‘At the moment, commissioning (by Evidence 
Base) is not working.  Were this itself evidence based, we would have dropped it years ago as a 
technique and gone back to central planning.’   
 
Joseph Ippolito (co-head of public sector health at Deloitte) also identifies a conflict between 
government vision and evidence based decision making. Considering this conflict he offers a different 
take on the choice debate, regarding it largely as a diversion. ‘Choice might work in a free or semi-free 
market, which adjusts itself to serving customer needs. But I don’t understand how the government 
thinks choice can work for the NHS, which isn’t a market with free entry or exit.’ Ippolito is no anti-
politician intellectual though as he further berates thee lack of evidence based decision making when 
considering the quality of NHS management.  “The NHS was right to reduce the number of strategic 
health authorities, not least because of the dearth of quality management teams. ‘The NHS is focusing 
on the lack of teams skilled enough to implement the evidence of what needs to be reformed’ he said”.  
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4. Research Objectives 
 
4.1 Key Questions 
 
I wish to consider the extent to which Evidence Based Practice is a norm or an ideal for daily 
professional management in the National Health Service?  To what extent do practicing NHS Managers 
think Evidence Based Healthcare Management is an appropriate tool to resolve problems and what do 
they actually use?  
 
As a publicly funded body do the public want decisions about the NHS made on the Best evidence 
possible?  Is there a conflict between politicians’ view of an effective national health service and the 
view of NHS managers?  If so, where is the conflict and would application of Evidence Based 
Healthcare Management resolve the conflict. 
 
 
4.2  Conceptual Framework: the Evidence Based NHS Box 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Specifically I will ask the following questions. 
 
Are decisions based on a careful appraisal of the best evidence available? How is that evidence 
incorporated into the decision making process? Are the resources available for using “best evidence” 
Innovation                Professional Practice          Decision 
& Change in                 making  
Clinical Practice                tools 
 
 
 
 
 
     
Objectives are 
Customer              Taxpayer 
Orientated        Organisation of Public Services         Revenues 
Clinicians NHS Managers 
Patients Politicians 
 
An Evidence Based 
Organisation of 
Knowledge 
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consistent with the needs or values of the NHS Senior managers under consideration?  Do NHS 
managers have a bias towards particular interventions and their impact and if so/not then why? To what 
extent does a structured, dispassionate debate exist about whether evidence, values and assumptions of 
NHS managers are consistent? 
 
 
Using these questions it is my intention to understand and draw conclusions about the nature of the 
preferences and decisions using Evidence Based Practice within the NHS.  The focus of the study will 
be predominantly in the top right hand corner of the box and will therefore begin with the question of 
appropriate decision making tools for NHS Managers. The researcher intends to be shocked and 
surprised during the process and has a flexible opinion about the answer at the outset of the research. 
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5. Research Plan 
 
Document 2 
 
Document 2: Will be The Critical Literature Review – the academic, managerial and political 
contribution to EBHM as a subject. 
 
The literature review will identify what people are saying about evidence based practice and where 
they are saying it.  More precisely it will review how other people have researched the subject of 
Evidence Based Healthcare Management.  There is a loaded question of whether doctors within the 
NHS use a qualitative better decision making tool than managers at the same level.  The literature 
review will take in issues about equality, rationality, power of the majority, the political choices made 
in health care.  The literature review will consider what organisations, academics and politicians said 
about the NHS in 2006/07.   
 
It will develop and refine the research questions and method and provide a 
Conceptual framework and justification for the research  
 
Document 3 
 
Document 3: Will be a Qualitative data review – simple structured questionnaire, focus groups and in-
depth one to one conversations 
 
20 Senior NHS managers across a variety of NHS organisations in the East Midlands will be recruited 
to work in focus groups or to answer 1:1 structured questions.  This will derive subjective and 
qualitative data responses to the questions posed by the literature review.  The review will test whether 
managers will use Evidence Based Healthcare Management (in) appropriately when it is (not) 
expedient to use it?  Working with colleagues within the NHS Executive community 2 or 3 dilemmas 
will be posed and managers will be surveyed as individuals and groups to collect their reactions. 
 
Specifically I will ask the following questions stated in 4.1 (above) 
 
Are decisions based on a careful appraisal of the best evidence available? How is that evidence 
incorporated into the decision making process? Are the resources available for using “best evidence” 
consistent with the needs or values of the NHS Senior managers under consideration?  Do NHS 
managers have a bias towards particular interventions and their impact and if so/not then why? To what 
extent does a structured, dispassionate debate exist about whether evidence, values and assumptions of 
NHS managers are consistent?  
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I intend to repeat at least in part the work carried out by Hewison in 1992 when analysing the reforms 
of the National Health Service arising from the White Paper Working for Patients, which were 
predicated on a particular view of management. The implementation of the changes heralded by this act 
relied heavily on the actions of the managers charged with carrying them through. Hewison reported on 
work undertaken to discover how middle managers responded to this challenge. The views of middle 
managers concerning the values that guide their work were explored in the context of managing in the 
reformed NHS. Data was collected by means of a focused ethnography and analysed thematically. This 
process was informed, in part, by recourse to Weber's conceptualization of rationality. It was found that 
managers are struggling to reconcile the demands inherent in their role that arise from contrasting and 
often competing rationalities, which is a reflection of conflict over priorities in the wider health policy 
environment 
 
 
 
Document 4 
 
Document 4: Quantitative structured piece of research using statistical techniques of data collected 
by academics government, organised labour, professions and international agencies about the impact of 
“evidence based decision making”.  Place the subject and the NHS in a longitudinal and cross-cultural 
context.  Efficiency, productivity, satisfaction, outcome will be key areas tested by the qualitative 
review 
 
A questionnaire will be designed again.  Different to Document 3, this will gather quantitative data 
about the consequences or otherwise, of implementing Evidence Based Healthcare Management.  4 or 
5 NHS organisations in the East Midlands will be asked to choose from a range of Evidence Based 
Healthcare Management Practices (the menu) and say the extent to which they apply these techniques 
on a scoring basis.  The researcher will similarly score the organisations on the same basis.  This score 
set will then be cross referenced with performance scores issued about the same organisations in the 
public domain.  A numerate conclusion will be drawn about the relationship between high/low 
performing organisations, their perceived application of Evidence Based Healthcare Management and 
any gap between perception and researcher scored responses.  A typical relationship or correlation 
would be with Fit for Purpose scores or Star Ratings. 
 
Document 5 
 
Will take the richness of materials gained in documents 2-4 and design an audit and evaluative model 
of Evidence Based Healthcare Management in Practice.  This has two possible outcomes.  If EBHM is 
said to work then the theses will provoke a credible response to the Chief Executive of the NHS, 
Secretary of State and the cohorts used in document 3 and 4 to say that its use should be deepened.  If 
EBHM fails the audit and evaluative tests it will be possible to provoke a credible response to GPs and 
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non-executives in the Board Room that whilst Evidence Based Medicine is used in the NHS there is 
insufficient reason to use Evidence Based Healthcare Management.  The researcher intends to be 
shocked and surprised during the process and has a flexible opinion about the answer at the outset of 
the research. 
.
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6. Organisational and Ethical Considerations 
 
Time Plan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Literature Review 
 
Quantitative Review 
 
Qualitative Review 
 
Thesis 
March 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 2007 
 
Prepare Document 2 – 
identify research 
questions, research 
framework or model 
and methodology 
 
Make first contact with 
advisors on ethical 
committee approval 
with attempt to avoid 
process.  Identify 5 key 
NHS organisations to 
work with 
 
Make first contact with 
expected cohort of 
NHS managers 
identifying participants 
and time commitment 
 
Proposition 
1 can research 
evidence based 
management 
2. results will be able 
to inform management 
         
March 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 2008 
 
 
 
Ethical Committee 
approval if necessary 
 
Conduct focus groups 
and 1:1 interviews 
 
Discuss with cohort of 
managers likely 
audience for thesis 
Do managers use 
research 
         
 
 
 
 
March 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
Return to original 
research framework to 
identify new papers or 
updated thinking in 
this area 
 
Conduct numerical 
review of management 
practice with 5 NHS 
organisations and 
compare to ‘high 
performing 
organisation’ scores 
 
Return results to 
cohort participants 
with significant  
thank yous and updates 
on further process 
 
Write thesis – identify 
conclusions and likely 
impact 
Evaluate theory and 
practice 
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Ethical Views 
 
The author holds a senior management position in the National Health Service.  The National Health 
Service being under transition affects the individual professionally therefore there is a subjective bias 
in the analysis of EBHM in the NHS. This issue of being a player in the system under review will 
qualify the judgements and interpretations of the researcher.  Significantly the researcher has been a 
player in the National Health Service system since 1987, during which time many theoretical and 
practical models have been applied to the NHS.  The National Health Service is an organisation that 
continues to deliver services.  As with all socio-economic models, it is not possible to hold the day to 
day experiences of patients and the public frozen, therefore it is not possible to experiment with the 
system which will affect people’s lives just for the purposes of observation. The organisation that 
employs the individual is part-funding this research, therefore the NHS has a discernable desire to 
achieve a piece of management information. 
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7. Personal and Organisational outcomes 
 
Management Practice 
 
Overall project strategy 
 
As with medicine, management is and will likely always be a craft that can be learned only through 
practice and experience.  Yet I believe that managers (like doctors) can practice their craft more 
effectively if they are routinely guided by the best logic and evidence – and if they relentlessly seek 
new knowledge and insight, from both inside and outside their companies, to keep updating their 
assumptions, knowledge, and skills.  We are not there yet, but we are getting closer.  “The managers 
and companies that come closest already enjoy a pronounced competitive advantage”. (Pfeffer 2006) 
 
What, then, are NHS managers to do?  There are a number of ways the dramatic conflict in the NHS 
might be resolved.  In broad terms, there are three answers.  Introduce more resources, reduce demand 
and make better use of our existing resources.  Let’s examine each in turn. 
 
If the initial challenge is smaller real-terms increases in government money, might there be scope for 
substituting other sources of funding?  After all, the pan-European vista suggests society at large is 
willing to commit an even greater share of national wealth to health care.  The tension in Britain is 
between this willingness and reluctance to increase taxation, with the political mantra of an NHS free at 
the point of care tying all parties’ hands.  What then of reducing demand, otherwise known as ‘demand 
management’?  At one end of the spectrum, this implies an explicit decision to discontinue a particular 
form of care, on the grounds that NHS resources have higher priorities.  Tattoo removal, varicose vein 
surgery and in-vitro fertilisation are common examples of treatments that primary care trusts have 
chosen not to fund.  In reality, however, the decision to disinvest in a specific treatment is often 
contentious, based on values that are open to challenge (so who says IVF if low priority and why?) and 
– as PCT’s that initially chose not to fund Herceptin quickly learnt – prone to being undone by higher 
authorities.  
 
Given the limited effectiveness of additional funding and demand management to resolve the conflicts 
what are the options to embrace improved effectiveness in application of resources?   No, the answer 
applies in better management of resources.  The outcome of this paper/thesis will be a much better 
basis upon which management practice in the NHS can make decisions.  EBHM will be researched as 
to its ability to be a tool, the only tool or no-use-at-all in the NHS management tack. 
 
 
 
 
Impact 
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The NHS response to the same question was to employ the company McKinsey to create “Fit for 
Purpose” models for PCTs and aspiring Foundation Trusts. This model assesses the short-term risk of a 
PCT’s failure to meet its objectives. Tools to evaluate outcomes assess financial results; Operating 
outcomes are provided and tools to evaluate main drivers of performance are introduced. Strategy; 
Governance; External relations; Emergency planning are considered with the NHS organisation at 
hand. Near term risk of failure: low (green), medium (amber), high (red) is classified and required 
actions are agreed. An NHS organisation rated red in finances need to develop a recovery plan showing 
how the PCT will reach minimum standards within next 12 months.  Divisions rated red elsewhere 
need to show the remedial plan that they have developed to address these issues within 18 months. A 
detailed Diagnostic is used to spot process and capability development needs of the NHS organisation. 
In this way the NHS should act effectively as commissioners of health services including evaluating 
functional performance: Strategic planning; Care pathway management; Provider management; 
Monitoring are all assessed for strength? The question for the researcher is to what extent the 
McKinsey model represents a bias towards heuristic or detailed evidence based decision making? 
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Abstract 
 
The NHS was set up in 1948 and is now the largest organisation in Europe.  
The NHS has many and myriad subdivisions and specialisms.  The NHS is 
regulated by the Healthcare Commission and funded by the government from 
general taxation.  Managerial accountability and authority has been a part of the 
NHS since 1983 and NHS managers have been given the responsibility for 
delivery of structural reform and therefore an understanding of the managers’ 
views, beliefs and attitudes is an area worthy of study.  Evidence based 
management is but one of a number of ways that an organisation might attempt 
to improve its effectiveness.  Within the specific context of the NHS there are a 
number of questions to be answered.  Can we have in the circumstances a 
system process view of management?  Is health management based on facts?  
Whose facts and fallacies prevail and why?   
 
The student is on a personal journey as a practicing NHS manager, to consider 
whether the notation of being a manager in the NHS could be grouped within an 
evidence based organisation of knowledge.  The literature review helps to 
understand not only the rationale for an evidence based approach to 
management but also whether this concept is alien and damaging to the NHS.  
The student shows that he is with Murphy and Mintzberg believing in the NHS 
management is more and more a craft and takes issue with writers such as 
Learmonth, who claims that management in the NHS is a crudely imposed 
reduction technique.  Through referencing writers such as Hewison, Mitten and 
Karl the writer says NHS management is both evolving and technically skilled.  
Conversely, Mello writes about the preoccupation of management with norms 
and averages and this “myth of the mean” is a particular branch of decision 
making tools that is possible to consider further.  At the core of the conceptual 
framework is an evidence based organisation of knowledge, and supporters of 
this school of thought are sceptical about experience or wisdom.  Sherman’s 
model of grading evidence from weak to strong, based on rules of scientific 
inference, would say that Mellow was correct.  In Sherman’s view a manager 
who uses evidence but then ranks this evidence against normative 
performance/behaviour is guilty of weak decision making just the same. 
 
The desire for managers in public services to portray that they know all they 
need to know to make decisions for the public, is shown to be very persuasive.  
Ambiguity and research leading to conclusion may not be the model preferred 
by the public even if the NHS manager were to express such a preference.  The 
literature identifies research methods and strategies that have been employed 
in studying the grey area of public preference for ‘Best Evidence Possible’ in a 
publicly funded body like the NHS. 
 
A lengthy journey through relevant writers leads the author to conclude that the 
public do not want decisions made on the best evidence possible (a 
philosophical challenge for the author early on the DBA), and that although 
there is no conflict between politicians and managers view of an effective NHS 
this is only because neither party accept or set a consistent frame of reference.  
The author hits a second philosophical challenge because the literature review 
seems to be obfuscating conclusions and the literature review detours into the 
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nature of qualitative material to see if it is the nature of language, discourse 
analysis and grounded theory and the student is struggling with.  Some 
additional ideas were encountered in the literature review.  Learmonth and 
Sambrook both say that the significance and implications of management 
language are an important part of this study, but it is difficult to continue to 
pursue this area within the conceptual framework. 
 
Are decision making tools disciplined or does it follow the hopes of the 
managers?  The reason for reviewing this particular question in the literature is 
the juxtaposition of science and management.  This is important for the NHS 
because the practice of medicine is bounded by the scientific method.  Medical 
progress, the development of pharmaceuticals, the review of outcomes 
following a randomised control trial and even public health interventions are 
progressed using a cycle of observation-recording-discourse and conclusion.  If 
that is true for the medicine then what of the management system that manages 
the medicine?  The literature highlights a writer with an approach to the 
combination of science and decision making. 
 
The literature leads to a conclusion that a falsehood or myth had been 
perpetrated within the NHS.  Managers and clinicians both have an inherent 
bias towards making change in professional and organisational practice based 
upon the best available evidence.  The falsehood that evidence based decision 
making is prevalent amongst clinicians and absent by managers, is exposed as 
an exaggeration – even the scientific method used by doctors is ignorant of 
cultural aspects of phenomena that cannot be measured, controlled and 
counted.  Similarly Rousseau is used to show that for an NHS manager, 
evidence based management or “decision based on careful appraisal of the 
best evidence available” is not only possible but empowering.  Ultimately 
Rousseau proves to be a powerful tool for rescuing evidence based knowledge 
from a ‘challenge and despair’ that earlier parts of the literature review (about 
the public and politicians) had unfortunately left the author in. 
 
Ultimately, the writer concludes that the decision making box proposed in 
document 1 as a way of understanding and explaining the problem under 
consideration, is sustained by the literature review. 
 
Significant writers in the study of NHS management and evidence based 
management such as Learmonth and Rousseau are studied and a conceptual 
framework “The Evidence Based NHS Box” is discussed and used to reference 
ideas about the subject.  The key outcomes of the NHS such as improving 
health, value for money, wellbeing and better experience of care are taken as 
givens but the management responses to this problem are compared from the 
views of those who propose and oppose evidence based management. 
 
What do writers conclude about evidence and the nature of evidence?  Guven-
Uslu was able to ask whether the nature of papers written upon the 
consideration of evidence based management were qualitatively different from 
those of other management disciplines.  Moving through the literature, the writer 
concludes that “evidence based management” is not so much a tool of decision 
making, as it is a state of mind.  The incorporation of evidence based 
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management into decision making is not at the decision point – it is the entire 
continuum of the philosophy of management.  It becomes a credo wherein all 
decisions are taken in a structured and methodical way, and to some extent, 
trading timeliness for accuracy. 
 
 6 
Introduction 
 
The context of the National Health Service.  (www.nhs.uk). 
 
The NHS was set up in 1948 and is now the largest organisation in Europe. It is 
recognised as one of the best health services in the world by the World Health 
Organisation but there need to be improvements to cope with the demands of 
the 21st century. This has brought about some fundamental changes in the way 
the NHS is structured and the way in which the different organisations within the 
NHS relate to each other. 
 
The diagram below shows you how the NHS structure works in England.  
 
 
 
 
Authorities and trusts are the different types of organisations that run the NHS 
at a local level. The whole of England is split into 10 strategic health authorities 
(SHAs). These organisations were set up in 2002 to develop plans for improving 
health services in their local area and to make sure their local NHS 
organisations were performing well. 
Within each SHA, the NHS is split into various types of trusts that take 
responsibility for running the different NHS services in the local area. 
The different trust types are:  
Acute trusts 
Hospitals are managed by acute trusts, which make sure that hospitals provide 
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high-quality healthcare, and that they spend their money efficiently. They also 
decide on a strategy for how the hospital will develop, so that services improve. 
Acute trusts employ a large part of the NHS workforce, including nurses, 
doctors, pharmacists, midwives and health visitors, as well as people doing jobs 
related to medicine – physiotherapists, radiographers, podiatrists, speech and 
language therapists, counsellors, occupational therapists and psychologists. 
There are many other non-medical staff employed by acute trusts, including 
receptionists, porters, cleaners, specialists in information technology, 
managers, engineers, caterers and domestic and security staff. 
Some acute trusts are regional or national centres for more specialised care. 
Others are attached to universities and help to train health professionals. Acute 
trusts can also provide services in the community, for example through health 
centres, clinics or in people's homes.  
Foundation trusts 
Foundation trusts are a new type of NHS hospital run by local managers, staff 
and members of the public, which are tailored to the needs of the local 
population. Foundation trusts have been given much more financial and 
operational freedom than other NHS trusts and have come to represent the 
government’s commitment to de-centralising the control of public services. 
These trusts remain within the NHS and its performance inspection system. 
They were first introduced in April 2004, and there are now 67 foundation trusts 
in England. 
Ambulance trusts 
There are currently 13 ambulance services covering England, which provide 
emergency access to healthcare.  
If you call for an emergency ambulance the calls are prioritised into: 
• Category A emergencies, which are immediately life-threatening, or  
• Category B or C emergencies, which are not life-threatening. 
The emergency control room decides what kind of response is needed and 
whether an ambulance is required. For all three types of emergency, they may 
send a rapid-response vehicle, crewed by a paramedic, equipped to provide 
treatment at the scene of an accident. Over the past five years the number of 
ambulance 999 calls has gone up by a third. 
The NHS is also responsible for providing transport to get patients to hospital 
for treatment. In many areas it is the ambulance trust that provides this service.  
Care trusts 
Care trusts are organisations that work in both health and social care. They may 
carry out a range of services, including social care, mental health services or 
primary care services. 
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Care trusts are set up when the NHS and local authorities agree to work 
together, usually where it is felt that a closer relationship between health and 
social care is needed or would benefit local care services.  
At the moment there are only a small number of care trusts, though more will be 
set up in the future.  
Mental health trusts 
Mental health trusts provide health and social care services for people with 
mental health problems. Mental health services can be provided through a GP, 
other primary care services or through more specialist care. This might include 
counselling and other psychological therapies, community and family support or 
general health screening. For example, people suffering bereavement, 
depression, stress or anxiety can get help from primary care or informal 
community support. If they need more involved support they can be referred for 
specialist care. 
More specialist care is normally provided by mental health trusts or local council 
social services departments. Services range from psychological therapy, 
through to very specialist medical and training services for people with severe 
mental health problems. About two in every 1,000 people need specialist care 
for conditions such as severe anxiety problems or psychotic illness.  
Primary care trusts 
Primary care is the care provided by people you normally see when you first 
have a health problem. It might be a visit to a doctor or a dentist, an optician for 
an eye test, or just a trip to a pharmacist to buy cough mixture. NHS walk-in 
centres and the NHS Direct phone line service are also part of primary care. All 
of these services are managed by the local primary care trust (PCT). 
A PCT will work with local authorities and other agencies that provide health 
and social care locally to make sure that the local community's needs are being 
met.  A PCT must make sure there are enough services for people within their 
area and that these services are accessible. It must also make sure that all 
other health services are provided, including hospitals, dentists, opticians, 
mental health services, NHS walk-in centres, NHS Direct, patient transport 
(including accident and emergency), population screening, and pharmacies. 
They are also responsible for getting health and social care systems working 
together for the benefit of patients. 
Strategic health authorities 
Created by the government in 2002 to manage the local NHS on behalf of the 
secretary of state, there were originally 28 strategic health authorities (SHAs). 
On July 1 2006, this number was reduced to 10.  
Strategic health authorities are responsible for: 
• developing plans for improving health services in their local area,  
• making sure local health services are of a high quality and are 
performing well,  
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• increasing the capacity of local health services - so they can provide 
more services, and  
• making sure national priorities - for example, programmes for improving 
cancer services - are integrated into local health service plans. 
Strategic health authorities manage the NHS locally and are a key link between 
the Department of Health and the NHS. 
Special health authorities 
Special health authorities are health authorities that provide a health service to 
the whole of England, not just to a local community – for example, the National 
Blood Authority.  
They have been set up to provide a national service to the NHS or the public, 
under section 11 of the NHS Act 1977. They are independent, but can be 
subject to ministerial direction like other NHS bodies. 
 
Regulation and inspection, performance 
 
Independent regulations – The Healthcare Commission is England’s healthcare 
watchdog. Through its regulatory work it promotes and drives improvements in 
the quality of healthcare and public health for the benefit of patients and the 
public. 
 
In 2005-06 the Healthcare Commission introduced a new system for assessing 
NHS healthcare organisations, aimed at measuring the things that matter to 
patients. Known as the annual health check, it gives each trust a rating for the 
quality of its healthcare services and for how well it manages its financial 
resources. These ratings, along with detailed information about each trust’s 
performance, are published on the Commission’s website each October.  
Annual health check  
What the two ratings mean: 
Quality of services 
The score for quality of services covers a range of areas that matter to patients, 
including safety, cleanliness and effectiveness. In particular, it reflects:  
• whether a trust is meeting basic standards of care,  
• how a trust is performing in relation to targets set by the government, and  
• the results of reviews of specific services or topics, such as tobacco 
control, community mental health, management of admissions and 
diagnostic services. 
Use of resources 
The score for use of resources is based on how well an organisation in the NHS 
manages its finances. This could include how it plans and reports on its 
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financial performance, how it monitors the money it spends, and how it makes 
sure that the services it offers to patients represent good value for money. 
 
The role of competition and co-operation between 
professionals 
National service frameworks (NSFs) cover some of the highest-priority 
conditions such as the UK's biggest killers - cancer and coronary heart disease 
- as well as other common conditions including mental health and diabetes. 
There are also NSFs for some of the key patient groups including children and 
older people. 
 
NSFs have two main roles. They: 
• set clear quality requirements for care based on the best available 
evidence of what treatments and services work most effectively for 
patients, and 
• offer strategies and support to help organisations achieve these. 
One of the main strengths of each NSF is that they are inclusive, having been 
developed in partnership with health professionals; patients, carers; health 
service managers; voluntary agencies and other experts. 
Patient Choice - What is choice? If the patient and GP decide that the patients 
needs to see a specialist, the patient can now choose where and when they see 
the specialist from a list of hospitals or clinics. This will include several local 
hospitals, NHS foundation trust hospitals across the country and a growing 
number of independent sector treatment centres and hospitals that have been 
contracted from the private sector to provide services to NHS patients. A patient 
can choose according to what matters most to them: waiting lists, MRSA rates, 
bus routes, or many other criteria. 
Over the next few months more and more hospitals will be added to the list of 
choices until, by April 2008, patients will be able to choose from any hospital 
that meets the standards set by the NHS.  
 
The NHS Choices website will help the patient make the choice of where to go 
by providing information on different hospitals. Patients can select a hospital 
based on how close it is to their home, how it rates on quality of cleanliness and 
services such as car parking, waiting times and more. 
 
What isn’t included in choice? 
It may not always be appropriate for the patient to choose where to see their 
specialist. For the time being they will not be able to choose if their GP decides 
they need to see a specialist quickly, for example, if the patient has chest pain, 
or need to see a cancer specialist. A patient will also not be able to choose if 
they need to see a hospital specialist about a mental health condition or about 
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pregnancy.  NHS care has always been delivered as a partnership between 
patients, NHS staff and other carers. GPs will offer only the choices they are 
confident will provide the right type of treatment. 
 
Managing in the National Health Service 
Sarah Harvey of LOOP2 Consultancy often begins her seminars with a slide 
something like the following.   
 
Her method is to derive the main points of debate about health policy in large 
distribution documents and significant peer reviewed publications (in the 
previous month) to juxtapose humorously the contentions that managing 
complex public health systems is simple with the challenges facing managers at 
the moment.   
In order to understand the significance of the role of the National Health Service 
managers as far as the NHS reforms are concerned it may be useful initially to 
provide a brief background on the relative increase in prominence of the 
managerial function within the NHS.  Prior to the advent of managerialism within 
the NHS, decision making was influenced through “consensus management” by 
the various professional groups within the NHS.  This system came under 
constant criticism for being inefficient, wasteful of resources and lacking in 
professional management and direction, and as a result in 1983, the Thatcher 
‘commissioning’ PCTs 
quality driven consolidation of acute services 
‘divestment’ of PCT services 
new sources of health capital 
consistent policy pressure for OoH care  
private sector behaviour 
powerful new ‘IPCO’s 
new building technologies 
roll out of FT status 
choice in primary care 
 new providers  
 
network re-engineering 
public demands for better access 
reduced ‘costs of entry’ 
the money 
reliable telemedicine emerging 
Practice Based Commissioning 
hospital ‘closures’ 
new remote diagnostic  technologies  
decline in PFI orthodoxy  
drive for big ‘2nd loop’ efficiencies 
independent consultant ‘chambers’  
Primary care  
regulation 
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government commissioned Roy Griffiths, a senior Sainsbury executive, to look 
at management in the NHS and his report which was subsequently 
implemented, introduced general managers at regional, district and unit levels.  
“The Griffiths team was struck by what it saw as an apparent lack of clearly 
identified leaders and lines of management authority”.  The introduction of “line 
management” by the Griffiths report created a new more powerful cadre of 
managers who were given the “strategic role of change agents (within the 
NHS)”.  This approach was in harmony with the ideology associated with the 
evolution of the new public management movement in the UK at the time.  The 
prescription in the 1980’s was to reinforce the authority of this new cadre of 
managers with a battery of reviews and performance indicators and eventually 
to introduce the competitive incentives of an internal market and change the 
culture of the NHS so that it was more business-like.  The intention was also to 
highlight the significance of value for money and financial control. 
 
The role of managers 
As the main change agents NHS managers have been given the responsibility 
for the implementation of the recent reforms and therefore an understanding of 
the managers’ views, beliefs and attitudes to these reforms should provide an 
insight into the extent to which the NHS managerial culture supports and 
facilitates the implementation of the recent wave of NHS reforms.  Considering 
the importance of managers’ views there has been a relatively limited amount of 
research undertaken to examine in any great depth what the reforms have 
actually meant on a day-to-day basis to the people (including managers) who 
work in the NHS.  Much of the work carried out has often adopted a positivist 
approach to the analysis and understanding of these issues and it has tended to 
neglect the recognition of the multiple factors that influence and affect the social 
construction of reality of the actors involved in the implementation of the 
reforms.  Furthermore, it has been suggested that overall there has been a 
poverty of research focused on middle management within the NHS.   
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The approach to management 
Mark Brittnell, the NHS Director of Commissioning, has identified in his policy 
document “World Class Commissioning” the following competencies for the 
NHS manager: 
• Visible leaders with the mandate of the local population 
 Local ownership and accountability 
 Confident choices 
• Driving success through partnerships 
• Seek and act on patient expectations and experience 
• Strategic vision, clear goals and outcomes 
• Professional organisations that learn and develop 
• Excellent knowledge management and use of evidence 
• Excellent business organisations – turning vision into practice 
• Stimulating and managing a provider market  
• A commissioning process that’s fair, transparent and open to influence 
An examination of these NHS managers’ core competencies shows that they 
are mainly altruistic in nature.  Although directions in this policy suggests that 
most of the managers (a majority of whom have worked for the NHS for a 
number of years) believe they held altruistic values which remain unchanged 
despite the previous and present reforms, there are also other values identified 
in this policy.  These values relate to personal enhancement and career 
development, but such values are commonly quoted alongside altruistic ideals.  
Britnell believes that the majority of managers feel that the perceived value 
system in which they operate is an important and rewarding quality of their work 
and they perceive that their shared values had always been present and had 
survived over the years despite the increasing “business-like” emphasis in the 
NHS introduced by the new public management movement.   
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The Extent to which Evidence Based Practice is a norm or an ideal? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Over the last few years I have been in a quandary about something and that is 
whether the notion of being a manager could be, within the NHS, grouped within 
an evidence based organisation of knowledge.  On the one hand the discipline 
of the ‘balance sheet’ gave a respectability to the performance management 
methods used by me to help shape the patient care, but the use of that tool was 
necessarily shaped by the business and value model upon which it is based.  
Not all companies that employ accountants are successes so where was the 
equivalent for an ‘evidence base’ within the literature? 
 
Specifically within the day to day experience of NHS managers: what does the 
literature tell us about the use of Evidence Based Management?  Let me start 
with two pieces of literature, one an authored piece of academic work and the 
other a document from the Department of Health.  The reason for starting here 
is to try and establish two polarities of what is already known in connection with 
this research area.  One comes from the bottom right left corner of the 
conceptual framework and is the Department of Health attempt to ensure 
managerial objectives are customer oriented and the other is a critique by an 
academic of the top right hand corner of the conceptual framework of the 
decision making tools used by NHS managers. 
 
Evidence based management is but one of a number of ways that an 
organisation might attempt to improve its effectiveness.  Within the specific 
context of the NHS there are a number of questions answered by the literature.  
In the circumstances does a system process view of management exist?  Is 
health management based on facts?  Whose facts and fallacies prevail and 
why?  In terms of what is already known in connection with this area, I would 
Innovation                Professional Practice          Decision 
& Change in                 making  
Clinical Practice                tools 
 
 
 
 
 
     
Objectives are 
Customer              Taxpayer 
Orientated        Organisation of Public Services         Revenues 
Clinicians NHS Managers 
Patients Politicians 
 
An Evidence Based 
Organisation of 
knowledge 
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like to refer to a landmark author and a landmark document.  The author 
Learmonth maintains that evidence based management is but one of a number 
of previous and potential imposition of ideologies he calls managerialism onto 
the NHS.  The document is the code of conduct for NHS managers which has, 
as its basis, an idea that ‘we simply must not repeat the mistakes of the past’. 
 
In a 2006 work informed by the work of French geographer Henri Lefebvre 
Learmonth (2006) suggests that in the long term the very study of evidence 
based management is likely to inhibit rather than encourage, a fuller 
understanding of the nature of public services.  The author critically evaluates 
the recent phenomenon of ‘evidence based management’ in the public services 
that Learmonth says is especially prominent in health care.  He goes on to 
suggest that the current approach, broadly informed by the pursuit of evidence 
based medicine, is misguided.  The reasoning behind this approach from 
Learmonth is that there is a weakness at the heart of evidence based 
management.  There is, quite simply, a deep debate to be had about the nature 
of ‘evidence’ within the discipline of management studies.  Ultimately Learmonth 
moves to the conclusion that the pursuit of evidence based management has 
less to do with improving organisational effectiveness than it has to do with the 
transfer of certain management styles to the public service in spite of theoretical 
problems with their deviation.  I find Learmonth to be personally challenging and 
he may help me get to the identification of my quandary – how does a 
respectable NHS manager confess that he is not sure whether he is being an 
effective part of the NHS. 
 
It is important to start the review of literature in this research area with 
Learmonth, not only because he is an academic and former NHS Manager, but 
because work like his 2006 piece are part of a continuum of investigations by 
the author into managerialism and NHS managers stretching back to his own 
doctoral thesis soon after leaving the NHS.  Learmonth (1997) presents the 
results of empirical work examining public attitudes towards UK NHS managers, 
with the author discussing possible explanations for the findings that there is a 
strong lack of sympathy for managers.  The preferred explanation is that NHS 
managers as a group, tend to share an ideology about the nature of the NHS 
and the role of management within the NHS which is at odds with the belief held 
by most members of the public on these matters.  Consistent with what 
Learmonth is still writing in 2006.  Learmonth explores the origins and nature of 
managerial ideology (managerialism) in the NHS.  In both his 2006 and 1997 
papers, Learmonth suggests that management styles are being imported to the 
NHS, based on little effectiveness and that his 2006 identification of the 
symptom is evidence based management.  Winyard (2003) agreed with 
Learmonth and further added that the introduction of general management in 
1984 created new fault lines between doctors, managers and politicians.  Now 
we are getting somewhere – my whole professional ethic and credo is, 
according to these writers, doing more harm than good – but where did these 
ideas, ethics and credo come from in the first place? 
 
In Hard Facts, Dangerous Half-Truths and Total Nonsense, Pfeffer examines 
the evidence for the effectiveness of various popular management ideas.  
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(However, the goal is to demonstrate what an evidence based approach is like 
in my interpretation). 
 
Pfefer (2006) says “evidence based management entails three things.  First it 
involves making decisions on what we know to be true.  Many companies and 
government organisations disregard the facts and act instead on belief, 
ideology, casual benchmarking, what they want or hope for, what they have 
done in the past, what they seem to be good or experienced in doing – in short, 
on everything except the facts”. “ How do managers make decisions?  Normally, 
they make decisions based on their own opinions, ideologies, hopes and by 
copying what other companies are doing.  If a company adopts forced ranking 
then it may be because the CEO believes in a survival of the fittest ideology.  If 
they use psychological assessments it may be because the VP Staffing knows 
other organizations do it.  If a company uses incentives to drive performance it 
may be because the VP Manufacturing desperately hopes it will improve 
productivity.” 
 
The emergence of evidence based medicine in the early 1990’s led to some 
clinicians challenging managers and policymakers to be equally evidence based 
in their policymaking.  This demand was shared by some health policy analysts: 
“At a time when ministers are arguing that medicine should be evidence based, 
is it not reasonable to suggest that this should also apply to health policy?  If 
doctors are expected to base their decisions on the findings of research surely 
politicians should do the same …. The case for evidence based policymaking is 
difficult to refute” (Ham). 
 
The need to be seen to be making evidence based decisions has permeated all 
areas of British public policy.  The government has proclaimed the need for 
evidence based policing, and the 1998 strategic defence review introduced 
evidence based defence.  In the health sector, the concept of evidence based 
policy has gained ground, and a journal has been launched devoted to this 
challenge (journal of Evidence Based Health Policy and Management). 
 
Having joined the NHS management in 1987 and being part of the ‘objectives’ 
discipline of finance myself, I have often thought about the role that an 
accountant has in improving the performance of a healthcare system.  Taking 
3.5 years of post graduate training to become a qualified professional, I then 
enjoyed the benefits of professional practice within a recognised discipline.  
Learmonth and Winyard are important parts of the literature to me in that they 
critique not only the reasons for what I practice in terms of whether it is efficient, 
effective and economical a method to improve patient care.  Rather they put the 
role of NHS managers, such as myself, into the category of an imposed 
philosophy upon the NHS.  The extent to which other writers agree, disagree, 
enhance or corrupt the Learmonth view of the world will be a theme throughout 
this literature review. 
 
It is interesting though to understand how limited the freedom of an apostate 
NHS manager would be to challenge the prevailing ideology.  Midway between 
these two dates of Learmonth lay the 2002 introduction of a code of conduct for 
NHS managers (Department of Health, 2002).  The idea of the code was 
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developed in the aftermath of high profile scandals around the management of 
clinical safety (Bristol) and dignity of the treatment of the body parts of 
deceased children (Alder Hey).  The code set out the ethical and behavioural 
standards expected of managers.  Breaches were to be viewed as gross 
misconduct leading to dismissal.  Serious breaches such as financial fraud, 
supplying false information and negligence towards patient safety would result 
in the offender never being employed in the NHS again.  Nigel Crisp, the then 
NHS Chief Executive said ‘the vast majority of managers in the NHS are highly 
principled and value driven people who will welcome the code.  But we must 
deal with failure’. 
 
According to supporting documentation from the NHS issued at this time, this 
would be consistent with an evidence based culture. This code of conduct could 
be contrasted with how models for organisation and management in health care 
over the last 20 years had been based on popular trends and fads rather than 
research on organisational and management practice. Strategic decisions, it 
was maintained, typically follow the recommendations of consultants with the 
information upon which these are based remaining unchallenged. As evidence 
based healthcare was popularized among health care professionals there would 
be increasing recognition that these ideas should be adopted in management. 
Management innovations that were not evidence-based included the use of 
organisational mergers in tackling service quality; decisions on the optimal size 
of organizations for capacity or financial viability; substitution of doctors with 
other health professionals and the move towards home care as an alternative to 
hospital inpatient care. 
 
Of course, this reflects what managers are paid to do—make decisions.  
However, it should not be asking too much for managers to make informed 
decision based on evidence, not just on their opinion. 
 
Systematic management in the NHS would look like something that the 
literature can say answers the Ham and Pfeffer questions.  This paper will go on 
to review the extent to which evidence based management is a norm or an ideal 
for daily professional management in the NHS.  The literature does go some 
way to answering the question of the extent to which practicing NHS managers 
think evidence based decision making is an appropriate tool to resolve 
problems, but also asks what do they actually use.  Rousseau (2005) says that 
evidence based management links how managers make decisions to the 
continually expanding research base on the effect of human behaviour on 
organisational actions. 
 
What Rousseau has done is link how managers make decisions to the 
continually expanding research base. Evidence-based management, as in the 
example derives principles from research evidence and translates them into 
practices that solve organizational problems. This isn’t always easy Rousseau 
maintains “Principles are credible only where the evidence is clear, and 
research findings can be tough for both researchers and practitioners to 
interpret. Moreover, practices that capitalize on a principle’s insights must suit 
the setting (eg who is to say that the particular performance indicators the 
executive director uses are pertinent to all units?)”.  
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Having spent most of this chapter on a critique of the philosophical 
underpinning of my training I would like to move on to a more practical analysis.  
The literature can help us to understand not only the rationale for an evidence 
based approach and we have seen it can even help us to consider whether this 
is alien and damaging to the NHS, but all of this is only a rhetorical debate 
unless we consider what tools NHS managers actually use so I will look at that 
next. 
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What tools do NHS managers actually use? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Away from reading Learmonth and Pfeffer as academic sustenance, I have 
explained how I am, on a day to day basis, an NHS manager.  What does the 
literature offer me by way of introspection about the individual manager and the 
way they make decisions?  How do managers make decisions?  Does the use 
of opinions or ideologies prevail?  I wish to consider the opposing theoretical 
and methodological approaches to this research area.  If we take the NHS 
management tack it is possible to see hierarchical structures from national 
down to local level.  It is also possible to see methods that employ modern 
technology such as the now ubiquitous “blackberry” handheld communication 
device and management policies exist covering areas as diverse as the 
governance of clinicians and the terms of exchange between buyers and 
providers of service.  But how do equipped, guided and structured managers 
make their decisions? 
 
There are obviously a number of other ways that this management task of 
resource gathering and allocation can take place.  I would like to continue with 
the theme of the Learmonth approach to NHS management before moving on 
to other studies.  Learmonth (2003) returns to the areas he had covered 
previously in suggesting that much of the established work in health services 
management research takes for granted managerial assumptions that are not 
consequently subjected to sustained critical examination.  Learmonth maintains 
that this veneer of research credibility reinforces a view of management style 
and contribution to the NHS that appears to be neutral and disinterested, but 
actually supports elite interests.  But, having established that Learmonth is a 
major writer in this field – who is there to challenge Learmonth’s own 
observations? 
 
Even prior to Learmonth, Harries (1999) acknowledges the importance of 
developing an NHS where practice and policy is more evidence based.  Harries 
paper is based on a qualitative study which aimed to identify factors which 
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facilitate or impede evidence based policy making at a local, rather than, 
national level in the NHS.  Harries drew conclusions about the importance of 
influences and commitment in facilitating evidence based change.  Harries 
actually did what Learmonth accuses the NHS of not doing and moved beyond 
the rhetoric of evidence based policy by conducting a series of in depth 
interviews with lead policy makers and analysis of project documents to see if 
and where and why evidence based management exists in the NHS. 
 
Further to Harries; Pearson (2007) took on Learmonth by conducting a re-
consideration of what constitutes evidence in healthcare.  Pearson offers the 
Joanna Briggs Institute model to illustrate the broader definition of what works 
as evidence and therefore challenges Learmonth that the whole concept of 
evidence can be described fairly and without prejudice.   Enthoven (2000) in 
Pursuit of an Improving NHS, says that previous reforms of the NHS were quite 
limited in effect because the essential conditions for a market to operate were 
not fulfilled.  Enthoven ascribes the management tasks of innovation, improving 
efficiency and driving good customer service as absent from NHS management 
and recommends the market as the best stimuli to improve the quality of 
management in the NHS with little or no evidence other than replication of what 
Enthoven saw elsewhere.  But Enthoven himself was more a politician than an 
academic researcher in his prescription for the NHS so what can be learned 
from that more learned teacher Henry Mintzberg? 
 
Henry Mintzberg famously said “if you want to be a manager, get yourself 
educated in something that teaches you about the world – physics, philosophy, 
whatever – and then get a job in an industry you really care about, and prove 
yourself.  The specialised MBA degree is great if you want to be an analyst or 
financial expert; just don’t pretend it will teach you to be a manager”. 
  
Do ideas simply follow fashion?  If we take this Mintzberg view of the world, do 
we conclude that decision making in the NHS follows the courses and 
philosophies set by the business schools?  There are two areas to pursue here 
– what the literature tells the researcher about the nature of received versus 
demonstrated wisdom in managing health service, and whether the setting of an 
organisational culture by acquisition of management training is an enhancement 
or impediment to good organisational performance. 
 
In an interview with Henry Mentzbery, Murphy (2006) reads again the Mintzberg 
approach to this research area and concludes that management is a craft and 
not something that can be learned in the classroom.  When asked by Murphy 
what he means in the book “Managers not MBA’s” Mintzberg replies that he 
means a style where people are involved and personally engaged in their work 
which makes them able to engage others.  If Mintzberg were to be taken as a 
direct challenge to the evidence based management approach specifically and 
the whole concept of scientific management generally it might cause a dilemma 
for the further use of Mintzberg in informing this research paper.  Tengblad 
(2006) to some extent reveals a different pattern of behaviour compared with 
Mintzberg.  Whilst the empirical data shows that new work practices such as 
evidence based management are combined with older practices such as craft 
and personal engagement in complex and content-specific ways as the 
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appropriate occasions for each solution arises.  Soltani (2007), using case 
evidence, explores the implications for senior management of attempts to move 
from, as Mintzberg (2005) put it, ‘direction and supervision towards protection 
and support’. 
 
Finkler (2003) explored the then state of the use of evidence by managers for 
cost containment in hospitals.  Finkler took this narrow premise to try and 
reconcile and direct future efforts by researchers and managers in the area of 
evidence based management.  The author presents a framework for priorities 
that managers and researchers can use to increase the amount of research 
done to generate evidence and to increase the use of evidence by health care 
managers.  Finkler added to the methodological debate by observing that there 
was a duality to the problem.  Part of the problem is that managers do not seek 
out available evidence that exists and part of the problem is a lack of sufficient 
research to generate evidence for managers to use. 
 
Delbanco (2006) published the Leapfrog Hospitals Insights Measures.  In this 
US approach, purchasers will be asking hospitals to report their effectiveness 
and efficiency in five clinical areas.  Similarly Zairi (2001) developed, on behalf 
of the European Centre for Total Quality Management, an organisational 
effectiveness model.  What is useful in the context of this review of 
methodological approach is that, although falling into the Learmonth critique of 
designing best models based on prejudice about managerialism, neither 
approach believes organisational effectiveness to be a result of management 
process or people, but a combination of both. 
 
HTO Davies (2007) explored the relationship between senior management 
team culture and organisational performance in English hospital.  Davies used 
an established culture-rating instrument, the Competing Values Framework to 
assess senior management team culture.  Organisational performance was 
assessed using a wide variety of measures routinely collected by the 197 NHS 
hospitals in England.  Through multivariate econometric analysis Davies 
provided that there was a contingent relationship between culture and 
performance. 
 
This issue of organisational culture and its effect on the implementation of 
evidence based practice in the NHS had been reviewed by Dopson (2006).  
Dopson noted that for the past several years evidence based healthcare has 
been viewed by NHS policy makers, managers and clinicians as an important 
level ensuring clinical practice is more effective and represents value for money. 
 
What typical decisions might a manager make with their tools?  Three writers, 
Hewison, Mitten and Peacock help to answer this question.  Whilst the literature 
review makes a case for the terms of evidence based management decision 
making, these three writers make a set of leadership interventions they believe 
are preferable for sustained improvement of the NHS.  They create arguments 
that even if the manager is proficient with using a researched evidence base 
this would not necessarily be the right system for decision support. 
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Hewison (2004) examines the development of evidence based approaches in 
health care and question the appropriateness of such an approach to 
management.  The problem inherent in applying the principles of evidence 
based decisions to management are explored and alternative approaches 
based on the notion of craft is suggested as more practical and realistic. 
  
In Mitten (2002), several approaches to priority setting are critiqued here from 
both practical and theoretical perspectives, including needs assessment, cost-
of-illness studies, core services, economic evaluation and quality-adjusted life-
year league tables, and programme budgeting and marginal analysis (PBMA).  
 
In conclusion Mitten says PBMA is based on underlying economic principles 
and has been widely used in practice.  While there are many approaches to 
priority setting, even so-called "economic" techniques often fail to recognise 
fundamental economic principles, leaving decision makers unable to meet key 
objectives.  Greater focus on these principles will aid in priority setting in 
practice.   Peacock (2007) recognises that Programme budgeting and marginal 
analysis (PBMA) is becoming an increasingly popular tool in setting health 
service priorities.   The paper presents a novel multi-attribute utility (MAU) 
approach to setting health service priorities using PBMA.  This approach 
includes identifying the attributes of the MAU function; describing the scaling 
attributes; quantifying trade-offs between attributes; and combining single 
conditional utility functions into the MAU function.  
 
Are decision making tools disciplined or does it follow the hopes of the 
managers?  The reason for reviewing this particular question in the literature is 
the juxtaposition of science and management.  This is important for the NHS 
because the practice of medicine is bounded by the scientific method.  Medical 
progress, the development of pharmaceuticals, the review of outcomes 
following a randomised control trial and even public health interventions are 
progressed using a cycle of observation-recording-discourse and conclusion.  If 
that is true for the medicine then what of the management system that manages 
the medicine?  The literature highlights a writer with an approach to the 
combination of science and decision making. 
 
Karl (2007) discusses scientifically based decision making and the role of 
politics in establishing environmental dialogues.  The author suggests that 
policy making is never completely rational and that in an adversarial process 
advocates seek to prevail rather than find solutions.  Karl recommends 
collaboration and joint fact finding in which all participants have a role in framing 
the questions, analysing the alternatives and their impacts, and fashioning 
solutions given the limits of the resources and levels of scientific uncertainty.  
 
Joint fact finding (JFF) refers to a procedure or set of best practices that have 
evolved over the past decade or so for ensuring that science and politics are 
appropriately balanced in environmental decision making at the federal, state, 
and local levels.  Because JFF promotes shared learning, it helps to create 
knowledge that is technically credible, publicly legitimate, and especially 
relevant to policy and management decisions.  JFF is a procedure for involving 
those affected by policy decisions in a continual process of generating and 
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analysing the information needed to shape scientific inquiry and to make sense 
of what it precludes.  It allows for the consideration of local and cultural 
knowledge as well as expert knowledge.  A well-designed and managed JFF 
process does not result in "science by committee" or all science to devolve to 
lowest common denominator thinking.  A high quality JFF process helps ensure 
that the best-quality science (from the standpoint of those committed to the 
norms of independent scientific inquiry) is used to inform discussions.  
 
So what do I make of these writers?  To what extent have they helped me to 
understand the tools I actually use and why?  I am with Murphy and Mintzberg – 
NHS management is more and more a craft.  My MBA was learned in the 
classroom but the tools would not of themselves, add value without a 
sympathetic and positive reaction to the organisation.  It is possible to 
extrapolate this interpretation to say that Delbanco and Davies were 
management ideas re-framed for their applicability to healthcare rather than an 
imposed ideology.  The other thing that Learmonth didn’t understand when I 
reviewed his writings, was that people like Hewison, Mitten and Karl represent a 
drive for technical excellence in management.  Although their acronyms (PBMA, 
JFF etc) may seem at odds with a caring clinical NHS, they were actually 
improvement tools that managers used that try to work with the grain of the 
prevailing organisational culture.  Moreover, these acronyms show that the 
same tools managers use are constantly evolving to meet the tasks of 
managers and in that way management cannot, as Learmonth says, be taken to 
be a bluntly imposed reductionist technique.
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As a publicly funded body, do the public want decisions made on the best 
evidence possible? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If we accept that in a liberal democracy people are interested with the extent to 
which politicians whims could change their lives, the conceptual framework 
must quite rightly consider the bottom right-hand corner in the literature review.  
Politicians are responsible for the collection of taxpayer revenues which mostly 
fund the National Health Service and the organisation of public services which 
include the provision of health services direct to the patient.  The NHS is thus 
both insurer of the populations health and the provider of health care to the 
same insured population.   Within this context the role of research in helping to 
direct the policymakers is an important part of the literature review. 
 
Evidence based policy is not simply an extension of evidence based medicine: it 
is qualitatively different. Research is considered less as problem solving than as 
a process of argument or debate to create concern and set the agenda. During 
the 1980s and 1990s this view was extended to a more interactive model based 
on a close dialogue between researchers and policymakers in which knowledge 
is considered to be inherently contestable (Giddens 2003). 
 
The implication of accepting this model is that policymakers have to get 
something out of research if they are to use it. It is necessary, therefore, to 
consider which arguments are likely to be useful or gratifying to which 
policymakers. Researchers have to accept that their work may be ignored 
because policymakers have to take the full complexity of any situation into 
account. They need to recognise that the other legitimate influences on policy 
(social, electoral, ethical, cultural, and economic) must be accommodated and 
that research is most likely to influence policymakers through an extended 
process of communication. 
Innovation                Professional Practice          Decision 
& Change in                 making  
Clinical Practice                tools 
 
 
 
 
 
     
Objectives are 
Customer              Taxpayer 
Orientated        Organisation of Public Services         Revenues 
Clinicians NHS Managers 
Patients Politicians 
 
An Evidence Based 
Organisation of 
knowledge 
 25 
Chester Barnard (1938) promoted the development of a natural science of 
organization to better understand the unanticipated problems associated with 
authority and consent. Since Barnard’s time, however, writers have struggled to 
connect science and practice without a vision or model to do so. Evidence 
based management may provide the needed model to guide the closing of the 
research-practice gap.  
Rousseau continues to address why evidence-based management is timely and 
practical in resolving the dilemma proposed by Barnard.  An “evidence 
orientation” according to Rousseau shows that decision quality is a direct 
function of available facts, creating a demand for reliable and valid information 
when making managerial and organisational decisions. Improving information 
continues a trend begun in the quality movement giving systematic attention to 
discrete facts, indicative of quality  “This trend continues in recent developments 
regarding open-book management (Case,1995; Ferrante & Rousseau, 2001) 
and the use of organizational fact finding and experimentation to improve 
decision quality (Pfeffer & Sutton).  In all the attention we now give to evidence, 
it helps to differentiate what might be called Big E Evidence from little e 
evidence. Big E Evidence refers to generalizable knowledge regarding cause-
effect connections derived from scientific methods. Little e evidence is local or 
organization specific, as exemplified by root cause analysis and other fact-
based approaches the total quality movement introduced for organizational 
decision making (Deming, 1993; Evans & Dean, 2000)”. 
Little e evidence, according to Rousseau refers to data systematically gathered 
in a particular setting to inform local decisions. “As the saying goes, “facts are 
our friends,” when local efforts to accumulate information relevant to a particular 
problem lead to more effective solutions. Although decision makers who rely on 
scientific principles are more likely to gather facts systematically in order to 
choose an appropriate course of action fact gathering (“evidence”) doesn’t 
necessarily lead decision makers to use social science knowledge (“Evidence”) 
in interpreting these facts”. 
 
We can observe the substance and discipline behind the evidence based 
culture; two writers Lomas and Rist are found in the literature with a number of 
lessons that they prescribe for anybody wishing to understand whether the 
public actually want their decisions to be made on the basis of best evidence.  
As a simple rule book this part of academic practice can be helpful in shaping 
an understanding for the later documents of how policy, public preference and 
management decision making come together.  The writers make some bold 
statements as follows: 
 
The relation between research and policy depends on the arena and, thus, the 
policymakers. Research evidence is more influential in central policy than local 
policy, where policymaking is marked by negotiation and uncertainty. Thirdly, 
the use of research depends on the degree of consensus on the policy goal. It 
is used if it supports the consensus and is used selectively if there is a lack of 
consensus. Fourthly, many researchers are politically naive. They have a poor 
understanding of how policy is made and have unrealistic expectations about 
what research can achieve. And, fifthly, policy-making is not an event but is 
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“ethereal, diffuse, haphazard and somewhat volatile.  (Lomas 2006) ”The 
consequences of failing to understand this are clear: “So long as researchers 
presume that research findings must be brought to bear upon a single event, a 
discrete act of decision making, they will be missing those circumstances and 
processes where, in fact, research can be useful.  (Rist 1994) ”In other words, 
we need a better model to underpin the relation.  
 
The desire for managers in public services to portray that they know all they 
need to know to make decisions for the public, is very persuasive.  Ambiguity 
and research leading to conclusion may not be the model preferred by the 
public even if the NHS manager were to express such a preference.  Starting 
with the possible methods for conducting this literature review, I myself am 
demonstrating some of the bias inherent in NHS management to precise rather 
than deliberating decision making.  The literature identifies research methods 
and strategies that have been employed in studying the grey area of public 
preference for ‘Best Evidence Possible’ in a publicly funded body like the NHS. 
 
I have considered five separate areas for conducting the literature review.  I 
chose in the end ‘formative evaluation’.  In this way I considered definitions and 
solutions already tried, provided a summary of the possible choices by 
elimination.  Ultimately I aimed to summarise the problem, the solution and 
explanations tried and gave an insight into alternative approaches. 
 
Of the methods I chose and then rejected for the literature review, two were 
given by the author Learmonth.  Arising from his 2003 work Learmonth (2003) 
proposed the idea of the radical critical management studies.  This means 
taking only those views that challenge the orthodoxy of NHS management and 
exploring literature in an emancipating way.  The other Learmonth method was 
from Learmonth (2001) when he analyzes the NHS management task in a post 
structuralist way.  Learmonth ironically represents NHS Chief Executives as 
heroes in the style of a story.  Although the paper represents a material of the 
reading of the transcripts of interviews with NHS Trust Chief Executives 
Learmonth concludes his study of the nature of truth by following NHS Trust 
Chief Executives in a Homerian classic hero story line.  Danger and magic are 
both overcome by the masculine characteristics of rationality, strength and 
resourcefulness and places the management style as evocatively drawing on 
the religion/myth of ancient origin and therefore impervious to the tests of truth 
or evidence. 
 
The last two possible structures for the argument that I rejected were the 
summative evaluation and analytical evaluation.  Summative evaluation 
describes the nature of the problem showing its extent and offers evidence that 
the problem exists, developing a possible definition of the problem.  Analytical 
evaluation establishes the possible cause of the problem and shows the main 
factors underpinning the proposed causes. 
 
At the heart of this chapter – do the public want evidence based management – 
is the nature of how the public wish choices in healthcare to be analysed, 
indeed, how they wish these choices to be expressed.  In Dakin (2006) the main 
issue for the writer is that previous research modelled NHS management 
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decisions on the cost effectiveness of new pharmaceuticals had emphasised 
decision making as a binary choice (accept/reject).  Dakin’s paper proposes and 
tests an alternative model of decision making that may better represent the 
“yes, but…” nature of many such NHS management decisions.  In employing 
the multinomial modelling method Dakin is able to identify that somewhere 
between routine use of absolute rejection of these pharmaceuticals emerges a 
concept of restricted use to modify the impact of each extreme.  If Dakin is so 
clear that the finery choice model is so difficult for the public to accept and 
therefore so difficult for NHS managers to use, then where are the alternatives?  
My favourites are listed here as follows: 
 
Elliot (2000) conducted a literature review and case studies of social research 
papers that were initiated by NHS managers and clinical leaders in one region 
of the NHS.  In depth interview and document analysis were used.  Elliot 
concentrated on only one NHS region in England.  Elliot used a qualitative study 
that aimed to identify factors that facilitate or impede evidence based policy 
making at a level in the English NHS.  Elliot considered how models of research 
utilisation drawn from the social sciences map onto empirical evidence from this 
study. 
 
A number of writers propose arguments, hypothesis and techniques of other 
researchers that inform the relationship between what the public want and 
executive decision making in public authorities.  By looking outside the NHS to 
the global view writers such as Laurie talk about evidence juxtaposed with 
public preference.  There seems to be no clear pattern emerging from the 
literature.  It is clear, however, that the public preference for common sense or 
the status quo is at least as strong if not stronger, as the promise proposed by 
evidence based management.  To meet public expectations over how publicly 
funded NHS makes its decisions, the literature cannot support an evolution 
towards evidence based management. 
 
In Laurie (2007) the author notes that a lack of evidenced based management 
in the global health programs was likely to lead to a squandering of an 
unprecedented rise in public and private giving.  Laurie noted that diseases and 
health conditions that enjoy a temporary spotlight in rich countries garner the 
most attention and money.  This means that advocacy, and the particular 
concerns of wealthy individuals and governments drive practically the entire 
global public health effort.  Evidence is that the top three killers in most poor 
countries are material death around childbirth and paediatric respiratory and 
intestinal infections leading to death from pulmonary failure or uncontrollable 
diarrhoea.  But few woman’s rights groups put safe pregnancy near the top of 
their list of priorities and there is no dysentery lobby or celebrity attention given 
to coughing babies. 
 
Sambrook (2006) studied the language of NHS management.  A particularly 
interesting dimension is the transition from being a nurse to becoming a 
manager and the ways in which different individuals cope as articulated in their 
language use.  The results highlighted some of the linguistic techniques used to 
maintain ones professional (nursing) identify when promoted to managerial 
positions. 
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In Millward (2005) the article draws on a study of Housing Investment 
Programme submissions to study the effect of evidential performance.  Millward 
notes that there is nothing to distinguish those authorities receiving high and low 
levels of funding except for considerable differences in their use of language 
that would please government policy makers. 
 
 In Open Boundaries, Howard Sherman and Ron Schultz of the Santa Fe 
Centre for Emerging Strategies see many parallels between complex natural 
systems and markets.  Both involve so many intricate interactions that 
outcomes cannot be predicted.  The authors advise managers to stop trying to 
plan and prepared for change and instead build companies into self-organising 
teams ready to adapt to whatever opportunities emerge. 
 
Thomas Hout (1999) of the Boston Consulting Group finds much that is useful 
in complexity theory, particularly for turbulent industries.  But there are limits to 
the pursuit of flexibility and self organisation, he argues. 
 
Even in the fastest-industries, good managers can still add value by creating the 
right working conditions to spur creativity.  In other words, management still 
matters a lot, Hout says, even in the new economy. 
 
Findings from the third annual Tufts Centre for the Study of Drug Development 
survey of 22 leading diseases and pharmacy benefits managers suggest that 
incorporation of disease management into Medicare would lower hospital 
inpatient costs.  However, it is unclear whether hospital cost savings would be 
sufficient to offset increases in pharmacy, physician, and outpatient 
expenditures as a result of an added combination disease management and 
pharmacy benefit.  Furthermore, the survey indicates that the Centres for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) would likely struggle in recruiting 
disease managers due to their limited enrolment of Medicare beneficiaries, 
relative inexperience with contracts that put disease managers at risk. 
 
So, in summary, it is possible from the literature to deduce that the answer to 
the question is in fact “no”.  The public do not want decisions made on the best 
evidence possible.  Rousseau has given a compelling analysis of evidence and 
choice, but it would appear that managerial judgement or sentiment are more 
popular with the public for decision making by NHS managers.  Laurie, 
Sambrook and Millward have indicated that the public like successful 
organisations to say and do the acceptable and preferable thing whether or not 
they have the evidence.  This could have left me philosophically challenged with 
no where to go only half way through the paper.  But Tufts and Sherman/Shultz 
helped by pointing out that no matter whether you are evidence based or not, 
the adaptive and risky nature of organisational structure means that in the end 
there are just so many synapses in the chain that I should give up trying to 
control and predict and should simply ‘choose’! 
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Is there a conflict between politicians view of an effective National Health 
Service and the view of NHS managers? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The need to be seen to be making evidence based decisions has permeated 
areas of British public policy.  The National Health Service went through a 
structural reform during the summer and early autumn of 2006 know as 
“creating a patient led NHS”.  The new organisations created as a result, were 
subjected to an extended peer to peer review designed by the McKinsey 
Corporation known as “Fit for Purpose” to judge management capabilities 
against the McKinsey definition of “World Class”.  It is therefore worthwhile in 
this literature review of evidence based decision making in the NHS to 
understand what Rousseau worries about “McKinsey says it, that doesn’t make 
it true”.  Similarly, the political imperative to make management evidence based 
just because medicine is, needs to be considered. 
 
There is evidence that the same problems (of the under use of effective 
interventions and the overuse of ineffective ones) are as widespread in health 
care management as they are in clinical practice. Because there are important 
differences between the culture, research base, and decision-making processes 
of clinicians and managers, the ideas of evidence-based practice, while 
relevant, need to be translated for management rather than simply transferred. 
The experience of the Center for Health Management Research (CHMR) is 
used to explore how to bring managers and researchers together and promote 
the use of evidence in managerial decision-making. However, health care 
funders, health care organizations, research funders, and academic centers 
need wider and more concerted action to promote the development of 
evidence-based managerial practice. 
Rousseau says “Several decades of research on attribution bias indicate that 
people have a difficult time drawing unbiased conclusions regarding why they 
are successful, often giving more credit to them-selves than the facts warrant. 
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Management gurus are in no way immune. Sadly, there is poor uptake of 
management practices of known effectiveness.  
There is, consistent with McKinsey an observed research-practice gap. In 
businesses populated by managers who have acquired MBAs from top-ranked 
universities there is un-explained wide variation in managerial practice patterns 
(eg, how [or if] goals are set, selection decisions made, rewards allocated, or 
training investments determined) and, even, persistent use of practices known 
to be largely ineffective (eg, downsizing [Cascio, Young, & Morris, 1997]; high 
ratios of executive to rank-and-file employee compensation [Cowherd & Levine, 
1992])”.  
The NHS is a case study for the application of Evidence Based Management in 
the public sector. It is possible to observe its impact in two fields highly 
influenced by legislative decisions: policing and secondary education. In 
evidence-based policing, community police officers are trained to treat criminal 
suspects politely, because doing so has been found to reduce repeat offences 
(Sherman, 2002). In evidence-based education, many secondary schools have 
restored the practice of social promotion, where students who have difficulty 
passing their courses, even after several tries, are advanced to the next grade 
level. Research indicates that social promotion’s benefits outweigh its costs, 
because a high school diploma increases the likelihood of sub-sequent 
employment and lowers the incidence of drug use, even among students who 
wouldn’t otherwise have qualified for that diploma (Jimerson 2005). Evidence-
based practice is a paradigm for making decisions that integrate the best avail-
able research evidence with decision maker expertise and client/customer 
preferences to guide practice toward more desirable results (Sackett 2000). 
Proponents of Evidence Based Organisation of Knowledge are sceptical about 
experience, wisdom, or personal credentials as a basis for asserting what 
works. W. Sherman indicates that evidence can be graded from weak to strong, 
based on rules of scientific inference, where before-and-after comparisons are 
stronger than simultaneous correlations—randomized, controlled tests stronger 
than longitudinal cohort analyses. Strong evidence trumps weak, irrespective of 
how charismatic the evidence’s presenter is. Sherman sums it up: “We are all 
entitled to our own opinions, but not to our own facts”. 
 
The government has proclaimed the need for what works to overrule ideology in 
the delivery of public services in the 21st Century.  There is a remarkable 
consensus between both the Labour and Conservative parties over the 
structure, remuneration and incentives of the National Health Service.  If there 
is a conflict between the NHS as a politically totemic vote winner/loser in 
general elections and the managerial agenda to run the health service on a day 
to day basis what do writers do to help.  Is there an evidence base to help 
managers and politicians distinguish what does and does not work? 
 
In Navarro (2006) the aim of the study was to examine the complex interactions 
between political traditions, policies, and public health outcomes, and to find out 
whether different political traditions have been associated with systematic 
patterns in population health over time.  The author analysed a number of 
political, economic, social, and health variables over a 50 year period, in a set of 
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wealthy countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD).  Findings support the hypothesis that the political 
ideologies of governing parties affect some indicators of population health.  
Analysis makes an empirical link between politics and policy, by showing that 
political parties with egalitarian ideologies tend to implement redistributive 
policies.  An important finding of the research is that policies aimed at reducing 
social inequalities, such as welfare state and labour market policies, do seem to 
have a salutary effect on the selected health indicators, infant morality and life 
expectancy at birth. 
 
Marks (2005) said that Key NHS policy initiatives have been developed in 
isolation from each other.  While their combined effect remains unpredictable, 
they may serve to threaten the welcome shift towards managing for health 
improvement.  Marks continues that the current system of targets and 
incentives prioritised access to acute service.  The author says public health 
skills were too thinly spread, baseline data were inadequate, decision-making 
for public health investment was fragmented and evidence for effective 
interventions was scanty.  Health improvement targets should be plausible, 
longer term and locally owned says Marks.  Strengthening the NHS's role in 
managing for health was welcomed, but enthusiasm was tempered by 
concurrent NHS policy initiatives and incentives pulling in opposing directions. 
 
Various writers write that some policymakers have goals other than maximising 
clinical effectiveness. The goal may, for example, be social or financial. The UK 
government's decision to aim the safe sex campaign in the 1980s at the entire 
population, rather than those at high risk, owed nothing to research but to 
avoiding a possible backlash against gay men and black people.  (Klein 1990) 
And the introduction of the prenatal triple test for detecting Down's syndrome 
helped providers fulfil their contract with local purchasers. (Rosen 2000) Even 
terms and conditions of employment of staff can justify a policy. Decisions 
regarding health promotion in primary care in the early 1990s were influenced 
by negotiations on the general practitioner contract between the profession and 
the department of health.  (Florin 1999) Policy may also be shaped by electoral 
considerations. For example, the Changing Childbirth policy in the 1990s was 
politically led with no secure scientific base.  (Ferlie 2000) Local policymakers 
are therefore under a myriad of often competing pressures, of which scientific 
evidence is but one. Secondly, research evidence may be dismissed as 
irrelevant if it comes from a different sector or specialty. For example, general 
practitioners have been reluctant to extrapolate the results of randomised trials 
on the use of anticoagulants to primary care because the studies were carried 
out in hospitals. 
 
If it is difficult to argue that objective research should not drive policy, then what 
role does evidence based management have, according to the literature, to help 
improve the quality of what might be described as fundamental and essential 
aspects of patient care?  Politicians clearly understand about comparison and 
league tables.  The introduction of benchmarking – undertaken with some 
success, although not universally implemented – is understandable by 
politicians.  Of more value to managers may be, according to the literature, 
evaluation, audit and research where in, data is submitted for validity checking 
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and once this has been reviewed, the findings are returned to the originator of 
the data to share with the wider NHS. 
 
Evidence may also be dismissed in areas where practice often depends on tacit 
knowledge, such as surgery. Perceived lack of applicability can also lead to 
dismissal—because research on the effectiveness of interferon alfa for hepatitis 
C was confined to patients with no other serious health problems, the evidence 
has been seen as irrelevant for a population with high comorbidity (Raine 1998). 
 
There may be a lack of consensus about the research evidence because of its 
complexity, scientific controversy (incomplete or inconsistent evidence), or 
different interpretations. Policy on preventing heart disease in primary care has 
suffered from widely differing interpretations of the results of the two major 
randomised trials (Horch).  Policymakers may value other types of evidence 
such as personal experience, local information on services, eminent colleagues' 
opinions, and medicolegal reports.  The social environment may not be 
conducive to policy change. Attempts at introducing evidence based needs 
assessment, have been hampered by frequent organisational changes lowering 
staff morale. (Harries) And finally, the quality of the “knowledge purveyors” may 
be inadequate. These are the people who carry the research evidence into the 
policymaking forums. In central government, civil servants usually have this 
crucial role. In the United Kingdom, a high turnover of such staff, lack of 
experience in a particular field, and high workload militate against good quality 
advice. 
 
There is an implied model of policy making in all of this.  The essence of which 
is that evidence based management for the NHS is a conflict with policy 
making.  The reason for this conflict is essentially one between an NHS based 
solution founded on evidence and the politicians decision made in the context of 
taxpayer revenues, the maintenance of electoral authority (not losing votes) and 
consistency/precedent.  In order to resolve whether there is a conflict between 
politicians and managers view of an effective National Health Service the 
literature seems to direct us not to whether the conflict exists, but the extent to 
which this conflict is played out. 
 
What is the implied model of policymaking? In essence, protagonists assume 
that the relation between research evidence and policy is linear; a problem is 
defined and research provides policy options. Research is used to fill an 
identified gap in knowledge. This is consistent with both a positivist model of 
science and professional dominance, in which the views and priorities of 
healthcare professionals (and doctors in particular) dominate healthcare 
policies. It assumes research evidence can and should influence health policy. 
Lomas has suggested that the model is viewed as “a retail store in which 
researchers are busy filling shelves of a shop-front with a comprehensive set of 
all possible relevant studies that a decision-maker might some day drop by to 
purchase.” 
 
Discussion of the theory underlying evidence based policy might safely be 
consigned to an intellectual dustbin if it were not for the practical consequences. 
Accepting a linear relation, then the value of research will inevitably be judged 
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in terms of its impact on policy. Few would argue with “the need to show that 
public investment in research results in benefits for patients”, but politicians and 
managers take it a stage further, requiring “a substantial return from investment 
in health services research”. This implies that at least some aspects of the 
impact of research can and should be quantifiable, even in monetary terms. 
 
So I conclude that there is no conflict between politicians views of an effective 
NHS and the views of NHS managers.  That is because neither side accept nor 
set a consistent frame of reference.  Both sides flip willingly between scientific 
and pragmatic analyses of the problem confronting them.  Help! I thought I was 
going to be able to draw some conclusions and I seem to be in danger of simply 
taking a meandering journey.  Perhaps the problem is the way that I thought I 
was framing and undertaking this journey itself.  Perhaps the problem is that I 
am using fuzzy or qualitative material for the first time. 
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Methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Methodology approaches to this study identified by literature. 
 
The use of qualitative material as a qualitative person 
 
Accountants do not traditionally deal with qualitative data such as whether a 
patient was happy or sad or whether it looked like to him, that his father would 
die when a patient brought him to the emergency service.  Qualitative data is 
not objective.  It cannot be reliably verified.  Quantitative data can often be 
verified – you can see the evidence on paper that it is correct.  Accountants like 
myself, like things to be clear and unambiguous, for there to be no doubt, for the 
amounts presented to be clearly verifiable.  In this document and throughout 
document 3 and document 4, I will be following a reflective journey concerned 
with the need to be more flexible, more willing to embrace new sources of data 
from qualitative sources.  There is still a problem that I face through traditional 
research designs usually rely on a literature review leading to the formation of a 
hypothesis.  The literature review (this document) has not, however, helped me 
to create a test capable of experimentation in the real world as I had hoped.  I 
have read about grounded theory and discourse analysis and hope that they 
may prove appropriate tools to keep some discipline and structure in my thesis 
despite the problems I am facing. 
 
The literature review offers the following insights. 
 
Discourse analysis is defined as “concerned with the interrelationships between 
language and societies and as concerned with the interactive or dialogic 
properties of everyday communication”.  To this are added two subdivisions – 
genre and ideology.  All of this is relevant in my study of management in the 
NHS because of genre and ideology.  Genre is a communication which has a 
staged goal-oriented social process, it creates exclusivity and is therefore an 
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important part of the imposition of philosophy and professional behaviours 
critiqued by Learmonth as being inappropriate for the NHS.  Language is used 
to exert authority over the NHS.  Ideology accounts for the differences in 
meaning held by the participants in the dialogue.  Thus “evidence based 
management in the NHS”, even within the same genre, is capable of creating 
tensions between doctors, patients and NHS managers because there is not an 
equal distribution of the meaning and what is enthralling and empowering to one 
group, may create systemic inertia in another group.  Discourse analysis 
manages to get me back on track by helping me to review the giving, taking and 
sharing of power when I interview my participants in document 3 and further 
identifies the relationships between participants in the NHS as also being 
between ideologies negotiating. 
 
In addition, what excites me about grounded theory is that it analyses the data 
with no pre-conceived hypothesis.  Rather than searching for data that confirms 
or rejects my hypothesis, I can spend my time searching out the concepts 
behind “evidence based management” as they reveal themselves to my cohort 
of participants.  Maybe the answer or question is unclear, but I can conduct a 
study on the nature of evidence based decision making as it is judged and 
participated in by NHS managers.  A possible criticism of grounded theory is a 
lack of rigour due to careless interview techniques and the introduction of bias.  
On the other hand, a working awareness of bias is imperative in all interview 
research and as long as the researcher genuinely has discarded any 
preconceived ideas before collecting and analysing data then the interview 
technique is a neutral tool.  For me, I have long gone past the point of wanting 
to introduce or reject evidence based management in the NHS – I simply wish 
to understand if, how, when and why it is used or rejected and to reflect that 
back to NHS managers themselves.  For this reason, grounded theory is an 
appropriate tool. 
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Exploring the conceptual framework: The Evidence Based NHS Box 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How does evidence affect innovation and change in clinical practice?  What 
does the literature tell us about the top left hand of the box.  The literature 
review and document one, make reference to evidence based medicine as a 
contextual juxtaposition for evidence based management in the NHS.  What can 
the literature tell me about the development of a research supported decision 
making process for doctors/nurses in the NHS?  When discussing an evidence 
based organisation of knowledge in the NHS it is necessary to consider at least 
in passing what a literature review says about how innovation and change in 
clinical practice is affected by evidence, professional practice and patient facing 
decision making.  A summarised conclusion of evidence based medicine from 
the literature is as follows: 
Medicine is a success story as the first domain to institutionalize evidence-
based practice. Evidence based medicine is the integration of individual clinical 
expertise and the best external evidence. Its origins date back to 1847, when 
Ignaz Semmelweis discovered the role that infection played in childbirth fever. 
Semmelweis was vilified by physicians of the time for his assertion that it was 
doctors themselves who were infecting women by carrying germs between 
dead bodies and patients. Nonetheless, his work influenced the formulation of 
germ theory, which gained acceptance with the work of Lister and Pasteur forty 
years later (Wikipedia, 2005). Evidence-based-clinical care as a way of life in 
health care organizations is of relatively re-cent vintage, enjoying its greatest 
growth after1990.  
Let us consider a specimen and thought provoking piece of evidence based 
medicine.  Using published resources about germ theory it is possible to 
understand what its counterpart in management might look like. By way of 
example, germ theory is widely understood by clinical care givers. It has led to 
broad application of infection control systems (gowns, sterile needles, and 
sterile instruments), medicines to avoid or cure infections, and supporting 
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practices (handwashing). Its application has led to radical but important 
interpretations of seemingly distant events. Incidence of heart attack, for 
example, increases immediately after having one’s teeth cleaned. Reflecting on 
this correlation in light of germ theory led to recognition that teeth cleaning 
disperses mouth bacteria into the heart’s arteries. Certain bacteria in these 
arteries create conditions that give rise to heart attacks. Recognizing this causal 
link led to a risk-reducing solution: giving heart patients antibiotics to take before 
dental treatments as a preventive. This application of medical evidence involved 
cause-and-effect connections - how dental practice can disperse mouth bacteria 
into the heart’s arteries. It also required isolation of variations that affect desired 
out-comes, requiring knowledge of the mechanisms triggering heart attacks 
(and, in this case, knowledge that gum disease may itself trigger heart attacks 
[Desvarieux 2005]). Yet more than scientific insight is needed to create 
evidence based practice. In fact, only some physicians recommend this 
preventive action for their heart patients. Others may not see the risk as that 
great, are unaware of the finding, or merely have forgotten to make this 
preventive action part of their standard orders for cardiac patients. The 
involvement of other practitioners further complicates matters: dentists are not 
necessarily educated to inquire about heart conditions. Organizational factors 
affect whether evidence based practice occurs. In health care settings certain 
features increase the likelihood that an at-risk patient will get the preventive 
medication. Social networks and organizational culture matter. It helps if the 
patient’s physician is part of a practice or a hospital where others recommend 
such preventive care. Similarly, impeding this evidence based practice is the 
fact that dentists are unlikely to be in the same professional networks as 
physicians. In a hospital where medical leadership promotes evidence-based 
medicine, more physicians are likely to be aware of the finding. 
 
Given that the example of germ theory in teeth cleaning shows that the 
objective of practicing evidence based safe medicine is not universal.  How 
does evidence determine whether NHS objectives are customer/patient 
orientated?  The literature review, using the specimen example of germ theory 
alone, has managed to point out that the implementation of evidence based 
best practice is not the same as the creation of evidence based best practice.  
Presuming that patients want the most effective care, how should the 
organisation tailor its approach to implementation?  The literature about this 
area gives clues to how managers implement successfully, evidence that is 
representative of best patient care.  For later documents (3, 4) it is worth 
considering the methods used to improve concordance with medical and 
management policy. 
 
Such settings are also likely to have staff in-services to update physician 
knowledge where this practice might be discussed. Participation in research 
increases the salience of the evidence base. It helps if physicians in the 
immediate environment have participated in clinical research and are engaged 
in one of the several online communities that review clinical evidence and then 
create and disseminate recommendations, which raises the next point: access 
to information on those practices the evidence supports. Physicians have online 
services that provide ready access to clinical practice best supported by 
research, based on the review and recommendation of health care experts (for 
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example the Cochrane Collaboration or Map of Medicine). Such services 
capitalize on the information explosion and internet connections to build 
communities of practice enabling experts to communicate their knowledge, 
identify the best quality evidence, and disseminate it broadly to care givers. 
 
How does evidence affect the organisation of public services?  To an extent this 
was referred to in the discussion about politicians and taxpayers, but there are 
also strands of the literature discourse about the area between Patients and 
Politicians on the Evidence Based NHS Box – namely the actual organisation of 
public services.  The NHS management is involved in 2007 in structural re-
alignments such as the devolution of resources to Primary Care Physicians 
(who are contracted to, but not employed by, the NHS), the creation of 
autonomous provider units known as Foundation Trusts and the introduction of 
non-NHS providers into the NHS ‘family’ of logo users.  The literature tells us 
the following things about evidence for organisational structure. 
 
The consequences of failure to properly organise are fairly clear. So, how 
successful have researchers been at facilitating evidence based structure? 
Is NHS structure evidence based? Several studies have been conducted on the 
relation between research and structure over the past five years. A useful 
distinction has been made between practice policies (use of resources by 
practitioners), service policies (resource allocation, pattern of services), and 
governance policies (organisational and financial structures). 
 
The relation between research evidence and clinical practice has been 
thoroughly examined by practitioners of evidence based medicine. Clinical 
effectiveness should clearly play a large part in determining practice policy. 
Concern has focused on the delays observed in implementation of research 
findings. 
 
The linear, rationalist model holds up quite well for practice policy, although it 
shows signs of strain in two ways. Firstly, policymakers differ in their 
interpretation of the evidence. For example, guidelines on cholesterol testing 
vary considerably both between and within countries. Such differences reflect 
variations in context (values) and in the background of the policymakers. 
Generally, the more clinicians are involved, the less the policy reflects the 
evidence. 
 
An alternative view was proposed by Weiss in the 1970s, the enlightenment 
model. In this model, research provides a new way of conceptualising the world, 
mapping the decision making terrain, and challenging conventional 
assumptions. Research is seen as one of several knowledge sources and 
cannot speak for itself in policy terms. 
 
How does an evidence based organisation of knowledge affect professional 
behaviour of clinicians?  In my 20 years experience as an NHS Manager, the 
area in the ‘Evidence Based Box’ juxtaposing NHS managers professional 
practice where their decision making has been considered.  What hasn’t been 
completely understood, is the congruence between doctors/clinicians 
professional practice and their use of evidence to affect change in clinical 
 39 
practices.  This might seem like a semantic distinction but it must be 
remembered that clinicians are allowed to practice based upon admission to 
Royal Colleges of similarly trained and qualified professionals. 
 
Dopson concluded that applying research findings about good practice into 
implemented clinical practice in the NHS is notoriously difficult in the fact of 
strong professional views and complex organisational culture.  Further Aarons 
(2006) by correlating the views of 303 NHS clinicians working in children’s 
mental health with management styles in successfully implementing evidence 
based practice.  In outcomes of the regression analysis Aarons concluded that 
leadership in organisations is important in shaping workers perceptions and 
acceptance of evidence based practice. 
 
In Malterud (2001) the author says that the tacit knowing of an experienced 
practitioner should, along with any evidence or scientific method, be 
investigated, shared and contested.  As Malterud notes medical doctors claim 
their discipline is founded on scientific knowledge.  Yet clinical knowledge 
consists of interpretation, communication, opinions and experiences.  The 
traditional use of quantitative research methods to define clinical evidence 
ignores the cultural aspects of phenomena that cannot be measured, controlled 
and counted.  Qualitative research, says Malterud, could lead to a broader 
understanding and inquiry of the culture of medicine Buxton (2006) echoed 
Malterud when pointed out that although in the NHS high-quality economic 
evaluation played a major role in decision making the process is far from perfect 
and is certainly not representative of the decision making by the NHS as a 
whole.  Further, Buxton is happy with this situation and says that health 
economists need to engage with the public and the health service to better 
understand their perspectives rather than focusing on academic concerns 
relating to details of theory and analytical methods. 
 
Therefore, I conclude that a falsehood or a myth has been perpetrated that 
goes to the heart of my question.  The decision making box put clinicians and 
NHS managers at opposite corners.  The presumption that “innovation and 
change in clinical practice” are consistently evidence based is not true.  What is 
clear is that there is a bias towards trying to make such changes on the basis of 
best available evidence, but that the implementation of clinical change is subject 
itself to variability and in that way the clinicians – despite their explicit 
protestations – are no more evidence based than managers with their own 
decision making tools. 
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So what about Professional Practice – surely that is based on careful 
appraisal of the best evidence available? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Looking at the diagram above – it is the professional practice that links 
clinicians and managers.  The very notion of being a professional is the source 
of both consistency and conflict.  The emergence of evidence based medicine 
in the early 1990’s led to some clinicians challenging managers and policy 
makers to be equally evidence based in their policy making, that much literature 
has established.  Writers such as Learmonth (again!) and Mello – the Chief 
Operating Officer at DaVita Inc, an American Healthcare Organisation, start to 
derive the inclusion or exclusion of some variables in the later research.   
Learmonth manages to add to the conceptual framework an additional concept 
of the prejudice of management language in the NHS to his other concerns 
about management ideology (managerialism).  Mello, by contrast, says that the 
use of research evidence to affect decision making, must exclude a tendency to 
concentrate on the average (mean or median) performance as the norm.  The 
evidence based organisation of knowledge must formally exclude a drive to 
‘normal’ behaviour according to Mello. 
Learmonth (2005) asks that the significance and implications of observations 
about management language are central to the study of Evidence Based 
Management. Drawing primarily on ideas in postcolonial theory, with the aim of 
bringing some insights from the apparent periphery of organizational life to 
disrupt the taken-for-grantedness of ‘teams’ – a central, apparently ‘natural’ 
category of management practice and organization theory. The writer says “ 
Just as postcolonial theory, for (Prasad  2003), is often concerned with “a 
project of the decolonization of the mind [which] is strongly committed to 
contesting and subverting the unquestioned sovereignty of Western categories” 
(see also Banerjee and Linstead (2004), so the aim in this talk is to contest the 
sovereignty of ‘teams’ as one of the unquestioned categories of organizational 
scholarship.  An alternative from the field (‘the girls’) is also introduced, but not 
so that it might be appropriated, or used to facilitate control.  Rather, in thinking 
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about alternatives to received terms, we have an opportunity for engaging 
critically with our established modes of knowing.  In particular, I submit, the 
juxtaposition of contrasting categories (such as ‘teams’ and ‘the girls’) can 
encourage organizational scholars (and others, such as managers) to consider 
the interests served by their use of ‘teams’, as well as those interests its use 
might marginalize or deny “. 
 
Joseph Mello presented in 2005 an idea about the preoccupation of 
management with norms and averages “Over the past number of months I have 
been in a quandary about something that I would love your opinions about. That 
is, “the myth of the mean”.  In essence Mello believes that the 
mean/median/mode has only minimal power in true evidence based 
management. Increasingly the use of “average” data says Mello never gets to 
the essence of what is happening with any discrete population that drives 
performance. 
 
Mello gives specific examples from his own organisation “In measuring clinical 
performance for DaVita we pay attention to lots of indicators. One of them is 
“average hematocrit level”.  We’ve been patting ourselves on the back for 
moving this indicator higher over the past 3 years. I am certain that is a good 
thing. However, in any given month when that number goes up, I have no 
window on whether we really improved the aggregate population, we got the 
patients that were already high higher, or we got the low patients up - which of 
course would be the best thing”. 
 
The rise of evidence based clinical practice in health care has caused some 
people to start questioning how health care managers and policymakers make 
decisions, and what role evidence plays in the process. Though managers and 
policymakers have been quick to encourage clinicians to adopt an evidence-
based approach, they have been slower to apply the same ideas to their own 
practice. 
 
Social factors that allow or prevent experiments with evidence of best practice.  
Rousseau as a writer, quotes from a wealth of resource available to guide 
effective execution of evidence based management “goal setting and feedback 
(Locke & Latham 1984); feedback and redesign (Goodman 2001); health care 
managements greater orientation towards scientific evidence (Lemseux-Charles 
& Champagne 2004)” and says that the continued wide variation that we 
observe in how organisations execute decisions is remarkable.  I have written in 
tabular form, the nature of the discourse contained in Rousseau’s literature so 
that a wealth of writing can be synthesised.  
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After Rousseau: A synthesis from the literature of Rousseau on the practice of 
Evidence Based Management 
 
 
Management Issue With advanced knowledge of 
effective implementation of 
Evidence Based Management 
For evidence avoiding status 
quo 
The supervision of 
employees 
Managers acquire a systematic 
understanding of what productivity 
gains are most appropriately 
cultivated from their staff 
A manager may misuse 
threats and punishments or 
overuse positive 
encouragement with no 
reference to the outcome of 
either style or organisational 
performance 
Information available to 
managers on the 
consequences of their 
decisions 
Appropriate evidence and data 
base: perceptual gaps and 
misunderstandings are significantly 
reduced so that post 
implementation review is a valuable 
part of improving management 
Information is poor as data 
and evidence is not collected 
so that experiences are likely 
to be misinterpreted 
The delivery on 
promises to the public, 
employees, 
stakeholders/taxpayers 
customers and others 
Decisions are based on systematic 
causal knowledge conditioned by 
expertise.  Decisions are 
legitimised by being made in a 
systematic and informed fashion 
more readily justifiable in the eyes 
of stakeholders 
In such settings, managers 
cannot learn why their 
decisions may have been 
wrong, nor what alternatives 
would have been right.  The 
public challenges decisions in 
the search for transparency 
Management style Managers have an understanding 
of the powerful impact their 
decisions have on the fate of their 
firms.  Managerial competence is 
recognised as a critical and often 
scarce resource 
Evidence based management 
seems to threaten managers 
personal freedom to run their 
organisations as they see fit 
Approach to academic 
research 
Managers read the academic 
literature regularly and the 
consultants who advise them are 
likely to do so also.  There is a 
recognition that this research exists 
Despite the explosion of 
research on decision making, 
individual and group 
performance, business 
strategy and other domains 
directly tied to organisational 
practice, few practising 
managers access this work 
Management culture Supervisors and managers respond 
to a belief system probably 100 
years old, as far back as Fredrick 
Taylors structured methods for 
improving efficiency were classified 
under scientific management 
A belief that good 
management is an are - !the 
romance of leadership” school 
of thought where a shift to 
evidence an analysis connotes 
loss of creativity and autonomy 
In conclusion Managers have evidence on which 
to base their decisions and 
consequently what is at stake 
should the decision or implantation 
fail 
Managers are prevented from 
real learning by fads and 
falsehoods 
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I would like to consider the writings of two new thinkers on how evidence based 
management might develop in industrial and customer orientated environments.  
These are Purdey Crawford and Bob Sutton.  Crawford, an industrialist, and 
Sutton, an academic, have a wit and enthusiasm for the subject that moves the 
concept of evidence based management from the dusty pages of rhetoric and 
treatise to something that is exciting, permissive and rapid, rather than simply a 
caveat or a caution.  Their writing is no less disciplined in the use of a careful 
appraisal of the best evidence available, but what it does is turn the philosophy 
into a search for new frontiers rather than a reason for tardiness and 
introspection. 
 
A company that embraces evidence-based management sees their company as 
a laboratory.  Crawford ran an experiment to answer a specific question.  Many 
businesses could do the same.  Wherever there are multiple units - multiple 
stores, warehouses, production lines or branches - the company can run 
experiments to find out what works.  This simple idea, "the company as a 
laboratory" is powerful one. 
 
Bob Sutton on his Web blog says “Last week I spoke to a group of MBA 
students (the Santa Clara University Executive MBA class of 2007). Their 
comments and questions gave me food for thought. For starters, is evidence 
based management anything new? Is it a movement that should be 
enthusiastically promoted, or simply a day-to-day activity that people should be 
encouraged to do? And what should it be called (assuming it even needs a 
name)? Sutton wishes to avoid using "data-driven" as a substitute, because 
evidence doesn't always arrive in the form of hard data. Likewise, he says not to  
call it "fact-based" management, because not everything can be reduced to a 
set of objective facts. Sutton thinks "research-based" management is a decent 
description, but worries that it that might trigger “the dreaded MEGO (My Eyes 
Glaze Over) response”. 
Sutton continues. “Setting those questions aside, if your goal is to improve 
management outcomes, here are things you can do, starting now: Raise the 
bar. Expect people to gather facts and knowledge from a wide variety of 
sources; say explicitly what is the current, best evidence; and then show how 
they arrived at their judgments, proposals, and recommendations. Don't settle 
for remarks like "I don't think customers care about that product feature." 
Instead, gather some systematic intelligence: what are your customers doing 
and thinking? Use unknowns as guideposts, not roadblocks. One of the biggest 
payoffs from evidence-based management is discovering what you don't know: 
This can prevent people from hurriedly adopting poorly conceived plans. But 
formal acknowledgments of uncertainty can also draw people into a "paralysis 
of analysis" cycle that keeps them from doing anything, using comment periods, 
customer feedback, and evidence-gathering as delay tactics. So instead of 
casting shadows over new, potentially profitable ideas, try this: establish 
explicitly what it is you don't know, then figure out how you can gather more 
complete information as things unfold. Identify key unknowns and develop a 
plan for eliminating those unknowns - this will help you demonstrate whether 
your projects or products are performing, and where adjustments are needed”. 
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What each of the writers in this chapter have done is provide a sense that 
evidence based management or “decision based on a careful appraisal of the 
best evidence available” is not only possible, but empowering.  Whilst it has at 
its heart an inquiring style of management, it is not cautious in approach.  If the 
manager were, say, the executive director in charge of twenty clinics, each with 
varied performance, the manager might reasonably conclude that the 
performance differences were due to something about the clinics or their 
administration.  The executive director might even combine that presumption 
with a professional background in clinical or business disciplines to draw 
conclusions.  What these writers have told the NHS manager to do instead, is to 
look for systematic attention to local facts (ie, the best evidence available) and 
plan their response accordingly which may mean looking at patients, building 
stock, transport or public health, but to look at them quickly!  In that way at least 
it is possible to seen professional by using evidence based management.  At 
least the decision making box finds at least one successful home and refuge for 
an evidence based organisation of knowledge – the notion of professional 
practice.  Rousseau has proven twice now (here, and earlier in the concept of 
little e evidence) to be a powerful tool for rescuing evidence based knowledge 
from challenge and despair. 
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At the heart of the decision making box – what does the literature say 
might be missing from this box? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I like to use this box, first seen in document 1, as a map of these areas within 
which my consideration of the evidence can be framed.  It emanates from the 
“organisation of knowledge” at its heart and I do want to discuss some things I 
have read that confirm or reject my box/map.  For example, a number of writers 
in recent years have written about the importance of staff morale and complex 
tribal instincts and power struggles that must be taken into My conceptual 
framework puts NHS managers and clinicians at opposite ends of the 
‘professional practice’ part of the box and this in itself reflects and functionally 
separates within the NHS.  This may identify a further research question about 
the nature of an organisation that is multidisciplinary.  The NHS is not unique, 
but it is unusual in that the line of authority between ‘managers’ and ‘employees’ 
(clinician) is unclear.  Were there to be a significant body of literature, I might 
have to re-think the model itself. 
 
Dopson (2006) argued that in the NHS local professional groups work together 
in communities of practice that are frequently multiprofessional.  Although 
Dopson studied the role of the middle managers in the implementation of 
evidence based healthcare, rather than the senior and executive management 
cohort of this study, the author adds a new dimension or question to the study.  
Dopson argues that if the quality of health care is to be improved, we need to 
understand the complex (historically and contextually informed) interactions 
between different professional groups and to design diffusion strategies that 
acknowledge this complexity.  Dopson was preceded by Ruta (2005) who 
argued that because recent NHS reforms give doctors increased responsibility 
for efficient and fair use of resources techniques must be employed to ensure 
the views of all stakeholders are properly represented.  Greener (2005) 
concludes by suggesting that much that occurs in manager-doctor relations is 
obscured by the two tribes practices, that there are gendered differences in the 
Innovation                Professional Practice          Decision 
& Change in                 making  
Clinical Practice                tools 
 
 
 
 
 
     
Objectives are 
Customer              Taxpayer 
Orientated        Organisation of Public Services         Revenues 
Clinicians NHS Managers 
Patients Politicians 
 
An Evidence Based 
Organisation of 
knowledge 
 46 
behaviour of managers towards clinicians and that game playing in relation to 
the performance management regime is a function of its imposition.  Guven-
Uslu (2006) believes that strategic change in organisations is best supported by 
encouraging networks rather than imposing change bureaucratically.  Guven-
Uslu notes that in the NHS the government has been encouraging clinicians 
and managers to work together in network to improve performance.  The author 
shows that this kind of networking is difficult to realise, the author explains 
where the main problems lie: clinical-management conflict, top-down 
approaches, the implementation of benchmarking initiatives: and the 
inadequacy of the evidence base for comparison. 
 
Where policy makers value evidence over personal experience or prejudice, 
there is a bias towards incorporating evidence into decision making.  This is by 
no means a consistent or expected method of policy making according to the 
literature.  Having considered what the writers said about the rest of the 
conceptual framework, it is necessary to note that writers such as Kleen and 
Robinson are able to distinguish wisdom (or experimental evidence) from 
research evidence so that the ‘evidence based’ circle at the heart of my model 
is itself capable of being questioned.  Both distinguish ideology from evidence, 
but are inconclusive about evidence itself. 
 
Kleen goes further – saying that the NHS actively rejects the use of evidence in 
designing its own governance structures.  Kleen says that the direct influence of 
research on governance policies has been negligible. This is illustrated by the 
reorganisations of the NHS in 1974 and 1989. In both cases research evidence 
was ignored but for different reasons.  In 1974, there was a consensus—
unification of services was necessary, as was coterminosity with local 
government. Therefore, no research evidence was needed. Instead working 
parties were set up in which decisions were based on experiential evidence. In 
contrast, in 1989 policy was largely influenced by ideology and electoral 
considerations. Ambiguous research evidence (such as on the merits of 
competition in the United States) was used selectively.  A second example is 
the policy of introducing managed care to the NHS. Robinson (2000) Evidence 
from the United States has been used both by proponents and opponents. 
Opponents noted that of 81 published observations of outcomes, 68 showed no 
significant advantage for managed care. Meanwhile, proponents pointed out 
that in the other 13 observations, managed care organisations achieved lower 
use of services and of expensive tests and procedures (where alternatives 
existed) without compromising quality of care. In effect, research evidence has 
had little effect on the policy to introduce managed care. 
 
Clearly, research has only a limited role because governance policies are driven 
by ideology, value judgments, financial stringency, economic theory, political 
expediency, and intellectual fashion.  (Kleen) It would be naive and unrealistic 
to expect research to provide evidence to clinch arguments about governance 
policies. 
 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion of practice, 
service, and governance policies. Research has little direct influence on service 
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and governance policy if we adopt those criteria set and accepted by 
researchers. 
 
Maybe there is a problem at the heart of the model on the nature of evidence?  
When will we know we are seeing an evidence based approach rather than any 
other organisation of knowledge?  Guven-Uslu was able to ask whether the 
nature of papers written upon the consideration of evidence based management 
were qualitatively different from those of other management disciplines.  Moving 
through the literature, the writer concludes that “evidence based management” 
is not so much a tool of decision making, as it is a state of mind.  The 
incorporation of evidence based management into decision making is not at the 
decision point – it is the entire continuum of the philosophy of management.  It 
becomes a credo wherein all decisions are taken in a structured and methodical 
way, and to some extend, trading timeliness for accuracy.  What does evidence-
based management look like?  It is a disciplined approach to decision making 
meetings where the team asks "What are the assumptions behind this?", "What 
evidence do we have that it will work?", and "What evidence do we have that 
things may go wrong?"  Let me highlight two aspects of that last sentence.  The 
first aspect is discipline.   Evidence-based management is not as easy as 
opinion-based management.   An organization committed to evidence-based 
management takes the time to approach decisions in a disciplined way.  The 
second aspect is an attitude of inquiry, not of advocacy.  In North America 
managers tend to come into a meeting with an opinion which they defend.  In 
contrast, managers with an attitude of inquiry would come into a meeting 
asking, "What are the options?", "What do we know?", and "What do we need to 
find out?" 
 
When Purdy Crawford was CEO of IMASCO there was a heated argument as to 
whether loss-leader items led to greater sales.  As CEO he could have made 
the decision based on his own opinion but that's not what happened.  Crawford 
said, "Let's not argue, let's find out."  They proceeded to do an experiment to 
see if shoppers buying sale items also bought enough other items to justify the 
sale. (They didn’t).  This is a great example of the attitude of inquiry.  Crawford 
had asserted the primacy of evidence over opinion or judgement based on 
experience. 
 
In summary, I think the decision making box has shown itself to be worthwhile 
as a simplification (necessarily) of the real world.  The box might have been 
drawn as a 3d venn diagram and the multiple overlapping relationships would 
be more faithfully represented, but for the purposes of helping with a rational 
approach to my discourse, I think Guven-Uslu and Crawford save the day in 
validating the model. 
 
 
 48 
In Conclusion 
 
Whilst I have written this paper in personal narrative style I would like to 
conclude by reframing the discussion in a way that answers the examination 
guidelines just to prove I knew there was a question that needed answering. 
 
What is already known in this research area? 
 
Learmonth, an academic and former NHS manager, suggests that in the long 
term the very study of evidence based management is likely to inhibit rather 
than encourage a fuller understanding of the nature of evidence based 
management.  Pfeffer has managed to write a definition of evidence based 
management and says that this is not how managers make decisions but that 
they instead focus on their own thoughts.  Rousseau is entirely supportive of 
Pfeffer and, after exploring the promise that research offers for improved 
practice concludes that at present, it falls short.  Elliot in a study of NHS 
managers provides some explanations for the constraints upon managers that 
prevent the use of research evidence. 
 
What each of these writers say, is that the most successful NHS organisations 
would share one common strength – outstanding use of knowledge acquired 
through research (evidence).  They would produce evidence the way that they 
need in order to inform decision making by management.  Using an expertise 
with evidence they would make the best decisions, minor and major, everyday. 
 
Opposing theoretical and methodological approaches to this research area? 
 
Pearson takes issue with Learmonth and says that the whole concept of what 
constitutes evidence is itself, full of inequality and prejudice.  Murphy, 
Mintzberg, Soltani may be taken as a direct challenge to the whole concept of 
evidence based management.  In any case, they argue that there is a reason 
for the craft of management and personal experience to supplement evidence 
based management in context specific ways.  Malterud manages to deconstruct 
the whole notion of a scientific approach to the knowledge of medicine. 
 
Writers such as Delbanco, Davies, Dopson and Mitten propose that 
organisational effectiveness is not a result of effective management process or 
people but instead a combination of both.  Issues such as organisational 
culture, leadership, total-quality management philosophies and innovative ways 
of budget setting are all claimed to have at least as great an impact on 
organisational outcomes as well researched decision making. 
 
Karl suggests that in adversarial process advocates seek to prevail through the 
enjoyment of power, rather than through evidence based solutions and 
develops an alternative practical model of collaboration through join fact finding 
is proposed.  Smith supports the search for alternatives because, in the author’s 
view, uncritical reliance on performance data can lead to a number of 
unintended and adverse consequences and Pearson says that evidence 
gathering is too slow to properly influence policy.  
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Arguments, Hypothesis and Techniques of other researchers not pursued 
further 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of the themes that I found out about, the following have been notes in the 
literature review but will not be followed further or added to the conceptual 
framework.  Laurie makes explicit value/evaluated judgements about the impact 
of ignoring evidence on the health of the most vulnerable in poor countries.  
This is contextually important, but neither in the NHS nor near the top right hand 
corner of the evidence based NHS box which is the prime area for study.  Hout 
poses a challenge that it is unclear whether cost savings arising from disease 
management would offset increases in running the system and whether 
sufficient analysis existed to synthesise the data to make it managerially 
meaningful even in the long term.  This is a potent challenge to evidence based 
management, but more about the top left hand of the box, innovation in clinical 
practice which is supportive to but not central to this study.  Marks said that 
strengthening the NHS’s role in managing for health was welcomed but 
enthusiasm was tempered by concurrent NHS policy initiatives and incentives 
puling in opposite directions.  I will not be pursuing this further as it is more 
about the lower part of the conceptual framework – the organisation of public 
services as they are influenced by taxpayers and politicians. 
 
What research methods and strategies have been employed in studying this 
area? 
 
Learmonth used two quite innovative methods to study this area.  Learmonth 
proposed the idea of ‘radical critical management studies’ which requires the 
researcher to take the null hypothesis that everything in the NHS orthodoxy is 
correct and therefore the tests are only those that challenge the orthodoxy.  
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Learmonth is, in effect, following this methodology in his framing of NHS 
managers as heroes in the style of ancient Greek literature and then ironically 
challenging this perspective in “an emancipating way”. 
 
Elliot studied the paperwork of managers and clinicians in one region of the 
NHS and in depth interview and documentary analysis were used to collect 
evidence.  Elliot used the ‘one region’ method favoured in my research proposal 
for reasons of practical concern – time, money, co-ordination – and also 
because the concept of the region was meaningful in the NHS.  The region 
represented a natural cohort of NHS managers and a distinct area with a 
variable degree of autonomy from the Department of Health over how decisions 
about resource allocation are made. 
 
Giddens posed the point that  - policy makers have to get something out of 
research if they are to use it.  Further, that it is necessary to consider which 
arguments are likely to be useful or gratifying to which policymakers.  Giddens 
makes the point, significant for myself as an NHS employee studying the NHS, 
whilst part funded by the NHS to undertake the academic course and research, 
that it is still valid for the researcher to influence policy makers through an 
extended process of communication. 
 
Inclusion of exclusion of variables in the research? 
 
A synthesis from the literature of Rousseau proposes a juxtaposition of 
management decision making between systems that adopt evidence based 
management and those that avoid the use of research.  The questions 
proposed by Rouseau are worthy of further discussion with practicing NHS 
managers.  Some additional ideas were encountered in the literature review.  
Learmonth and Sambrook both say that the significance and implications of 
management language are an important part of this study, but it is difficult to 
continue to pursue this area within the conceptual framework.  Conversely, 
Mello writes about the preoccupation of management with norms and averages 
and this “myth of the mean” is a particular branch of decision making tools that 
is possible to consider further.  At the core of the conceptual framework is an 
evidence based organisation of knowledge, and supporters of this school of 
thought are sceptical about experience or wisdom.  Sherman’s model of grading 
evidence from weak to strong, based on rules of scientific inference, would say 
that Mellow was correct.  In Sherman’s view a manager who uses evidence but 
then ranks this evidence against normative performance/behaviour is guilty of 
weak decision making just the same. 
 
Medicine is a success story as the first domain within the NHS to institutionalise 
evidence based practice.  The literature says that more than scientific insight is 
needed to create evidence based practice.  Guidelines do not of themselves, 
equate to evidence of implementation.  An evidence base can only improve 
outcomes with adherence and therefore it is necessary to note that the heart of 
the conceptual framework (an evidence based organisation of knowledge) is 
only a partial proxy for applied evidence based decision making. 
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Further Research Questions identified? 
 
To the key questions considered in the research objectives (which make up the 
chapter headings of this literature review and conceptual framework) some 
further research questions are identified.  Sutton asks whether evidence based 
management is anything new or is it simply an extension of a century long 
debate about scientific management?  Sutton also asks, if it is new discipline, 
what it should be called and asks whether a home can be found that doesn’t 
cause readers to lose enthusiasm in any attempt to introduce it into an 
organisation?   Dopson, Ruta, Greener and Guven-Uslu all considered the 
nature of the NHS as a multi-professional organisation.  This is covered in the 
conceptual framework in that the phrase either separating or linking NHS 
managers and NHS clinicians is “Professional Practice”.  The further research 
question identified as a consequence, is whether evidence based decision 
making within the NHS, is best supported by encouraging multi-professional 
manager-doctor networks, rather than imposing change bureaucratically? 
 
For the purposes of research governance, the NHS is of the opinion that this 
conceptual framework will need to be submitted for Research Ethics 
Committee.  This is because it is not an audit of an existing standard of 
management practice or an evaluation of a specific organisational change, but a 
survey using multiple methods to test a thesis and generating new knowledge.  
Should this be true though given that my methodology will only access staff and 
I am already an NHS employee?  If Research Ethics Committee submission is 
necessary, I intend to use a qualitative evaluation of the method and experience 
to gather evidence about the nature of applied evidence based decision making 
in the NHS.  
 
Probably the most important research question identified by this paper is that 
conducting a literature review has, in a way my MBA never did, confront the use 
of qualitative material as a quantitative person.  A plaintive “help!” half way 
through this paper was not staged….what if I have to face the problem that this 
literature review threw up?  Namely that the journey may need some new tools 
such as discourse analysis and grounded theory to provide meaning and that 
these tools have rigour and power no matter what my instincts as an accountant 
said.
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Abstract 
 
A decision making theory and process 
 
I undertook a qualitative assessment of the use of evidence based decision 
making from real-world participants in the NHS.  A qualitative approach was 
used because I wanted to develop a general categorisation of decision 
making that will enable me to develop topics for later thesis and qualitative 
study.  The study is a selected sample of subjects representing a spectrum of 
Executives in the NHS from different professional backgrounds including 
doctor, accountant, academic professor, statistician and nurse.  Subjects were 
recruited from the cohort of people working in the NHS in the East Midlands 
through personal contacts and in one case, referral by other subjects.  A 
preliminary interview schedule was developed and two pilot interviews were 
conducted with people from outside the cohort to test this method as well as 
the recording equipment.  
 
Little in depth research has been done into the implications of the 
philosophical approach that a practicing group of senior executives in the NHS 
have to the work of the NHS itself and its bases in evidence based decision 
making.  I wish to pursue the work of Rousseau on the difference in 
management response to management issues depending upon whether the 
decision maker was equipped with advanced knowledge of the effective 
implementation of Evidence Based Management or otherwise.  Sample 
selection for this testing of Rousseau in a field environment was essentially 
pragmatic, based upon people who knew me well enough to give frank 
disclosure, but not well enough to have perceptions about what I thought the 
“correct answer” is.  (I have no view on the “correct answer”). 
 
Grounded theory and qualitative material 
 
The overall aim of this research model is to enhance good practice in the craft 
of management in the NHS. To achieve this aim my objective in this piece of 
qualitative research is to conduct a systematic investigation into current 
perceptions of evidence based management including perceived barriers to its 
use and also including perceptions of good practice in the use of evidence 
based management.  It was also necessary to begin to ascertain perceptions 
of skill deficits in this area and factors viewed as contributions to these 
deficits.  The effect of the researcher as an observer is unknown.  It could 
have an effect on the interviews and it may inhibit parties who participated in 
the review of meetings.  A further limitation of the study is that I only included 
leaders from within the NHS East Midlands and it is possible that NHS regions 
may be more or less equipped to engage in a discourse about evidence 
based management.  The strength of this study is that observation and 
participation with individuals and the groups by the researcher on an ongoing 
basis in the NHS in East Midlands increase the credibility and trustworthiness 
of the findings. 
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So in Summary My Conclusion is 
 
In the matter of the approach to 
academic research (Against!) 
 
 
 
 
In the matter of supervision of 
employees (For!) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the matter of the information 
available to managers on the 
consequences of their decisions 
(Against!) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the matter of management style 
(No preference either way) 
 
 
 
 
 
In the matter of the delivery of 
promises to the public, stakeholders 
and others (Against strongly!) 
 
There is a bias against using 
academic research by NHS 
managers in the East Midlands.  This 
is by no means universal, but is 
consistent in its presentation. 
 
There is a very strong preference for 
using evidence based decision 
making amongst the cohort of East 
midlands managers and use an 
appropriately cultivated management 
approach to support evidence based 
decisions. 
 
There is a bias against evidence 
based decisions.  Decisions have 
insufficient data and evidence for 
decision making, and little value is 
attached to post implementation 
review.  Some managers are neutral 
towards this subject but few, if any, 
show a preference for evidence 
based decision making informed by 
the consequences of their decisions. 
 
There is only an inconclusive result in 
the area.  There is no preference.  
Some managers have a preference 
for evidence it seems but equally 
same would discredit it as a viable 
and realistic approach. 
 
Of all the areas this is the one where 
there is next to no examples of 
evidence based decision making, but 
there are multiple strong, lengthy and 
cross-referenced examples of 
decision making that is neither 
systematic nor developed by causal 
knowledge.  Decision making is 
opaque to the public and frequently 
challenged. 
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THE DYNAMICS OF DECISION MAKING IN GROUPS AND BY 
INDIVIDUALS 
 
A decision making theory and process 
 
I undertook a qualitative assessment of the use of evidence based decision 
making from real-world participants in the NHS.  A qualitative approach was 
used because I wanted to develop a general categorisation of decision 
making that will enable me to develop topics for later thesis and qualitative 
study.  The study is a selected sample of subjects representing a spectrum of 
Executives in the NHS from different professional backgrounds including 
doctor, accountant, academic professor, statistician and nurse.  Subjects were 
recruited from the cohort of people working in the NHS in the East Midlands 
through personal contacts and in one case, referral by other subjects.  A 
preliminary interview schedule was developed and two pilot interviews were 
conducted with people from outside the cohort to test this method as well as 
the recording equipment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are a few notes to say about the author.  My own personal baggage 
about Evidence Based Management is that; 
 
I have worked in services where EBM was a new or alien concept.  Although 
the hierarchy of evidence is vaguely understood by most if not all NHS 
managers the sense that evidence should support or instruct decision makers, 
as proposed by distinguished leaders in the NHS management such as Muir 
Gray (1997), is not commonly accepted.  To an extent the concept of 
evidence was mostly a binary rather than a linear concept.  By that I mean 
that the Randomised Control Trial or RCT was seen to be “evidence” and that 
anything other than an RCT was not.  In that way the concept of evidence was 
elevated to its most extreme version where an almost laboratory level of 
precision within its practice frightened lesser users.  I have performed the role 
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of Director and Chief Executive in NHS organisations that were deemed to be 
successful.  Although I am by no means a leading light amongst my peers the 
organisations I have lead either in the boardroom or as Accountable Officer 
(Chief Executive) have been surplus making, target hitting, award winning, 
highly credited by the auditors and demonstrably successful in the eyes of the 
regulators.   
 
On a personal level I have tended to lead successful teams of high performing 
individuals and usually inherited maturing or well established teams but have 
rarely been asked to establish new organisations when the NHS goes through 
its periodic regular re-organisation.  So a pattern emerges throughout my 20 
year career in the NHS of being the director who succeeds the first Chief 
Executive in an organisation, the team player who replaces the first team 
leader when they leave and so on.  I have worked in parts of the NHS that 
used EBM sparingly.  For example the recruitment of leaders is supported by 
the evidence that it is possible to assess future leaders through competency 
based extrapolation of their past performance and also by evidence that 
emotional intelligence correlates with predictions of successful leadership.  
EBM has existed in three ways, as a self critique by managers that some of 
the decisions or assertions are just plain errors which would improve if based 
on evidence of what works, as an exploration of the differences in culture that 
exist between NHS doctors who are increasingly evidence based and HNS 
managers who are seen to make little progress in adopting the concept and 
finally in a way to stop the NHS re-inventing the wheel and making repeated 
mistakes or even worse employing management consultants to make the 
same mistakes. 
 
I have worked high up and low down in the management hierarchy and my 
experience of EBM was that it faced/faces being squeezed by two forces that 
both oppose its very existence in the NHS management lexicon and toolbox.  
Unlike Medicine and Nursing in the NHS, management is not a profession.  
Put crudely, it is considered a task or an overhead.  With the exception of 
Finance roles there is no established legal or cultural requirement regarding 
education or knowledge for an individual to become a manager the way there 
is for Doctor, Nurse, Physiotherapist, Podiatrist, etc.  This does not mean that 
NHS managers are not legion in their BSC’s, their MBA’s, even their Doctoral 
qualifications but it does mean that no formal disciplinary body or professional 
pressure exists to promote use of evidence by any manager who refuses to 
do so.   
 
Secondly, even some senior (former) NHS managers such as Learmonth  
(2000) oppose the scientific method and suggest that management is not an 
automatically good thing as it is believed to involve the exercise of power and 
the exploitation of others.  These critics find some resonance in the media and 
popular cultural account that managers do not wish to consider the impact of 
their decisions on stakeholders. Ultimately, in my working life, I deal with 
these situations all the time, the adoption of evidence based practices is likely 
to be organisation specific where an NHS manager, typically an incoming 
Chief Executive or Director takes the initiative to build an evidence based 
culture.  Fads, fashion and management consultancy are more often seen in 
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the design of a decision making or decision support system than problem-
based reading and discussion of research summary.    
 
Before I began, I was expecting to find that the Chief Executives would 
consider evidence based decision making to be a luxury.  By luxury I meant 
that it was used sparingly and where a big decision/occasion merited detailed 
consideration.  Implicitly a luxury would not be something they used every 
day.  I also expected there to be a strong degree of convergence between the 
leaders given that they were working in the same health market, with the 
same policy framework and were using each other as reference points for 
acceptable norms of behaviour.  I had considered this beforehand, probably 
as it matched my own practice when I had been a Chief Executive, and 
thought what a terrible waste this was.  I declare that I remain neutral on the 
position of whether we should use evidence based decision making but with 
the amount of control we have as executives over risk, expenditures and 
investments it struck me as sad that we would not or could not practice an 
evidence based approach to these critical decisions. 
 
 
Relevance and Rigour: the Hierarchy of evidence and the realist 
synthesis 
 
Current schemes for evidence hierarchies were developed mainly for clinical 
research questions and therefore place major emphasis on randomised 
controlled trials as the main and most convincing evidence in the evaluation 
process.  These types of study are rarely available for lifestyle-related factors 
and might even not be feasible to obtain.  Arguments are advanced to support 
the notion that a modification of currently existing ‘levels of evidence’ as 
developed for clinical research questions might be necessary.  Thereby, one 
might be able to accommodate the specific aspects of evidence-related issues 
of recommendations for primary prevention through lifestyle changes, like 
dietary changes.  What I wanted to do in this study was to make sense of the 
evidence hierarchy for NHS managers to make sense of it, organise and 
follow their response to evidence given that the NHS is not a randomised 
control trial in total. 
 
Levels of evidence have been used widely in evidence-based medicine.  In 
this context, hierarchies of evidence have been further developed and 
modified.  During the past few years, several organisations have created their 
own version of a hierarchy of evidence.  Whilst in all these hierarchies the 
lowest level of evidence is given to expert opinion and the highest level of 
evidence to systematic reviews or meta-analyses of randomised controlled 
trials (RCTs), there is considerable variation among the categories in 
between.  Common to all of these modifications is the emphasis on RCTs and 
meta-analyses thereof.  But the question remains in the context of healthcare 
in England, how do the managerial leaders feel about this, is the meta-
analysis believed to be the prime, the apex of decision making tools in non-
clinical fields.  Is it even respected by these people in clinical settings? 
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This (in the clinical context) well-founded grading system based on RCTs is 
now commonly regarded the one and only way to provide reliable answers to 
all medical questions.  Even though it is stated in Cochrane Collaboration 
handbooks (2008) that reviews of other types of evidence can be helpful for 
decision-making, especially in areas where RCTs are either not available or 
not feasible, the stigma that everything else beyond RCTs is second – or even 
third-class evidence and therefore basically not credible is inherent to this not 
foreseen expansion.  By making the manager come alive I wanted to 
understand whether there was a contradiction between the stigmatisation of 
everything but RCT in the medical and managerial parts of the same 
organisation. 
 
A critical appraisal of the hierarchies of evidence and their application appears 
necessary, however, because a specific type of research question – mainly 
the evaluation of therapeutic effects – has driven the development of these 
hierarchies.  This has led to the specific order and inclusion of certain study 
types.  Only recently, levels of evidence have been published which take into 
account that different medical areas require different sets of levels of 
evidence.  The Canadian Task Force on the Periodic Health Examination  
(1979) differentiated the following research categories and now presents 
separate hierarchies of evidence for each of these categories: 
 
 Therapy/Prevention/Aetiology/Harm; 
 Prognosis; 
 Diagnosis; and 
 Economic analysis. 
 
In many of the grading schemes presented previously, observational research 
has been shifted to lower levels of evidence and/or the grading of 
recommendations attributed only second-or third-level grades to 
recommendations based on results from observational research.  In addition, 
different types of observational study were often listed together in one group 
without differentiation of study designs, and often were not presented in their 
completeness.  For example, several hierarchies of evidence do not even 
mention cohort studies at all. 
 
The widespread notion that only RCTs are a valid basis for type A 
recommendations might delay or even stop decision-makers in the public 
health sector from devoting attention or resources to primary preventative 
measures just because, according to certain schemes, no ‘grade A’ evidence 
is available.  If the sum of all evidence points in one direction and plausible 
alternative explanations are not present, the mere fact that ‘only’ observational 
studies are available should not automatically preclude one from deriving 
recommendations.  So it is clear that the individual experience of the NHS 
manager can credibly be different to the RCT model.  But by holding up a 
mirror to the people I talked to I wanted, in a non-judgemental way, to see 
where they sat on the spectrum of the credibility of evidence. 
 
Individuals or the chairs of the groups to be recorded were initially contacted 
by email with a very prompt follow up by telephone.  I outlined the nature of 
 65 
the project and the contribution I felt the individual or group could make to my 
initial piece of qualitative research.  I explained that all interviews would be 
taped, but that the material gathered would be considered confidential by me, 
with no identification of individuals except by some implicit membership of the 
taped group meetings.  All of the individuals I approached were happy to help 
with this piece of the project, many suggesting this was an important 
discussion in the NHS that warranted further investigation.  All of the 
interviews were conducted at the interviewees’ work place.  The meetings that 
were recorded happened at normal monthly meetings with the agenda of the 
previous months meeting including an explicit discussion about my authority 
to record the events verbatim. 
 
I emphasise the mirror holding nature of this work and the questions this 
raises and the most suitable structural model for this is grounded theory 
(1967).  In addition, what excites me about grounded theory is that it analyses 
the data with no pre-conceived hypothesis.  Rather than searching for data 
that confirms or rejects my hypothesis, I can spend my time searching out the 
concepts behind “evidence based management” as they reveal themselves to 
my cohort of participants.  Maybe the answer or question is unclear, but I can 
conduct a study on the nature of evidence based decision making as it is 
judged and participated in by NHS managers.  A possible criticism of 
grounded theory is a lack of rigour due to careless interview techniques and 
the introduction of bias.  On the other hand, a working awareness of bias is 
imperative in all interview research and as long as the researcher genuinely 
has discarded any preconceived ideas before collecting and analysing data 
then the interview technique is a neutral tool.  For me, I have long gone past 
the point of wanting to introduce or reject evidence based management in the 
NHS – I simply wish to understand if, how, when and why it is used or rejected 
and to reflect that back to NHS managers themselves.  For this reason, 
grounded theory is an appropriate tool. 
 
After Rousseau 
 
The UK government (funder of the NHS) proposes an approach to 
management that involves executives making decisions through the provision 
of increased access to information and this is, in itself, consistent with the 
philosophy of evidence based medicine which features strongly in the 
compliance and governance process of clinical/medical care.  In practice the 
changing role of the executive in NHS management in this area is uncertain, 
despite being well researched as the literature review shows.  Despite the 
accountability of executives being very clear and that managers in the NHS 
are ideally placed between the aspirations of the public/taxpayer and 
practicing clinicians, they are still ultimately viewed as an addition to the 
medical-patient relationship rather than integral to it.   
 
Little in depth research has been done into the implications of the 
philosophical approach that a practicing group of senior executives in the NHS 
have to the work of the NHS itself and its bases in evidence based decision 
making.  I wish to pursue the work of Rousseau (2006) on the difference in 
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management response to management issues depending upon whether the 
decision maker was equipped with advanced knowledge of the effective 
implementation of Evidence Based Management or otherwise.  Sample 
selection for this testing of Rousseau in a field environment was essentially 
pragmatic, based upon people who knew me well enough to give frank 
disclosure, but not well enough to have perceptions about what I thought the 
“correct answer” is.  (I have no view on the “correct answer”). 
 
Elliot (2000) studied the paperwork of managers and clinicians in one region 
of the NHS and in depth interview and documentary analysis were used to 
collect evidence.  Elliot used the ‘one region’ method favoured in my research 
proposal for reasons of practical concern – time, money, co-ordination – and 
also because the concept of the region was meaningful in the NHS.  The 
region represented a natural cohort of NHS managers and a distinct area with 
a variable degree of autonomy from the Department of Health over how 
decisions about resource allocation are made. 
 
Giddens (2003) posed the point that - policy makers have to get something 
out of research if they are to use it.  Further, that it is necessary to consider 
which arguments are likely to be useful or gratifying to which policymakers.  
Giddens makes the point, significant for myself as an NHS employee studying 
the NHS, whilst part funded by the NHS to undertake the academic course 
and research, that it is still valid for the researcher to influence policy makers 
through an extended process of communication. 
 
A synthesis from the literature of Rousseau proposes a juxtaposition of 
management decision making between systems that adopt evidence based 
management and those that avoid the use of research.  The questions 
proposed by Rousseau are worthy of further discussion with practicing NHS 
managers.  Some additional ideas were encountered in the literature review.  
Learmonth and Sambrook (2006) both say that the significance and 
implications of management language are an important part of this study, but 
it is difficult to continue to pursue this area within the conceptual framework.  
Conversely, Mello (2007) writes about the preoccupation of management with 
norms and averages and this “myth of the mean” is a particular branch of 
decision making tools that is possible to consider further.  At the core of the 
conceptual framework is an evidence based organisation of knowledge, and 
supporters of this school of thought are sceptical about experience or wisdom.  
Sherman’s model of grading evidence from weak to strong, based on rules of 
scientific inference, would say that Mello was correct.  In Sherman’s (2002) 
view a manager who uses evidence but then ranks this evidence against 
normative performance/behaviour is guilty of weak decision making just the 
same. 
 
Medicine is a success story as the first domain within the NHS to 
institutionalise evidence based practice.  The literature says that more than 
scientific insight is needed to create evidence based practice.  Guidelines do 
not of themselves, equate to evidence of implementation.  An evidence base 
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can only improve outcomes with adherence and therefore it is necessary to 
note that the heart of the conceptual framework (an evidence based 
organisation of knowledge) is only a partial proxy for applied evidence based 
decision making. 
 
Tony Kovner (2008) commissioned 14 case studies on management 
interventions in health care organizations using an evidence-based approach.  
Kovner found the managers did not follow a rigid template but made 
significant attempts to properly frame research questions, obtain evidence 
with a balance of viewpoints represented, decide whether the intervention 
could be adapted to their organization, analyze what it took to make the 
intervention actionable, and consider whether further evidence was needed. 
 
The interventions involved: emergency preparedness, leadership 
development, the chief learning officer, forming a corporate university, criteria 
for hospital evacuation, chronic care management, improving pain 
management, improving health of underserved children, the business case for 
a hospital palliative unit, state Medicaid management, quality management in 
home health, inpatient planning, and improved operating room scheduling.  
The authors and editors of these cases studies believe that managers in these 
context had better evidence than is customary in considering these 
management interventions. 
 
Kovner concluded that evidence-based management is not widely used by 
health care managers for the following reasons;  first, the business case for 
return on investment has not yet been reliably made.  Second, widespread 
use would shift power away from senior toward junior managers.  Third, 
hospital boards do not regularly review the quality of the managerial decision-
making process.  David Fine suggests that in the field of management, unlike 
clinical medicine, students are not taught to value and depend on studies as 
physicians are, and in part because of the lower priority, there are fewer 
studies done. 
 
Whatever the merits of evidence-based medicine, it got off to a rocky start.  
When Guyatt began championing it back in the 1990’s, he called it “scientific 
medicine,” but he learned quickly that if you want to start a revolution, it helps 
to pick the right slogan.  Many of his colleagues were outraged by the implied 
insult to their expertise.  So he quickly went with “evidence-based”, and 
tempers cooled. 
 
Little in depth research has been done into the implications of the 
philosophical approach that a practicing group of senior executives in the NHS 
have to the work of the NHS itself and its bases in evidence based decision 
making.  I wish to pursue the work of Rousseau on the difference in 
management response to management issues depending upon whether the 
decision maker was equipped with advanced knowledge of the effective 
implementation of Evidence Based Management or otherwise.  Sample 
selection for this testing of Rousseau in a field environment was essentially 
pragmatic, based upon people who knew me well enough to give frank 
disclosure, but not well enough to have perceptions about what I thought the 
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“correct answer” is.  (I have no view on the “correct answer”). 
 
Grounded theory and qualitative material 
 
The overall aim of this research model is to enhance good practice in the craft 
of management in the NHS. To achieve this aim my objective in this piece of 
qualitative research is to conduct a systematic investigation into current 
perceptions of evidence based management including perceived barriers to its 
use and also including perceptions of good practice in the use of evidence 
based management.  It was also necessary to begin to ascertain perceptions 
of skill deficits in this area and factors viewed as contributions to these 
deficits.  The effect of the researcher as an observer is unknown.  It could 
have an effect on the interviews and it may inhibit parties who participated in 
the review of meetings.  A further limitation of the study is that I only included 
leaders from within the NHS East Midlands and it is possible that NHS regions 
may be more or less equipped to engage in a discourse about evidence 
based management.  The strength of this study is that observation and 
participation with individuals and the groups by the researcher on an ongoing 
basis in the NHS in East Midlands increase the credibility and trustworthiness 
of the findings. 
 
Even champions of evidence-based practice acknowledge that the approach 
has limits.  “Some things can’t be tested in randomzed trials, and some things 
are so obvious, they don’t need it, “says Dr. Paul Glasziou, director of the 
Center for Evidence-Based Medicine in Oxford, England.  (2007) There have 
never been randomized trials to show that giving electrical shocks to a heart 
that has stopped beating saves more lives than doing nothing, for example.  
Similarly, giving antibiotics to treat pneumonia has never been rigorously 
tested from a scientific point of view.  It’s clear to everyone, however, that if 
you want to survive a bout of bacterial pneumonia, antibiotics are your best 
bet, and nobody would want to go into cardiac arrest without a crash cart 
handy.  “Where randomized trials are most important is where you’re trying to 
affect a long-term condition, like stroke or cancer, “Glasziou says. 
 
Finally, the very definition of evidence-based medicine is something of a 
moving target.  Physicians who encouraged their female patients to take 
hormone-replacement therapy to prevent heart problems later on were 
practicing a kind of evidence-based medicine, since the best available 
evidence at the time – observational studies and the like suggested a benefit.  
Of course, when a randomized controlled trial showed otherwise, the advice 
changed.  Even at that, the case is not entirely closed.  Some researchers 
now believe there may be a window of opportunity right around the years of 
menopause during which hormone-replacement therapy could help the heart.  
Proving that would, naturally, require another study. 
 
All the same, few people deny that the trend in medicine is increasingly to be 
guided, if not governed, by the date an idea that is spreading to other fields as 
well.  Evidence-based practice is now being taught in nursing, general 
education and even philanthropy, thanks to the influence of the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation, a results-based group if ever there was one.  You 
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could see even the political fights over global warming as the birth pangs of 
the new practice of evidence-based policy. 
 
But it is in medicine that the practice will have the most emotional impact.  All 
patients would probably benefit if their doctors were abreast of the latest data, 
but none would benefit from being reduced to one of those statistical points.  
“You have to be able to take a good history and do a physical examination,” 
Guyatt says.  “And you have to have an understanding of patients’ values and 
preferences.”, there is still as much art to medicine as there is science.   
 
Revealing the role of the manager in the NHS 
 
Five in depth interviews were held with leading managers in the NHS.  Three 
meetings of senior NHS managers in the East Midlands were also recorded.  
Interviews were transcribed verbatim and interpreted with the aid of template 
analysis based on the Rousseau model as summarised above.  The 
interviews and the meetings were structured around three major themes from 
this analysis concerning the extent to which the participant believed evidence 
based practice is a norm or an ideal, what tools they and other NHS 
managers actually used and whether public and politicians want decisions 
made on the basis of the best evidence possible.  Let me start the reporting of 
this interview with two of the leaders who have been on both sides of the 
clinical and managerial debate, starting as clinicians but latterly attaining real 
top jobs as executives. 
 
Right, well I think in medicine, it’s sort of the norm in that there is a real status 
to understanding the evidence base in medicine, so the medical hierarchy is 
based on a sort of expert model, if you know the most, you’re the most 
important and so they work very hard to demonstrate that they know the 
evidence base; you see it in junior doctors particularly, they are very keen to 
say, not just that they know what they’re doing but that …d…d…d….d – 
here’s the evidence base to support it and therefore promote me!  That’s the 
sort of view you get. (Respondent 5 is a doctor of some seniority working 
outside of the hospital environment who has transferred to a managerial role 
by career progression but is well respected by colleagues for technical 
understanding of medicine). 
 
For senior managers, oh I suppose consultants in the Health Service, it’s a 
kind of expected thing, but that’s all about the management of patients; and 
although people profess that, if you really pin them down on the evidence, a 
lot of the time the evidence is not what’s supporting it, it’s a sort of dogma 
around the subject that often isn’t challenged very often, and I think that’s one 
of the reasons we have lots of variations in clinical practice, because the 
evidence 20 years ago, is know very well by some consultants, and they’ve 
carried on doing the same thing regardless of what’s happened. (5 again, this 
time revealing one of the hidden aspects of  this dispute between doctors and 
managers – whether evidence still counts as evidence over time or whether its 
value diminishes rapidly, more rapidly than career progression). 
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You write a letter to an MP and you can get an intervention tomorrow can’t 
you so!  But they don’t want to intervene based on evidence though, they 
want to intervene based on electoral support.  Ok.  So if you look at the things 
that’ve been prioritised by Health Secretaries lately, they’ve all been around 
what the public say they want; the public say they want cleaner hospital, 
they’re frightened, so that’s top of the list; they want shorter waiting times, ok, 
so that’s top of the list.  And, what’s the latest one, I don’t know, but anyway, 
that’s how it works – they haven’t looked at the whole system, what does 
reducing the waiting time to a certain level do to the rest of the system, what 
things are not prioritises as a result?  So they haven’t taken a scientific 
approach to what would make things better. (5 in response to a question 
about whether there was any respect for evidence based decision making 
amongst political leaders). 
 
I think that’s a very narrow definition of management …carry on…..to me, 
that’s a definition of planning.  My definition of planning is about ensuring that 
those who have responsibility for resource and allocation, do so in an 
informed manner, that’s almost the same as what you’ve called management 
– the allocation of resources, scarce resources.  To me, management is the 
function of achieving organisational, or achieving the objectives which are set 
for you, you do that by management, and that can be about resources, it can 
be about resource utilisation, it can be about service provision, it can be about 
moving the chair from one side to the other, moving 100 chairs, I think you 
need management tools, techniques and processes, and that to me is what 
management is about, it’s about a set of tools, techniques and processes 
which achieve an objective.  (Respondent 4 is a clinical who, though 
successful in that arena, decided to move into a more generalist managerial 
role rather than lead a team of clinicians.  He is answering a question about 
whether their skill set acquired in clinical settings had benefited their 
managerial practice.  The respondent disagrees with my concept of 
management). 
 
Grounded theory and qualitative material 
 
The overall aim of this research model is to enhance good practice in the craft 
of management in the NHS. To achieve this aim my objective in this piece of 
qualitative research is to conduct a systematic investigation into current 
perceptions of evidence based management including perceived barriers to its 
use and also including perceptions of good practice in the use of evidence 
based management.  It was also necessary to begin to ascertain perceptions 
of skill deficits in this area and factors viewed as contributions to these 
deficits.  The effect of the researcher as an observer is unknown.  It could 
have an effect on the interviews and it may inhibit parties who participated in 
the review of meetings.  A further limitation of the study is that I only included 
leaders from within the NHS East Midlands and it is possible that NHS regions 
may be more or less equipped to engage in a discourse about evidence 
based management.  The strength of this study is that observation and 
participation with individuals and the groups by the researcher on an ongoing 
basis in the NHS in East Midlands increase the credibility and trustworthiness 
of the findings. 
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The use of qualitative material as a quantitative person 
 
Accountants do not traditionally deal with qualitative data such as whether a 
patient was happy or sad or whether it looked like to him, that his father would 
die when a patient brought him to the emergency service.  Qualitative data is 
not objective.  It cannot be reliably verified.  Quantitative data can often be 
verified – you can see the evidence on paper that it is correct.  Accountants 
like myself, like things to be clear and unambiguous, for there to be no doubt, 
for the amounts presented to be clearly verifiable.  In this document and 
throughout document 3 and document 4, I will be following a reflective journey 
concerned with the need to be more flexible, more willing to embrace new 
sources of data from qualitative sources.  There is still a problem that I face 
through traditional research designs usually rely on a literature review leading 
to the formation of a hypothesis.  The literature review (this document) has 
not, however, helped me to create a test capable of experimentation in the 
real world as I had hoped.  I have read about grounded theory and discourse 
analysis and hope that they may prove appropriate tools to keep some 
discipline and structure in my thesis despite the problems I am facing. 
 
The literature review offers the following insights. 
 
Discourse analysis (1952) is defined as “concerned with the interrelationships 
between language and societies and as concerned with the interactive or 
dialogic properties of everyday communication”.  To this are added two 
subdivisions – genre and ideology.  All of this is relevant in my study of 
management in the NHS because of genre and ideology.  What is vital for the 
reader to understand as we progress on to the analysis of a specific decision, 
is that, without retro-fitting onto my material there was something that I hadn’t 
anticipated, that a real human narrative evolves and in the conclusion I use 
the Rousseau model to reveal that however the manager feels about 
‘evidence’ as useful in their day to day behaviour they think they are playing a 
different game. 
 
Through critical thinking or philosophy about the condition of management has 
existed throughout the study of NHS management, I find discourse analysis 
as created by Zellig Harris very useful in the analysis of the interviews I 
undertook.  Harris was a true innovator because he maintained that the ‘sense 
making’ or classification system used is more subjective interpretation that is 
conditioned by social surroundings and the dominant ideas of its time.  
Alternative writers such as Poster (1990) or Steele (1997) say that discourse 
analysis is actually impossible to do with my level of training in the subject.  
Such alternative writers take a fundamentalist position, that with my 
interviews, discourse analysis cannot provide definitive answers and the best I 
can hope to achieve is an insight about any continuous debate but that it 
would lack conclusion or authority.  For me though, what Harris offers is a 
useful low technology tool that can lead to a fundamental change in the 
“practice of an institution, a profession or even society as a whole” (Harris).  I 
also like the Harris method because ultimately it showed that it could evolve 
from its low technology source.  It was developed into a system for computer 
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analysis of natural language by New York University (NYU) and in particular 
applied to medical informatics.  Known as the Medical Language Processor, it 
is widely used in the field of evidence based medicine which ignited my 
original concept of a study of evidence based management in the NHS. 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF A PARTICULAR DECISION 
 
How was the particular decision bounded? 
 
Investigating the criteria used to assess the quality of a decision is a key 
objective of the research presented here.  The way in which evidence is 
assessed is closely related to the perceived status and credibility of the 
evidence itself.  It is possible to provide an idea of some broad areas the 
respondents seemed to take into account when assessing the quality of the 
evidence.  The following comments reflect the extent to which the evidence 
reflects technical expertise in this area and also the neutrality of judgement 
when faced with the evidence.  I chose to focus on a particular decision.  The 
cohort being followed were charged with conducting a deep clean of clinical 
areas in the NHS in response to high profile media and political concerns 
about infection rates and the effect they were having on patients.  The worst 
outcome for patients is for those with poor health and reduced immunity due 
to a range of factors (age, diet, morbidity) that proximate exposure to these 
infections would in fact kill them.  That much was agreed by the cohort but the 
decision was around the way they approached the instructed solution of a 
‘deep clean’, and the extent to which the assessment of the quality of 
evidence is used in that decision.  A subset of this observation is the extent to 
which the use of evidence is seen as intuitive decision making rather than the 
systematic application of criteria. 
 
Turning first to respondent 4 who is, you will remember, a clinician who moved 
to management early on in their career. 
 
Who should determine the evidence, I mean, you used a very, almost, the 
answer’s in the library approach, is that right, is it people who are skilled in 
research techniques, is it academics, who is it that gathers the evidence?  
Well I think the evidence does tend to be gathered by academics, but then 
there’s a body of evidence which is experiential and gathered up by the 
individual.   (4 what he is saying is that the answer to deep clean might be 
something that universities can be equipped to design solutions for there is 
something even more important in the role of the individuals that interprets 
and develops the academic model.  Remember here we are talking about 
‘deep cleaning’ to rid hospitals of deadly bacteria – a decision more closely 
related to laboratory control than most clinical interventions and yet the sense 
that it isn’t quite the whole picture prevails). 
 
The bare below the elbows thing – ok – I was in a Board meeting with my 
Chairman, where he was adamant we’d got this letter from Alan Johnson 
saying that all hospital workers should be bare below the elbows, so they 
shouldn’t have watches and rings on and things like that, so that it would 
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promote hand washing and it would reduce infection, he was adamant that, 
this is what the Health Secretary says therefore it’s policy, and we must do it, 
and he wanted us to write out to every clinician telling them that we’re going to 
do this and we’re going to come in and do spot checks in hospitals.  (5, our 
eminent doctors, rebuts the policy that his own boss is using.  5 demonstrates 
a deep despondency with his bosses response to politicians and glumly 
reflects on the lack of evidence for the policy!). 
 
Next, we turn to our first recording of a group response.  Group responses are 
always bound by a box in this report to enable the reader to understand that 
such things were said in a meeting, rather than by one person.  In a meeting, 
ideas diverge and converge and the linear pattern I give to the quote is a 
faithful representation of the idea, but that the people speaking may have 
been numerous. 
 
3 is a group of people who meet monthly to review how their own 
organisational response to the NHS might work with other NHS organisations 
to smooth any avoidable conflicts and contradictions.  Remember that, 
although all part of the NHS system, these people are executives in charge of 
statutorily independent authorities and accountable to the public as such. 
 
And I went to the Chief Execs column ergo, seminar in London, David 
Nicholson (the Chief Officer of the NHS nationally)  was up on his feet and he 
said, I go round the country, and he said, some people would rather have an 
argument with me about whether there is any evidence base about deep 
cleaning, than get on and do it, they need to just do it.   I thought, what an 
arrogant pig that man is; well he isn’t, because he’s a great guy, but from their 
perspective, they have a different viewpoint on the world, their viewpoint is, 
the public have lost confidence in the NHS, the public must have their 
confidence restored in the NHS for their own good and for the good of the 
politicians.  (What is of note here is that the whole group of 3 reflects what 
respondent 5 said that the policy was more important than the evidence.  In 
fact, the de-facto top manager in the NHS was saying so and despite some 
initial disquiet about the personal motives of David Nicholson, even he is 
distanced from the politicians in the implementations of policy.  Ultimately, the 
political imperative is and was respected though). 
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So you need to disentangle the means and the end, and focus on the end, so 
I guess the end in this case was restore public confidence, and it might have 
looked like strange move, like throwing money down the drain, strange way of 
improving the service, but in the eyes of the department, it was getting there, 
but what they sometimes fail to acknowledge is down at my level, the 
credibility is then so low.  (6 – the same subject, but discussed at another 
meeting a week later, 6 are a different, but similar group to 3 and they reflect 
two things.   One, that a week later the group are a lot calmer than 3 about the 
lack of evidence for the policy, but two, they demonstrate more concern that 
the level they are operating at – though still very high – is a level at which the 
politicians ‘just do it’ imperative is beginning to lack credibility). 
 
Did the decision lend itself to evidence? 
 
Different managers agreed that clinicians, their staff and indeed the politicians 
(perceived to be the source of this objective) needed to be exposed to multiple 
interpretations of why this decision was made.  Conversations with politicians 
concentrated on what was going on ‘out there’ in the media and the public 
discourse of the problem/decision.  Conversation with clinical staff often 
concentrated on the issue of the perception about what had caused this 
decision and differences between professionals interpretations of the 
solution/causes of the decision.  The decision did lend itself to evidence, but 
the conclusion from the views expressed by the interviewees is that 
consideration of the evidence in making a decision was both vital and in fairly 
short supply.  There was a thematic response that any evidence used in the 
decision should derive from both an outline theory of the nature of the 
problem, but relate closely to the practice of NHS management that means 
that given the potential lack of general management expertise in the area, any 
evidence ought to be accessible to NHS managers if they were to paint an 
organisational map that helped them to make decisions. 
 
And that’s typical of a political response, and the medical view of that is 
absolutely damming, and the difference view is that the politicians are saying 
– look – we know this works it’s completely sensible, the politicians want it to 
happen, we know the public want it to be done; what’s so special about these 
doctors that they can’t wear short sleeved shirts and just do it for the patients’ 
benefit.  And it’s not acceptable for them to say no, they should just do it, and 
we can manage this, we can make it happen.  (1 returns to the earlier 
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concerns that 5 had about short sleeved shirts.  1 though, if not a doctor, but a 
practicing manager, who comes from a non-NHS background in industry, but 
one has been a ground breaking respected NHS executive/leader for 7 years 
now). 
 
Well, it’s an interesting thing, I mean, I guess I’ve learnt a bit over this, we all 
got it and went, how ridiculous is that, you know, do they think we don’t deep 
clean areas, you deep clean it, and the minute somebody sets foot in it it’s 
contaminated, it’s stupid, witter, witter as you do.  (7 is a group of people 
tasked with the actual implementation at the sharp end.  They have roles that 
have given them accountability for operational delivery of this policy in clinical 
environments). 
 
And it is clean, we threw some measures at it, we’ve increased our antibiotic 
prescribing policing, we put a half time post in there, we’ve made such a 
saving on the antibiotic prescribing alone, that we’ve made that up to full time 
now and it’s still releasing cash which we are putting into cleaning; so I’m not 
looking to take money out, I’m looking to reinvest it, the place is a lot cleaner. 
(1 manages to take a pragmatic and organisationally beneficial response – a 
cleaner hospital – to a policy which, as a member of 3 (group) he would have 
accepted was flawed from an evidence base). 
 
The uniforms are important, because that’s about visibility, so that’s what we 
are doing internally.  (1 deliberately develops this opportunistic response.  The 
public has in its mind a fixed view that dirty uniforms or uniforms worn outside 
of hospital, contribute to the spread of infection.  Whilst disagreeing both 
individually and collectively as part of 3 with the evidence, respondent 1 is 
again willing to take the opportunity to make some pragmatic and necessary 
changes to maintain public confidence). 
 
I asked the individual executives about how they had appointed the person to 
do this job.  What were the characteristics of success they sought for this job.  
Respondent 2 is somebody who has occupied top executive roles in the NHS 
for the last 20 years and is, in this case, commenting upon somebody who is a 
member of group 7. 
 
They all did their numeracy test, their verbal reasoning, and went through 
some 1:1 interviews, 15 minute talk when I told them what I wanted, and then 
they went through a formal interview.  The person who scored the highest on 
the numeracy, never had a chance at the job because he didn’t have the 
personality; the one who scored the highest on verbal reasoning, was ok, but 
would never have convinced people of the direction to go in; ‘A’ scored pretty 
badly on both, had a blazing interview and she got the job on personality and 
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potential.  I only ever appoint people who can’t do the job, because if they can 
do the job I won’t appoint them because they have no where to go.  (2, so it is 
very clear that personality is considered a vital attribute in carrying out this 
policy and that the individual who carries out the implementation must have 
developmental capacity.  Worth noting is that 2 is pragmatic about how the 
leader for the task is chosen and whether evidence was of any relevance to 
the policy anyway). 
 
Take infection control, because you mention that as being one of the greatest, 
ambitious gains be this government over the next six months to try and 
restore public confidence, but as you’ve said, no real evidence base, that 
anything we’re doing is going to affect the world, how does that play out 
because you clearly identify yourself as wanting to give the public confidence 
in you being a good custodian of their health service, versus the method that 
would do that is not really evidence based.  No it isn’t, and what we’ve done is 
made, we’ve taken some decisions none of which were evidence based. (2) 
 
In summary, I will leave my answer to whether the decision lent itself to 
evidence to my respondent 4 – the clinician in the past. 
 
And we’ve seen that already, time after time, the decision on cleaning wards, 
deep cleans, is not an evidence based decision, it’s a decision based around 
context as much as anything else.  I agree, it’s good, it’s cheap actually, it 
improves the reputation of the NHS and gets the public off our back, around 
something that evidence will say will always be there called MRSA, it’s 
actually not bad, the fact is a bad decision on one bit of evidence; so I think 
subjectivity and judgement of different evidence to make decisions is a real 
subtle art.  (4, I emphasise again that bacteraemia are laboratory tested and 
counted.  This is as near to medicine – by – numbers as it is possible to find in 
the NHS in 2008 and yet there was no agreement that evidence clinically 
backed the managerial response.  But it was accepted as the right thing to do 
despite explicit knowledge by managers that this was the case). 
 
Links back to Rousseau and my learning process are available in many ways: 
 
This has changed the way I see things in the following ways.  Rousseau starts 
from a principle that Evidence Based Management will enhance the overall 
quality of organisational decisions through deliberative use of relevant and 
available scientific evidence.  What is omitted is that NHS managers have a 
vast behavioural science base relevant to effective management practice on 
which to draw and yet they choose or one forced to choose by politicians, 
experimentation and redesign of practices, structures and remuneration that 
reflect on ever changing (dynamic) social value and mission for the NHS.  
Therefore, what Rousseau overlooks for the NHS is that the single most 
important part of Evidence Based Management in the NHS is educating 
current and future managers and politicians in power and politicians in waiting 
about evidence-based practices applied in running the NHS.  I am a clear 
supporter of the Rousseau method to describe the world with/without an 
evidence base but it is not sufficient in itself without using organisation such 
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as the NHS Institute and HHS Library as a repository of cares and tools that 
can inform the distribution of evidence based management in the NHS. 
 
If anybody else takes on this research I would start with a tighter definition of 
the area to be considered.  Whilst in an earlier literature review it was 
important to contextualise all of the players in the NHS using the “decision 
making box” it is clear from that work that evidence has different meaning to 
taxpayers – the media – patients – politicians and NHS managers.  The 
Canadian Health Education and Research Foundation, the centre for Health 
Management Research and the Health Research and Educational Trust of the 
American Hospital Association all have structures to begin building 
management communities promoting Evidence Based Management.  My 
recommendation is that a future researcher working with a similar cohort in 
this area asks the question of whether their study group has the 
characteristics of a receptiveness to EBM that would enable them to 
undertake just such an initiative.   
 
It is possible to block out or be more blinkered about Rousseau in the 
following ways, like evidence based medicine the Rousseau model needs to 
consider that the professional is not a robot.  Education about the method still 
requires judgement in its application.  The NHS manager must also consider 
the circumstances of the decision and the ethical concern that the 
management decision may provoke.  For example, immediately prior to a 
general election is not an easy time for an NHS manager to promote the idea 
that the NHS might improve its efficiency by paying cash incentives to drug 
users to attend Methadone clinics but to deny the ability of a woman to top-up 
her cancer treatment by co-payment for drugs.  Whilst both decisions may be 
made by contemporary NHS Chief Executives on the basis of a developing 
evidence base relevant to effective management practice neither decision 
alone (and definitely not when they are juxtaposed) will be considered 
appropriate to the circumstances of an election nor ethically appropriate when 
portrayed by the media.  So I would be more blinkered about finding out what 
parts of the ‘time’ horizon it is appropriate to take a Rousseau type decision in.  
In this way, it is important to remember that Rousseau is only describing an 
hypothetical NHS organisation that uses Evidence Based Management wildly 
in contrast to the same organisation as a hospital provider where Evidence 
Based Medicine will most likely actually exist.   
 
What 5, the eminent doctor, brings to the discussion about evidence, is that it 
is bought into at one level but not implemented.  5 returns to a theme used 
earlier by him, that evidence needs not only to be relevant to the decision, but 
time sensitive as well.  Here he discusses the causes of hospital acquired 
infection and whether it was preventable. 
 
I know in several cases clinicians sat down with the architects and drew in 
what needed to be done, but of course, by the time the PFI arrives, it’s all 
been taken out through cost savings, so the doctors’ view is, so you managers 
are putting us in this position, in conditions which predispose to hospital 
acquired infection, you won’t do any of the things of which there’s a very good 
evidence base that it would make a difference, and so your first engagement 
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with us, is to come and tell us to do something for which there is no evidence 
that any infection has been prevented, anywhere in the world – ever – by 
doing this, and you think that’s the most important thing that we should do.  
Furthermore, you’re effectively saying it’s our fault, you’re blaming us for the 
infections, when actually it’s all your fault!  (What 5 has done here is to draw 
together two ideas seen earlier – that an idea needs to use evidence, but 
evidence can be too early to be c** or too late to still be valid.  5 concurs with 
the idea that 3, 1 and 6 had that the politicians damage managerial credibility). 
 
Yes, I think the public as body public, would expect evidence based decision 
making, and quite rightly expect that, and would want it as well.  I think the 
public as Joe-individual probably would expect, would want it, but when it 
came to them, would probably bring in other subjective assessment criteria.  I 
think politicians are a bit different, and I don’t think, whilst they would probably 
in a purer discussion say, of course we do, I think they will always, and 
evidence is always driven by context, they would always want their policy 
implemented – evidence or not. (1, the industry transfer to the NHS concurs 
with 5 – anybody can buy into the idea but nobody wants to deal with the 
inconvenient application.  Further, I heard that:) 
 
Ok.  So the black and white, the gold standard, the RCT’s and so on, that is 
an academic gathering, and some of the big research studies, you know, we 
all go back to Mintzberg and all this sort of stuff don’t we?  So you look at 
some of the big bits of work that they’ve done, that is the academics, but I 
think there’s also something about as you move up through a career, you 
gather experiential evidence, because the context in which we’re all operating 
is continually changing, and none of us enjoy the context in which the 
research for x was done.  So, you know, the operating of the context in the 
NHS from the political to the economic to the sociological, never mind the 
technological, the demographic and all the other bits of changes that are 
happening. (4 is saying that there are good reasons why the RCT basis for a 
solution to hospital acquired infection may be scientifically robust but 
organisationally naive). 
 
Mainly for the good of the politicians, but, it would help the public if they didn’t 
feel scared to death every time they came into hospital.  Therefore, we must 
do something to restore that confidence, what shall we do? (3, the group 
acknowledges that the public are concerned with confidence rather than 
evidence, but what group 7 conclude is that with a little more patience, we 
could have restored public confidence and been scientifically robust). 
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So, what worries me about that is, was it for the public or was it for the 
politicians?  If it’s for the public, I think they’d have thought about it a bit 
longer, a bit harder and picked a better thing!  But then I’m just cynical!!  ( 7 )  
 
Finally, this issue of buying into the evidence at one level but not 
implementing it, is given a humorous twist by 2.  Maybe, evidence is only the 
retro-fitting of lunatics and prejudice after all. 
 
The number of times, and as an accountant you can probably relate to this, 
the number of times when you look at something, and you come out with the 
answer, and then you spend time working it up to demonstrate the answer’s 
right and question it, and when you get to the end of the process, you came 
up with the right number in the first place, and there is something inside 
people, I have this sort of belief that there is something inside your brain that 
assembles evidence (2   ) 
 
The decision making structure 
 
Managers demonstrated a world view in terms of their preference or otherwise 
for evidence-informed decision making.  The decision making structure was 
seen to reflect a theme that analysing, presenting and delivering this task 
within the NHS required considerable charismatic management not just an 
evidence based focus.  Occasionally the cohort singled out a specific group 
who in their eyes particularly needed help in understanding of and/or 
participating in the decision. 
 
The doctors’ view is, ok, 20 years ago, when you were building this hospital 
(because we’ve been here for 20 years, not 10 minutes), 20 years ago we 
said to you, the design of this wonderful new PFI was wrong, you’ve got too 
many beds for the footprint, so the beds are too close together, you get cross 
contamination, you can’t clean round the beds. Because there aren’t enough 
beds, you’ve got too faster through put, so people with infections are moved 
around the hospital.  (5  ) 
 
I don’t know who they asked, they picked the wrong things, but it kind of 
doesn’t matter, do you know what I mean?  If they are wanting to change 
perceptions, you know, if they said, paint your hospitals pink and it will deal 
with infection, we might have said what a load of crap, but if the public 
believed that pink hospitals were less likely to give them MRSA, it would have 
the desired effect.  (3) 
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I mean, I had this very argument with my technical directors, look, I said, look, 
if people will believe painting the hospital pink will make them safer, then we’ll 
do it.  I don’t care, that’s what we’ll do. (3, what is interesting here is that 
‘painting the hospital pink’ has quickly and previously entered the groups 
language as a shorthand for any method chosen to deal with this problem that 
is organisationally robust, but evidence weak). 
 
I’m a Chief Exec who is not one who will try to lead totally by charisma, I will 
try to do it by persuasion as well, and persuasion has a body of evidence 
behind it – even with my directors, when I want things to go different ways, I 
will often work with them on a 1:1 basis and show the evidence, so that I can 
get a quick decision later.  You know, and there’s something about, I think the 
evidence has got a role and responsibility.  (4 manages to show that evidence 
takes time to consider and that a speedy decision making process may 
necessitate protected time to consider the evidence.  That means implicitly 
that evidence does not inherently present to decision makers in an easily 
digestible form). 
 
1 makes a vital distinction about the nature of decision making in the following 
quotation.  When asked about who and who wouldn’t  use evidence he draws 
the answer towards whether you want to make a transformational change to 
the NHS or simply be a good leader in the mould of the NHS of that day. 
 
It’s interesting Nissan for an example, on their in-house college, they’re very 
clear at saying to people, good leaders will keep this company afloat, great 
leaders will write a new chapter in the history of this company; do you want to 
be a good leader, or a great leader – because they will train you to be both, 
but they ask them very, because you know, are you willing to have an 
ambition for writing a new chapter in the history of Nissan, or do you just want 
to be the person who keeps the shareholders happy.  ( 1  ) 
 
THE APPLICATION OF A VALUE SET AND DISCOURSE 
 
What part does blind prejudice play 
 
The implication of blind prejudice for the objective of enhancing good practice 
in NHS management are profound.  What we perceive as ‘good practice’ itself 
is called into question.  This would imply that there was error in the NHS 
managers themselves rather than the context in which they find themselves.  
Whilst there will be a blurred distinction between heuristics and prejudice the 
term ‘blind prejudice’ might most usefully be applied to ignoring any conformity 
with accepted good practice where evidence to inform the decision is simply 
not sought out.  The use of blind prejudice in this context is usually driven by a 
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desire to succeed in the political context – it is simply an exercise in power.  
There are many potential decision makers out there, but only so many posts, 
awards, organisations and years in a career and in the competition for 
resources and power, blind prejudice is simply a rejection of evidence where it 
does not enhance the standing of the individual decision maker.  The 
individual is required to be a strong leader, not an evidenced decision maker. 
 
And that’s kind of inevitable, but the way I kind of play managing this Trust, 
you know, if I see a journey, the way policy works, it’s seemingly, you know, I 
think we’re going there, the government says we’re going there, and all of a 
sudden, we’re off up here, or we’re off up there, or we’re going down here, 
and we’ll probably go back up there and then we’ll go down here. 
 
You know, my job I always think is to translate policies, a bit like a pendulum, 
know where it’s going to settle, and it, you know, somebody keeps bashing it 
and it’s swinging around, you know where it’s going to settle, and the trick is I 
think, to describe what’s happening, which may seem a little strange, you 
know, introducing competitions, subsidising competition.  (3 ) 
 
I can justify that to my organisation, in terms of it being the government 
wishing to give people choice, wishing to drive up quality, yes it’s tough, yes it 
has very difficult set of issues for us to handle, but they’re doing it because 
they want care to be better, and so you’re always describing the end point, 
and trying to make sense of it and what’s more trying to use it to get you to 
that point, and sometimes that means I sort of half ignore things I’ve been 
asked to do, or I throw myself at them with absolute huge enthusiasm 
because they seem to be going in the right direction. 
 
How do you think you respond to oratory? You know, if you see a great 
speech does it leave you cold, does it leave you questioning?  I can be 
admiring of it, I can be motivated by it on a good day, although I tend to be 
quite analytical and I reflect on things.  My nephew said the other day, we 
were going to see a film at the pictures, and he said he didn’t want to go with 
anyone, he wanted to go on his own, because he didn’t like talking about it 
afterwards, the way you all do, I think I’m a bit like that really, I like to kind of 
mull things over, and allow things to connect.  (3) 
 
Do you read at all?  Hardly ever, only on holiday; I never read papers, never, 
I only open the pages quickly in the Health Service Journal.  I used to read the 
Health Service Journal more than I do, but now I just sort of flick over the 
news and see what’s in there, and put them in a pile to read until it falls over, 
and I throw them in the bin! – recycling, nowadays.  (3  ) 
 
We had a doctor here say to us, we don’t have to comply with the Health Care 
Commission standards because we’re not a hospital!  What’s that about?  
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Yes.  What end is that a means to?  Certainly wasn’t about better patient care.  
The trouble is I think, we half bake the rules and that’s even worse than not 
having any at all because people can make things fit.   (3  ) 
 
Trillion times more complicated than a car engine, but there is no manual for 
the NHS, so I kind of take the view that there is no evidence on which you can 
call; when you evidence assess drugs, I mean there are lots of drugs you use 
for lots of different things, but it’s only evidence when you’ve tested it in 
circumstances in which you want to draw a conclusion – ok – so it’s got to be 
the drug in that category of patients, and not the same drug in a different 
category of patients, so it’s very specific, and we never, ever have that. (3   ) 
 
So as a reader I conclude that the cohort will use clinical evidence, I think 
managers are very much into the development of clinical pathways, working 
with clinicians and doing the best things in the best way.  But as to how the 
NHS works, the sort of infrastructure, where services are located, how they’re 
delivered, I don’t conclude that they do use evidence, I observe there is some, 
scientific evidence in there, they’ll look at journey times, and they’ll look at 
volume, populations and the needs of that population (not been done very 
well until fairly recently).  So they’ll do that sort of thing, but a lot of the 
decisions that are made, seem to be based more on history, on the views of 
politicians and key stakeholders, which are often not really evidence based.  
 
So what I as reader need to be careful on evidence of course, as always, is to 
make sure it doesn’t just fit in with their own values and your own beliefs and 
actually be a bit more critical about that appraisal.  That’s one of the reasons 
for having a narrative conversation, is so that you don’t have to pull all your 
sources out at the same time, but the method seems to have gained some 
understanding of the role of blind prejudice.  To conclude from group 6.   
 
I think in organisational change type evidence around management tools, 
techniques, where the evidence can often be seen to be quite a subjective set 
of evidence, or the context when it was developed, might have been different 
from today – yes you know, the evidence around change management is, 
there’s lots of articles, lots of books and lots of research around change 
management, in my mind they come down to two things, one is it’s like a 
pendulum, you push it bloody hard and it will finish up where you want it, or 
the other way you just gently nudge it to where you want it.  Now, they are two 
total extremes, but you can find the evidence for both approaches.  (6) 
 
The acceptance or rejection of challenges that don’t fit the value system 
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Let me start this section with a quotation from ‘4’ who swapped between 
clinical and management roles. 
 
I think my need for an evidence base would have been different at different 
stages in my career; the fact I’ve come up the clinical route, I hope I’ve use an 
evidence base for my clinical work previously.  I’ve sought an evidence base 
for the interventions I’ve made to make things work and happen differently 
throughout my career, because it seems to me, if it’s worked somewhere else, 
ie, there’s evidence it’s actually helped somebody else gain objective or reach 
an objective, it’s probably worth trying here.  So the evidence might not be 
gold standard evidence, but there is some evidence base to what I do.  So I 
think that probably never peaked, but since I’ve been in management roles, I 
think I’ve always had, and considered evidence for the way I operate and what 
I do.  (4) 
 
Maybe a way to view this is that rather than viewing evidence based practice 
as squeezed out of the prevailing value set of NHS managers, it is anticipated 
that evidence based decision making may become the mainstream approach 
of the near future.  There is a need therefore to review how the NHS 
managers recorded accept or reject challenges that don’t fit the prevailing 
value system, how do values adapt?  If the NHS is living through an era that 
does not favour one or more potential methods of decision making this may 
be temporary.  How does NHS management introduce alternative approaches 
and consider whether they may become acceptable and even desirable.  Can 
the NHA managers allow themselves to have a critical account of their own 
management?  The record of the interviews says that this self critique is 
happening, but at the same time, the overall picture is one of the forces of 
orthodoxy maintaining the “status quo” (as portrayed in the Rousseau model).  
This, whilst it is possible to see that the NHS managers may be disposed to 
accept challenges that fit the value system, it is part of the natural balancing.  
None of the managers expressed a desire to explore the ‘eccentric’ (or 
abnormal) values that challenged the prevailing orthodoxy but they were 
willing to be flexible and accept challenges when they could point to 
something particular that prompted the change. 
 
At a particular point in the conversation this rejection of the rules, this 
acceptance in the executive was becoming clear so I asked an explicit 
question.  
 
Ok.  Do you think we back off, from the implementation of the rules 
sometimes?  I think we do, yes.  Well they are sort of political; some of it is a 
genuine means to an end, and I can see that: the reason we brought the 
private sector in and allowed them to be paid stupid amounts of money, is to 
get them in, and maybe the same as with practice based commissioning, now 
they’re talking about paying them tariff, albeit the same tariff at the very low 
end complex work, I suppose it’s a step in the right direction, but we usually 
do it because we’ve fallen flat on our face, rather than we ever had a grand 
plan.  (8, who was an executive recently arrived in the NHS after 3 years away 
in the private sector, and a successful 20 year NHS career beforehand).   
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So I asked the same question to 5 and there was broad agreement that 
sometimes the rules needed to be broken but because the rules themselves, 
although based on an orthodoxy were stupid! 
 
There was something Melvin Brag was whittling on about on the radio whilst I 
was driving, about people who believe there was black blood and red blood 
and all about bloods being out of balance, and they used to bleed you, oh for 
Gods sake!  But then we used to burn witches at the stake too didn’t we!  (4) 
 
This wasn’t the first time BBC radio 4 was used as a source of reference and 
this stimulated most noticeably a quotation I heard almost as an aside from 1 
when we were just starting our talk together. 
 
I’m just listening on audio, to the Blair Diaries from Alistair Campbell and I’m 
not so sure there, I haven’t got far enough into it, so great leaders, I think, do 
have an evidence base and do consider the evidence, whether they - keep on 
going back to it, how they then fit that into the context of the situation of where 
they are, I think decides on how much credibility they give to the evidence. (1) 
 
It became clear that these executives did not stand alone in their decision to 
accept or reject challenges to the prevailing orthodoxy, they were very 
concerned that ‘we’ (the cohort of NHS managers) had sometimes used the 
wrong benchmarks in assessing performance and evidence. 
 
Another thing is, we get complacent about, we compare ourselves with 
ourselves, we talk about world class commissioning but we never look at 
what’s happening in the world, we look at what’s happening down the road, so 
if you look at Children’s Services for example, our Children’s Services, our  
best Children’s Services are some of the best in the world, but our worst 
Children’s Services are terrible.  And if we look at outcomes compared to 
Europe, and the Unicef study compares us with most major economies, not 
just in Europe, and we’re right at the bottom of the heap for Children’s 
Services, why should that be, when we know that our best services are 
absolutely up there with the best. (5) 
 
To that end the self-critique is not just of their own approach to evidence, but 
a critique of whether the group they identified as we had got their own 
orthodoxy wrong and that they were trying to evolve an answer or change 
from within rather than shouting from outside the team. 
 
Finally, the conversations turned to people who were considered to be outside 
the value system.  Firstly the politicians and their motivations were seen as a 
major challenge to whether evidence based decision making was welcome. 
 
Politicians, do politicians want evidence based decision making for the NHS?  
No, they want to be elected, and that’s the bottom line, and as long as you 
remember that, then everything they do is completely understandable!    (5) 
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And then the public – who despite being patient, customer, taxpayer and 
friend to the NHS: 
 
The public has very limited perceptions as to what the NHS is, and if you say 
to people, just list me the NHS from 1-10, it’ll be ambulances, A&E, GPs, 
maybe surgery, and that’s about it.  Where’s drug and alcohol abuse, where’s 
mental health, where’s learning disabilities, where’s speech and language 
therapy, where’s GUM, aren’t anywhere to be seen, and that’s because as a 
society we foster it, don’t we, where are the bright lights, they’re on an 
ambulance, they’re outside A&E and the GP down the road, and of course on 
TV.  (2 were considered to have little to add to the evidence based debate not 
because they couldn’t cope with the debate, but that ‘they’, including it must 
be said, those who worked within the NHS in some cases, had a fundamental 
lack of insight into what the NHS down). 
 
Lastly, and probably telling in this consideration of challenges that don’t fit with 
the current system, is the sense that evidence based decision making cannot 
ever win the day by hegemony but it cannot be disregarded either. 
 
I’d expect them to do nothing which is contrary to the evidence………..ok, I’m 
interested now………firstly I’d not expect them to do anything that’s contrary, 
I’d expect them, if they don’t follow best practice, to have thought why not, and 
to be able to justify that to themselves, and therefore to the organisation.  (2) 
 
The hegemony of organisational structure – reproduction and 
transformation 
 
Managers in particular in this project, described a situation where their own 
control over the decision making process had been to some extent, lost 
through the requirements of audit and the promotion of certain themes 
consistently in the NHS.  Executives have to be seen to be performing in an 
overt and accountable way and their work must be visible and subject to audit 
and inspection.  A model of performance management is contrasted with 
maturity of thought and debate over the use of evidence.  The external 
pressure for conformity and consistency is seen to result in high quality 
decision making tainted by group think.  Managers cannot always dwell on 
particular topics or pursue the evidence base for what they are doing (or being 
told to do).  There is a pressure to be overtly productive in the presentation of 
solutions rather than consideration of evidence.  The interview and meetings 
material touches upon some of the complex relationships between established 
management culture, career needs of the managers themselves and the 
conduct of evidence based decision making.  The pressure to obtain 
recognition for both themselves and their organisation may encourage a 
pursue of more credible ‘target hitting’ and leaves insufficient time for a 
consideration of the evidence in shaping organisational structure.  In general, 
as described in this qualitative material, the current organisational form may 
discourage evidence based decision making and the need for reproduction 
will be perceived as less risky. 
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What I was really trying to say is, why I guess, why do we not have a think 
tank of credibility to have these debates, it always seems to come from a 
policy angle; no matter what the policy sub-group is called, you scratch below 
the surface and it’s always either right wing, left wing, drug funded, you know.  
There doesn’t seem to be an appetite for any environment within which this 
debate can actually happen. (5) 
 
Fashion.  The simple arcane practice of following the latest trend or idea, of 
importing behaviours from other societies was seen as damaging to an 
evidence based NHS.  In a way it is believed that evidence is crucial to an 
acceptance of organic (internally generated) change within the NHS, but even 
higher than evidence in the hierarchy is novelty or importation from other 
systems. 
 
I mean, we do have experience, we do have learning, we do have other 
places and other countries doing it differently to us, from which you can learn 
things, but it doesn’t mean that you can straight forwardly apply them.  And it 
fascinates me in a way, because we do the whole army of, the House of 
Commons is traipsing around the world visiting China and wherever.  When 
ever I meet our local MPs, they’ve always been somewhere abroad to learn 
how to do something, and yet, when we do find things that work, it was all 
Kaiser, wasn’t it?  Which was an integrated primary and secondary care 
service, and did we learn from it?  No!  You know, we almost steadfastly 
refused to accept that it might possibly work and it was worth considering, 
because it didn’t fit the positive framework of choice and competition.  (8) 
 
We put people in positions which are very difficult to back down from, and 
we’ve now exposed them in a way, and I think, the fear of world class 
commissioning will expose the leaders again, and that’s why people 
sometimes abreact when it’s suggested that we need to examine our own 
portfolios, our own evidence base, our own tool box, and actually check it’s 
correct for world class commissioning.  (4)   
 
But there was one part of the organisational transformation from importation of 
ideas that was widely admired – the model of foundation (semi-autonomy) 
trusts imported from Spain. 
 
One of the things that’s happened of course to FTs is that they’ve attracted a 
different calibre and type of Chief Exec, arguably.  I think, you know, we’ve 
advertised for two director posts lately and there are a lot of people who want 
to work for an FT…..ok………there are a lot of people moving out of Trusts 
that wont make it to FT status, so you could say, what we’ve been doing is 
sapping the best management resource out of the non-FTs to maintain the 
performance of the FTs.  We’ve also attracted, I think,  some quite different 
people in Non-Executive roles and Chair roles; the Chairs of FTs, a lot of them 
are, like the freedom bit, like the get on and do run a business thing.  (3) 
 
The key distinction between a leader who had risen in confidence and 
therefore had the ability to avoid simple replication, is that they were given 
protected time to personally develop. 
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I think there would be nine very close opinions of what management is, 
because I think leaders, or people who have got to leadership positions at any 
part of the organisation with some development behind them, as opposed to 
just by natural progression, tend to have been on development programmes, 
where they have spend a lot of time considering leadership as opposed to 
management.  Management is a tool and a technique, leadership is a bit more 
than that.  (4) 
 
Equally it was possible to distinguish a large amount of individual autonomy 
that would be given to and/or earned by people who worked even for some 
quite direct and authoritarian managers. 
  
And if somebody passionately believes that the answer’s right, then what I’ll 
never do to them is say ‘you’re wrong’; what I’ll say is, ‘well, just go away and 
have a think about this again’ and then sometimes you find they do come 
back and they’ve modified their view.  But I’m a big believer that when you put 
somebody in a position of, you know, authority to deliver, as one of your 
senior managers, you’ve got to give them their head, what you can’t allow 
them to do is to go off the edge, and I think one of the products about being at 
a place a reasonable amount of time, is that people know how to read you as 
well – this works both ways.  (2) 
 
So the question remains about whether the NHS approach to evidence is 
borne of a desire to reproduce by template expected behaviours or is capable 
of changing through transformational leadership.  One answer is: 
 
You know I mentor a lot of people and a lot of them are Directors in PCTs and 
over the years I’ve watched them do fantastic things, and I’ve watched them 
being stopped from doing fantastic things, because some rule book says it’s 
not allowed; do you know what I mean?  Yes.  I find it sad, I mean, and the big 
picture is probably, you know, progress, the little picture depressingly irritating 
backwards steps.  (8) 
 
But even 8, who looked for the transformational leader returns to the problem 
identified by 2 – you may want the manager to make transforming decisions 
but the executives wants them to be the same decisions they would have 
made. 
 
Well, he reminded me what the end was, that’s what he ultimately did, he kind 
of made me think about what they were trying to do, yes they did it in a cack-
handed, stupid, I wouldn’t have done it that way, kind of a way, but given that 
that’s what they were trying to do, it was really not helpful for us to jump up 
and down and say ‘there’s no evidence for this’, because it undermines the 
whole investment programme they’ve put in place, which wasn’t adding any 
value to anybody, it was just making it wasted money, instead of possibly 
purposeful money.  (8) 
 
In summary, this section, whilst leading to few conclusions about the use of  
evidence does suggest that if evidence based management is to blossom in 
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managers in the NHS it will have to be given a foreign label, taught on 
management courses and lead to the same conclusions the boss wanted it to. 
 
How the system could learn, this is what my study so far has said 
 
Chief Executives and the elite managers of the NHS must be fellow travellers 
in the creation of the concept before they will be judged by it.  Whether they 
trust anybody else to lead this type of NHS management evolution is 
debatable.  Whilst it is not credible to say that the NHS is unique, and indeed 
none of the respondents said this, there is a particular refrain that it doesn’t 
compare to any other business.  Even if the manager or executive is relatively 
new to the NHS it does not take long for this cultural reference point to 
represent itself in their behaviour.  There is an innate nervousness about 
introducing a concept such as EBM to the NHS management structure, with a 
worry about how it will be perceived in the press and no recognisable 
communication method to ensure that their credibility is maintained or 
enhanced by fulfilling a commitment to EBM.  In order for a learning system to 
evolve around EBM the Chief Executive must engage with it emotionally 
displaying interest and pleasure in the message being cascaded.  The type of 
incentives not only include a demonstrated generation of public service ethos 
but also an emotional attachment and pleasure in autonomy, applause, status 
and plaudits for their organisation where it achieves its targets.  It is clear that 
money (personal or organisational) may help them to embrace an 
organisational approach to Evidence Based Management but that the benefits 
to patients makes them more responsive to system learning than money.  If 
Evidence Based Management were to find itself imposed upon rather than 
developed by Chief Executives and locum? Managers it is clear that they are 
skilled enough at organisational cascade to make it look that they find it 
palatable without actually making it happen. 
 
In order for the NHS managers to ‘learn’ then the contradictions and ambiguity 
that are thrown up need to be accepted without feelings of loss of status or 
embarrassment.  The essential contradiction with reference to Evidence 
Based Management is that the Chief Executives do value somebody holding 
the detail, somebody having a handle with what is going on but they 
themselves like to set direction with autonomy, expressing their judgement 
and decisiveness even when they confess to having little idea what is going 
on.  For example, the managerial response to policy may not be coherent 
when compared to the surplus or deficit financial position of the organisation.  
The managerial response from the Chief Executive need not take into account 
the best way to improve efficiency on an evidenced basis nor how to make 
investments on an evidenced basis (for example opportunity cost or Quality 
Adjusted Life Years QALY’s) only that they have an active leadership role in 
the decision.  So to the ambiguity inherent in adopting a learning approach to 
system development.   
 
Whilst as a researcher I was able to ask for clarification of particular aspects 
of the application of EBM, the elite manager must feel that a codification of 
EBM is not just adulterated into a form of Pedantic Control.  The traits that the 
Chief Executives and Senior Managers demonstrated were strong leadership, 
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setting a good example, negotiating and navigating the future and co-
ordinating disparate strands of policy into one coherent whole.  In order for 
EBM to rise above the change of pedantry into a system wide learning model 
it would have to enhance the ability to lead, negotiate, navigate and co-
ordinate.  The risks from adopting a learning system are to appear 
disengaged and not genuinely enthusiastic about looking at alternatives for 
each decision based only on best available evidence. 
 
So from this section is it possible to conclude that such a change cannot come 
from internal experience based actions or mangers sharing experience and 
evidence from current practice?  To be honest, that is the only conclusion that 
can be drawn.  Take this in the context for the introduction of a policy by a 
director that they know to be evidence based or the opposition for a policy 
known not to be evidence based by the same director.  It is imperative that the 
manager is prepared to respond to challenges based upon a conviction that 
evidence is ‘the best’ policy not simply using an evidence-based-approach 
common to the team. 
 
This result could be seen to be good from this perspective.  The Chief 
Executives are demonstrating intelligence.  The elite has shown the ability to 
interpret policy and understand the business but they are relying on heuristics 
to drive solutions.  The reason this is good is that leadership is visible, to an 
extent charismatic and essentially a valued commodity.  In order to portray 
this behaviour the executive or senior manager has shown the following 
competencies/behaviour. 
 
In order to steer a successful course without recourse to evidence they need 
to be all or some alchemy of the following – politically astute, decisive, 
hardworking on networks to extend and share political authority.  This 
demands in turn that they are perceived to be young in outlook, 
flexible/pragmatic, energetic and experienced.  All of these are attributable 
characteristics that leaders cannot acquire themselves – they are by definition 
attributed by others.  Crucially they are also consistent with the characteristics 
a Chief Executive or Senior Manager will want attributing.  There is one 
characteristic that this rejection of the Evidence Based Approach will attribute 
and that is ‘hard working’.  There is no doubt that evidence based decision 
support is not seen to be ‘hard work’ but equally it is not clear whether ‘hard 
working’ is a positive or negative connotation for the managers and 
executives.  On the other hand, a rejection of EBM could be seen to be bad 
from the following perspective. 
 
Despite a range of data sources, the organisation will struggle to assert that it 
is a demonstrable learning system or entity.  Given the complex/adaptive and 
evolutionary nature of organisational survival this inability to learn from the 
evidence is a drawback.  Decisive management without Evidence Base can 
evolve easily into autocracy and egocentric leadership.  Typically this will be 
bad in that decision making will essentially be short term as the time horizon 
without evidence about what works is at best 2/3 years (the possible time 
horizon of NHS organisation stability) but most likely the 12 months of the 
annual NHS planning and performance management cycle.  Significantly the 
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leader will design systems without the ability to learn from failure or weakness.  
Charismatic management characteristics demand the rejection or re-
interpretation of failures that deny the heroism of the leader.  Similarly the 
inability to learn from failure sets the decision making system of the NHS 
manager at odds with the medical and nursing equivalents that are at the 
clinical core of the very same organisation that they lead.  This will only 
continue communication and delegation and restrict decision making to an 
elite inner circle not a distributed evidence based allocation of power to 
different levels of decision makers. 
 
 
When is fine detail important to the decision? 
 
If evidence based practice is seen as something separate and distinctive from 
day to day decision making, then the prevailing management culture works 
against the objective of basing decisions on the basis of evidence.  On the 
other hand, evidence based practice may entail rejecting the accepted 
management orthodoxy and creating a separate quasi-autonomous enclave of 
interested practitioners.  The key to understanding this ‘community wide’ 
approach to evidence based decision making versus setting up evidence 
based practitioners as appellant micro communities, is the degree to which 
the cohort sample says fine detail is important to the decision.  It is not 
‘evidence base’ alone that determines the value set and the discourse – it is 
the extent to which the evidence base is taken down through organisational 
views to a granular level before a decision is made. 
 
The first part of fine detail that is important to the decision is what we must 
ask: not ‘do you understand the answer’? but ‘do you even know what the 
question is’. 
 
Because sixty thousand more people die each winter than in summer – why?  
At a journalistic level we’d say, well, of course they do it’s winter – it’s cold, so 
more people die in the cold, they don’t die of hyperthermia, they die of 
respiratory disease, more heart attacks.  We’d say, we can’t change the 
weather, that’s the way it is.  But, they don’t do that in Siberia, they don’t do 
that in Norway, they don’t do that in Sweden, Canada or Germany.   So 
places which have a worse winter than we do don’t have this, they have a little 
bit more mortality but not much, and it’s all down to poor housing policy, 
benefits, insulation, social care, primary care access, all of those things.  So if 
we were to look at it and say, ok, it’s a really big health issue, we could save 
sixty thousand lives a year.  I mean if sixty thousand people died in plane 
crashes a year what would we do?  We’d throw billions at it.  So it’s happening 
and we’re doing nothing, the answers are out there, other people are doing it 
– it’s very easy.  So that’s one example.  5, so, let’s compare that to the earlier 
discussion about deep cleaning of hospitals.  Managers found peace with the 
need for a structured political response by David Nicholson but here, in the 
case of winter death, he was avoiding even asking the question because the 
public wasn’t asking the question.  I therefore asked if that meant they thought 
Nicholson rejected evidence where is said uncomfortable things about 
subjects the public weren’t asking about.  The response: 
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I would suggest that he uses an evidence base for what he’s done and how 
he’s moved things forward, along with a set of personal beliefs, so I feel 
comfortable with that.  (4) 
 
And further I was satisfied that 4 was clear that Nicholson had to respond to 
each decision differently with a fine level of distinction between each. 
 
So, I think you can use interventions which often conflict.  Ok. (4) 
 
And in any case Nicholson was clearly not alone in using the public to get to 
the fine detail of a problem.  Vox Pop even in its most rudimentary form was 
useful in focussing down on the detailed part of a decision. 
 
And sometimes reading things, I prefer talking to people really, and I talk to a 
lot of management consultants who kind of say things, it’s not that it tells you 
something new, it’s just that it allows you to relate things in a different way.  
But so can stood in a queue at a supermarket, when you hear a conversation, 
in front of you, or behind you – you can just have one of those ‘ah-ha’ 
moments, that just kind of chrysalises something, and I think a lot of it is in 
your in heritability to be able to relate things, and relate to people and put 
yourself in other people’s positions, I don’t think it’s a learnt thing.  (3) 
 
Most fundamentally, detail and the use of detail in decision making was seen 
to be a product of where you were in the hierarchy in fact, detail was seen to 
positively inhibit the executive function. 
 
How much do you use email, phone, internet, you know, those sorts of 
media?  Hardly ever, well, hardly ever at work and all the time at 
home…….ok, tell me, that’s an interesting one!........well I’ve worked out 
over the years, I mean, I did have a computer at one time, and I worked out, I 
can type about 20% of the rate of my PA, the very process of opening and 
closing, and looking for and finding – she can probably do twice as fast as me, 
and what I find it does is it fails to flag up priorities for me, particularly because 
I work on two sites.  I’ll go into my office, I haven’t got one on my desk at the 
moment, because I dealt with them all up there, but there will be a file on the 
top of my tray that says urgent, and it might have an email from last week, I 
wasn’t in, or I missed, or that’s become urgent, because somebody’s rung, it’ll 
have a phone message, it’ll have something that came in the post, it’ll have a 
note from somebody who walked by, you know, a patient’s just about to shoot 
me, and I’d better know, and, so I’ve got the ten things that I’ve go to deal with 
in the next five minutes, in that tray, there is no way on God’s earth that I can 
process by hearing anything in that way; at home, I’m a shambles!  I do it all 
myself, I do half my emails, and fall asleep and leave it, I’ve missed the one 
that said, ‘can you let me know by tomorrow’ and I didn’t and……ok………so 
it’s a kind of needs must thing, I mean I find it very tedious anyway, because 
it’s very detailed.  (1) 
 
And this was corroborated by the colleague executive when they said: 
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I think it’s good theory, it probably makes good papers and I don’t think it does 
the job, that doesn’t mean that I totally rubbish it, but I think it depends on 
where you sit in an organisation very often, and I think the evidence becomes 
less important the higher up the tree you go.  The higher up the more it 
becomes intuition and more it becomes esp, the more it becomes knowledge 
that you don’t know you’ve go.  (4) 
 
So we can see that fine detail is important in defining the question, crafting an 
answer and showing an ethical management style in the NHS but is given little 
credence in the day to day practice of top executives. 
 
WHAT CONSTITUTES EVIDENCE? 
 
Key words or phrases that are most used 
 
Discourse analysis is a methodological approach that can be used in the 
study of communication by NHS managers.  Activity type analysis permits the 
identification of characteristic forms of talk in the use of evidence and decision 
making.  It is possible to recognise patterns of awkward or critical 
moments/words.  The transcripts have been selected for their representative 
nature and simplified for presentation and ease of reading in the ‘Rousseau 
Box’ style appendices of this report and in the conclusions. 
 
What I want to do here is to focus on the use of the word ‘evidence’ and 
consider its nature. 
 
Let’s consider some key words or phrases that are quoted in the interviews 
and taped group meetings.  To the left I have put them in their stated form and 
in the right, whether this was used frequently, infrequently, positively or largely 
negative.  I have also been clear where the phrase is used more than once 
but with no clear agreement about its value between managers. 
 
Evidence Based 
Management 
Frequent positive associations.  Seen as a 
good thing, but struggling for a consistent 
definition. Juxtaposition with Evidence Based 
Management easily understood. 
Evidence Based 
Administration 
Used only once.  A potentially semantic 
definitional distinction but very powerful when 
used by the 1 respondent.  This is a metaphor 
for an idea expressed by many that the 
freedom to stray from evidence increases the 
higher up the organisation you go.  
Distinguishes managers (higher) from 
administration (lower).  
Evidence Based Leadership Used occasionally.  Very negative associations.  
Seen by some to be an oxymoron.  Seen to be 
an expedient at best and part of a value set that 
evaporates when applied to politicians. 
Evidence Based Decision 
Making 
Used often, but not surprising given my 
questions.  The phrase ‘administration’ in this 
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table above is key to distinguishing its positive 
and negative usage.  Seen to be cumbersome 
and more relevant to juniors than executives. 
Evidence Based Resource 
Allocation 
Occasional use.  Very positive associations.  
Given that resource allocation is considered a 
rare, but significant strategic action by leaders 
the supportive evidence for this is seen as 
crucial.  Most persuasively used in gaining 
autonomy from the DH. 
Evidence Based Reporting Occasional use.  Mostly negative.  Seen to be a 
by-product of ‘administration’ rather than 
‘management’ and much less importance in 
performance management than policy targets. 
Evidence Based Argument Occasional use.  Mostly negative.  Seen to be 
an insufficient basis upon which to make an 
acceptable decision.  Where it is used it is 
almost pejorative in its diminution of the quality 
of the argument.  
Evidence Based Learning Frequent positive association.  A clear value 
exists in the attempt to learn from the evidence.  
To foster a culture with due regard to evidence 
is viewed as an overwhelming positive. 
Evidence Based Knowledge Frequent positive associations.  The 
organisation, communication and maintenance 
of knowledge are all seen to be ways within 
which the hierarchy of evidence is vital.  
 
These examples show most importantly the differences between managers in 
the way they respond to concepts.  The following concepts have no agreed 
definition. 
 
Information:  used to mean everything from public communication to a  
   relevant set of managerial numerics. 
Data:   seen as collected for purpose and objectively or the  
   arcane desire to count by bureaucracies that generates 
    meaningful information. 
Interpretation: seen by some as a meaningful contextualisation of the 
   evidence or by otherwise savvy managers as a means to  
   discredit the evidence or source. 
Protocol: 
Best Practice: From an attainable counsel of perfection to a normative  
   standard for all. 
Culture:  positive and enabling, stifling and disempowering 
   transformations only allowing reproduction. 
NHS:   An organised system of tax funded healthcare or just one  
   big experiment in political authority and social cohesion.   
   The backbone of the political offer or the basis of a  
   random importation of foreign fractions in healthcare  
management without necessary debate or evaluation. 
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I’ll leave the final comment in this section to group 3 and a quote from one 
individual in the group. 
 
But what we tend to not have is enough rules, it’s a bit like practice based 
commissioning you know, I mean, they invent it as a concept, because it 
seems to be a means to an end, the end being whatever it is we all want – 
better everything – and we haven’t made up the rules, I mean to me there are 
three criteria, does it give a better service?  Does it offer better value for 
money?  And is it sustainable?  (3, after a long meeting of fierce debate and 
intellect, the silence around this definition was telling). 
 
How do you identify your outliers and what they are saying? 
 
Conversational attempts by the outsiders or outliers included assertions of 
academic knowledge, professional training and experience.  The extracts 
illustrate a sequence of the type that was common during the interviews and 
the meetings.  The sequence begins with the chair asking if, prompted by me 
recording the interview, whether evidence would help at all.  On discovering 
that the group is willing to accept that the NHS is far from an ideal 
organisation, he asks some questions that get a more radical response than 
some of the strategic platitudes normally classified by the same individuals as 
‘assurance’.  The chair continues a light cross examination as well as inserting 
a supportive and friendly narrative throughout.  The Chair’s role was didactic – 
in order to get to what the people were saying the conversation was nurtured 
– on only one occasion did an individual specifically announce that he wanted 
to ask a question. 
 
The following is an example of when an ‘outsider’ (an off protocol doctor) is 
encouraged to move back into the fold of the use of evidence.  In the end, an 
absence of evidence was taken as a lack of legitimacy (by managers) to 
practice. 
 
And there will be occasions, you know, medicine’s instinctive, and there will 
be occasions, I think, where you don’t follow the protocol, because you don’t 
know why you don’t follow it, but you must have seen a patient somewhere 
similar; you wouldn’t expect it to be the norm, but you should be able to justify 
in your own mind why you’ve not followed best evidence, what you should 
never do is not follow best evidence.  If I take an example, we had here an 
anaesthetist prescribing some pain relief some years ago, and the evidence 
on it was no where near conclusive, no where near conclusive at all, and this 
was in the early days of clinical movements, and we looked at all the pros and 
cons, we looked at all the evidence, and in the end, we said to the 
anaesthetist, you will not prescribe.  (2) 
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But on the other hand, there is an explicit acceptance that the NHS cannot 
change without exploring the boundaries of the NHS.  In the following 
quotation there is a direct challenge to a doctor who believes that the NHS 
has attained an evidenced optimum. 
 
To what extent would evidence help you at all, or is it………it does a lot, it 
does a lot, there’s loads of things we use, I mean, to me, you know the job is a 
simple job, I always say to people, you know, that’s where we are now, that’s 
the NHS today, and that’s where we’re trying to get it, and I’ve only had one 
person in my whole life say ‘it’s perfect now’, only one person – a pathology 
trainee I was talking to a Keele University, clearly, a strange man!  (3) 
 
Let’s consider something that I want to reflect back to the managers.  The 
following is an extract from a 10 minute journey where a senior group of 
executives are trying to find the way to speak the unthinkable.  It is worth 
knowing from the start that this discussion starts with trying to find a way to 
consider the proposition that nurses in a particularly poorly performing hospital 
(on quality and economic performance) are not a solution to but a cause of the 
problem.  The outsider nature of this debate, challenging years of acquired 
cultural parameters about nurses is revealing.  What is interesting in the 
following quotation is that the outsiders in the following group meeting don’t 
use evidence to describe the need for change.  What they choose to explore 
are scenarios.  Much like a health economist they start off with an assumption. 
 
But let’s assume there’s a journey to be made, right, and you can begin to 
describe what’s in this future NHS, it’s less wasteful, there’s no healthcare 
associated infections, shorter waits, greater satisfaction, more motivated, you 
know, nicer buildings, better equipment, all the new drugs, whatever. (3) 
 
Further, this is picked up by the next person in the group.  Again, what the 
outsiders are trying to explore……or rather, what the NHS manager in a 
protected environment within which they can think of the future……are 
scenarios. 
 
And my job is to take this organisation on that journey, but it’s not just a 
simple more, more, more thing, as I think we all understand, and we all do that 
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all the time at home, we’re all trying to get the best for our family, we have a 
limited income, we have circumstances, we all live in England – it’s cold!  (3) 
 
Scenarios are by definition, alternative, plausible pictures of the future.  
Scenarios are created that are definitely not forecasts but are free from 
organisational constraint. 
 
You know, so you’ll say, we’ll have a holiday a year, and I’ll make sure I have 
central heating, and I can afford to keep paying the gas bill, and keep buying 
trainers for the retched kids feet that grow six inches every week, you kind of 
make those decisions to make that journey at home.  (3) 
 
The scenarios are written in a deliberately provocative style to tease out the 
differences between the different pictures of the future.  The previous speaker 
was describing steady interactive change.  The following speaker, although 
using a comforting style and collegiate language is painting an alternative 
scenario which is clinically relevant but more challenging. 
 
And we have just the same to do at work, and we’ve kind of coined the phrase 
at the moment particularly about  best care and best value, it’s not just one, 
and it’s not just the other, it’s not just saving money at the expense of quality, 
it’s not pursuing quality, spending money we haven’t got, it’s got to be about 
best care and best value, and I think people can relate to that.  (3) 
 
Then another more detailed description is ventured by the next reader.  
Scenarios, as I said are alternative plausible pictures and the next readers 
picture should be read side-by-side with the others to understand the 
differences. 
 
‘With you so far’ they’ll say, as a tax payer, as a user of the service, of course 
I want it to be as good as it can get, if we’re wasting money seeing ten 
patients in a clinic when we could be seeing 20, somebody is missing out on 
something aren’t they – that’s an opportunity cost in terms of health gain.  (3) 
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Until finally, we craft an answer to the problem.  The staff can accept the 
analysis when applied in the abstract the actual implementation of the answer 
struggles when “the light is shown” on the problem.  Only at the very very last 
moment is the evidence stated…..’overpaid compared’.   
 
So, people are with you there, I mean, I’ve done lots of staff briefings and 
they’ve all left happy, what’s got them is when you’ve then pointed the light 
from the two towers into their department and said what’s more, you’re all 
overpaid compared to grades in other Trusts.  (3) 
 
My understanding of this whole conversation is that the evidence that was 
there all the time is not used by the very people who need to use this 
evidence to win the ‘outsider’ debate! 
 
The quantum of support and the critical single piece of evidence 
 
Managers took every opportunity to offer advice and support.  The advice was 
often resisted or rejected by one of the other participant(s) in the discussion 
and advice was often given in the absence of any stated problem by the 
manager.  Active resistance was very rarely shown to the giving or receiving 
of advice and managers did not call on any higher authority such as “the law” 
or the Department of Health.  There were times when the critical single piece 
of evidence was sought by all contestants.  That is where the advice was felt 
to have the potential to undermine and threaten the managers assumed 
competence amongst their peers.  As important as evidence, were questions 
of integrity and self regulation by the group. 
 
The next quotation shown that policy makers and commissioners do try to rise 
above their entrenched positions to agree a joint plan aimed at making the 
health services safe and high quality in a cost effective fashion. 
 
Yes, I think one of the problems is actually what we measure, and so the 
information that we have to deal with.  I mean, when you think about health 
and the paradigm, the NHS where we have performance data about activity, 
and we have some health data.  But the system looks a lot different if you 
actually focus on some of the outcome data which is not routinely known.  And 
if we were to focus on that, and ask why the system is failing these particular 
bits, then we might get a different view.  (5) 
 
But when it came to the acceptance of clinicians to allow quality-based 
benchmarking and to take part in the specialisation of these databases this 
was seen to be damaged by the political and policy pressure to do something 
based on a single précis of  evidence – about public attitudes to infection in 
this case – or even no evidence at all. 
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If I said to you, evidence based, does it elicit a reaction in you, does it make 
you go ‘no’ or ‘yes’, does it, is it a neutral phrase, is it a pejoratively bad 
phrase, is it a phrase that you would want to follow?  I think it makes me feel, 
you know, chance would be a fine thing, but surely we ought to do our best, 
that’s what I would say, because there is too much that isn’t, you know, deep 
cleaning a case in point.  (3) 
 
Information about acquired infection is readily available to patients and has 
had a real impact on their choice of provider, but the general attitude to the 
quantum of support for evidence based decision making, was in total 
undermined by this pre-occupation with a limited evidence base.  There was 
no doubt that this was made worse by the media spotlight focussed on 
healthcare. 
 
The political, health and social care agenda shifted in 2007/08 to focus 
policies and accountabilities on patient experience.  There is a telling desire 
though to still trust that there is an evidence based solution that is better than 
random political interactive and that, even given the political desire to make 
this policy, evidence might be the best way to allocate resources to the policy. 
  
If they had looked at the evidence, they could have made the best choice 
about how to spend that money, and if we don’t even try, if will be purely 
chance.  (3) 
 
Further there was an explicit request to use evidence locally.  There was 
broad acceptance that the choice of policy might not be evidence based but 
its effective implementation should still use the evidence of the best way to 
proceed. 
 
So, I have two feelings about it, one is that we shouldn’t see it as the solution 
for all of our problems, because it will never be that well developed in this 
experiment that is the NHS, and two, we should acknowledge that in the 
absence of evidence, we should do our very best to get the approximation for 
best knowledge to drive our decisions, that’s what I think.  (3) 
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My understanding of what happened here is that the ambition is for joint 
planning to be devolved to regional level and the East Midlands to become a 
role model for implementation of a national policy through evidence of best 
method. 
 
Then the media spotlight was discussed.  The media spotlight was accepted 
as staying focussed on healthcare – indeed it was hoped that in the next five 
years the ‘diabesity’ (diabetes and obesity) epidemic could be curbed by being 
the most common topic of TV debates and cooking programmes focussed on 
healthy eating. 
 
There was however, a sanguine response to the media.  In total, the 
population was able to deal with complex issues, but the newspapers (as the 
next three quotes show) are seen to maintain an adversarial stance even 
when the readers of their own papers were more sophisticates. 
 
The Editorial stance of the paper, is not the same as those people who 
comment, so for example, when we talked about scrapping the air ambulance.  
(3)  
 
The Editorial stance of the newspaper was totally a terrible thing, this is a 
bureaucratic decision, the comments on the website, were broadly in support 
of our policy.  (3) 
 
In terms of, let’s have less flash, so it’s almost like the media was slightly out 
of step to the people it sells.  (3) 
 
So in total, we see a desire by the managers to gain competence and control 
even in the most trying of times and they did, consistently refer to evidence as 
the basis of authority and control. 
 
How many times was something given negative or positive 
associations? 
 
The project here tries to conceptualise the issue of credibility.  Some concepts 
are judged by the participants to have poor credibility.  If quantification, 
consistency, industrial level adoption and rigour are indicators of credibility 
then in our understanding of evidence based decision making it is possible to 
recognise items that have strong positive or negative responses.  Credibility is 
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not validated by the researcher it is expressed as a judgement made by the 
participants.  Judgements of credibility are also seen to be influenced by 
particular (political) contexts so that what constitutes credible may change 
from period to period so it is difficult to say that the evidence base is able to 
avoid the temporal nature of credibility.  In the specific context of the evidence 
based manager, there was a strong correlation between credibility and one 
word/phrase – “NHS” and a strong correlation between “politics” and the 
absence of credibility.  I have included one quotation also to illuminate that at 
the heart of this conflict between credibility and two words/ideas, is the role of 
the NHS executive and whether they are agreed to be system leaders or 
system managers. 
 
Consider that since 2000/01 the government decided to increase public 
spending and the proportion of public spending spent on the NHS 
significantly, and this was sustained for 7/8 years and yet politicians were 
given lots of negative associations such as the politician below, who is 
considered to be motivated by electoral majority not the NHS role in ‘reduce 
inequalities’ or even the NHS managers role in ‘best value for money’. 
 
He’s an MP like the ‘X’ guy, who isn’t local doesn’t know the area, he’s in for 
the ballet box, he’s in for the re-election; you take someone more local like 
‘AB’, who’s a local lad, worked in one of the local schools, will always live in 
this town, he’s got the mix, because he’s precariously seated because of the 
ballet box, because despite the fact he’s been in twice, this is not a natural 
one party community, and at some stage it will move again.  (1) 
 
NHS East Midlands commissioners are occasionally taken to judicial review 
for restricting access to new drugs yet a request for Labour MPs to be 
collegiate with government policy results in the following frustration. 
 
And then you’ve got Dennis, who’s Dennis! and Dennis will only ever do what 
Dennis thinks is right, irrespective of which Party’s suggested it.  (2) 
 
What the NHS managers are identifying are examples of how they feel 
disaffected because politicians, as seen earlier, are only too keen to dictate 
NHS policy, but are absent, even when in government, when the policy needs 
public support as it is conducted and implemented by managers.  Further: 
 
But it’s fostered by television, and if you look at all the newspaper coverage, 
where’s all the noise in the Health Service about, it’s either GPs or it’s 
hospitals?  It isn’t anywhere else is it!  It’s all a perception affair, that whole 
feeling of that perception is about hospitals, ambulances, GPs.  (5) 
 
Managers in that quote are noting that politicians know a vote-winning part of 
the NHS when they see it, and vote winning areas don’t often coincide or find 
congruence with the methods used by managers to optimise quality, share 
risk and deliver cost efficiency. 
 
But the connotations of management and even the less valued ‘administration’ 
compared unfavourably with what was considered to be the (small p) 
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politically charged leadership.  There was a general trend to emphasise 
leadership, but equate management with bureaucracy.  
 
I’m interested you’ve chosen evidence based management and not evidence 
based leadership, because I think there’s a difference between leadership and 
management.  I suppose, there’s something about management based 
around evidence and management decisions based around evidence, which 
might be different from evidence based management.  It depends how you 
define management, and evidence probably as well.  (4) 
 
The question about why politicians behave in the way (to see if positive 
associations are possible) was considered and the NHS dilemma of policy 
being set by politicians who were weak in defence of the policies – was seen 
to be no better or worse than democracy itself. 
 
It’s a yes and no if I’m brutally honest on this, if you take them in an enclosed 
ecosphere, where there are no consequences to their decisions, then they will 
always go with the evidence, then you put them back in the real world, and 
there are all sorts of other pressures and constraints that come into play, and 
democracy is an imprecise science, but it’s the best that we’ve got.  (2) 
 
The question was then put about the political closure of an unsafe hospital. 
 
There will be the mother and father of a job to close it, the MP will be up, the 
population will be up in arms about it.  (8) 
 
And when the same issue came up in a group meeting, the managers could 
see only equivocation coming from the local MP even after a lengthy 1:1 with 
the NHS executive. 
 
She’s new, so first and only time I’ll ever speak to her live, you know it was a 
bit like the André Previn bit on Morecombe and Wise, you know all the right 
notes, not in all the right order, I’m sure I said all those words, but did I put 
them together in that way, no I certainly did not!  (3) 
 
Due to lobbying and marketing from providers, drug companies and patient 
organisations, the population now expects the NHS to provide an extensive 
care package and, remembering that co-payments are minimal in the NHS, 
the media has become a key driver in setting the expectations of the 
population for the NHS and newspapers critique the role of the manager.  
Whilst the media are accepted or supported, there is a particular loathing of 
‘the local’ paper by all the NHS managers.  The quality of journalism is seen 
as low and overtly personal in their attacks. 
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And of course it’s been hugely, you know, people saying, ‘how dare she say 
this’, not the first time that’s happened to me, but, they kind of generated a 
level of, you know, misery that didn’t exist before, and they’re loving it, and 
they want me to enter into a conversation with my staff on their website, you 
know, more people are writing, you really ought to get on, and I’ll go, ‘no’.  (6) 
 
One Chief Executive even went so far as to say that local print media had lost 
all relevance and that the key task of talking to people was direct not through 
the print news. 
 
I said I shall be writing my next Chief Execs column in the staff newspaper, 
urging them to write to me, and I will reply, and I will go and meet with them.  
(7) 
 
The motivation for press participation in the NHS is importantly considered to 
be opportunistic and not driven by values. 
 
I’m not doing it on your website.  No doubt I’ll get another rotten story out of 
that, but I really don’t care!  Chief Executive refuses….you know!  So, but they 
do, that’s what they’re trying to do, they’re trying to create the news that sells 
newspapers, even if they sometimes get it wrong.  (7) 
 
So, if politicians and the media have frequent negative associations who 
gained from positive credit by the NHS manager.  In one word – Doctors! – 
are viewed favourably regularly and consistently.  Although, as you can see 
from earlier readings there was a worry that nobody was willing to take on real 
clinical leadership or instigate innovative thinking the comment below is typical 
of a sympathetic attitude to doctors who are viewed to be in a predicament.  
 
Well, I think we’re not in a position where it would be true in any system 
because the potential demand on the NHS is limitless now because there’s so 
much we can do, and it’ll get worse and worse.  (5) 
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East Midland’s clinicians are praised for their clinical innovations.  Noted 
examples were the Patients’ Medical information is available on-line and that 
virtual communication has lowered the patient threshold for seeking 
consultation and is increasing demand.  Doctors were praised for their swift 
adoption of new technologies. 
 
But I think it’s a cultural thing about the way doctors are trained, and they’re 
sort of inducted into a system, very early on in medical school, whereby you’re 
taught the important thing is the doctor patient relationship, so they work for 
the patient, they don’t work for the NHS, and that’s the difference.  (3) 
 
And the doctors association with the NHS was considered to be broadly 
altruistic as opposed to entrepreneurial and venal in their behaviours. 
   
They’ll buy into the idea of the NHS, because it’s got egalitarian, utilitarian 
values, but they don’t buy into that from a management point of view.  (7) 
 
The question even arose about GPs motivation to work for the NHS and 
managers could see a way clinicians could abandon NHS employment to 
work from Chambers like other professionals, but this was given a positive 
light and association. 
 
I think most GPs would quite happily work privately outside the NHS, because 
they could still maintain their doctor patient relationship.   (6) 
 
The only worry in all this was that clinicians could drive the use of information 
technology as a method of achieving higher quality and effective care, but 
could not progress from excellence in the treatment of individuals to a wider 
treatment of the population more effectively using technology. 
 
 And the managers see the value of the NHS, in my mind the managers are 
more the champions of the peoples’ health than the doctors are, but the 
doctors don’t see that.  (5) 
 
How does a decision blossom and develop? 
 
The responses indicate that the interviewees and meetings participants are 
not applying a consistent criteria when making a decision.  The decision 
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blossoms and develops in a quite unexpected way.  In contrast to the 
perception that a decision would be clear in its use of evidence the reality is 
that the decision must be evidence based but the decision point itself is 
iterative, nobody is really sure when the decision is made.  The idea evolves, 
contorts, negotiates, makes decisions, re-checks expectations.  Even within a 
single organisation there are different interpretations contingent upon issues 
of hierarchy in the organisational structure.  Thus, for example, the same idea 
may be evaluated by different people in terms of the extent to which it makes 
a decision necessary or possible.  It may be that as an executive becomes 
very experienced in organisational leadership, they develop their own list of 
criteria which although not formally written down, are used as a heuristic 
device to make sense of the decisions they have to make or even whether 
they need to make a decision at all. 
 
You know, if somebody took a senior member of your team, if they came to 
you with an idea or a solution, would you rather they had it on paper or they 
were able to explain it to you in a conviction way.  I’d rather they explained it 
to me, but I think, what I usually say to people, and there’s a lot of people that 
kind of knock on your door and say …neh, neh, neh I’ve been thinking and 
neh , neh, neh when you haven’t got time to listen to it………ok……..  doesn’t 
really help, I’d prefer things to be explained, but  things like that are very 
difficult to move on in an organisation of 7000 people, if they don’t very shortly 
afterwards appear on paper, so you can do something with it.  So personally, I 
prefer the conversation, but practically to progress it, it needs to extend 
beyond jabbering on the corridor or whatever’s going on.  (3) 
 
Note that the word evidence never appeared in the above quotation at all, but 
then the manager was talking about a member of their team.  Conversely 
when another executive talks about their own decision making (below) the 
word evidence appears time and again. 
 
I think to be successful, you’ve got to be instinctive, you’ve got to make the 
decisions, you can’t think about it – right or wrong decision – any decision is 
better than no decision, you then have to back your decision to the hilt, you 
have to be big enough to say you’ve dropped a bollock if you’ve got it wrong 
and change it if necessary.  And probably every decision I’ve made I could 
retro-fit on evidence, but I didn’t make them on evidence at the time.  (2) 
I don’t think you’re ever totally crass to consider an evidence base, but to use 
it solely for decision making I think is crass in most situations.  I think it’s good 
in scientific situations, when I was a chiropodist, when it came down to the 
amount of chemical I put on to destroy something – there were tables of 
evidence about what was most effective, that was, to go outside of those, I 
can think of little context to go outside of those.  When it comes to an 
investment decision, or even a personnel decision, you know, you can use the 
evidence of whatever, that’s behind that decision, but if you don’t understand 
the people, the place, the politics the environment, you can make a bad 
decision; so for instance, be it an investment decision around upgrading or 
changing a hospital, or buying or not buying a service, you need to 
understand the wider context that’s there; be it the N in National for NHS, the 
national targets, national regime, be it the local context around who was 
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denied a drug six weeks ago, and now you’re spending £60,000 on people 
that seem to be more spurious – even if the evidence for one is nil and the 
evidence for an investment in district nursing is high.  (4) 
 
Note that there was no consistent base for saying the decision was evidence 
based, but there is clear reference to ‘evidence’ being the field or environment 
within which personal decision making takes place.  Now consider the same 
executive in response to another prompt. 
 
I think evidence based administration, to me administration is the application 
of processes to achieve an end, to me, that’s what an administrator is doing, 
with a small degree, often no degree of latitude or ability to make changes.  
Management, managers have the ability to make changes to those processes, 
and leadership I think, is different.  I think leadership is about achieving an 
organisational goal, and taking the whole organisation forward to achieve 
corporate objectives.  So I do, evidence based administration, I think I would 
struggle with that, because I think the processes that are used by 
administrators should have an evidence base for doing them, and a rational 
defined by evidence; evidence based management, I think managers should 
use evidence in reaching their decisions, and evidence based leadership I 
think would go the same as management.  (4) 
 
So what we see revealed is that evidence is a consistent part of the 
framework of executive leadership, but the latitudes to err from the evidence 
or to even create the evidence afresh is denied to lower levels of manager – 
deemed to be administrators. 
 
The use of decision by individuals? 
 
In considering the way that individuals rather than organisations apply 
evidence to the decision making process, of particular interest is the 
underlying assumptions about the career of the NHS manager and the life 
stages they go through with regard to autonomy.  The way in which individuals 
define the use of evidence is important in that it shapes their perceptions 
about who should be free to use judgement and who needs to concur with the 
evidence base (and indeed seek out the evidence base) before making a 
decision.  From the responses and the recordings it is clear that a variety of 
individual decision making methods are in use and there is no general 
consensus about the nature of evidence in decisions by individuals within the 
NHS.  What is clear though is that rather than being a restrictive or indeed 
exclusionary practice of some NHS managers, there is a body of support for 
evidence based decisions, with the right evidence by the right individuals in 
the right context. 
 
Can I explore one of those, and I’m not challenging what you say, it’s 
just this -  say the rule book, say the rule was the piece of evidence 
based practice, and the manager is just coming up against that, you 
know, the person that, are just not getting it as anything other than a 
limiting factor, what do they do with that?  Do they respect the evidence 
and back off, or do they try and work round it, or…….my guess, I’d say it 
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depends on their capabilities, it’s a bit like one of these things in this 
document they’ve sent me – if you want to be a manager, get yourself 
educated in something, then get a job, just don’t pretend it will teach you to be 
a manager, I mean, it’s a bit like, don’t pretend that world class commissioning 
will teach you to be a commissioner.  Ok.  So, a good person would be able to 
see the sense in that situation, people without good sense had better just 
follow the rules ‘cos they’ll be safer, do you know what I mean? I don’t know, it 
depends on the rules!...........it’s interesting about that, that follow the rules, 
because I think, a lot of that is a proxy for evidence based medicine isn’t it?  
It’s the, you know, look, the vast majority of you will not be as good as the 
best, so follow the rules, and then the outcomes will be better for everyone.  
(3) 
 
And I have no problem with that, because what it tends to do is it generates a 
coherent conversation, you know, I mean for us; a lot of the rule following is 
very wasteful, labour intensive, and there are plenty of people who know the 
answer, without having to follow the rules, but there are a lot of people who 
don’t; and the good thing about rules is it encourages conversation, you know 
if we want to prescribe a drug that’s not on the protocol or the pathway, 
someone says, hey, this is what I want to do, and this is why I want to do it, a 
few great minds come together and will probably make what is the right 
decision, whether it follows the rules or not.  (3) 
 
To the two quotations above which talk of a negotiated use of evidence is the 
concept of earned autonomy.  Earned autonomy first through acquired years 
of experimental learning. 
 
But I do think that you work up through your career, you have to be more and 
more evidence based because you haven’t built up the wealth of experience, 
the wealth of knowledge, the falling over, the making mistakes, to make the 
judgement call in the same way.  (2) 
 
And earned autonomy through understanding the ‘culturally correct’ way to 
respond to the signals being given by operational managers. 
 
Yes, well, depends how you set yourself up really, I mean, you know, I and 
other managers get criticised a lot for not being out on the shop-floor enough, 
and indeed I’m not, but you pick up limited information about what’s going on 
on the shop-floor if you stay close to the people running the business, they 
can be clinical or managerial, they will, you know, they will tell you what 
they’re fretting about, they will say, ‘oh my goodness, we’ve now got five 
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vacant posts in A&E and when this lot leave I don’t know what we’re going to 
do’, that’s what you need to know, but you also need to create a culture in 
which that happens, because, we were talking about this the other day 
actually, we’ve imported some new managers from another trust not far from 
here, and they had this alarming habit of telling you everything’s alright, when 
it isn’t!  (3) 
 
But broadly a consensus is achieved that evidence/science applies 
predominantly to clinicians and is a luxury few managers can afford. 
 
I think they’ll use clinical evidence, I think managers are very much into the 
development of clinical pathways, you know, working with clinicians and that’s 
fine, doing the best things in the best way, but as to how the NHS works, the 
sort of infrastructure, where services are located, how they’re delivered, I don’t 
think they do use evidence, I think there is some, some scientific evidence in 
there, they’ll look at journey times, and they’ll look at volume, populations and 
the needs of that population not been done very well until fairly recently, but 
they are doing that.  So they’ll do that sort of thing, but a lot of the decisions 
that are made, seem to be based more on history, on the views of politicians 
and key stakeholders, which are often not really evidence based.   (5) 
 
The making of decision by groups? 
 
One of the objectives of this project is to hold a mirror up to the cohort (of 
which I am a member) to identify perceptions of good NHS management 
practice.  Within this I wished to look at how the group (when it worked 
collectively) would make decisions.  It is amusing that interviewees found it 
easier to identify bad practices in the working of the group than highlight 
aspects of good practice.  The issue of the right environment within which to 
make an evidenced decision emerged as being something managers needed 
to ‘get right’ it does not exist as a natural state in the group.  Rather than 
making a decision that focused on technical constraints, describing and 
reflecting on the appropriate place and circumstance to make an evidence 
based decision as a group was highlighted by many of the cohort.  Good 
practice in relation to the presentation of evidence and the use of evidence 
involved on ability to engage this group/a group, to be persuasive and to be 
credible despite limitations of data and knowledge.  There is a caveat 
however, in that the very diversity of group structures makes universal 
interpretation problematic. 
 
Clinicians were widely reported as helping negotiate quid pro quo deals to 
consolidate services such as stroke, trauma and maternity across sites.  But 
they did this for managers who had years of NHS experience more readily 
than newly introduced managers. 
 
For a manager to be accepted as something other than an irritation, getting in 
the way of clinical work, they have to demonstrate that they’re in it for the long 
haul themselves, and that’s very hard, and after the first three or four 
managers have gone your chances of making it as number five are really 
quite small.  But there’s a down-side to this longevity thing as well, and it’s this 
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sort of practice being entrenched, that once, you know, we’ve done it this way 
for the last ten years, so you’re not going to change what we do, and also, the 
culture becomes quire unhealthy because of the longevity sometimes.  (5) 
 
But the very longevity of managers that enables clinical participation is seen 
by some as a limiting factor when getting clinicians across the East Midlands 
to lead and support required configuration and productivity improvements.  
Here is 5 again, talking about how a new to the NHS executive uses clinical 
evidence to provide an antidote to organisational inertia and antipathy towards 
him as an individual. 
   
He just rolled his trousers up, put a knotted handkerchief on his head and 
said, ‘look – what do you want?  This is evidence based medicine, here’s the 
evidence, what are you all talking about?’  And still, it made a big impression, 
it got a lot of laughs, but it takes that, sort of real challenge, before a lot of that 
out of date evidence is discarded.  So evidence base – it’s sort of important, 
but it’s almost a culture rather than a reality sometimes.  (5) 
 
It is clear that strong financial control over medical cost increases is valued by 
executives, but in the following discussion by a leader who is no longer in 
finance, two things are worthy of note:  the absence of the word evidence in 
any reference to accountants in the NHS and despite appreciation of their 
corporate contribution a question mark hangs over their ability to influence 
group decision making. 
 
I think it depends on what sort of an accountant you are, I mean, I don’t think it 
was my natural bent to be honest, and I was heartily glad to get rid of it, 
because it was too precise for me.  But it taught me some things, it taught me 
a balance sheet is only balanced when it balances to zero.  Which is a good 
discipline; these people who go……..well, that’s about right! taught me you 
can approximate, but you need to know how you’re approximating, you know, 
when you round to the nearest million, you know what you’ve lost don’t you.  It 
doesn’t mean you have to mess around with pennies, it just means you need 
to know what you’re not taking account of.  It taught me some good practice 
around delving in the detail, which is not my natural bent, and for people that 
are, they do struggle to make good strategic decisions, and I have watched 
accountants struggle to do that; I’m not suggesting you’re one for a minute, 
but I have an ability to get into detail when I need to, in a way some people 
just can’t, and it’s given me an understanding in money that’s essential if 
you’re trying to do my job, it really is.  And there are many, many, many times, 
no disrespect to ‘B’ who’s been a great Director of Finance here, there are 
many times when we’re kicking numbers around, and it’s me who goes, ‘but 
hang on a minute, you know, if that’s going to drive that, and that’s that and 
that’s got to go there, then surely we’ve got a problem here’, and you can kind 
of see everyone going oh-yes!  And I couldn’t do that probably, if I’d been a 
Physiotherapist.  Ok, so your profession has been a tool that you’ve been 
able to use on an ongoing basis……..yes, hugely.  Ok.  (3) 
 
But, the decision making by accountants was not the only one group to fail the 
executive test of reasonableness – so to the matrons. 
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I went in very, very hard with the matrons last April about their cleaning audits, 
because what they were telling me back in March/April was that we were 
going to fail the health care commission standards, when we had all the 
matrons in, I said, I know it’s not like that, you know it’s not like that, what are 
you playing at.  (1) 
 
Finally, let’s consider two quotations about the apex ‘group’ of the 
organisation – the board itself.  The decision making in the boardroom is 
expected to be, demonstrated to be, cognisant of evidence based decision  
making. 
 
Imagine you’re in a boardroom and it’s one of those, where for some reason, 
you’re still in there at seven o’clock at night, and you know you’ve got locked 
into something, and you need to make a decision before the morning, and 
somebody says, shall we have a look at what the evidence says – is that a 
good thing to do at that moment, because it is a distraction and the evidence 
isn’t in the room; imagine, taking my scenario, the evidence isn’t in the room, 
so there was no reason you should have used it before, do you take a break 
and go and look for the evidence or do you say, no, we have sufficient skills to 
understand the context and consequences – in this room, of getting the 
decision right or wrong – we don’t need any evidence, what we need is a 
decision.  I would be shocked if the evidence wasn’t already there, and I 
would want to have the evidence if there was some evidence around, I 
certainly would want to know it was there and on certain decisions I would 
want the ‘show-me test’ as well.  On big things I want to see it.  So I would 
stop – go to the evidence, then consider the evidence in the wider context of 
the decision we’re making.  (4) 
 
And, this is true even when the whole board might be agnostic about the 
approach. 
 
Oohh, I think one or two of them would react positively, I think one or two of 
them, would I think not understand what I meant…ok…..and the rest would be 
agnostic in the middle.  But, I do think that self perception and review of one’s 
performance is something which leaders sometimes get a bit blasé about, and 
don’t do!  (5) 
 
Is information collected and evaluated? 
 
It is established by respondents that they have the technical skills to 
undertake evidence based decision making and to write a coherent ‘evidence 
based’ story.  The managers were also able to demonstrate that they 
understood the importance of reflexivity as a management competence.  What 
is less clear is that managers were happy that the collection and evaluation of 
data was sufficient to treat the data as information to help aid decision 
making.  Given the political context (and the consequent implications of 
decision making) the collective and evaluated information may go some way 
to enhance the quality of NHS management.  But the technical task of the 
assimilation of information may not be able to go far enough to convince NHS 
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managers to move without a sceptical evaluation.  More generally it was also 
asserted that there will always need to be more resources in order to carry out 
training in the evaluation of information. 
 
I think World Class Commissioning, if we’re not careful, will give us a rigorous 
discipline on investment issues, even going down to an actuarial type 
approach, and I think that’s actually quite dangerous, because context and 
consequences are two things that a manager and a leader need to continually 
take into account, the consequences of one decision on another set of 
decisions.  (4) 
 
So somebody has done some research, however subjective, to actually say 
those who scored highest on health commission scores, those who had most 
financial balance, those who were actually achieving the most important 
government targets.  What was common about them?  (4) 
 
So I pushed the respondents to explore this idea with the following question: 
 
You know when they talk about ideas like balance scorecards or even 
the idea that you spin up your machine in the morning and there’s like a 
dashboard of dials in front of you telling you – how does that type of 
model play with you? 
 
And, the most illuminating quotations were as follows: 
 
Well it works to a degree, I mean, you know, I have one on my car, and it says 
ok when I switch it on, and sometimes it says ok and I go down the road and it 
stops, or brakes or the tyre goes flat, or you know, it’s not foolproof.  But I 
think it lulls you into a false sense of security because, if I take one of my 
current pressures at the moment, A&E, not the wrong side of the line, but 
dangerously close!  And it’s, well its the right side of the line, my dashboard 
would say ok, but what I know is, I’ve got a whole middle grade rota missing 
down there, because we can’t appoint middle grade staff, because of all the 
MMC debacle etc, etc, so I know, you know, we tried to fill a post, we 
shortlisted 14 people and one turned up, and that’s telling me that my car’s 
going to be breaking down some time in the future, and there’s no point 
switching on my engine; it’s not proactive enough again.  (3) 
But, soon within this discussion arose the spectre of the ill-informed politician 
again. 
 
Have you seen that joke, it was in the Health Service Journal a couple of 
weeks ago, about …..’look minister, they look like they’re achieving now, ok, 
time for a reorganisation!’, so we’re retrofitting the evidence to see what’s 
failed, as opposed to it’s working and let’s destabilise it.  (3) 
 
And, to that was added a long narrative reconsideration, in great technical 
detail, of the case against politicians with regard to NRSA.  The information 
was collected and evaluated by the NHS it was ignored by politicians.  Even 
worse, politicians used a partial dataset about hospital acquired infection upon 
which to determine their policy response. 
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And what we always find is every time they introduce one set of priorities, 
another set of priorities emerges because they’ve been ignored by the first 
set!  Carry on with that, it’s fascinating.  Well, it’s just the way of the world.  I’ll 
tell you what’s going to happen next year if you like?!  Yes.  Yes, we’re 
focusing on healthcare acquired infections, but we’re only focusing on two, 
we’re focusing on MRSA and Cdif, ok, which together account for about 25% 
of hospital acquired infections, so what’s going to happen when we’ve sorted 
those two out?  Well, all of a sudden, Pseudomonas is going to become an 
important infection.  Vancamycin resistant enterococci are going to become, 
TB is going to become one.  Because all of these infections are being ignored, 
because everyone’s focusing on MRSA.  And you may say, ok, but the 
measures we take to reduce hospital infections are generic, so if we take 
action against MRSA it’ll work for every thing – but it doesn’t, they’re different, 
and what we already see is that the hospitals are dong well on MRSA and not 
doing well on Cdif and vice versa.  I mean, MRSA bacteremia for an average 
hospital in this region, we’re talking about 30 cases a year, of all the hundreds 
of thousand, or millions of patients we treat every year, we’re trying to reduce 
30 to 25, what the hell’s that all about, you know, and yet that’s the top of the 
priority.  And we don’t even look at the vast of MRSA infections, we don’t look 
at all the MRSA infections that don’t get bacteremia, all the joint infections, the 
skin infections, you know, the ulceration that people get, we don’t look at the 
damage that that causes in the community.  So we’re looking at the tiniest tip 
of the smallest iceberg here, it’s no way to do things, and yet that’s the target, 
so the target culture enables then to say we’re making progress against 
infection.  Whereas we’re sort of, it’s like pushing the lumps down on the 
carpet you know, we’re making progress on that one there, but this mound’s 
appeared over here.  (5) 
 
And even more stringently the individual asserted that political policy without 
reference to the NHS clinician or manager was no more informal than that of a 
seven year old. 
 
I asked a bunch of seven year olds, ‘what do you think hospitals are for?’ and 
they came up with pretty much the standard answer, it’s where you go to 
when you’re poorly so that you can get better.  I thought, brilliant yes.  So 
where in our performance management system is anything that tells us if that 
is actually happening.  You know, when people go in with chronic obstructive 
airways disease, do we make them better than if they’d just stayed at home?  
Why aren’t we measuring whether we make people better; we measure how 
many people die.  (5) 
 
At stages of the interview I asked whether the 7th of the stages of a system 
implementation (post implementation) was a feature of management policy. 
 
Is the impact of a decision evaluated by post implementation review in 
the short and/or long term?  Is empirical evidence used? 
 
As stated in the introductory chapter of this project, one of the key objectives 
is to develop a narrative about evidence based management that encourages 
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informal and reflexive practice in NHS management research.  To this end, 
the seventh stage of system implementation (post-implementation review) 
needs to be identified in the responses.  Whilst the objectives of each of the 
participant managers may be different in content for each individual, the 
exercise of post-implementation review should be evaluated.  The question is 
the degree to which participants and/or the wider NHS draw upon their own 
extant work to stimulate experimental learning. 
 
The first negative response to the question of whether the NHS was 
appropriate evidence said:  
 
That’s fascinating, and nobody’s mentioned, so, old evidence becomes 
dogma, so it’s established on an evidence base, and this is not just relevant to 
medicine, so it’s not just established on – it’s established on an evidence 
base, but then that becomes dogma which in its self evaporates over time and 
then the evidence isn’t refreshed, is that………  (5) 
 
And even more telling was an acknowledgement that there was no post-imp 
limitation work done to evaluate the success of the initiative. 
 
Which of all the measures here, we have introduced, has worked because our 
infection rate has reduced……..I don’t know, if I’m honest, I don’t much care 
so long as it’s happened, it’s a number of things we’ve thrown at it.  I could 
play the experimental – I could take that one out and see if it makes a 
difference, but I’m not interested, it has had the desired effect.  (1) 
 
And 5 again returns to the sense that this is all irrelevant in a system 
determined by politicians and political favours. 
 
Carry on with that, that’s fascinating!  We work in a system where most of 
the levers that we’ve got were actually worked through with politicians in the 
first place, weren’t they?  Yes.  NICE is a construct of a political approach to 
the NHS, by a government that hasn’t changed political party in the last 11 
years, and yet we don’t seem to be any closer to political tolerance to this 
system than we were when we started; so that thing about, all they want to do 
is be elected.  (5) 
 
The alternative is to give some well resourced people the time to plan, model 
and shape systems and more importantly, review what we have learned from 
what we have already done. 
 
And I think everything else was left to – let’s see what happens, we’ll give 
some clever people and see if they come up with something, and that’s what 
seems to happen with the NHS, the politicians either seem to go for a 
structural reform, on the grounds that it’ll take a couple of years to do, and we 
can always claim – yes we know the system isn’t working, we’re doing this 
massive review, we’re doing all this work to restructure, and it’s going to work 
– just you wait and see, and then of course it takes three or four years to 
come through, doesn’t work, and so they have to do it all over again!  And if 
you look at the last three or four reorganisations, I don’t think there’s any 
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evidence that any of then have benefited the NHS at all.  And certainly they 
didn’t start off with any aspirations for that evidence.  (5) 
 
And then there are some direct and lengthy quotations given by an individual 
in a group situation that are worthy of inclusion as individual quotes.  I like the 
one here that says the NHS is complex and cannot be easily modelled, but 
makes no reference to evidence. 
 
I do believe that most people can understand that that’s the world we work in, 
most people can understand that there isn’t a text book on the shelf of how to 
do this job, and most people in my experience, if you spend the time talking to 
them, will understand that, all we’re trying to do is what we believe to be the 
best, taking account of what everyone’s telling us, and from my perspective, in 
my job, it’s not opening holiday brochures, reading the small print and looking 
it up on the website, it’s talking to people, and you know, should we regrade 
nurses in surgery they’d say no, you ask some of the surgeons they’d say no 
and if you do I’m going on strike, and you know, you ask some other nurses 
and they go, well yes, fair enough, whatever, you get a whole wide variety of 
views, and you somehow have to make sense of it. (3) 
 
But the individual view is that there is sufficient evidence to make information 
and informed decisions that we can rely on. 
 
I don’t think evidence takes time to mature, evidence is there from when it’s 
presented .. ...it’s then assessed, folk law, takes the time to mature, so I think 
evidence can come and be there, I think in management terms, new evidence 
rarely comes to light, but I think evidence itself, becomes evidence from the 
day it’s presented, it’s just a question of what category and what quality it is.  
(4) 
 
The problem as ever, again quoted in a group context, is that politicians and 
information do not fit nicely together. 
 
Yes, it is really, I said to my board, just the other day, you know, working in 
the NHS is like living the world’s biggest experiment, and it is, you know, we’ll 
twiddle this, and I always used to think, particularly when we had Alan 
Milburn, I used to imagine, you know, the man stood in front of this big 
complex machine with fan belts and nuts and bolts, and cogs and things, 
turning the spanner in his hand, just kind of diving in and just loosening a bit, 
or tightening a bit, taking a bit off or adding a bit on, and going, oh, that didn’t 
work, we’ll have another go, you know? (3) 
 
And to the final observation on the use of information is a sense that however 
we focus on results – information – evidence and outcome, it will never be 
enough to identify the critical success factors in any post implementation 
review. 
 
But you don’t know precisely what measure resulted in that success.  Ok.  I 
think it’s probably a bit of all of those things.  I think some of the writers say, 
you know, just give it up because you’ll never be able to diagnose the causes, 
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any one person can claim it’s one thing, but it’s a mixture of culture, ability and 
structure.  This about hugely energetic capable people, do you think that, that 
almost gives them to reach an optimum outcome, irrespective of which path 
they follow?  (3) 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
I would like to draw my conclusion back to the original concept of Rousseau.  
There has been a broad discussion in the paper of Rousseau and in amongst 
my hours of narrative I think it is most useful to classify my findings as follows: 
 
First let me reproduce the table “After Rousseau” from my literature review. 
 
After Rousseau: A synthesis from the literature of Rousseau on the practice of 
Evidence Based Management 
 
Management Issue With advanced knowledge of 
effective implementation of 
Evidence Based Management 
For evidence avoiding status 
quo 
The supervision of 
employees 
 
A 
Managers acquire a systematic 
understanding of what productivity 
gains are most appropriately 
cultivated from their staff 
A manager may misuse 
threats and punishments or 
overuse positive 
encouragement with no 
reference to the outcome of 
either style or organisational 
performance 
Information available to 
managers on the 
consequences of their 
decisions 
 
B 
Appropriate evidence and data 
base: perceptual gaps and 
misunderstandings are significantly 
reduced so that post 
implementation review is a valuable 
part of improving management 
Information is poor as data 
and evidence is not collected 
so that experiences are likely 
to be misinterpreted 
The delivery on 
promises to the public, 
employees, 
stakeholders/taxpayers 
customers and others 
 
C 
Decisions are based on systematic 
causal knowledge conditioned by 
expertise.  Decisions are 
legitimised by being made in a 
systematic and informed fashion 
more readily justifiable in the eyes 
of stakeholders 
In such settings, managers 
cannot learn why their 
decisions may have been 
wrong, nor what alternatives 
would have been right.  The 
public challenges decisions in 
the search for transparency 
Management style 
 
D 
Managers have an understanding 
of the powerful impact their 
decisions have on the fate of their 
firms.  Managerial competence is 
recognised as a critical and often 
scarce resource 
Evidence based management 
seems to threaten managers 
personal freedom to run their 
organisations as they see fit 
Approach to academic 
research 
 
E 
Managers read the academic 
literature regularly and the 
consultants who advise them are 
likely to do so also.  There is a 
recognition that this research exists 
Despite the explosion of 
research on decision making, 
individual and group 
performance, business 
strategy and other domains 
directly tied to organisational 
practice, few practising 
managers access this work 
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Management culture 
 
F 
Supervisors and managers respond 
to a belief system probably 100 
years old, as far back as Fredrick 
Taylors (1911) structured methods 
for improving efficiency were 
classified under scientific 
management 
A belief that good 
management is an are - !the 
romance of leadership” school 
of thought where a shift to 
evidence an analysis connotes 
loss of creativity and autonomy 
In conclusion 
 
G 
Managers have evidence on which 
to base their decisions and 
consequently what is at stake 
should the decision or implantation 
fail 
Managers are prevented from 
real learning by fads and 
falsehoods 
 
And this is what we find. 
 
In the matter of: 
 
So, in conclusion, using the Rousseau or After Rousseau model.  This is what 
we conclude about the nature of evidence based decision making within the 
NHS in the East Midlands during 2007-08.  I have notated a + to mean that 
the quotation favours an evidence based approach and a – to mean that the 
quotation means the lack of an evidence based approach to decision making 
or an = sign to say that it neither favours one conclusion or the other. 
 
In the approach to academic research 
 
An evidence based approach would conclude that managers read the 
academic literature regularly and the consultants who advise them are likely to 
do so also.  The alternative conclusion is that few practicing managers access 
this work. 
 
- “get yourself educated in something, then get a job, just don’t pretend it will 
teach you to be a manager” 
- “it’s a bit like practice based commissioning, you know, I mean they invent 
it as a concept because it seems to be a means to an end, the end being 
whatever it is we all want” 
+ “And sometimes reading things, I prefer talking to people really and I talk 
to a lot of management consultants who kind of say things, it’s not that it 
tells you something new, it’s just that it allows you to relate things in a 
different way” 
- In conditions which predispose to hospital acquired infection “you wont do 
any of the things of which there’s a very good evidence base that it would 
make a difference, and so your first engagement with us, is to come and 
tell us to do something for which there is no evidence that any infection 
has been prevented, anywhere in the world – ever, by doing this and you 
think that’s the most important thing that we should do” 
- “If I say to you academic evidence?  I think it makes me feel, you know, 
chance would be a fine thing” 
- “It will never be that developed in this experiment that is the NHS” 
+ “So places which have a worse winter than we do don’t have this, they 
have a little bit more mortality but not much and it’s all down to poor 
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housing policy, benefits, insulation, social care, primary care access, all of 
these things” 
= “I think they’ll use clinical evidence, I think managers are very much into 
the development of clinical pathways, you know, working with clinicians 
and doing the best things in the best way, but as to how the NHS works, 
the sort of infrastructure, where services are located, how they’re 
delivered, I don’t think they do use evidence” 
- “No!  We almost steadfastly refuse to accept that it might possibly work 
and it was worth considering because it didn’t fit the positive framework of 
choice and competition” 
 
In the supervision of employees 
 
An evidence based approach would conclude that managers acquire a 
systematic undertaking of what productivity gains are most appropriately 
cultivated from their staff, in the alternative a manager would have a style with 
no reference to its outcome or organisational performance. 
 
+ “I went in very, very hard with the matrons about their cleaning audits, 
when we had all the matrons in, I said, I know it (the evidence) is not like 
that, you know its not like that, what are you playing at” 
+ “We had a doctor here say to us, we don’t have to comply with the Health 
Care Commission standards because we’re not a hospital!  What’s that 
about?  Certainly wasn’t about better patient care” 
= “My next Chief Execs column in the staff newspaper, urging them to write 
to me, and I will reply, and I will go and meet them” 
+ “You work up through your career (and to begin with) you have to be more 
and more evidence based because you haven’t built up the wealth of 
experience, the wealth of knowledge, the falling over, the making 
mistakes, to make the judgement call in the same way” 
+ “I think the processes that are used by administrators should have an 
evidence base for doing them, and a rationale defined by evidence, I think 
managers should use evidence in reaching their decisions and evidence 
based leadership I think would go the same” 
 
In the information available to managers on the consequences of their 
decisions 
 
An evidence based approach would conclude that there was appropriate 
evidence and data, a significant reduction in perceptual gaps and post 
implementation review is valued.  The opposite is, that information is poor and 
evidence is not collected. 
 
- “Old evidence becomes dogma.  So it’s established on an evidence base 
but then that becomes dogma which in itself  evaporates over time and 
then the evidence isn’t refreshed”  
- “Balanced scorecards.  It’s not foolproof.  I think it lulls you into a false 
sense of security.  A&E, not the wrong side of the line, my dashboard 
would say ok, but we tried to fill a post there, we shortlisted the people and 
one turned up, and that means it’s going to be breaking down some time in 
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the future, it (the balanced scorecard) is not proactive enough again” 
- “I think world class commissioning, if we’re not careful, will give us a 
rigorous discipline on investment issues, even going down to an actuarial 
type approach.  And I think that’s actually quite dangerous because 
context and consequences are two things that a manager and a leader 
need to continually take into account, the consequences of one decision 
on another set of decisions” 
= “I’d prefer things to be explained but things like that are very difficult to 
move in an organisation of 7,000 people, if they don’t very shortly 
afterwards appear on paper so you can do something with it” 
= “Taught me you can approximate, but you need to know how you’re 
approximating,  you know when you’re approximating you know what 
you’ve lost.  But I have an ability to get into detail (the evidence and the 
data) when I need to in a way that some people just can’t” 
= “I don’t think you’re ever totally crass to consider an evidence base, but to 
use it solely for decision making I think is crass in most situations.  I think 
it’s good in scientific situations, when I was a chiropodist, when it came 
down to the amount of chemical I put on to destroy something – there were 
tables of evidence about what was most effective, that was, to go outside 
of those, I can think of little context to go outside of those.  When it comes 
to an investment decision, or even a personnel decision, you know, you 
can use the evidence of whatever, that’s behind that decision, but if you 
don’t understand the people, the place, the politics the environment, you 
can make a bad decision; so for instance, be it an investment decision 
around upgrading or changing a hospital, or buying or not buying a 
service, you need to understand the wider context that’s there; be it the N 
in National for NHS, the national targets, national regime, be it the local 
context around who was denied a drug six weeks ago, and now you’re 
spending £60,000 on people that seem to be more spurious – even if the 
evidence for one is nil and the evidence for an investment in district 
nursing is high” 
- “The doctors’ view is, ok, 20 years ago, when you were building this 
hospital (because we’ve been here for 20 years, not 10 minutes), 20 years 
ago we said to you, the design of this wonderful new PFI was wrong, 
you’ve got too many beds for the footprint, so the beds are too close 
together, you get cross contamination, you can’t clean round the beds. 
Because there aren’t enough beds, you’ve got too faster through put, so 
people with infections are moved around the hospital”  
In the delivery on promises to the public, stakeholders and others 
 
An evidence based decision making would conclude that decisions are based 
on systematic causal knowledge conditioned by expertise.  Decisions in an 
evidence based conclusion would be systematic, informed and readily 
justifiable.  In the opposite environment the public challenges decisions in the 
search for transparency and managers cannot learn why their decisions may 
have been wrong nor what alternatives would have been right. 
 
- “Politicians, do politicians want evidence based decision making for the 
NHS?  No, they want to be elected and that’s the bottom line and as long 
as you remember that, then everything they do is completely 
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understandable!” 
- “Nice (the National Institute for Clinical Excellence) is a construct of a 
political approach to the NHS by a government that hasn’t changed 
political party and yet we don’t seem to be any closer than we were when 
we started” 
- “And what we always find is every time they introduce one set of priorities, 
another set emerges because they’ve been ignored by the first set” 
- “Yes, I think the public as body public, would expect evidence based 
decision making, and quite rightly expect that, and would want it as well.  I 
think the public as Joe-individual probably would expect, would want it, but 
when it came to them, would probably bring in other subjective 
assessment criteria.  I think politicians are a bit different, and I don’t think, 
whilst they would probably in a purer discussion say, of course we do, I 
think they will always, and evidence is always driven by context, they 
would always want their policy implemented – evidence or not” 
- “Pseudomonas is going to become an important infection.  Vancamycin 
resistant enterococci are going to become, TB is going to become one.  
Because all of these infections are being ignored, because everyone’s 
focusing on MRSA” 
- “And we don’t even look at the vast of MRSA infections, we don’t look at all 
the MRSA infections that don’t get bacteremia, all the joint infections, the 
skin infections, you know, the ulceration that people get, we don’t look at 
the damage that that causes in the community.  So we’re looking at the 
tiniest tip of the smallest iceberg here” 
- “you clearly identify yourself as wanting to give the public confidence in 
you being a good custodian of their health service, versus the method that 
would do that is not really evidence based” 
 
In the matter of management style 
 
In a conclusion erring towards evidence based decision making about the 
NHS, managers would have an understanding of the powerful impact of their 
decisions and managerial competencies would be recognised as critical and 
scarce.  The opposite conclusion would be that evidence based decision 
making seems to threaten managers personal freedom to run their 
organisations as they see fit. 
 
= “You know I mentor a lot of people and a lot of them are Directors in PCTs 
and over the years I’ve watched them do fantastic things, and I’ve watched 
them being stopped from doing fantastic things, because some rule book 
says it’s not allowed; do you know what I mean?  Yes.  I find it sad, I 
mean, and the big picture is probably, you know, progress, the little picture 
depressingly irritating backwards steps” 
+ “So there was no reason you should have used it before, do you take a 
break and go and look for the evidence or do you say, no, we have 
sufficient skills to understand the context and consequences – in this 
room, of getting the decision right or wrong – we don’t need any evidence, 
what we need is a decision.  I would be shocked if the evidence wasn’t 
already there, and I would want to have the evidence if there was some 
evidence around, I certainly would want to know it was there and on 
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certain decisions I would want the ‘show-me test’ as well.  On big things I 
want to see it.  So I would stop – go to the evidence, then consider the 
evidence in the wider context of the decision we’re making” 
= “One of the things that’s happened of course to FTs is that they’ve 
attracted a different calibre and type of Chief Exec, arguably.  I think, you 
know, we’ve advertised for two director posts lately and there are a lot of 
people who want to work for an FT…..ok………there are a lot of people 
moving out of Trusts that wont make it to FT status, so you could say, what 
we’ve been doing is sapping the best management resource out of the 
non-FTs to maintain the performance of the FTs.  We’ve also attracted, I 
think,  some quite different people in Non-Executive roles and Chair roles; 
the Chairs of FTs, a lot of them are, like the freedom bit, like the get on 
and do run a business thing” 
- “I’m interested you’ve chosen evidence based management and not 
evidence based leadership, because I think there’s a difference between 
leadership and management.  I suppose, there’s something about 
management based around evidence and management decisions based 
around evidence, which might be different from evidence based 
management.  It depends how you define management, and evidence 
probably as well” 
- “Well, he reminded me what the end was, that’s what he ultimately did, he 
kind of made me think about what they were trying to do, yes they did it in 
a cack-handed, stupid, I wouldn’t have done it that way, kind of a way, but 
given that that’s what they were trying to do, it was really not helpful for us 
to jump up and down and say ‘there’s no evidence for this’, because it 
undermines the whole investment programme they’ve put in place, which 
wasn’t adding any value to anybody, it was just making it wasted money, 
instead of possibly purposeful money” 
 
 
 
 
 
So in Summary My Conclusion is 
 
In the matter of the approach to 
academic research (Against!) 
 
 
 
 
In the matter of supervision of 
employees (For!) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the matter of the information 
 
There is a bias against using 
academic research by NHS 
managers in the East Midlands.  This 
is by no means universal, but is 
consistent in its presentation. 
 
There is a very strong preference for 
using evidence based decision 
making amongst the cohort of East 
midlands managers and use an 
appropriately cultivated management 
approach to support evidence based 
decisions. 
 
There is a bias against evidence 
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available to managers on the 
consequences of their decisions 
(Against!) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the matter of management style 
(No preference either way) 
 
 
 
 
 
In the matter of the delivery of 
promises to the public, stakeholders 
and others (Against strongly!) 
based decisions.  Decisions have 
insufficient data and evidence for 
decision making, and little value is 
attached to post implementation 
review.  Some managers are neutral 
towards this subject but few, if any, 
show a preference for evidence 
based decision making informed by 
the consequences of their decisions. 
 
There is only an inconclusive result in 
the area.  There is no preference.  
Some managers have a preference 
for evidence it seems but equally 
same would discredit it as a viable 
and realistic approach. 
 
Of all the areas this is the one where 
there is next to no examples of 
evidence based decision making, but 
there are multiple strong, lengthy and 
cross-referenced examples of 
decision making that is neither 
systematic nor developed by causal 
knowledge.  Decision making is 
opaque to the public and frequently 
challenged. 
 
 
So how does this help in building up a grounded theory and how is the 
process of grounded theory working?  The NHS is reflected by the cohort 
interviewed to be an industry whose growth is entirely government 
determined.  It is not to say that it is a matter of ideology and indeed all three 
political parties support the NHS models in the provision of public healthcare 
but wherein lies the grounded theory of NHS management that emerges from 
these observations and interviews? 
 
The following issues show that some similar concepts exist.  All of the NHS 
executives interviewed and the group exercises recorded indicate that NHS 
managers in the east midlands are working for common, popular approaches 
to decision making that enable them to share and compare and to bargain 
and negotiate with each other or with politicians and the media.  The public 
are a real challenge to their sense of comfort but there is no model or general 
methodology for generating theory to be tested out with the public and 
stakeholders.  The group is numerate and the decisions by the individuals or 
bigger meetings are grounded in data that is collected and analysed even if 
that is never validated or best available evidence or best decision making tool.  
So in the round ideas are grouped into popularity – general 
application/applicability and – grounding in data.  If and when public spending 
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growth in the NHS slows it is these grounded concepts – is the decision 
“popular, general and data driven” that emerge as a grounded theory. 
 
Considering these examples, it is possible to form a collection of categories.  
The data used for decision making must have joint ownership between those 
collecting it and those being performance managed by it.  This joint collection 
and analysis is a key to the evolution of a grounded theory of the relationship 
between NHS elites and the organisations, especially the clinical 
organisations that they lead.  The data analysis is conducted in a system 
which seeks theoretical consistency no matter whether the evidence supports 
the theory.  So for example data is compared against evidence about choice, 
competition, privatisation (plurality) and contracts (contestability) which is 
saturated imposition of neo-classical economics theory on the NHS even if 
there is no evidence for how it improves the organisational effectiveness of all 
or even part of the NHS.  What is clear is that there is a constant desire for 
compassion. 
 
Thinking about different ways to look at the evidence these are emerging 
themes and trends.  It is clear that this piece of qualitative research was able 
to examine the individual and group behaviours of the current elite east 
midlands vision of the NHS manager.  Other forms of qualitative research may 
have been applied.  Ethnography might have lead to a way of understanding 
the daily life of NHS executives but there is a bias in this method to seek 
methods that improve the probability of success, conversation analysis may 
have explored the turn taking and power relationships at play and evaluation 
research applied would have lead to a consideration of the interests and 
values of NHS managers relative to the general and public welfare.  
Consistent with my position as a participant in the system and my desire to 
not only observe the cohort but to create a generalisable theory about us then 
grounded theory (the generation of theory from data has proven to be the 
most successful tool.     
 
If the manager is a decision analyst then what do they count?  All decision 
making, the direct costs of which are met by NHS funds collected by the 
taxpayer, should: provide new knowledge or direction needed to improve their 
performance and the performance by their part of the NHS.  This should 
improve the health and/or healthcare of the population for which they are 
responsible. 
 
If an NHS manager were to fill up a box that says ‘EBM’ what would they put 
in it and what would they throw out?  Does this lead to the viable creation of a 
theory that can be concluded to arrive from grounded research? 
 
The manager is willing to use evidence to argue their case and protect 
themselves.  This in turn would mean that the findings of an EBM decision 
would be in the box only if they result from the following condition:  The 
evidence was from a source that is generalisable for others in the NHS cohort 
to use – either by having adopted others sources or added to the 
commonwealth of resources.  That the decision followed a protocol that was 
clear even to the layman/non-executive and was bounded by clear limits of its 
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applicability.  An EBM box would include things that they were happy for 
everyone – their peers, their staff, politicians, taxpayers, patients to review for 
its evidential consistency.  The box would have in it only those ideas that were 
ethically accepted as consistent with NHS values, rejecting those that are 
efficient but not effective in achieving organisational mission and goals.  Given 
that the cohort in study are Chief Executives and senior managers, they will 
have demonstrated that these are clearly structured methods for 
implementation of their decision and that a cascade system exists for the 
dissemination of their decision. 
 
How does this fit with my model and is it possible to create another diagram to 
show the relationship between these elements? 
 
Let us consider the differences exhibited by groups and individuals, that 
groups were happier with evidence than individuals.  Consider the definition of 
a pedant.  A person who is overly concerned with formation and precision and 
who makes a show of learning.  The corresponding notion is that the person is 
also a source of instruction or guidance.  The term can typically be used with 
a negative connotation indicating someone overly concerned with minutiae 
and whose tone is perceived as condescending but when it was first used by 
Shakespeare in 1588 it simply meant teacher.  Some people take pride in 
being pedantic and may preface a sentence as such.  Therefore I believe 
there is a boundary where pedantry is an accepted form of evidence based 
decision making and that this is consistent with the amount of authority and 
status the individual has. 
 
From the conversation I think through grounded theory, I can say that; 
 
The cohort treats EBM in the following ways to display that the cohort itself is 
efficacious.  By efficacy I mean that the effect of a given managerial 
intervention has to not only be economically efficient it must be ‘acceptable’.  
Acceptable in that the political and public context of the NHS means that the 
impact of an intervention by the Chief Executive or senior manager has been 
thought through in an evidence based way before the decision has been 
unleashed in the real world NHS.  Acceptable in that there is concerns that 
this decision is at least as good as any other. 
 
That EBM in the cohort is alive in the following ways.  If you consider the 
diagram below it is clear that there are some places where EBM is effective.  
Referring back to earlier conversations we see quotations that talk of a 
negotiated use of evidence through acquired years of experiential and 
experimental learning.  This leads to the oft sought for “earned autonomy”.  
The best quote was the one that said “because you haven’t built up the wealth 
of experience, the wealth of knowledge, the falling over, the making mistakes, 
to make the judgement call in the same way”. 
 
But that EBM is dead to the cohort when you consider that managers in 
particular in this project, described a situation where their own control over the 
decision making process had been to some extent lost through the 
requirements of audit.  At low levels of autonomy you use evidence a lot and 
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at high levels of autonomy you use evidence a lot again but somewhere in 
between it gets much more difficult.  The best two quotations to summarise 
why EBM might be dead to the cohort are “It’s a yes and no if I am brutally 
honest, if you take them in an enclosed ecosphere when there are no 
consequences to their decisions.  Then they will always go with the evidence, 
then you put them back in the real world and …” plus “a lot of decisions that 
are made, seem to be based more on history and on the views of politicians 
and key stakeholders, which are often not really evidence based. 
 
So in later study I would take the following defined tool and go back to the 
cohort in a challenging way. 
 
 
                                                                                              Level of  
                detailed use 
                of EBM            
 
This model is emergent rather than solid and concrete and how I can look at it 
and define it is something like this.  I have quartered the box not by quadrants 
but by triangles to show that this model to an extent overlaps and is about 
occupying different zones of the autonomy/detail axis.  The key is that there 
are four zones.   
 
1. “Participative leadership”.  Experienced at all levels of autonomy, NHS 
managers try to use some degree of Evidence Based Management but 
they never explore it to its full extent.  The best they ever get is a 
‘halfway’ experimentation with evidence.  Indeed it is possible to make 
decisions without evidence at all. 
 
2. “Zone of pedantry”.  Evidence is used to develop and control the 
organisation but the manager never rises above the middle tier of 
autonomy and authority.  Note the use of phrase autonomy rather than 
“authority” or “power” as even a powerful individual may find 
themselves in the zone of pedantry when working in a group because 
Level of 
Autonomy 
Zone 
zone 
Zone o f 
 
Zone of 
efficacy 
 
Zone of 
participative 
leadership 
Zone of 
effective 
evidence 
Zone of 
pedantry 
The Evidence Based Box of 
East Midlands NHS Managers 
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their autonomy is diminished in the meeting.  In this zone a very 
detailed application of evidence based decision making coreless 
negatively was autonomy – if you have to use a lot of detail to make a 
decision you don’t have much autonomy. 
 
3. “Zone of efficacy”.  The decision will use varying degrees of evidence in 
getting things done.  What is effective is not necessarily efficacious.  
The efficacious decision is the one that produces a desired amount of 
the desired effect and the success in achieving a given goal.  It is 
imperative to note that in this zone, the complete acceptance of 
rejection of evidence based decision making are polar opposites but 
exist in their purest form where the manager has the ultimate 
autonomy. 
 
Finally from my increased understanding and interpretation of findings it is 
possible to say that evidence based management has an identified and 
discernible impact on NHS management but it is not common and is certainly 
not in good health as a prevailing philosophy.  It is not the managers who will 
keep it alive and any implementation of evidence based management on a 
wide scale will require the importation of external skills and political will to 
implement.   
 
Given that my intent way to hold up a part of the minor to the “us” that I belong 
to (NHS managers in the East Midlands) this makes me feel that we are using 
a body of care that draws upon our own experiences and the experience of 
generations of practitioners.  The sad thing is that much of it has no real 
evidence base on which to justify various things that we do in the name of 
leadership and decision making.  This only diminishes the sense that we are 
engaged in professional practice, that we have a gathered body of well 
organised knowledge that on a personal level nothing can be identified that 
eliminates unsound or excessively risky practices in favour of those that have 
better outcomes except my training as an accountant.  Throughout this 
process I decided to slow the mirror in a way that enabled a true reflection not 
to study the effect of an evidence based intervention.  Using the question of 
an “evidence based approach: does it exist? Had a number of advantages 
because it enabled all of the NHS managers to avoid truisms that are socially 
acceptable but which would prove not to be true when I sought the 
corroboration.  For example the demand to provide evidence can simply be 
used as an excuse to avoid options and scenario’s which have not yet been 
evaluated or which because of their nature are very difficult to evaluate. 
 
Whatever my conclusions it was possible to say that I defined the mirror as 
the method by which our productivity as NHS managers might be enhanced in 
our own eyes.  There is no doubt that a lack of an evidence base for a 
profession has left the door open to amateurish practice by charlatans and 
rogues.  Therefore what I found fascinating (and led to the reused diagram) is 
that the evidence base is widely recognised as the means to provide sound 
validation for the work of middle managers.  The Chief Executives and senior 
managers were not supportive of an imposed evidence based methodology 
but did acknowledge and support the control of junior staff to preserve the 
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integrity of the NHS management profession.  My own personal observation of 
what this means to “us” is that we should like evidence based decision making 
but remember that EBM is a philosophical approach that denies the true value 
of experience and heuristics.  I take comfort that examples of reliance on the 
“way it has always been done” can be found in almost every profession – 
including medicine and nursing – even when those practices are contradicted 
by new and better information.  I admire that the NHS leaders I met 
remembered that no evidence can be better than the use of poor quality, 
contradicting or incomplete evidence, so ultimately making sense of what I 
see in the mirror for the reader is: the model is considered valid by elite 
people but for control and direction not for personal accountability because 
they see themselves being their own person.  They don’t want evidence to be 
the concrete block that holds the elite down, they want freedom. 
 
The discussion of evidence based management is a valid question but it is not 
liked in the higher echelons of management, linked as it is to the notation that 
management can easily merge into administration when considering white 
collar tasks. 
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1 An Introduction to the problem 
 
1.1 Why this is worthwhile to me as a matter to study 
 
In my professional life I am a planner and purchaser of Emergency Ambulance Services.  So 
I spend a great degree of time analysing and considering data about performance of 
ambulance responses to emergencies, the most efficient ways to do things and looking for 
insights that will either improve quality for the same price, or get me the same quality for a 
lower price.  What I buy is affected by the reasons that people call for ambulances – 
dangerous personal behaviours, the frailty of the human body in times of extreme weather 
(heat and cold), biological factors such as disease or the contra-indicators of drugs, age and 
disability.  In the response to a particularly difficult performance period it becomes clear that 
“falls” were a key reason for the despatch of ambulances.  Although few trials have been 
carried out in the UK, the prevention and management of falls in the older population is a key 
government target in reducing ill health.  This is a key target of the national service 
framework for older people.  “Reduce the number of falls which result in serious injury and 
ensure effective treatment and rehabilitation for those who had fallen”.  (NSF 2001). 
 
So I asked for a simple binary analysis of the response to falls in the over 65 population.  
Using the previous 12 months data the query was asked – was the person you picked up as a 
result of a fall and if so, where did you pick them up from?  The received wisdom was that 
residential care homes were prone to call for ambulances to avoid picking up fallen clients 
for reasons of potential hazardous injury to the care staff and that the older population – 
particularly in cold weather – was prone to fall in the street.  So a simple analysis of the 
results was carried out and that is given in the figure below. 
 
Figure 1 
EMAS Responses to Falls in Over 65s: Type of Pick up Location 
Sample of data from 2006/7
Residential/Care Home
16.7%
Non-Residential Address
15.6%
Residential Address
67.7%
 
The sample set was 2700 records taken randomly from all EMAS calls received and non-
residential address includes things such as “outside”, “shops”, “pub”, as identified by the 
caller and where the location was clearly non-residential, such as outside a named business or 
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factory.  What fascinated me was that people fell in their own homes.  Consistently and 
evidentially people fall in their own homes.  As a proportion of the population who live in 
residential care homes more people may be falling than those who live in their own home 
but, as an organiser of ambulance services, the evidence tells me we should start with what 
people are doing in their own homes not anywhere else.  So why the pre-occupation with 
everywhere else in the study of falls?  It became clear that the study of falls was time and 
again about the reason for falling or the avoidance of admission to Accident and Emergency 
Departments.  Close (1999) analysed individuals presenting at A&E following a fall; Crotty 
(2002) looked at the best medicine and treatment to get fallers home quickly; Tinetti (1999) 
looked at improved daily living skills to prevent falls and developed work done by Ebrahim 
(1997) and only Pardessus (2002) considered the modification of environmental hazards that 
might affect the propensity of an individual to fall.  I was therefore presented with a very 
simple piece of evidence that mattered in the planning of ambulance services, specific to the 
actual rather than theoretical experience and it told me something that we weren’t 
considering.  Whilst  undoubtedly there was an issue with homes and people falling in the 
street, if we wanted to look at the reasons that the ambulance was called – in absolute rather 
than proportionate terms at least – then the answer for falls lay in peoples own homes. 
 
1.2 Why does this matter to the study of evidence based decision 
making in NHS management? 
 
Let me begin with two more data queries that were run on the same sample data, almost 
immediately after the first query.  Ambulance calls are triaged from Category A (see 
immediately, danger to life and the individual) to Category C (traumatic to the person but 
requiring quick rather than immediate attention).  There is also an acknowledgement in the 
work that NHS Direct do that communicating in a way that is sensitive to gender norms may 
also facilitate adherence to interventions that improve health or avoid ill health.  So two 
reports were run as below. 
 
Figure 2 
EMAS Responses to Falls in Over 65's by Call Category 
April 2006 to March 2007
CAT A
9.4%
CAT B
49.8%
CAT C
40.9%
 
Figure 3 
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These two pieces of data turned into information are really important because the context 
here is ambulance services not the general planning of falls.  Consider this quote from the 
NHS Direct website, (so this is the NHS talking about itself).  “Falls often result in serious 
injury, often to bones and joints and there are many fatalities particularly amongst older 
people ……. an estimated 1000 older people die each year from a fall on stairs.  Falls cause 
the most deaths and long-term health problems amongst older people”.  But for emergency 
ambulances as part of the NHS less than 10% of the work collecting falls is Category A 
(NOW!) and Category C (quick, but okay to wait) is over 40%.  However important falls are 
to the NHS, the Ambulance Service needs a different gradient to policy response for falls to 
other parts of the NHS.  An evidence based response to falls in the East Midlands Ambulance 
Service in 2006/07 would be – to paraphrase the NHS direct quotation above – “Falls often 
result in serious injury, often to bones and joints ….. but in most cases this will not require or 
receive a blue light response of a fast ambulance once we have assessed the comfort and risk 
of the fallen patient”.  I then engaged the question about whether this was a gender issue.  
Were there any issues that affected falls related to sex?  The figures showed that 2/3 of the 
responses were to women.  In an NHS where gender equality affects the general 
consideration of health status in the population the simple use of data analysed and identified 
a service with a specific gender bias and yet little or nothing was being done to identify this 
as a “women’s issue” in the say that, say, breast cancer was (predominantly but not 
exclusively a female condition). 
 
This all matters to the wider use of NHS policy.  Some very rudimentary queries using data 
coding, already available in the minimum data set for ambulance call outs, was throwing up 
evidence for one region in one year that lead to different conclusions about the nature of 
service delivery than a planner might have had based on national policy alone.  Let me 
consider for a moment five truly admirable things that NHS Direct tell us about falls as they 
affect the NHS: 
 
EMAS Responses to Falls in Over 65's: Gender 
April 2006 to March 2007
Female 
65.8% 
Male 
34.2% 
Unknown 
0.1% 
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1. Physical activity improves balance and prevents falls. 
2. Older people respond to life events such as retirement or becoming a grandparent in 
adjusting their perception of the need to manage risk to  
prevent falling. 
3. People like to work in groups on falls prevention, but these can be demanding if your 
hearing, sight or short-term memory isn’t the best. 
4. Self-management is better than dependence on professionals. 
5. Advice can be tailored using websites.   
 
Of these five, only one really mattered in the analysis of the EMAS response to falls, that in 
the over 65’s the effects of aging are critical.  As the next graph shows this is a material issue 
for EMAS. 
 
Figure 4 
EMAS Responses to Falls by Quinary Age Band and Call Category 
April 2006 to March 2007
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The response by quinary age band and call category tells us that in the over 65’s the call 
category is also related to age.  Responses to older people who have fallen are more likely to 
be coded as less urgent responses.  The frequency of Category B and C responses to falls 
increases exponentially in the older age groups.  In contrast, Category A responses increase 
only slightly in the older age groups.  As the human condition becomes frailer with age the 
urgency of the response by EMAS diminishes – more people fall as they get older but they 
fall in less traumatic ways – requiring a measured, rather than a “NOW!” response. 
 
1.3 The collection and storage, or use of data 
 
‘Performance’ has long been the NHS – including EMAS – term coined to the task of 
extracting useful information from the clinical data collected.  As new despatch and call 
handling methods have been introduced to ambulance services progressively since the 1980’s 
the increasing volume of data that is collected has lead to computer-based approaches for the 
storage of this data.  The degree and method for applying query software to this data for 
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information, discovery and knowledge can be obscured by the drive for ‘performance’ in the 
NHS.  ‘Performance’ in effect is a very specific set of numerical responses to NHS policy 
and targets that extracts the data and compares/juxtaposes it with plans in a very structured 
way.  What my first couple of introductory paragraphs have shown though is the dominance 
of performance can limit the use of simple algorithms to identify attributes of the NHS and 
identify opportunities to improve processes that we might have got from the same data. 
 
Let us consider the “Evidence Based Box”.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Starting with the principle that the ambulance data set has already given us four pieces of 
knowledge that we didn’t have before – the location where falls happen, that falls happen to 
women rather than men, that most calls are not critically urgent and that the older you are the 
more likely it is that you will fall but it won’t be a fall requiring a “NOW!” response from the 
ambulance crew.  Asking the four corners of the evidence based box about why they didn’t 
know this says some important thing to the use of evidence based management based on 
quantitative date in the NHS. 
 
“Politicians” – The NHS is an exercise in political power.  The politician will identify trends 
in public policy that go beyond simple analysis.  The politician is naturally distrustful of ever 
more detailed algorithms about delivery for a part of the NHS, being concerned with the 
‘National’ nature of the NHS and consistency of policy application.  As an avoider of data 
the politician can still have the opportunity to identify key business processes and target 
opportunities but will not be able to push for a multivariate analysis of the data.  Ultimately 
the problem is that the politician is concerned that abdicating control over the usefulness of 
data to the statistician to explore knowledge in this way may result in contradictions with 
policy, false-positives or results that are good for the NHS but no use for the politician at all. 
 
“Public” – Ambulances are an emergency service.  The call for an ambulance is 999.  The 
same as for Fire or the Police.  The public want their police visible and their fire service 
quick.  It follows that the public want ambulances – glamorised by the media portrayal – to 
be there quickly whatever the circumstances.  The public has made the ambulance service 
part of the taxpayers compact with the NHS and a forecast or predictive modelling based 
approach to the use of EMAS data is of low regard for the public.  The same data – mining 
and prediction techniques puts ambulances and modern response vehicles on road sides 
rather than ambulance stations and the public may be distrustful of the road-side ambulance 
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opined to be “doing nothing”, when it has actually been statically placed.  Data is, in effect, 
linked to targets – themselves a perceived corruption of a clinically lead NHS. 
 
“Clinicians” – The clinician, as has been seen in the short literature search identified in 
paragraph 1.1, is most concerned with the nature of the fall.  The ambulance service is seen 
as a scoop and run service, bringing the patient efficiently to the trauma centre.  To the 
clinician the policy response of the NHS is consistent with the patient experience.  Falls are 
ubiquitous and deadly, require immediate response and palliation for pain.  EMAS will 
transport patients who require moving to the centre for excellence in this area.  Continuous 
innovation in the clinical pathway, dramatically increasing the accuracy of diagnosis and 
prediction of likely outcomes for patients for different interventions makes them satisfied 
they are doing the best for falls: that the ambulance is likely to be the first responder;  that 
falls are rarely life threatening; that there is a gender bias in those who fall and that getting to 
people at home before they fall, not in the street after they have fallen, would be 
economically sensible; none of this will matter to the clinician. 
 
“Managers” – Managers rely on the use of data.  But they are unlikely to be happy with data 
that has unknown interrelations.  An unavoidable weakness of asking the sort of what-if 
questions posed about the EMAS data is that it can lead to two adverse reactions amongst 
managers.  Unlike performance data it may expose uncomfortable relationships to be 
observed between perceptions of excellence in the NHS target performance (attributed by 
others) and real questions about operational policy and superior operational delivery.  
Secondly it can expose the pursuit of an information data source that has never been 
observed and leads to the torment of the professional administrator – a request for more form 
filling and data capture.  Managers are also concerned about issues of data security given that 
significant data loss in the NHS is now a dismissible offence for all grades of NHS manager. 
 
2 Subjects under study 
 
2.1 A brief introduction to East Midlands Ambulance Service (EMAS) 
 
I wanted to complete the analytical quantitative part of my study of evidence based 
management by looking at EMAS, as the only clinical service organisation that covered the 
whole of the East Midlands.  EMAS also provides services in the South Humber areas of 
North and North East Lincolnshire which is outside the definition of East Midlands used 
elsewhere in this project.  When I talk of the East Midlands in regards to ambulance service I 
will be talking about the area co-terminus with the East Midlands Strategic Health Authority 
and the Government Office for the East Midlands, not the whole of the service area covered 
by EMAS including South Humber.  EMAS provided emergency and urgent care, patient 
transport, call handling and clinical triage services.  EMAS employ 3000 staff and have 70 
locations they operate from and an annual budget of £137 million in financial year 2008/09. 
 
Accident and Emergency crews responded to over 500,000 calls this year.  In addition, 
patient transport and volunteer ambulance car drivers provide care and transport on 5000 
journeys to and from routine NHS appointments each day.  Community Paramedics and 
Emergency Care Practitioners treat people in their own homes following an emergency 
response if a hospital visit is not required. 
 
The requirement is for all NHS ambulance services to respond to the most serious and life 
threatening injuries (what was called Category A earlier) within eight minutes.  Ambulance 
Trusts must also arrive at the home of patients within 15 minutes if requested by a GP.  The 
publication of “Taking Healthcare to the Patient – transferring NHS Ambulance Services” 
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(2005) also started a process of change which shifted the focus from simply response times to 
the quality of clinical care when response staff from EMAS reach a patient.  So measures are 
monitored for example: how many heart attack patients have been given clot busting drugs 
(for heart attach and stroke patients this is vital to be given as quickly as possible to prevent 
long term damage); how well pain has been managed for patients by the use of scales and 
EMAS performance also includes an active duty to make referrals under child protection 
guidelines as a first responder to families in varying degrees of distress. 
 
EMAS is organised as an NHS Trust and the ultimate objective of the organisation would be 
to sustain a sufficient track record of financial and quality performance over a number of 
years that they were authorised to be an NHS Foundation Trust.  They receive their annual 
income from Primary Care Trusts.  In that way EMAS can only be paid in 
competition/opportunity cost with every other possible disbursement of NHS resources.  The 
amount that EMAS receives is settled in exchange for services provided but will be in the 
same way exclude GPs, urgent care centres, some private providers and other NHS hospitals 
who might have thought they could use that money for the same patients in a better way.  To 
that extent, EMAS must constantly improve and re-prove itself to maintain the contract 
income it receives as well as place itself in the contest for additional resources within the 
NHS by way of innovation and good clinical quality.  EMAS has grown both organically and 
by merger from previous ambulance service that served the counties of Derbyshire, 
Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire and Rutland.  Before 2000 
these would have been separate organisations. 
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2.2 A brief introduction to the studied population 
 
Figure 5: Deaths from avoidable injury by age group in the East Midlands (2001-2005)i 
 
 
With a population of nearly 4.2 million, 7% of the UK total, the East Midlands is 
geographically the third largest region in England.  The area faces diverse challenges 
including dependence on manufacturing industries and ongoing problems of urban 
deprivation.  The south of the region is more prosperous due to close links with the South 
East but there are parts of the region affected by rural deprivation and isolation.  Specifically, 
the East Midlands is the third most rural region in England with 29% of the population living 
in rural areas.  The region has a similar age structure to the England average with 18% of 
residents of school age, 63% of working age and 19% of pensionable age.  The population is 
projected to increase between 2003 and 2028, with the principal driver of this growth being 
the group of pensionable age.  In the East Midlands there are slightly more women than men 
at 51% compared to 49%.  In the 2001 Census, 9% of the region’s population classified 
themselves as having an ethnic minority background.  Residents of Indian origin make up the 
largest group in the East Midlands accounting for 3% of the total population.  There is 
considerable sub-regional variation with ethnic minority communities making up 39% of the 
population of Leicester City, but only 3% in Derbyshire.  A statistical overview of the East 
Midlands region shows that it is the second smallest region in terms of population.  29.5% of 
the population is resident in rural areas, which is 10 percentage points higher than the 
England average.  In 2004, 19.8% of the East Midlands working age population self-
described themselves as having a disability, which is one percentage point higher than the 
UK average.    According to the 2001 Census of Population 72% of the population self-
identified at Christian.  1.7% of the population described themselves as Muslim and 1.6% as 
Hindus.  The Government estimates that between 5-7% of the UK population is gay, lesbian 
or bisexual.  In June 2007 76.2% of the working age population of the East Midlands was in 
employment.  This compares favourably with the average UK rate of 75.8%.  The 
employment rate was higher in rural areas than urban areas.  The regional NVQ3 rate for 
working age adults is 48.8% compared with the UK average of 50.5%. 
 
 
2.3 A brief introduction to the falls problem 
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Figure 6: Main causes of avoidable injury admissions in 2005/6 (all ages) - East Midlands 
residents
ii
 
 
 
Falls in the elderly population represent a serious and increasing issue in the UK and the 
subject area is attracting increased attention in current government policy development 
across different departments including health, social care and housing.  In January 2008 the 
Department for Communities and Local Government released a report entitled “Lifetime 
Homes, Lifetime Neighbourhoods” (2008).  This report highlights the following statistics: 
 
• One older person dies every five hours as a result of a fall 
• Falls in older people cost the NHS around three quarters of a billion pounds each year 
• 1.25 million falls a year result in hospital admissions. 
 
Ambulance services have a key part to play in tackling this issue.  The recent Department of 
Health guidance on Urgent Care Pathways for Older people with Complex needs states that: 
 
“The importance of the ambulance response to older people who have fallen has historically 
been poorly recognised within the wider NHS.  Ambulance clinicians are in a unique position 
of attending this group of patients in their own home and as a result are able to observe, not 
only the condition of the patients, but also their living conditions (hygiene, food etc).” 
 
“Lifetime Homes, Lifetime Neighbourhoods” commits the government to the following 
action: 
 
• “We will improve joined-up assessment, service provision and commissioning across 
these three sectors (health, housing and social care) in order to deliver better 
outcomes for older people.” 
 
Falls in the East Midlands 
 
Against this national back drop it is important to understand the ‘picture’ of falls in our area 
and what we can do as a service to reduce the number of falls, through partnership working 
or by managing our response to them more effectively.  The East Midlands falls data 
reinforces the national view and therefore there is a need to pay particular attention to falls. 
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3 Patterns of data 
 
3.1 Presentation of the data 
 
Several types of statistical/data presentation tools exist, including: charts displaying 
frequencies (bar, pie charts); charts displaying distributions (histograms) and charts 
displaying associations on an x-y scale (scatter or frequency diagrams).  Throughout this 
paper I will try to use the simplest diagram available to enable the data to be understood, with 
summary values and graphical presentation.  I have limited my presentation to summary 
values to illuminate the discussion for the reader.  It is important if a deeper understanding of 
this data were to be had, to look not only at absolutes and means, but also to look at 
distribution, median, mode, range and standard deviation.  It is important too to look at 
summary statistics along with the whole data set to understand the entire picture.  Descriptive 
statistics can be illustrated though in an understandable fashion by presenting them 
graphically.  It is important to note that this paper is an exercise in a consideration of 
evidence based management and the NHS management response not a classification of 
attribute and variable data so the data analysis is presented here with the following questions 
in mind.  What am I trying to communicate?  Who is my audience?  What might prevent 
them from understanding this display?  Does the display tell the entire story? 
 
I am trying to communicate that even a simple analysis of data readily available at source 
from a clinical service – in this case – EMAS provides evidence that the NHS find it 
complicated to respond to, so to that extent, I want the conclusions presented simply and to 
be quickly understood. 
 
The audience is the reader of a senior management level paper who can be presumed to be 
able to manipulate and interpret data but is not working in this circumstance to a high degree 
of technical specification and will not necessarily need to know confidence intervals in the 
data to draw conclusion about its usefulness as evidence.  What might prevent them from 
understanding the display is if the scale or origin of the data was skewed in presentation.  Bar 
and pie charts are particularly useful to compare the sizes, amounts, quantities or proportion 
of various items or groupings of items.  When I have presented data I can be confident it tells 
the entire story.  Bar and pie charts (which predominate in this paper) can be used in defining 
or choosing problems to work on, analysing problems, verifying causes or judging solutions.  
Bar and pie charts are particularly helpful in presenting results to peers and managers, mixed 
in as they are with a written narrative.  As part of the presentation here they can be 
particularly useful with variable data that have been grouped.  Bar charts work best when 
showing comparisons among categories, while pie charts are used for showing relative 
proportions of various items making up the whole. 
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3.2 An analysis of the data 
 
Consider the following table: 
 
Figure 7: Population Changes by Government Region
iii
  
 
 
 
 
The office for national statistics predicts that the East Midlands will be the government 
region that experiences the greatest growth in its elderly population in the next 25 years.  The 
regions male population over 85% years is expected to increase by over 200% in the same 25 
year period.  So we have an ageing population.   
 
Now consider the next table: 
 
Figure 8 
EMAS Unadjusted Emergency Response Rates by Age and Sex 
April 2006 to March 2007 
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Falls in the elderly have a significant impact on EMAS service provision.  Different age 
groups use the ambulance service in different ways.  This can be seen in the unadjusted 
emergency response rates for intervals of five-year age groups.  The unadjusted rate of 
EMAS responses to females in the 85 and over age group is 480.2 responses per thousand 
population.  This is over 6 times the response rates to teenage females which in itself is 5 
times more than the response rate to females who are of primary school age.  Any sense that 
the risk taking behaviours of school children in playgrounds or the lifestyles of teenagers  are 
more dangerous than simply being elderly, are not borne out by the data at all.  So, in this 
data rich area what is it possible to say about the data and not just the results?  The first point 
is about the source of the data: each and every ambulance call is collected, coded and 
despatched by a team of trained handlers who complete a minimum summary data set of the 
transaction.  This can be supplemented with other data but it does represent the same data 
used to provide published performance data, operational planning data for EMAS and 
contract (invoice) settlement data for the payers, the Primary Care Trusts.  The data from 
which the sample is drawn is used for planning and performance of EMAS services.  The 
queries may not always be the same as in the study, but the data is.  There is no question of 
bias in the data capture, as this is not trial data it is a random sample of the whole database 
(subject of course to type 1 and type 2 errors as all samples are).  The sample represents 
about 0.5 of 1 percent of the whole database of journeys over a financial year.  The data and 
the results have not been peer reviewed by other professionals.  Nevertheless, the data has 
been audited by external and internal auditors and is used in the publication of Healthcare 
Commission scores by the independent Healthcare Commission each year.  Manipulation or 
falsification of data is a breach of the code of conduct for NHS managers.  The combination 
of ethical, performance and legal controls combined with the use of the same data set for 
internal and external reporting gives confidence that EMAS do not have an incentive to hide 
data that contradicts their organisations position.  This paper is part of a whole research 
project that works within the NHS framework on ethical and peer reviewing of research, 
governed by the NRES.  The data used here is not an audit of an existing standard of 
management practice or an evaluation of a specific organisational changes but makes up part 
of a survey using multiple methods to test a thesis and generate new knowledge.  To that 
extend the data has been accessed rather than created and can be treated as a sound base upon 
which to draw conclusions. 
 
3.3 Validation of the results 
 
There are a number of possible limitations to the validity of the results despite the 
unequivocal analysis of the quality of the data.  This will be discussed further in paragraphs 
6.1-6.3 but before drawing conclusions and considering the implications for NHS policy and 
practice, I want to be clear about the range within which these results are valid.  First of all 
the data is a self-selected sample.  It is made up of people who called the East Midlands 
Ambulance Service in the 2006/07 year.  True, there were 500,000 + calls for an emergency 
response that year, but the population is of people who called the EMAS emergency 
numbers.  The conclusions are only valid in responding to evidence about the use of EMAS 
services therefore.  As an exercise in understanding the response wider of NHS management 
and NHS policy, it is valid but the conclusions are drawn from evidence that is valid only 
about EMAS.  In simple epidemiological terms this is a study about ‘disease’ (emergency  
medicine and nursing) that didn’t go out and collect data itself I have used source data that 
already existed and looked for meaningful patterns in the data to find something interesting 
or revealing about the nature of management by evidence in the NHS.  In order to avoid 
doubt this study, which sampled data for 2006/07, would need to redraw boundaries to check 
that the conclusions were true for periods less than a year and in other years before and after 
the same year too.  This type of meta-analysis of all the years would increase the validity of 
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my conclusions drawn from a longitudinal study of only one year.  I chose the year 2006/07 
as this was the last full year available when I undertook the literature review and the 
qualitative interviews of NHS executives so there is consistency of methodology.  I have 
tried to avoid regression analysis despite the attractiveness of correlation because I do not 
have a null hypothesis about causation that that I want to test – and in the act I have also 
excluded ‘spurious correlation’ as a problem.  Finally, the entire study has tried to draw 
conclusions using EMAS data about the nature of EMAS services.  Only in forecasting 
population growth have I had to go to another data source (the East Midlands Government 
Office).  What must be acknowledged about the validity of the results, is that it is not 
possible to have a ‘double-blind’ sample of people who did NOT call EMAS over the 
calendar year 2006/07.  Let me draw an illustrative conclusion.  EMAS has been sharing data 
with Nottingham City PCT in older to improve services for older people who have fallen.  
EMAS drew a pictorial representation of responses to falls in the over 65’s.  The local acute 
teaching hospital (Nottingham University Hospital) drew a similar map which demonstrates 
the residential address for hospital admissions due to falls.  Because the transport rates for 
falls varies between 30 to 50 percent of EMAS calls in response to a fall we have two similar 
but different populations.  The percentage of people over 65 who have fallen and the 
percentage of people over 65 who have fallen who require transport to hospital.  Add to this 
the cohort of people who fell but did not call EMAS, either because the incident was trivial 
or self-managed or they were transported independently or privately and we have four 
possible cohorts.  All people who fell, were over 65 and used NHS services and/or EMAS.  
With ALL of this data – prohibitive if not possible to collect – not all extrapolation of the 
results I have found will be valid.   
 
3.4 Significance of the results 
 
A number of interventions exist that address the problem of falls.  Home assessment and 
modification reduces the risk of falling by adapting homes of individuals at risk (introducing 
grab rails and ramps, removing loose rugs).  Pharmacy reviews can address the 
pharmacological risk factors for falls.  Other interventions soften the impact of falls – hop 
protectors are shields worn over the hip designed to distribute impact forces away from the 
hip into the soft tissues.  Hip fracture appears to be a rare event when hip protectors are worn 
at the time of the fall. 
 
Whilst the above interventions are effective against falls, they are expensive to administer.  
Resources are limited and therefore must be allocated to those interventions that bring the 
greater benefit.  Currently we have a significant understanding of the magnitude of the 
problems that falls amongst the elderly creates, in terms of acute and long term needs.  So 
what does an evidence based approach to the numbers we have seen so far mean to the ever 
growing knowledge of falls in the NHS.  We have seen seven pieces of data so far.  The 
evidence based significance of the results in a responsive NHS would be: 
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Pie chart, graph or table already 
displayed 
Significance of the results to the debate 
about on NHS management that is 
evidence lead (+) and (-) not evidence 
based and  to show which is most likely 
EMAS response to falls in over 65’s: by 
call category 
+ Work with family and friends to 
develop a minimal lifting policy to 
differentiate recovery from traumatic 
injury. 
-Treat all falls as traumatic irrespective of 
carer () 
EMAS response to falls in over 65’s by 
call category 
+ Ambulance staff are recognised as 
normally the health and social care ‘first 
contact’ with fallers and triage is scaled 
appropriately. 
- PCTs invest in falls managers to fulfil 
the older people’s national service 
framework only.   No work with EMAS.  
No work with EMAS () 
EMAS responses to falls in over 65’s by 
gender 
+ Implement falls initiatives that 
positively impact on falls preventative 
issues recognising this is a major female 
use. 
- Undifferentiated service leads to low 
quality patient experience () 
EMAS response to falls in the population 
that is over 80 years old 
+ Following transportation to hospital the 
support networks including family are 
continually engaged around the patient. 
- Admission to hospital the norm () 
Population changes by government 
region 2004-2029 (male) 
+ Recognise gender is an issue in that the 
service mix changes from predominantly 
female. 
- Fail to tailor information on hop 
protectors to a male audience() 
Population changes by government 
region 2004-2029 (female) 
+ Implement commercial policing of 
alarms systems or alert systems to cope 
with prevalence of low impact falling () 
- Despatch ambulances to aging female 
population 
EMAS unadjusted emergency response 
rates by age and sex 
+ Ultimately reduce ambulance responses 
to those who fall. 
- Despatch ambulance as only source of 
care () 
 
So in only one area do we see anything like a positive likely evidence based outcome. 
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3.5 How do the results answer the problem? 
 
As with much of the discussion about evidence based management in the NHS, I find two 
things to be true.  1 – using the Rousseau model (below) it is quite clear, quite quickly that 
the evidence based response can be differentiated from the non-evidence based response.  It 
is also quite clear, quite quickly that the non-evidence based response is sub-optional in the 
opportunity cost of patient care and wasted resources.  2 – that somebody somewhere will 
have drawn the conclusion and be implementing a pilot or innovative local solution but that 
this will not be normalised behaviour for the NHS. 
 
After Rousseau: A synthesis from the literature of Rousseau on the practice of Evidence 
Based Management. 
 
Management Issue With advanced knowledge of 
effective implementation of 
Evidence Based Management 
For evidence avoiding status 
quo 
The supervision of 
employees 
Managers acquire a systematic 
understanding of what productivity 
gains are most appropriately 
cultivated from their staff 
A manager may misuse 
threats and punishments or 
overuse positive 
encouragement with no 
reference to the outcome of 
either style or organisational 
performance 
Information available to 
managers on the 
consequences of their 
decisions 
Appropriate evidence and data 
base: perceptual gaps and 
misunderstandings are significantly 
reduced so that post 
implementation review is a valuable 
part of improving management 
Information is poor as data 
and evidence is not collected 
so that experiences are likely 
to be misinterpreted 
The delivery on 
promises to the public, 
employees, 
stakeholders/taxpayers 
customers and others 
Decisions are based on systematic 
causal knowledge conditioned by 
expertise.  Decisions are 
legitimised by being made in a 
systematic and informed fashion 
more readily justifiable in the eyes 
of stakeholders 
In such settings, managers 
cannot learn why their 
decisions may have been 
wrong, nor what alternatives 
would have been right.  The 
public challenges decisions in 
the search for transparency 
Management style Managers have an understanding 
of the powerful impact their 
decisions have on the fate of their 
firms.  Managerial competence is 
recognised as a critical and often 
scarce resource 
Evidence based management 
seems to threaten managers 
personal freedom to run their 
organisations as they see fit 
Approach to academic 
research 
Managers read the academic 
literature regularly and the 
consultants who advise them are 
likely to do so also.  There is a 
recognition that this research exists 
Despite the explosion of 
research on decision making, 
individual and group 
performance, business 
strategy and other domains 
directly tied to organisational 
practice, few practising 
managers access this work 
 
 
 
 
Management culture Supervisors and managers respond A belief that good 
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to a belief system probably 100 
years old, as far back as Fredrick 
Taylors structured methods for 
improving efficiency were classified 
under scientific management 
management is an art – “the 
romance of leadership” school 
of thought where a shift to 
evidence an analysis connotes 
loss of creativity and autonomy 
In conclusion Managers have evidence on which 
to base their decisions and 
consequently what is at stake 
should the decision or implantation 
fail 
Managers are prevented from 
real learning by fads and 
falsehoods 
 
Let me consider again the table in 3.4.  In summary, evidence suggests that a significant 
percentage of those who fall are elderly and that following transportation to hospital their 
support networks and infrastructures are switched off – hence they tend to be admitted to 
hospital.  On a practical level, the falls co-ordination services provided and commissioned by 
PCTs do not co-ordinate well with EMAS and fail to recognise that a) EMAS is the first 
responder in most cases, b) fewer of these cases are Category A calls.  So the evidence based 
solution would be to adjust NHS policy and operational response to this issue.  Which is just 
what the NHS in Plymouth did.  In one ambulance station; this innovative team who have 
access to a specialist clinical support vehicle and access to the most modern lifting 
equipment, prevent other emergency vehicles and resources being sent to non-injury falls 
patients who do not need to be conveyed to hospital.  In a 20 day period during December 
2006 the method was used to respond to 24 falls and 95 GP urgent admissions. 
 
Unfortunately the NHS response is NOT to industrialise this good practice on a larger scale.  
The pilot in the ambulance station was nominated for a prestigious award by the Ambulance 
Service Institute and beat off national tough competition to win the ‘Award for Innovation’ 
which was marked by a ceremony at the House of Commons on 3 May 2008.  An MP 
presented the awards.  This year coming (2009/10 financial year), some moves will be made 
to introduce this pilot to Bournemouth, Yeovil, Exeter and Truro.  I will try to introduce it to 
EMAS for the East Midlands, but they have said, quite frankly, that they want to see the four 
pilots of the South West completed before they consider a change.  Falls just aren’t that 
influential it seems. 
 
Compare this to Ambulance Crew Reading to Cardiac Unit.  A new system for treating 
patients who have suffered from heart attacks is to be rolled out across Scotland after the 
success of a pilot project at Edinburgh Royal Infirmary.  In conjunction with the Ambulance 
Service for Scotland the hospital has been giving patients an automatic admission to 
operating theatres where on-call surgeons unblock the heart’s arteries.  Timing is very fast.  
Ironically, this is done by the ambulance crew sending an ECG reading straight to the cardiac 
care unit.  The Medical Director of EMAS advises that EMAS stopped doing this 3 years ago 
as the decision was to trust ambulance staff to read and therefore no need to transmit. 
 
In summary, a proven method of preventing falls being a drain on ambulance resources is 
struggling to get beyond pilot stage, despite evidence (and awards and acclaim) whilst an 
unproven pilot, the evidence of which is patchy for the East Midlands, is being rolled out 
across the whole of the NHS in Scotland.  The answer to the problem is that evidence is less 
important than policy. 
 
4 Implications for NHS Policy and Practice 
 
4.1 Practical Implications for Leaders in the NHS 
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Who does what?  In the organisation and planning of ambulance services in the East 
Midlands there is an inextricable link between organisational performance, organisational 
effectiveness and leadership.  Ambulance services and the importance of the ambulance 
response to older people who have fallen, has historically been poorly recognised within the 
wider NHS.  Ambulance clinicians are in a unique position of attending this group of patients 
in their own home and as a result, are able to observe not only the condition of the patients, 
but also their living conditions including hygiene, diet etc.  In order to transform the service 
that EMAS provides to falls victims and those at risk of fall, the Chief Executives of both 
EMAS and their Commissioning Primary Care Trusts, the transformational leaders, need to 
adopt an evidence based approach to the data collected b EMAS itself.  Instead of a total 
focus on specific organisation objectives that is typical of the existing contractual 
relationship with EMAS, the management style should place an emphasis on evidence as a 
basis for innovation and a rationale use of resources. 
 
How do they do it?  The NHS is the name of the Government policy not just a service.  The 
NHS identify can help patients and public access and understand this new system and the 
NHS can provide continuity of pathway planning.  By using the evidence available about 
how falls should best be managed, how the use of ambulance resources can be maximised 
and the effects that an aging population will have on calls to ambulances the leaders in the 
NHS can help the public to navigate the system in a different way, but still be confident that 
the system will be delivered in line with NHS standards and values.  The key is to respond to 
the evidence that has been collected, to park the targets of today as their assistant directors 
and operational managers will achieve this, and to shape the targets of the next decade in line 
with the Ambulance clinicians.  
 
When do they do it?  This paper has explored literature and data on evidence based decision 
making.  As we have seen in earlier papers, the rhetoric of evidence based management 
serves an essentially ideological function, obscuring the real difficulty in securing effective 
and sustainable change.  As considered earlier in this paper, the date exists, even with a 
simplistic analysis like mine to point to changing policy imperatives and a different 
prioritisation by age/sex/location of ambulance services.  In organisations with deeply 
engrained power structures and as complex and intransient in-year performance function as 
the NHS the executive of the East Midlands – particularly the PCTs – must only attempt to 
implement the evidence based approaches to EMAS when they meet collectively on a 
monthly basis.  Otherwise these ‘numbers’ I have found will not survive the challenge of an 
NHS hierarchy in a climate of turbulent change created by the volatility of government 
policy. 
 
Why do they do it?  Falls in the elderly population represent a serious and increasing issue in 
the UK.  This is gaining increased recognition in current government policy across different 
parts of government including social care and housing as well as the NHS.  The reason the 
executives in the NHS respond to this is because it is NHS Policy and Practice.  The key 
though is that at the very strategic level the NHS response via policy is, in this case, evidence 
based.  The report by the Department for Communities and Local Government released in 
January 2008, named “Lifetime Homes, Lifetime Neighbourhoods” highlighted the following 
statistics: one older person dies every five hours as a result of a fall; older peoples falls cost 
the NHS around three quarters of a billion pounds each year and 1.25 million falls a year 
result in hospital admissions.  The role of the NHS executive in respect to evidence based 
management in the East Midlands NHS and with respect to EMAS in particular should be to 
ensure that however big these absolute numbers seem they should elicit an evidence based 
and proportionate share of resources to their answer. 
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4.2 Clinical Practice and Managerial Practice 
 
Let me consider what the implications of quantitative analysis of East Midlands Ambulance 
Service referrals says about the development of evidence-based approaches to NHS 
management and policy. 
 
Cultural and attitudinal change 
 
Researchers and academics should be invited in to the commissioning cycle.  At the moment 
there is strong participation from clinicians, executives and accountants in setting a robust 
planning and contract negotiation framework.  There is some preference expressed for the 
use of data analysis – including to do some data mining – but the application of best 
management practice, knowledge management (or even a structured response to the research 
questions that the data throws up) is very difficult within the current make-up of the EMAS 
contract. 
 
Look for evidence based enablers of the ‘central targets’ hitting should also be pursued.  The 
key is here that the central targets for Category A response times, falls and patient transport 
are not going to disappear.  My pie-charts say some interesting things, even that we may be 
missing the strategic overview of the direction for EMAS services by hitting central targets.  
Nevertheless, we should not use this as an excuse to avoid evidence based culture and 
attitudes.  We should instead be looking for evidence of what works to do the most optimal 
things based upon ambulance resource usage and hitting the targets not making them 
mutually exclusive. 
 
Invest in developing the infrastructure to support evidence-based decision making 
 
Organise contract management boards that focus on clinical quality rather than adversarial 
performance assurance.  The debate about what works from an evidence point of view will be 
enhanced by putting clinicians into the commissioning/planning arrangement.  This is 
stimulated by the use of evidence based knowledge.  If this is called “Therapeutic 
knowledge” then the use of management evidence is moved to that which makes best use of 
scarce resources for EMAS in pursuit of the optimal therapeutic interventions.  Reducing 
waste is very good for EMAS and the NHS and patient education and communication being 
enhanced will make it better for patients to.  This infrastructure would necessarily mean that 
the summary monitoring information (necessary for assurance about central target hitting) 
moves from weekly to monthly collection to free up the time for the saved intellectual and 
data processing to be applied to evidence based decision making. 
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Develop a cadre of managers with the skills needed to use evidence more effectively    
  
Epidemiology and the patterns of population, falls, diseases that affect ageing (hearing, eye 
sight, bone density), age-sex ratios, population growth, morality and morbidity underlie a 
good use of data.  This does not obviate the need for Financial Planning which has tended to 
be used for EMAS previously but it does mean an alterative from cost to a detailed 
understanding, not only of efficiency and economy to include effectiveness too.  Evidence 
might be called the economic (opportunity cost) of the current solutions we use.  A lack of 
managers ability to use epidemiology ‘outcomes measurement’ is probably a big leap but the 
use of evidence based prompts in longitudinal studies would only be possible were the 
competence of managers to use this evidence effectively also developed.  Should plan 
whether something is feasible before we begin to do it.  This looks at the probability of 
success, risks, timescales and critical paths.  By simply saying that the data I have found 
about falls and EMAS should be applied to a feasibility analysis of an evidence based 
solution versus a policy solution to each project the cadre of skilled managers increases. 
 
Look for evidence of success of evidence based decision making as an innovation itself 
 
Managers and policy makers have been prominent advocates of evidence based clinical 
practice, but have not been quick to apply the same principles to their own decision making.  
In terms of the best commissioner performance, there is a post-hoc rationalisation of what 
was successful and what was not successful (normally in response to published performance 
ratings) but the key would be to show that by applying evidence based decision making, this 
lead to an evidence based increased in the performance and planning of EMAS.  An early 
proxy such as “Increased interest in the area from other planners and providers of ambulance 
services” could be taken to mean that the data for EMAS has been successfully data-mined to 
improve performance in such a way that use greater appreciation of the value of management 
and its role in patient care.  The key here is that the management role is enhanced by the use 
of evidence based management and in such a way the credibility and development of the 
subject area is enhanced. 
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4.3 Patient Behaviour 
 
Consider the following pie charts.   
 
Figure 9 
EMAS Responses to Falls in 2006/7: 
Age Group of Main Patient
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Figure 10 
 
EMAS Emergency Responses by Age Group in 2006/7: 
Age Group of Main Patient
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Whilst it is true that in both charts the use of the EMAS service increases with age, this is 
much more pronounced when it comes to falls than when the wider set of emergency 
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response is looked at.  That therefore means the patient behaviour that needs to be developed 
is not the same for falls as it is for EMAS as a whole.  The key here is to enhance 
communication between planners like myself, ambulance clinicians, control room 
dispatchers and most importantly patients.  In the planning of EMAS the policy for Category 
A responses should be explored to understand in the East Midlands, how older people view 
and respond to the challenges of independent living.  As earlier graphs have shown – without 
this communication about patient behaviour, the elderly will call EMAS but the very senior 
age-group, of 75+, will have a diminishing proportion of their falls treated as Category A.  
The commissioning policy for EMAS should collect information from the public about what 
they view as a successful outcome to their 999 call, but the data source should skew heavily 
towards the proportions outlined in the age - profile of falls – not the age profile of the 
population as a whole nor even the age population for which EMAS responds in a wider 
sense.  Note that further work is required on the effectiveness of tailoring health advice in 
changing patient behaviour for the better is nevertheless clear that the normal sense of 
tailoring to address inequalities in access by ethnicity and location, overlook the tailoring that 
is required here to address age and very senior aging.  The policy response for EMAS is not 
whether tailoring works as a model, but what the evidence tells us about when it is most 
effective, given the pie charts above.  For example, large advertising campaigns need to be 
using technology and environments appropriate to the population at risk.  Thus, the 
increasing vogue for mobile technology as opposed to traditional billboards on public 
transport and in supermarkets may not reach the target population.  It is also true as noted 
before, that as hearing and eye-sight weakens with advanced age, video and one to one in-
person interventions could be more successful.  As the very least, the EMAS and PCT 
response to this dilemma should be to check that written materials designed to encourage 
participation by the very senior age group(s) are usable and address the basic needs for 
autonomy and competence that motivates us all. 
 
4.4 A checklist of Evidence Based conclusion 
 
Frank Blackler of the University of Lancaster in 2006, published in a media interview in the 
Guardian newspaper, his synopsis of what was good/bad and hard in the political and 
managerial models of control of the NHS.  Taking that as a template it is possible to draw 
something of a framework for how the evidence based conclusions can be accommodated.  I 
will specifically address what this means for the subject I am studying, EMAS, and the 
response to falls. 
 
 
Blackler’s Contentions (My comments) What I observe as the Evidence Based 
Conclusion of my data on EMAS and falls 
2006/07 
1. Central controls have eroded the 
capacity of managers to lead (I disagree 
– central controls mean we now use our 
data better). 
1. The evidence collected shows that 
 in 2006/07 just under half of all  deaths 
from avoidable injury are in  people who are 
75 or older.  Prior to  national policy setting 
the role of  ambulances in this area has 
been  poorly recognised. 
 
 
 
2. The present system of politically lead 
target setting is wasteful.  (I agree). 
2. Our evidence indicates that the call 
 category of emergency responses 
 is also related to age.  Responses 
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 to older people who have fallen are 
 less likely to be coded as Category 
 A. 
3. Targets represent an instruction to 
manager and are based on a mistrust of 
managerial autonomy  (I disagree – the 
requirements to deal with over 85 year 
old females is neither promoted by nor 
limited by national targets). 
3. Falls in the elderly population have a 
significant impact on EMAS service 
provision.  Different age groups use 
ambulance services in different ways.  
For example, the adjusted rate of EMAS 
responses to females in the 85 and over 
age group is 480 responses per thousand 
population. 
4. The NHS has enjoyed substantial 
increases in public funding and 
politicians are anxious about how this 
money is used (I agree). 
4. The office for national statistics predicts 
that the regions male population over 85 
years is expected to increase by over 
200% between 2004 and 2029.  
Therefore the unequivocal substantial 
increases in public funding may be 
overtaken by an ageing growing 
population. 
5. Targets are a conduit for politicians that 
negates local prioritization (I agree). 
5. The data collected shows that 51% of all 
avoidable injury admissions in the East 
Midlands are due to falls.  This has little 
to do with government policy that 
requires more joined-up assessment and 
service provision. 
6. Managers need to be treated with and 
behave with confidence (I agree). 
6. If the managers use the evidence drawn 
from the data sample, then confidence is 
increased.  Evidence rather than opinion 
will increase confidence in decisions. 
7. It is difficult to distinguish the strategic 
objective of a policy from its day to day 
working (I disagree). 
7. The national policy reflects that falls are 
more common in the older population.  
The EMAS response to falls in over 65s 
by type of pick-up location is a day to 
day tactical East Midlands issue alone. 
8. Targets should be fashioned locally (I 
agree). 
8. EMAS has been sharing data with 
Nottingham City PCT in order to 
improve services for older people who 
have fallen. 
9. The difficult shift in the NHS doesn’t 
make management in the NHS hard – it 
is why we have NHS management (I 
agree). 
9. In 2006/07 EMAS made approximately 
42,000 responses to a person of 65 years 
or over who had fallen at an average cost 
of £193.  This requires both increased 
recognition in policy and management 
action. 
 
10. “Go towards the gunfire” (I agree). 10. Responses to falls in the 65 and over age 
group during 2006/07 cost 
approximately £8.1 million – this is 
worthy of getting involved in an 
evidence debate about. 
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5 Conculsions 
 
5.1 How this data has stretched our body of knowledge about EBM in the  NHS 
 
a. It has not been difficult to get access to a “body of knowledge” for East Midlands 
Ambulance Service.  A years data is stored and easy to access and operational 
procedures are clear.  It is clear from the EMAS dataset that much of what the NHS 
says about information and choice for the millennial generation that require power 
and choice itself – doubts the power and authority of myself and calls itself a 
customer.  That governs much policy and planning of the NHS.  EMAS on the other 
hand is a 10% glamour Category A service, but by majority it is a senor lady who has 
fallen and calls 999 because she did, but can wait. 
 
b. In our efforts to continually and refine the body of knowledge, guidelines exists for 
where evidence is and is not appropriate.  There is a culture of target hitting, self-
regulation and rooting out dangerous clinical practice that has it’s origins in criminal 
and unsafe clinicians such as Harold Shipman.  But there is also a fear of evidence 
that pervades any hope of a structural response to the issue.  There is also as we have 
seen far more complexity in the NHS.  We have pressures to avoid all clinical hazard 
whatever the opportunity cost is we have pressures and incentives for institutional 
growth over best patient care.  We have consumerism and we have pre-occupation 
with financial costs over economics or ‘whole system/whole life’ costs. 
 
c. It soon became clear that the challenge for evidence based management is both 
simple and complex at the same time.  Quite quickly, data can be manipulated to 
draw evidence based conclusions but these are multiple sub-tests.  Our patients whom 
we are analysing are also the patients whose behaviour we must modify and adapt if 
the changes are to be made to a more evidence based planning and funding of 
services.  Above all, what has changed in this report about EBM in the NHS, is that 
nobody can do it on their own.  The tasks of responding, collecting and treating the 
population of the East Midlands with Ambulances and Paramedics have passed the 
capacity of any single human mind to plan the service, no matter how skilled or 
altruistic or self monitoring they are. 
 
d. Our knowledge base is changing.  A definition of a ‘profession’ such as ambulance 
clinicians including paramedics as people reserving the right to judge the quality and 
appropriateness of their services is over.  It is clear that the politicians believe the 
bond of public trust to be broken.  The reason we get politicians using evidence based 
numerics in a heavy and dogmatic way is that the assumption of professionalism 
amongst paramedics has lost the confidence of politicians.  Transparency about data 
has shown itself to benefit the management of falls in the over 65’s in the East 
Midlands region, but at the same time the complexity of the NHS system means that 
simple-easy to communicate – policies are seen as the antidote to complexity not the 
use of evidence. 
 
e. Our best effort to date would look like this: the evidence would be generated to pose 
questions for negotiated change in EMAS services.  The work I do as a 
funder/commissioner of services has not stopped, fraying confidence in the public at 
large, of politicians and people like myself.  Who, neither of us are immune to the 
charge that we use data and targets to peddle the untruths of politicians and the half-
truths of managers like myself advertising success from data. 
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f. NHS Direct said a lot about falls, but too much has been made about boundaries and 
who owns the body ‘body of knowledge’ about falls and the area is replete with 
professional rivalry.  Organisations like NHS Direct and EMAS cannot thrive alone, 
but will thrive only in interdependency.  The parts of the NHS – acute trust – EMAS 
– NHS Direct – PCT – politician – clinician, can only use evidence properly if they 
ask less about ‘what do I do?’ and more about ‘what am I part of?’ 
 
5.2 Did this match what I thought in the introduction 
 
a. I spend a great degree of time analysing and considering data about performance of 
ambulance responses to emergencies, but the question of ‘how do we know what we 
know’ keeps coming up.  I – and the patients for who I buy services – have now 
become irrevocably part of something far larger than myself.  The craft of care has 
transformed into the machinery of a supply system.  By simply returning again and 
again to the question of what the evidence is telling us, will we answer the question of 
how we “know”.  In earlier papers it has been shown that leaders in the NHS prefer 
judgement to evidence, but in the matter of East Midlands Ambulance Service, I am 
not as clear as I was at the introduction, that craft of management can explain the 
totality of the machinery of care simply by judgement.  Data throws up some counter 
intuitive truths for us to act on. 
 
b. People fall in their own homes, but it is still not clear with whom do we share our 
knowledge.  Nobody has doubled my data, but the problem is the fact that there is a 
clash of prerogatives between Chief Executives and Doctors.  Political knowledge 
and policy may be more about power and influence than it is about distribution and 
seeking the wisdom of leaders.  The thing that I didn’t realise at the introduction, was 
that it was less about the data than it is about what happens when the evidence shines 
a spotlight on something.  It is not the evidence that will effect clinical change, it is 
what the funder (me) and the clinician does when the light is shone on the data and 
what I do is visible to myself, to others, to strangers even, even when I don’t want it 
to be visible. 
 
c. Despite all the writers about falls, it is clear that knowledge does not equate to value.  
Maybe nobody knew that night-time was less dangerous for falling than Saturday 
morning?  Maybe everybody knew you were more likely to suffer a fall in your own 
home than outside a pub?  But now we do know and so too do the clinicians 
delivering the service.  But it seems that without political support or the glare of 
media publicity, the gap between evidence and action is still large.  There is no 
altruistic reason for EMAS to respond to the data creatively.  I had expected altruism 
and care paramount but it became clear that the targets were a shield against deeper 
engagement with the public and although I have generated new knowledge, the value 
was being questioned.  People in EMAS do not trust me or the politicians to use the 
data without prejudice or manipulation. 
 
d. Ambulances use clinical best practice to categorise patients from A (high need) to C 
(low need) but in many ways I saw knowledge differ in education and practice.  There 
is evidence of unexplained variations in the pattern of treatment, evidence that was 
easily generated.  Why do so many more women than men fall – is this merely the 
age/sex ratio being played out in a harsher analytical gaze or is it that nobody has 
used the data before.  The conclusions are not stark, but eh implications for service 
delivery are quite profound.  If I thought that clinicians and politicians would respond 
positively to data based evidence, I misread the effect that a loss of control would 
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have for them.  Combining this data with the literature and my qualitative research 
about NHS managers attitudes to evidence, it is clear that what I thought at the 
introduction – those who define themselves by control over simple date – will not like 
the loss of control. 
 
e. ‘Evidence’ suggests that what I am engaged in is an exercise to control knowledge 
and choices and patient pathways that before only the politician and the paramedic 
controlled.  The reality is that I too cannot control the situation any more than they 
can.  I have some weakness of mind – of any mind – that means my response to 
evidence can only add value if I and the same team know what I need to know in 
order to help. 
 
5.3 What the picture looks like at the end of the analysis 
 
Figure 11 
EMAS Responses to Falls in Over 65s: Hour of Call
April 2006 to March 2007
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Figure 12 
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EMAS Responses to Falls in Over 65s: Day of Week
April 2006 to March 2007
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If we take the tables above.  We can say that the EMAS responses to falls in the over 65’s is 
likely to be by a woman at 9.30 on a Saturday and the call is not very likely to result in a 
Category A call, but will be made as a result of a fall in the home.  This in no way negates 
the importance that one older person dies every five hours as a result of a fall, but it does 
obviate the thought that this should be the most pressing and uppermost thought of the 
ambulance clinician.  Simple methodical application of data using pie charts and bar charts 
has given us a much, much richer analysis of the organisation of East Midlands Ambulance 
than the ‘blue light fallen trauma’ cliché that exists in the public imagination. 
 
It is clear that we cannot conclude with any clear consensus about what constitutes a body of 
evidence for the East Midlands Ambulance Service, but we can agree that decision making is 
improved by the context of using evidence based judgements.  It is true that a body of 
evidence or knowledge is multi-faceted and depends on one’s perspective.  Government 
policy may be based on evidence, but it can be alarmist and distorting of local prioritisation 
unless the Primary Care Trust takes a measured and evidence based response to the problems 
that EMAS face in implementing national policy.  The definition of evidence likely changes 
when we use it to regulate the delivery of a particular clinical service for a particular 
community – even one as big as the East Midlands. 
 
Sometimes a problem under consideration is advanced not by answering a question, but by 
better defining the question.  At this level the data analysis has been successful and I will 
consider in Chapter 7 the implications for further research. 
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6 Limitations of the approach 
 
6.1 Methodological limitations 
 
All of my conclusions about evidence depend upon good quality data.  The first problem is 
that I have used a secondary database.  I have asserted that this data is both relevant and 
complete and that has been audited as such.  I chose a random sample from the source data 
set.  Nevertheless, in the absence of good primary data collection, my method would be 
improved by repeated sampling to gain greater confidence that there is no inherent bias in the 
data I am sampling.  The method would be improved by panel studies or group consideration 
to validate in the absence of primary data. 
 
The indicators that I selected were fields already in existence in the data set (age/sex/time of 
call/category of response/location of incident) and the evidence gain came from the 
juxtaposition of the data against existing policy – including where no policy existed.  In 
selecting these indicators, I did not check the completeness of these data fields and whether 
there was any inherent bias towards that or this classification because of simple 
administrative routine. 
 
I have also used pie charts and histograms rather than regression analysis and it may be true 
that in a multifactorial situation, the relationships I have recorded are not, in actual fact, 
relationships between two variables, but reflect their variability when compared to a third (as 
yet hidden) variable.  I do not, therefore, attest to having detected statistically significant 
results and if they do exist I have not sought to prove any significant correlation.  The choice 
of simple presentation methods means that different risk factors play different roles in the 
evidence collected.  I have not tried to seek the major or determining variable around which 
the correlation of the ‘most efficient ambulance service’ should be organised.  Similarly, I 
have not tested this longitudinally using a ‘traditional’ surveillance model that public health 
would use.  I draw the conclusions from 2006/07 only, but presume generalisable 
conclusions across different time periods and this may be questioned. 
 
To improve the results I would also have tried to organise comparison with other samples 
from other ambulance services.  This is an NHS (National health system) about which we are 
trying to make conclusions without reference to habits and behaviours that are valid only in 
the East Midlands.  I have also, in respect to the same habits and behaviours, made the case 
that in response to evidence, the habit (for example of senior women over 75) to call 999 
when they fall, rather than their GP before they fall) can be changed so that the patient 
behaviour is the most favourable for patient and EMAS. 
 
The last thing is that a lack of cross-sectional studies means that, although I have used 
population data going forward 25 years, the effect of short-term exposures such as a 
particularly mild winter or a flu outbreak, can distort the numbers, despite other more 
significant variables (clinician behaviour, family and carer response or training of paramedics 
in first response) heading in a different direction.  In epidemiological terms the effect of 
environment fluctuations can affect population behaviour in the short, but rarely the long 
term. 
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6.2 Data Capture 
 
Let us consider what high quality data would be: it would be accurate, up-to-date, quick and 
easy to find and free from duplication.  As I have said previously, this is true for the EMAS 
dataset that I have used.  Similarly the data was free from fragmentation (where different 
parts of the patient’s records are held in different formats). 
 
There are however some limits in the data that was captured.  Firstly, the patient unique 
identifier is too weak to make a consistent electronic patient record by individual patient.  So 
the data set is built around the ‘event’ of the ambulance journey, call and despatch.  The NHS 
Care Records Service (NCRS), part of the NHS National Programme for IT in the NHS being 
delivered by NHS Connecting for Health will create a care record for every one of England’s 
50 million plus patients and allow information to be shared securely between all NHS 
organisations. 
 
This will mean that whenever and wherever a patient seeks an ambulance including, out of 
hours and away from home elsewhere in England, the people caring for them will have 
access to their health information 24 hours a day, seven days a week.  That means that files, 
scans, x-rays and general patient information that was traditionally ‘fragmented or found in 
different places’ will now/then be available to somebody repeating my research.  This will 
include demographic data such as name, address, NHS number and date of birth and clinical 
information such as allergies, adverse reactions to drugs and basic details of any visits to 
hospital.  This will provide an opportunity to put the EMAS data through the Information 
Assurance Quality Programme (IQAP) which has produced guidance to help with migration 
to a care records data service. 
 
The NHS number is important as a unique identifier; in that it will be possible to trace and 
verify patients using the NHS number which is specific to them.  At the moment, it would 
not be possible to build up a pattern of information where an individual seeks medical help at 
two different sites without the NHS number.  Creation of duplicate records for the same fall 
is a problem of data capture.  This is a particular problem for data capture without an NHS 
record as patients do not identify themselves in a consistent way when they use NHS 
services.  For example, EMAS may know that an individual can be linked to a certain 
address, but data matching to use the consistent record of address field if you are looking for 
a person called William, who is sometimes also known as Bill, to check that this is the same 
patient each time.  At the moment, without the NHS number, EMAS care for falls is not 
based on a complete, accurate and up to date record. 
 
6.3 Deliberate boundaries on the question 
 
I have defined the scope of the research to generate new and novel insights to an area that is 
compatible with my work as an NHS Commissioner.  I have attempted to make it reasonably 
comprehensive within the study of falls collected by EMAS.  The study of falls or emergency 
ambulance service is a much wider field than would be appropriate, given the limits of this 
particular study.  This problem is bounded by being about the use of, and response to, 
evidence by decision makers in the East Midlands of the NHS.  The question was whether 
using some very rudimentary queries using data coding, it was possible to make different 
decisions using the evidence that these data queries threw up, than decisions that would be 
made using national prescribed policy alone.  To that extent the deliberate boundary on the 
question was that it had to be so complicated that only sophisticated data management 
techniques could solve the calculation.  More could have been made about how national 
policy changes have affected the treatment of fallers favourably or unfavourably, how these 
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changes have or have not affected the elderly differentially and how East Midlands 
Ambulance Service have responded to legal developments in the training for lifting and 
handling in homes that the elderly have fallen in.  This would have strayed outside of my 
essential concept of using only that data which has been generated from the day to day 
delivery of emergency ambulance services by EMAS.  I did not want to look for data that 
was available in academic books and journal articles, because they would not have covered 
the same operational period – remember what I was trying to review was something relevant 
to recent decision making by EMAS.  I did not want to be concerned with articles from the 
popular press as they were pre-occupied with service delivery failure, not the upper decile of 
service delivery successes.  I did not wish to conduct a longitudinal study over too great a 
length of time as this was about primary sources of data still affecting service delivery today, 
not primary historical sources about the changing role of ambulances in the delivery of 
emergency patient care.  In the end the answers to the questions are aided by the use of 
essential data from the source of operational management by EMAS.  These deliberate 
boundaries on the question do not, I believe, limit the usefulness of the conclusions. 
 
7 Implications for further research 
 
7.1 Topics to be studied 
 
There are some interesting topics to be studied as a result of this research.  There is no doubt 
that falls and the integration of effective clinical strategies (in hospital and out) expands the 
range of successful services, but little is understood about how EMAS fit into this 
framework.  In particular, because there is a social norm to dial 999 upon the occurrence of a 
fall, it would be worth studying the extent to which EMAS are the appropriate organisation 
within the NHS system to most easily influence the behaviour of individuals.  If the key is 
falls avoidance and falls management , it would be worthy of study to understand the level of 
influence that EMAS have to make the utilization of all available services most effective 
compared to the existing community based approach to falls management. 
 
A further development of this study would be to pilot the linking of hospital and EMAS and 
community systems by computer such that referrals are automatically made from the hospital 
to EMAS as well as vice-versa, so that individuals at risk of falling are tracked by EMAS in 
the community prior to falling. 
 
Another combination of effective interventions would be to combine our knowledge of 
effective strategies for dietary management in the elderly, with the categories of call that are 
affected (A-B-C) by the quality of diet in an over 65 faller (in effect the ability of diet to give 
resilience to the consequence of falls).  This leads to the interesting work that could be done 
using “integrated care” models that put falls management by EMAS, the acute hospitals, 
community NHS providers and some GPs into the same organisational and operational 
structure.  This would be less passive in response to the evidence than this study indicated 
would be the case where only EMAS can respond fully.  If this were to be attached to a study 
about cost-effectiveness and magnitude-of-impact of EMAS interventions in falls, then this 
could rank the effect of EMAS utilization upon the total cost of falls management in the East 
Midlands NHS region.   
 
A similar intervention initiative that compares the value of EMAS’ treatment and patient 
delivery services after a fall with the cost effectiveness of interventions from Adult Social 
Services could help.  By looking at commissioning PCTs to determine the appropriate mix of 
NHS and population (Social Service) based support to improve the outcome for the patient, 
the NHS could be moving further along the evidence-based spectrum. 
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7.2 Different regions or countries 
 
There would be nothing to prevent this study being repeated in other regions of the National 
Health Service and would throw in further relevant factors to improve the applicability of the 
outcomes of this project.  What could be added to this study were it to be conducted in 
another country would be; the establishment of reimbursement methods to suppliers that 
benefited from better use of this data for example as an income generation activity, 
increasingly possible as the NHS moves towards the use of an individual patient tariff; the 
development of suitable organisational arrangements in the private sector that can respond to 
evidence more quickly than, and in preference to, prescribed national policy; the 
development of environmental and ecological factors that stop ambulances being despatched 
on unnecessary journeys where the personal pain of NHS treatment (or treatment foregone) 
could be compared with the ecological aspects of responding to distress quickly, but in fossil 
fuel burning vehicles; the enlistment of the elderly communities in co-production solutions 
that do not use expensive emergency ambulance services without being aware of the 
opportunity cost of using specialised health services, essentially for a transport-to-health 
solutions for the elderly. 
 
7.3 Foundation for further study of EMAS 
 
In terms of further study of EMAS, it would be useful to do a study of documents pertaining 
to the treatment, transportation, classification and prevention of people having falls/fallen.  
Documents could be letters, memoranda, agendas, administrative documents, newspaper 
articles and would all be used to triangulate/corroborate the evidence found in this study.  
The use of documents to test the evidence in this study rather than to draw new hypothesis, 
would prevent or at least severely reduce the falls leads that could arise from an unstructured 
document review.  It would be possible also, to repeat this study, supplemented by archival 
records and/or using structured interviews with executives and paramedics in EMAS 
themselves.  Finally, this study of EMAS could be improved by direct observation in the 
field over a limited period and even when the researcher or a member of the family has a fall, 
to keep a diary of the period of the contact with EMAS in a detailed way from beginning to 
end! 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Purpose and Aims of the study 
 
To contribute to the on-going debate over whether the use of evidence could and should 
improve organisational effectiveness.  This is especially important in the context of the 
health service that has, since (May 1997) enthusiastically adopted evidence based medicine 
as its method of health delivery.  To develop a practical explanation for policy makers and 
managers on how and where evidence based management is used appropriately. 
 
Justification 
 
Kovner and Rundall (2006 p3) said “the sense of urgency associated with improving the 
quality of medical care does not exist with respect to improving the quality of management 
decision making.  A more evidence based approach would improve the competence of the 
decision makers and their motivation to use more scientific methods when making a 
decision”.  The paper reviews the conclusion of Kovner and Rundall (2006) (an American 
study) within the context of the UK National Health Service.  There is a need to develop a 
theoretical framework of how and why evidence is (or is not)used by managers in the NHS.  
 
Motivation 
 
The author holds a senior management position in the National Health Service.  The author 
has performed the role of Director and Chief Executive in NHS organisations since 2000.  
These organisations have been surplus making, target hitting, award winning, credited by the 
auditors and successful in the eyes of the regulators.  Unfortunately over the last few years 
the author has been in a quandary about something.  Are NHS managers as a group of 
professionals, using policies that solved the wrong problem or solving the right problem, but 
still in the wrong way?  Following this line of thought, the author wanted to ask “why don’t 
executives in the NHS make evidence based decisions?” 
 
Methodology 
 
A survey was conducted of the most senior NHS managers in the East Midlands.  A set of 
interviews and participant observations of senior managers when making key decisions 
around current policy initiatives was recorded.  This explored how the concept of evidence 
based management is perceived by the managers.  The studied group were taken to have had 
career success and to be taken to be leaders in their field.  The researcher was a senior 
manager within the same region of the NHS.  The method additionally studied the effect of a 
discrete, but accepted piece of data upon the NHS as it struggled to adopt an evidence based 
response to the operational issue the data highlighted.  The researcher was a planner within 
the same region that this data was being used and was responsible for responding to the data.  
The ontology used Bryman (2004) and Morgan (2007) to attach meaning to the views that 
members of that part of the NHS had of their world. 
 
 165 
Methods 
 
Through taped recordings of meetings and verbatim transcripts of 1 to 1 interviews with 
senior managers the study recorded the awareness of a need for evidence (or not) and also 
analysed the collection and evaluation of evidence where such awareness did exist.   Using a 
model developed by Rousseau (2006) the study classified the responses.  Interpretation of the 
responses was shared with the participant and conclusions drawn against the Rousseau based 
model. 
 
Findings 
 
Senior managers approve of evidence as it gives them a systematic view of what their staff 
are qualified to do and a requirement for evidence based decision making is part of the 
scheme of delegation. 
 
Adoption of innovation and research is a complex and often drawn out process.  The 
adoption of research evidence is not a single discrete event.  Managers will only use research 
if it improves the organisations standing.  Finally, it is shown that there are credible and 
complex reasons for the failure in NHS managers to use evidence very often, despite the 
prevailing orthodoxy of evidence based medicine.  The researcher agrees with McDaniel 
(2009) that evidence should be used to start new creative methods of working.  Although 
Arndt and Bigelow (2009) raise objections against evidence based decision making as 
“decisions do not necessarily lead to expected outcomes” The researcher finds their work 
cautionary rather than impeding to what Banaszak-Holl says are “compelling arguments for 
moving forward with developing EBM”.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Purpose 
 
This work explains why an ethnographic account was used to record and then classify the 
conversations and decisions of current NHS managers.  To develop an understanding of the 
NHS that is enhanced by professional insight from working in the NHS. 
 
Key arguments and Conclusions 
 
1.1 The research is exploratory in an emerging field 
 
The nature of exploratory research is to provide an insight into and comprehension of an 
issue or situation.  This research is exploratory because a problem has not been clearly 
defined, nor can it even be shown that a perceived problem (managers should/should not use 
evidence in the NHS) really exists.  The study holds up a mirror to the cohort I work in.  
Components of this exploratory research will include a thorough literature review, informal 
discussions and in-depth interviews.  It is to be hoped by the exploration, that a research 
design, data collection method and subject selection will arise.  That would further the study 
of management in the National Health Service.  This issue of the mirror being held up to the 
cohort itself is important because exploratory research is not typically generalisable to the 
population at large.  The cohort of managers should be able to reveal what is going on with 
management in the health service during the period 2007 to 2010 and is investigated without 
explicit expectations.  This methodology is sometimes referred to as a grounded theory and is 
an attempt to unearth a theory from the data itself, rather than from a pre-disposed 
hypothesis. The overall aim of this research is to enhance good practice in a craft of 
management in the NHS.  The study will spend time searching out the concepts behind 
“evidence based management” as they reveal themselves to the participants. 
 
The Department of Health (2009 a and Appendix E) note that this is an emerging field when 
they say that “many of the research studies commissioned by the SDO over the last eight 
years have direct relevance to healthcare managers.  However, rather less of our past research 
has been directly focused on exploring the roles, work, performance, effectiveness and 
development of healthcare managers and healthcare management itself.  At the same time 
there is increasing recognition of the potential for research evidence to improve managerial 
practice and decision making (Shortell, Rundall and HSU 2007)”.  Further they say that “the 
rise of the evidence-based healthcare movement, the increasingly explicit use of research 
evidence….have all helped to focus attention on the way that healthcare managers and 
leaders use evidence in their decision making”.  Additionally one might say this is an 
emerging field because there are important differences between the culture, research base and 
decision-making processes of clinicians and managers so that the ideas of evidence-based 
medicine whilst relevant need to be translated for management rather than simply transferred. 
 
1.2 Why a specific research question would be inappropriate 
 
To emphasise the mirror holding nature of this work and the questions this raises.  What 
excites in this research is to analyse the data with no pre-conceived hypothesis.  Rather than 
searching for data that confirms or rejects my hypothesis, a template analysis can search out 
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the concepts behind “evidence based management” as they reveal themselves to my 
participants.  Maybe the question is unclear, but by conducting a study on the nature of 
evidence based decision making as it is judged and participated in by NHS managers 
questions will appear.  A working awareness of bias is imperative, but the author has long 
gone past the point of wanting to introduce or reject evidence based management in the NHS 
– so the paper simply wishes to understand if, how, when and why it is used or rejected and 
to reflect that back to NHS managers themselves.  In early stages the document also avoided 
using such questions as “does an evidence based approach exist?” because inherent in that 
question is a narrowing down of options and scenarios that the executives have not yet 
evaluated or which, because of their nature, are very difficult to evaluate.  This was because 
the evaluation did not want to impose a question that implied a thesis that was supportive of 
an evidence based methodology.  The reader should remember that evidence based 
management is a philosophical approach that denies the true value of experience and 
heuristics.  There had to be scope for the NHS leaders interviewed and recorded to say that 
they remembered, for example, that “no evidence” in decision making can be better than the 
use of poor quality, contradicting or incomplete evidence.  The discussion of evidence based 
management is a valid research area, but whether there is a single valid research question is 
uncertain.  There are undoubtedly key questions that arise in the research.  The paper does 
ask whether evidence based practice is a norm or an ideal for daily professional management 
in the National Health Service?  To what extent do practicing NHS managers think evidence 
based healthcare management is an appropriate tool to resolve problems and what do they 
actually use?  Is there a conflict between politicians’ views of an effective National Health 
Service and the view of NHS managers?  If so, where is the conflict and would application of 
evidence based healthcare management resolve the conflict?  What is intended to be gained 
from these questions though, is a understanding of and to draw conclusions about, the nature 
of the preferences and decisions expressed by the cohort.  Ultimately, the reason why the 
specific research question would be inappropriate, therefore, is that a question that implies 
best practice would typically only uncover case studies related to that practice and all other 
experiences would be under reported.  The mirror is much more use if it reveals things about 
the cohort (the nature of relationships, power, eagerness to learn etc) than if it was a didactic 
about best practice case studies. 
 
1.3 Why an ethnographic account was used 
 
In April 2009 the NHS created a web portal, NHS Evidence (Department of Health 2009a), 
“to provide online access to high quality information about health and social care to all staff 
who are making decisions about care they provide to patients”.  The objective is to help to 
make informed decisions about treatments and resources.  A key differentiation is made 
between ‘evidence’, clinical and public health ‘guidance’, and government ‘policy’.  This 
differentiation is at the heart of document 5.  According to Walshe and Rundall (2001 p 429), 
“the rise of evidence based clinical practice in health care has caused some people to start 
questioning how health care managers and policy makers make decisions and what role 
evidence plays in the process”.  Further, Walshe and Rundall say that (p 431) “though 
managers and policy makers have been quick to encourage clinicians to adopt an evidence-
based approach, they have been slower to apply the same ideas to their own practice”.  Yet, 
there is evidence that the same problems (of the under use of effective interventions and the 
over use of ineffective ones) are as widespread in health care management as they are in 
clinical practice.  According to the NHS, surveys done by the Department (Department of 
Health 2009 a, b) went on to say that the NHS had spent (08/09) £912 million on clinical 
research, £350 million on management consultants and yet had spent only £4 million on 
research and disseminating knowledge about the organisation and delivery of health care.   
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Pfeffer (2006, p 6) says that “evidence based management is a commitment to finding and 
using the best theory and data available at the time, to make decisions”.  This definition arose 
from study by Pfeffer (2006) of the “knowing-doing” gap and why managers “do things that 
were at odds with the best evidence of what works”.  This is the definition that I am settled 
on for this paper. 
 
My own personal baggage about Evidence Based Management is that; I have worked in 
services where EBM was a new or alien concept.  Although the hierarchy of evidence is 
vaguely understood by most if not all NHS managers the sense that evidence should support 
or instruct decision makers, as proposed by distinguished leaders in the NHS management 
such as Muir Gray (1997), is not commonly accepted.  To an extent the concept of evidence 
is mostly a binary rather than a linear concept.  By that I mean that the Randomised Control 
Trial (RCT) is seen to be “evidence” and that anything other than an RCT is not.  In that way 
the concept of evidence is elevated to its most extreme version where an almost laboratory 
level of precision within its practice frightens lesser users.   
 
I have performed the role of Director and Chief Executive in NHS organisations.  It is 
significant that as a qualified accountant with a masters degree I should put an emphasis on 
craft knowledge.  The use of evidence was seen not as a tool, but part of the ‘craft’ of a few 
researchers who could cope with the rigours of the RCT.  The study of what other health 
systems outside the NHS could offer in terms of evidence was seen to be the role of 
specialised divisions of the health system, not mainstream NHS management.  I broke into 
this through visits to Europe and to America.  I was able to discuss the concepts of evidence 
based management with leading advocates of the idea, such as Dave Knutson at Minnesota, 
Tony Kovner and Jon Billings at NYU, Johanna Brared-Christensson at Sahlgrenska and 
James Roosevelt Jr at Tufts Medical. 
 
Young (2005), Mitton (2003) and Wait (2005) have all presented models that allow for an 
international analysis of health outcomes, responsiveness and financing.  This is not a crude 
league tabling, but a mixture of simulations and benchmarking, that allow for managers to 
not only understand how much is spent on health care, but how the resources are being 
applied.  Indifference to such work typified the use of international comparative data by NHS 
management.  Mitton (2003) considers the problem of applying a “rationing process” based 
on national allocation judgements, as opposed to the crude application of private sector 
management concepts from alternative health systems. 
 
On the other hand, this baggage had the bonus that I could negotiate a quite privileged level 
of direct access to senior managers within my region of the NHS.  Professional experience 
within that region over the last 10 years, plus my engaged discussions (socially) with these 
managers about me studying for a doctoral level qualification, gave me confidence that I had 
a cohort to study.  But there needed to be a method of study and implicitly a preceding 
methodology to gather the best data from this research.  I was drawn to the work of 
Frankfort-Nachmias (1996, pp12-13) that said “logical empiricists take the position that 
social scientists can attain objective knowledge in the study of the social as well as the 
natural world.  Social and natural sciences can be investigated by the same scientific 
methodology.  Furthermore, logical empiricism sees empathic understanding as a helpful 
route to discovery”.  As I worked through the methodology – one thing troubled me about the 
method.  Under Frankfort-Nachmias (1996) the research process starts with a hypothesis.  
“But discoveries must still be validated by empirical observations if they are to be integrated 
into the scientific body of knowledge”.  So I carried on with the methodology and was more 
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easily reconciled to a method when I read Atkinson (1990, page 9).  Atkinson talks of 
ethnography as a “method and a genre” but just as importantly, Atkinson writes about the 
“poetics of authoritative accounts”.  Under method and genre, he said “it is therefore 
necessary to perform the equivalent of a ‘phenomenological reduction’; that is, to step back 
and bracket or suspend our taken-for-granted assumptions about how ‘facts’ and ‘realities’ 
come to be represented as they are in our monographs and papers”.  This appealed as it spoke 
to me of the way to observe my world as if I were an outsider despite being an actor in the 
system.  Then Atkinson added “everyday commonsense tends to make a radical distraction 
between facts at one extreme and at the other subjectivity.  If anyone were to adopt such a 
perspective then they would be guilty of gross over-simplification.  Science is itself a 
rhetorical activity”. 
 
For these reasons, I used an ethnographic account.  Although I was concerned about the 
validity of the method as I had not used the method in previous studies at Masters or 
professional examination levels it did seem the appropriate tool.  I did not want to observe a 
separate reality form the one I was working in as an executive in the NHS.  I did also want to 
avoid historical research as the longitudinal nature of the study had to, as much as possible, 
concentrate not on who we had been as NHS managers in the past, but to look at who we are 
now and why.  I accept that the ethnographic account is necessarily pragmatic and based on 
my values, but as I was trying to draw some general assumptions from explaining the 
behaviour of my peers, I believe it would be a valid research method.  The key reason that 
this method was useful as well as valid for me, is that the realism of the record made the 
account most contemporary and subject to audit by the people being observed. 
 
But what sort of ethnographic account to use?  Ethnography; ethno as in people, graph as in 
to write.  I am clear that I am writing about a people from my perspective.  My people.  NHS 
managers.  In my region of the NHS.  Denzin (1997) encouraged a creative study of human 
behaviour with lots of experimental texts and designs.  This form of inquiry did not appear to 
be one I could credibly reproduce.  In reference to Bryman (2004) I was able to gain a better 
idea of the structure of my ethnography.  It would include participant observation, but I could 
say to all participants that my exploration was not testing a hypothesis.  I simply wanted to 
record unstructured data, to find a particular case study within this unstructured data (in my 
case it turned out to be cleanliness in hospitals) and to add some interpretation to the 
decisions being taken.  Watson (1994) considered an ethnographic study that gave an insight 
into the way that managers worked, their thoughts and concerns.  Watson (1994) contrasted 
this approach to the numerate and standardising work that he saw typified much managerial 
research.  The key method that Watson (1994) had was to discover what management is like 
by understanding identity rather than observing the managerial task as if it was meant only to 
help to deliver a successful organisation. 
 
1.4  The effect of the patient and the politician upon NHS managers 
 
I was aware from my literature review that part of the ethnography would most likely 
observe the effect of the patient and the politician on managerial autonomy in the NHS 
manager.  I therefore mapped out key players in the NHS and the links to evidence based 
management as shown in table 1 (paragraph 2.4).  So, in this dynamic environment what else 
was it legitimate to add to my ethnography to make sure it passed the ultimate test of an 
ethnography; that you should be able to recognise the place at that point in time once you 
have read it?  Myers (1999, p2) who wrote an advisory note on ethnographic research in 
information systems, gave a helpful distinction “in a case study, the primary source of data is 
interviews, supplemented by documentary evidence such as annual reports, minutes of 
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meetings and so forth.  In an ethnography these data sources are supplemented by data 
collected through participant and non-participant observation.  Ethnography usually require 
the researcher to spend a long period in the field”.  The ethnography had to produce 
something meaningful not only to the reader though, but also to this group of NHS managers 
who were having to react quickly to patients and politicians.  Morgan (2007, p48) was 
helpful in adding to Bryman (2004) by saying that what I interpreted could be “from the 
perspective of the meaning, members of that society attach to their social world”.  
Importantly, in this unstable environment of reactive management, Morgan gave permission 
to “render the collected data intelligible and significant to fellow academics and other 
readers”. 
 
The ethnographic account was also seen as a useful way to improve the performance of 
current and future NHS managers by feeding back and discussing the way decisions were 
made.  Establishing a link between individual organisational effectiveness (and individual 
executive effectiveness) and the quality of evidence used by managers in the East Midlands 
was problematic.  On the other hand, the cohort studies were consistently assertive (about 
themselves and others) that individuals leadership and effective individual performance 
would make a substantial (differential) impact on organisational delivery.  This delivery 
would cover compliances with the metrics used by inspectors and the Government, but also 
better clinical performance.  There was little opportunity to reflect on the effectiveness of 
their behaviour as individuals or to share learning as a group, however.   Therefore this 
ethnographic study was welcomed to audit and articulate what worked today and also to see 
whether generalisable themes could be found to plan for future good performance (Yin 
2008). 
 
Some senior (former) NHS managers such as Learmonth (2000) oppose the scientific method 
and suggest that management is not an automatically good thing as it is believed to involve 
the exercise of power and the exploitation of others.   
 
Swan (2005, p920) said “the majority of studies in this field (of the politics of networked 
innovation) have tended to focus on the more overt forms of political influence, including the 
role of managerial coalitions political tactics and the micro-politics of self-interest amongst 
decision makers (Pettigrew, 1973; Brass and Burkhardt, 1992; Jones et al, 2001).  The 
emphasis has been on the ability to develop power over other groups, through the 
mobilization of resources (eg financial resources, information, and staff).  The negative 
connotations of a focus on hierarchically coercive power have tended to steer research of 
innovation away from deeper analysis of the dynamics of power (Hardy, 1996)”.  Swan 
concludes (2005, p938) “Dougherty and Hardy (1996 p1146) argue that for organisations to 
become innovative they must ‘reconfigure the power embedded in the organisational system 
– in its resources, processes and meanings’.  The findings reported here provide support for 
the view of the politicality of innovation processes”.  
 
Learmonth (2000) discourages the use of the scientific method due to exclusivity, but he 
needs not worry if managers themselves cannot or will not use the scientific approaches.  
Perhaps the answer is less about what numerics to use and move about what research can tell 
us about successful leaders in successful organisations and the management tools that they 
used. 
 
The links between the better use of research and improved organisational performance are 
key to answering the question of ‘why don’t we use more evidence more often?!’  So why 
does this link prove so elusive to find within this paper?  The DBA itself includes a literature 
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search – not quite a meta analysis, but thorough and completed as document 2 before any 
quantitative or qualitative analysis is done.  The conclusions were that evidence is rarely 
objective, rarely is it widely available to all NHS managers simultaneously and it is never 
free (requiring either cash or significant opportunity cost to trawl).  Worst of all, it is usually 
contextually created within the market for management consultancy within the NHS that 
was, in 2008/09 worth £350 million or 0.3% of the total NHS budget (Department of Health 
2009 b).  In summary, there is not yet any empirical evidence about evidence itself that 
demonstrates without prejudice its effectiveness. 
 
The following quotation from Giddens (1987, p310) explains how policy is related to 
research: “Evidence based policy is not simply an extension of evidence based 
medicine: it is qualitatively different. Research is considered less as problem solving 
than as a process of argument or debate to create concern and set the agenda. 
During the 1980s and 1990s this view was extended to a more interactive model 
based on a close dialogue between researchers and policymakers in which 
knowledge is considered to be inherently contestable”. 
 
The implication of accepting this is that policymakers have to get something out of 
research if they are to use it. It is necessary, therefore, to consider which arguments 
are likely to be useful or gratifying to which policymakers. Researchers have to 
accept that their work may be ignored because policymakers have to take the full 
complexity of any situation into account. They need to recognise that the other 
legitimate influences on policy (social, electoral, ethical, cultural, and economic) 
must be accommodated and that research is most likely to influence policymakers 
through an extended process of communication. 
 
In this section it is possible to conclude that there is a tension between politicians 
and managers in the running of the National Health Service.  It is possible to 
conclude that a similar tension exists between taxpayers, patients and politicians in 
the running and funding of the NHS.  None of the parties are inherently trusting of a 
link between research and improved organisational performance.  An ethnographic 
account will help the reader and researcher to understand why this is. 
 
1.5  A changing definition of management and professionalism 
 
Our knowledge base is changing.  A definition of a ‘profession’ as people reserving the right 
to judge the quality and appropriateness of their services is over.  (Bonnell 1999).  It is clear 
that the politicians believe the bond of public trust to be broken.  The reason we get 
politicians using targets and based numerics in a heavy and dogmatic way is that the 
assumption of professionalism has lost the confidence of politicians.  (Morris, 2002).  At the 
same time the complexity of the NHS system means that simple-easy to communicate – 
policies are seen as the antidote to complexity.  Not the use of evidence! (Paniagua, 2009). 
 
The linkages between research and other forms of knowledge are important to understanding 
‘who’ the NHS manager is and how this affects the production and use of evidence.  Senior 
NHS executives must – according to their job descriptions – have a professional 
qualification, a masters degree level education (or equivalent) and at least five years 
significant NHS experience at Board level (Appendix G).  This collective experience means a 
starting point for research and scientific enquiry that cannot only be forensic and analytical, 
but will also be experimental and, to an extent, based on story-telling and anecdote.  
Secondly, the leader will have won the post at a meritocratic interview within a public 
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domain following advertisement of the post and an extended competition.  This means that 
the structural analysis of who they are and how they use evidence, must consider that the 
process of arriving at being a leader is within a social/political context.  That their skills 
make them capable of using evidence is clear from the competence requirements of their job 
description – but there is every chance this skill will atrophy after appointment as other 
attributes are developed. 
 
1.6 Using my professional role to validate academic insight 
 
In my professional life I am a planner and purchaser of Emergency Ambulance Services.  So 
I spend a great degree of time analysing and considering data about performance of 
ambulance responses to emergencies, the most efficient ways to do things and looking for 
insights that will either improve quality for the same price, or get me the same quality for a 
lower price.  What I buy is affected by the reasons that people call for ambulances – 
dangerous personal behaviours, the frailty of the human body in times of extreme weather 
(heat and cold), biological factors such as disease or the contra-indicators of drugs, age and 
disability.  In the response to a particularly difficult performance period it became clear that 
“falls” were a key reason for the despatch of ambulances.  Although few trials have been 
carried out in the UK, the prevention and management of falls in the older population is a 
key government target in reducing ill health.  This is a key target of the national service 
framework for older people (2001).  “Reduce the number of falls which result in serious 
injury and ensure effective treatment and rehabilitation for those who had fallen”.  
(Department of Health 2001) is the direct mission statement of this particular national service 
framework. 
 
My professional roles gave me validity and made it acceptable to be an explorer.  When an 
academic explores the NHS and attempts to codify behaviour or establish a theoretical 
schema, their study may exhibit a certain formality and quality.  But the ultimate product is 
not useful to practicing NHS leaders in proportion to the resource deployed.  (Baker, 2009).  
The implementation of conclusions fully is unlikely.  This is not some problem with the 
epistemology that the academic displays.  It is that their exploration is that of a tourist within 
the NHS.  My validity means that any generality I observe will have to be tested in the 
challenges we as a cohort of NHS managers face in the future. 
 
Two academics explored this problem.  (Gill 2002 and Yin 2008).  Gill (2002, p5) said that 
“research in the United Kingdom comparing attitudes towards research of managers revealed 
that managers believed research was initiated by academic researchers often insufficiently 
familiar with the managerial culture and so lacked credibility.  For the most part, managers 
seemed to believe that management research was not cost effective but also, more critically, 
largely irrelevant to the problems they faced.  Many managers confessed that they did not 
know how to use research findings and that clearly utilisable research would be more helpful 
to them”.  Yin (2008) broadens this helpfully, by saying that if the researcher intensively 
studies one or a few entries a case researcher is likely to develop deep insights of a 
phenomenon from which hypotheses may be generated.  Following Yin (2008), my 
ethnography may lead to conclusions about the NHS in the East Midlands that are credible 
hypothesis in other parts of the NHS. 
 
I wanted to complete the analytical quantitative part of my study of evidence based 
management by looking at East Midlands Ambulance Service (EMAS), as the only clinical 
service organisation that covered the whole of the East Midlands.  EMAS also provides 
services in the South Humber areas of North and North East Lincolnshire which is outside 
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the definition of East Midlands used elsewhere in this project.  When I talk of the East 
Midlands in regards to ambulance service I will be talking about the area co-terminus with 
the East Midlands Strategic Health Authority and the Government Office for the East 
Midlands, not the whole of the service area covered by EMAS including South Humber.  
EMAS provided emergency and urgent care, patient transport, call handling and clinical 
triage services.  EMAS employ 3000 staff and have 70 locations they operate from and an 
annual budget of £137 million in financial year 2008/09. 
 
As well as the quantitative study of EMAS, I wished to do an in depth qualitative study.  
Investigating the criteria used to assess the quality of a decision is a key objective of the 
research presented here.  The way in which evidence is assessed is closely related to the 
perceived status and credibility of the evidence itself.  It is possible to provide an idea of 
some broad areas the respondents seemed to take into account when assessing the quality of 
the evidence.  I chose to focus on a particular decision.  The cohort being followed were 
charged with conducting a deep clean of clinical areas in the NHS in response to high profile 
media and political concerns about infection rates and the effect they were having on 
patients.  For those with poor health and reduced immunity due to a range of factors (age, 
diet, morbidity) proximate exposure to these infections would in fact kill them.  That much 
was agreed by the cohort but the decision was around the way they approached the instructed 
solution of a ‘deep clean’, and the extent to which the assessment of the quality of evidence 
is used in that decision.  A subset of this observation is the extent to which the use of 
evidence is seen as intuitive decision making rather than the systematic application of 
criteria. 
 
1.7  Conclusion 
 
I wanted a better understanding of the NHS that lead to better management (and especially 
executive) performance.  The key was to have an intelligent system that was also simple to 
read and understand.  I wanted to observe the most actively used algorithms for decision 
making by these managers (even if they didn’t recognise it as being something as 
sophisticated as an algorithm) and to understand which algorithms they thought most deeply 
about before applying them to their decision.  The codification of all of this needed to be 
something that would make sense to the participants in meetings and boards, not simply in an 
abstraction of their day to day experience.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
Context 
 
Purpose 
 
To represent schematically the relationship between policy makers, managers, clinicians and 
patients with respect to the use of evidence.  To represent diagrammatically the reasons 
evidence is (or is not) used by managers in the NHS and by those who fund, provide and 
receive NHS care. 
 
Key Arguments and Conclusions 
 
2.1  Evidence encompasses codified and non-codified sources of knowledge 
 
Kovner and Rundall (2006 p3) said “The sense of urgency associated with improving the 
quality of medical care does not exist with respect to improving the quality of management 
decision making.  A more evidence based approach would improve the competence of the 
decision makers and their motivation to use more scientific methods when making a 
decision”.  Kovner (2006, pp3-22) conducted a study of 68 US based health service 
managers and found a low level of evidence based management behaviours.  From the 
findings, Kovner (2006) suggested that evidence based decision making should focus on 
strategically important issues and to build a management culture that values research.  What I 
find compelling about Kovner’s study is that it understands that there is a bias in terms of 
describing ‘good’ management in health care in terms of what individuals know about their 
jobs, rather than describing a ‘good manager’ as one who uses research.  Against all of the 
good work to improve the use of evidence, are pre-existing management cultures and 
scepticism about the transferability of findings of research. 
 
Evidence based healthcare management (EBHM) refers to using research evidence in making 
management decisions. Defined narrowly it describes using evidence from randomised 
controlled trials investigating the effectiveness of management decisions.  For example 
evidence about the effectiveness of representations of service (case management or team 
work), or about changes to organisation (changing skill mix or merging two organisations) or 
about new financing arrangements (e.g. primary care purchasing), or about public health or 
health promotion programmes. This accommodates a more flexible concept of evidence of 
effectiveness which can include the opinions of stakeholders if gathered using accepted 
systematic methods.  
 
In its broadest sense EBHM describes using any “acceptable evidence” to make better 
informed management and policy decisions. Such evidence could be a survey of opinions 
about the likely value of a change or new policy, or an internal data gathering project to 
collect service statistics and assess their validity for informing a decision. An example of this 
concept is research informed management or  “Evaluation-informed management” defined as 
“making more informed management decisions by using research evidence and evidence 
from research”. 
 
In considering the way that individuals apply evidence to the decision making 
process, of particular interest is the underlying assumptions about the career of the 
NHS manager and the life stages they go through with regard to autonomy.  The 
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way in which individuals define the use of evidence is important in that it shapes 
their perceptions about who should be free to use judgement and who needs to 
concur with the evidence base (and indeed seek out the evidence base) before 
making a decision.  From the responses and the recordings  (described in depth in 
Chapers 5 and 6) it is clear that a variety of individual decision making methods are 
in use and there is no general consensus about the nature of evidence in decisions 
by individuals within the NHS.  What is clear though is that rather than being a 
restrictive or indeed exclusionary practice of some NHS managers, there is a body 
of support for evidence based decisions, with the right evidence by the right 
individuals in the right context. 
 
Even champions of evidence-based practice acknowledge that the approach has limits.  
“Some things can’t be tested in randomized trials, and some things are so obvious, they don’t 
need it”, says Dr. Paul Glasziou, director of the Centre for Evidence-Based Medicine in 
Oxford, England.  (2007 p3) “There have never been randomized trials to show that giving 
electrical shocks to a heart that has stopped beating saves more lives than doing nothing, for 
example.  Similarly, giving antibiotics to treat pneumonia has never been rigorously tested 
from a scientific point of view.  It’s clear to everyone, however, that if you want to survive a 
bout of bacterial pneumonia, antibiotics are your best bet, and nobody would want to go into 
cardiac arrest without a crash cart handy”. 
 
2.2 There is a recognised corpus of knowledge for NHS managers 
 
There is a managerial challenge, somewhere at the axis between clinicians and the NHS 
manager, that is about somebody making a decision about what the facts are going to be.  
The dialogue is between a claim for example about speedier recovery and the research 
evidence that confirms or denies this.  This will inevitably clash with custom and practice.  
Equally, it will clash with entrepreneurs/innovators who have a penchant for change and 
experimentation that is not evidenced.  Such entrepreneurs can be clinical or managerial.  
(Littlejohns, 2003 p862).  “Most new interventions in health care are driven by entrepreneurs 
who have great faith in their project.  They may not be capable of standing back and taking a 
dispassionate view of the cost effectiveness of the interventions.  In this case, the 
implications  of an emerging policy that was encouraging modular systems – that is, 
pharmacy and radiology that could be linked rather than fully integrated – were not fully 
assimulated”. 
 
Muir Gray (1997 p615) has said “management in health care is a young discipline without 
the trappings and traditions of medicine. Is it, though, more of an art than a science? 
Resistance to change may be less, but the increased rigor required could be much greater. 
Furthermore, in management and policy making the anatomy of a decision is very different 
from a clinical intervention. Deciding whether to invest in a further cardiothoracic centre in a 
health region or to move five vascular surgical units to one site, even if evidence were 
available, is a complex process. It can involve managers, professionals, local interest groups, 
politicians, the media, and the public. At times, social systems will undermine the science. 
For example, how often have we seen a decision changed late in the day by a bravura 
performance in committee, based on emotion?” The National Institute for Clinical 
Effectiveness (NICE) has been created to help to create a more evidence based climate and to 
avoid the emotive response noted by Gray.  The work that NICE is involved in attracts the 
attention of many groups, including doctors, the pharmaceutical industry, and patients. NICE 
is often associated with controversy,  (politics.co.uk, 2010) because the need to make 
decisions at a national level can conflict with what is (or is believed to be) in the best 
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interests of an individual patient, and because there is an inherent need for rationing in the 
NHS. From an individual's perspective it can sometimes seem that NICE is denying access to 
a potentially life-saving treatment. NICE has been criticised for its over-reliance on 
evidence-based medicine, which it is argued privileges certain kinds of econometrically 
derived types of studies over others. NICE has also been criticised for being too slow to 
reach decisions. Some of the more controversial NICE decisions have concerned beta-
interferon for multiple sclerosis, imatinib (Glivec) for leukaemia, and trastuzumab 
(Herceptin) for breast cancer. The process aims to be fully independent of government and 
lobbying power, basing decisions fully on clinical and cost-effectiveness. There have been 
concerns that lobbying by pharmaceutical companies to mobilise media attention and 
influence public opinion are attempts to influence the decision making process. A fast-track 
assessment system has been introduced to reach decisions where there is most pressure for a 
conclusion. 
 
There are obviously a number of other ways that this management task of resource gathering 
and allocation can take place.  I would like to continue with the theme of the Learmonth 
approach to NHS management before moving on to other studies.  Learmonth (2003) returns 
to the areas he had covered previously in suggesting that much of the established work in 
health services management research takes for granted managerial assumptions that are not 
consequently subjected to sustained critical examination.  Learmonth maintains that this 
veneer of research credibility reinforces a view of management in the NHS that appears to be 
neutral and disinterested, but actually supports elite interests. 
 
Harries (1999) on the other hand acknowledges the importance of developing an NHS where 
practice and policy is more evidence based.  Harries’ paper is based on a qualitative study 
which aimed to identify factors which facilitate or impede evidence based policy making at a 
local, rather than, national level in the NHS.  Harries drew conclusions about the importance 
of influences and commitment in facilitating evidence based change.  Harries actually did 
what Learmonth accuses the NHS of not doing and moved beyond the rhetoric of evidence 
based policy by conducting a series of in depth interviews with lead policy makers and 
analysis of project documents to see if and where and why evidence based management 
exists in the NHS. 
 
Further to Harries; Pearson (2007) took on Learmonth by conducting a re-consideration of 
what constitutes evidence in healthcare.  Pearson offers the Joanna Briggs Institute version to 
illustrate the broader definition of what works as evidence and therefore challenges 
Learmonth.  Pearson (2007) says that the whole concept of evidence can be described fairly 
and without prejudice.  This is not to say that Learmonth is entirely without foundation in his 
belief that management styles can be imported without evaluation.  Enthoven (2000) says 
that previous reforms of the NHS were quite limited in effect because the essential conditions 
for a market to operate were not fulfilled.  Enthoven ascribes the management tasks of 
innovation, improving efficiency and driving good customer service as absent from NHS 
management and recommends the market as the best stimuli to improve the quality of 
management in the NHS with little or no evidence other than replication of what Enthoven 
saw elsewhere. 
 
Hamlin (2001) presents arguments in support of evidence-based healthcare management, 
drawing on organisationally based empirical research, set within an NHS Trust Hospital in 
the UK. The research focuses on identifying the criteria of managerial effectiveness applying 
at the middle and front line management levels of the organisation, using critical incident 
technique and factor analysis methods.  The findings suggest the existence of generalised 
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criteria of managerial effectiveness, supporting the notion of the ‘universally effective 
manager’.  
 
Davis (2007) has made comparison studies of the functioning of health policy in Denmark, 
Germany, the Netherlands and the United kingdom, to understand the incentives, rewards 
and penalties that might make players in a health system allocate resources efficiently.  
Boufford (2002) has written about the importance of teaching evidence based healthcare in 
universities to pre and post qualification healthcare managers.  
 
There is a structure, albeit an informal one, for the implementation of management research 
in the National Health Service. The National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) was 
created in 2006 “to create a health research system in which the NHS supports outstanding 
individuals, working in world class facilities, conducting leading edge research focused on 
the needs of patients and the public” (Department of Health 2008). The NIHR is a virtual 
organisation, which provides a new framework for the Department of Health to work with its 
key partners involved in the different elements of NHS research.   Also noteworthy is the 
West Midlands Health Technology Assessment Collaboration between universities and 
academic groups mostly based at the University of Birmingham, United Kingdom. It 
produces reviews and evaluations for a variety of national and regional clients, undertakes 
methodological research on health technology assessment, and provides training in 
systematic reviews and health technology assessment. The Service Delivery and 
Organisation (SDO) Research and Development Programmed aims to produce research 
evidence directed at improving the organisation and delivery of health services, and to 
promote the uptake and application of that evidence in policy and practice. The SDO 
Programme is one of NIHR Programmes. 
 
 The Cochrane Collaboration is an international not-for-profit organisation that helps people 
make well informed decisions by preparing, maintaining and promoting the accessibility of 
systematic reviews of the effects of health care interventions. The major product of the 
Cochrane Collaboration is its database of systematic reviews. Most reviews are prepared by 
health care professionals and published in the Cochrane Library. The activities are supported 
by staff in Cochrane Centres (Department of Health 2005 a) around the world.  Centre for 
Reviews and Dissemination (CRD) was established in 1994 to provide the United Kingdom's 
National Health Service (NHS) with important information on effectiveness of treatments, 
delivery and organization of health care. CRD is a sibling organization of the United 
Kingdom Cochrane Centre and is part of a network of academic departments and research 
centres at the University of York concerned with teaching, research and consultancy in health 
and public policy.  
 
Evidence-based medicine categorises different types of clinical evidence and ranks them 
according to the strength of their freedom from the various biases that beset medical 
research. For example, the strongest evidence for therapeutic interventions is provided by 
randomised, double-blind, placebo-controlled trials involving a homogeneous patient 
population and medical condition. In contrast, patient testimonials, case reports, and even 
expert opinion have little value as proof because of the placebo effect, the biases inherent in 
observation and reporting of cases, difficulties in ascertaining who are an expert, and more. 
Evidence-based healthcare management is an emerging movement to explicitly use the 
current, best evidence in management decision-making. Its roots are in evidence-based 
medicine and as such is a quality movement to apply the scientific method to management 
practice. 
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2.3 Those who comment on the NHS don’t use evidence to do so 
 
Strathern (1997) says that any economic relationship which is used for policy purposes 
ceases to be valid.  The paper gives an anthropological comment on what the writer calls the 
‘audit explosion’ meaning the proliferation of procedures for evaluating performance.  
Strathern (1997) notes that audit does more than monitor, it actually has an effect on the 
behaviour and performance of the organisation that is being audited.   
 
Recent Institute for Public Policy Research/Ipsos Mori survey work indicates that only 
around a quarter of the public thinks that the availability of drugs and treatments should be 
determined by cost and effectiveness (Brooks 2006).  There are legitimate concerns about the 
cost and effectiveness of new drugs and treatments, and about the role of private companies 
in stimulating demand for their products, and these require a robust and transparent 
regulatory response. We certainly need a system that allows a rational pattern of expenditure 
rather than focusing disproportionate resources on specific treatments when they hit the 
headlines.   
 
Conversely Clarke (2004, p28), Director of Finance at the Homerton University 
Hospital NHS Foundation Trust, has insisted that ‘most people running hospitals 
know how to run them, and there is no universal solution available from the 
commercial sector’. In any case, with around 70% of costs set nationally, hospital 
management teams have only limited discretion – something the government’s 
‘turnaround teams’ have been finding out. Parker (2004, p29), chair of the King’s 
College Hospital NHS Trust, stressed that NHS managers are often being asked to 
manage ‘dysfunctional systems’, with a lot of perverse incentives. ‘We are managers 
but we’re being asked to act like civil servants, each time the government screws 
things up.’ 
 
Crawford (2009) wrote of a time when, in the role of Chief Executive Officer there was a 
heated argument as to whether loss-leader items led to greater sales.  As CEO he could have 
made the decision based on his own opinion but that's not what happened.  Crawford said, 
"Let's not argue, let's find out."  They proceeded to do an experiment to see if shoppers 
buying sale items also bought enough other items to justify the sale. (They didn’t).  This is a 
great example of the attitude of inquiry.  Crawford, (2009). 
 
An attitude of enquiry would include questions such as “what are the assumptions behind 
this?” “what evidence do we have that things may go wrong?”  Advocates come into a 
meeting with an opinion they wish to defend.  Bertelli (2008) employed count regression 
techniques to find out what MPs said about issues of wait times and resource allocation in the 
NHS.  Bertelli (2008) showed that political careerism goes a long way to show whether MPs 
tabled any questions in this area.  Advocacy was consistently used in the defence of high risk 
individuals, but MPs showed no appetite for discussion about more general health risks that 
may be a clue to an attitude of enquiry. 
 
2.4 A way to represent this as a diagram 
 
The decision to use evidence to distribute the resources of the NHS would be, of itself, a 
political act.  Clinicians, patients, politicians, all use Politics to distribute the NHS resource.  
Derbyshire PCT, where I work, is only the eight largest PCT in the country, and yet still 
distributes £1.1 billion of taxpayer’s money on healthcare.  (Department of Health, 2009c).  
The problem is not with the evidence based approach itself.  The problem is that good 
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evidence based decision making with an evidence based organisation of knowledge at its 
heart can be slow.  Decisions based on evidence can be full of checks-and-balances and be 
open ended.  The calm evidence based approach gets overtaken by an urgent desire to claim 
and distribute a significant part of this huge economic resource available from the NHS.  It 
will be helpful to draw this issue diagrammatically.  This way the researcher can frame 
within one picture or table the reasons why evidence is (or is not) used by managers in the 
NHS and by those who fund, provide and receive NHS care. 
 
I conclude that the cohort will use clinical evidence, I think managers are very much into the 
development of clinical pathways, working with clinicians and doing the best things in the 
best way.  But as to how the NHS works, the sort of infrastructure, where services are 
located, how they’re delivered, I don’t conclude that they do use evidence.  I observe there is 
some, scientific evidence in there, they’ll look at journey times, and they’ll look at volume, 
populations and the needs of that population (not been done very well until fairly recently).  
So they’ll do that sort of thing, but a lot of the decisions that are made, seem to be based 
more on history, on the views of politicians and key stakeholders, which are often not really 
evidence based.  
 
In our efforts to continually refine the body of knowledge, guidelines exists for where 
evidence is and is not appropriate.  There is a culture of target hitting, self-regulation and 
rooting out dangerous clinical practice that has it’s origins in criminal and unsafe clinicians 
such as Harold Shipman.  But there is also a fear of evidence that pervades any hope of a 
structural response to the issue.  There is also as we have seen far more complexity in the 
NHS.  We have pressures to avoid all clinical hazard whatever the opportunity cost is.  We 
have pressures and incentives for institutional growth over best patient care.  We have 
consumerism and we have pre-occupation with financial costs over economics or ‘whole 
system/whole life’ costs. 
 
Part of the problem in the discussion about evidence is that the players in the National Health 
Service can be difficult to follow if your primary perspective is the flow of patient pathways 
through the clinical experience.  This gives a sense that there is a linear NHS with one 
purpose and a clear objective.  Consider the diagram of the NHS as it is represented and it is 
possible to see a complex multivariate organisation within which each player has a different 
requirement of and/or rejection of the opportunities afforded by an evidence based approach.  
(Table 1, below). 
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Table 1 
 
An alternative diagram considered was the structured system analysis and design method 
(SSADM) piloted by Downs (1992). This is a registered trade mark of the UK treasury and 
therefore deeply embedded within the UK public sector.  This type of modelling involves 
recording and documenting how data moves around an information system.  This also 
involves significant dialogue with users and complex mapping and is a pinnacle of the 
rigorous document approach to system design.  Although the investigative nature of this 
diagram is helpful in constructing a diagram it has two drawbacks that mean I favour my 
alternative.  Primarily it is that SSADM is a waterfall method in which progress is steady 
through the phases of conception to construction and use.  It is also problematic in that whilst 
SSADM may be useful in implementing evidence in a single organisation, it is contextually 
limited for those influencing, but not part of, the NHS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
The rational decision making diagram amongst its many assumptions assumes a single 
optimal solution.  If, however, we opt for a diagram of ‘bounded’ rationality then my 
diagram makes sense.  The decision maker takes the decision or is assumed to choose a 
solution that is good enough within the limited freedom and autonomy they have.  All of the 
agents in the box makes assumptions about their perfect knowledge but all are aware that 
alternatives are limited by the other players in the box.  Document 2 of the DBA (the 
literature review) discussed this point in more detail. 
 
SSADM highlights that my diagram, as a faithful representation of the NHS, has a static 
nature and it may be that SSADM should be thought as the best way to enhance the 
“evidence based organisation of knowledge” at its core.  This links with the next section in 
that I have so far described the existence of evidence as if it were a given, and the only 
question is therefore, whether or not it is used.  Chapter 3 will discuss in more depth this 
issue of a “high quality knowledge base” and whether – if a decision was taken to be 
evidence based – the manager/politician/patient would find an “evidence based organisation 
of knowledge waiting to be tapped into”. 
 
Knowles (2008) says: Although the term “command and control” is used negatively in the 
current target-driven healthcare environment there is a coherent case for it being a more valid 
SSADM: A Summary 
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diagram than my evidence based approach.  “Commonly held views about command-and-
control are that it smacks of everything that is bad about those at the top telling everybody 
else what to do.  However, with many years of ‘shared situational awareness’ (within the 
NHS) we may think of this as being clear about what is expected of oneself and one’s 
colleagues and using one’s initiative.  It is about communicating a plan and ensuring it is 
understood”. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
Concepts and Conceptual Framework 
 
Purpose 
 
To understand the on-going debate over whether the use of evidence should improve 
organisational effectiveness. 
 
Key Arguments and Conclusions 
 
3.1 The primary use of research is in shaping ideas not in the solution of immediate 
problems. 
 
The National Institute for Health and Clinical Evidence (NICE) is a division of the NHS set 
up to consider not only the comparative clinical benefits, but also the cost-effectiveness of 
alternative technologies and services.  Unfortunately, as Chalkidou (2009b, pp4-8) says 
“NICE typically does not, however, encourage evidence generation through prospective 
research into existing uncertainties.  To the extent that evidence for new technologies is more 
readily available than for old.  (Existing) Service-delivery models are much less frequently 
the subject of economic analyses, which further biases the whole process to new 
technologies.  Local systems often lack the analytical capacity, resources, time and 
information and may overlook any resource use implications beyond the marginal pricing 
cost”. 
 
Chalkidou (2009a) studied the experience of senior technical and administrative staff in 
setting up what she called ‘comparative effectiveness research’ centres in Britain, France, 
Australia and Germany.  Chalkidou was a member of NICE (the NHS version of these 
‘comparative effectiveness research’ centres.  Using website access and informal interviews 
with key stakeholders, she was able to determine the mechanisms that typified their 
operation.  She concluded “they have adopted a core structural, technical and procedural 
principles.  Including mechanisms for engaging with stakeholders, governance and oversight 
arrangements and ‘explicit methodologies for analysing evidence’ to ensure a high-quality 
product that is relevant to their system” (my emphasis points). 
 
What do writers conclude about evidence and the nature of evidence?  Guven-Uslu (2006) 
was able to ask whether the nature of papers written upon the consideration of evidence 
based management were qualitatively different from those of other management disciplines.  
Guven-Uslu (2006) reviewed the literature of the NHS at a time when it was encouraging 
clinicians and managers to work together in networks to improve performance and the writer 
concludes that “evidence based management” is not so much a tool of decision making, as it 
is a state of mind.  The incorporation of evidence based management into decision making is 
not at the decision point – it is the entire continuum of the philosophy of management.  It 
becomes a credo wherein all decisions are taken in a structured and methodical way, and to 
some extent, trading timeliness for accuracy. 
 
Rousseau (2006, p256) quotes from a wealth of resource available to guide effective 
execution of evidence based management “goal setting and feedback (Locke & Latham 
1984); feedback and redesign (Goodman 2001); health care managements greater orientation 
towards scientific evidence (Lemieux-Charles & Champagne 2004)” and says that the 
 183 
continued wide variation that we observe in how organisations execute decisions is 
remarkable.  I have written in tabular form, the nature of the discourse contained in 
Rousseau’s literature so that a wealth of writing can be synthesised, in paragraph 3.3 and 
again in 5.9.  
 
The Cochrane Centre was established as part of funding in 1992 by the NHS ‘to facilitate and 
co-ordinate the preparation and maintenance of systematic reviews of randomised control 
trials of health care’.  The national level institution has been supplemented in the intervening 
years by National Service Frameworks (2000) and the National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence (NICE) (2001).  Other bodies such as Kings Fund, Nuffield Trust and the 
US Institute for Healthcare Improvement have been active in producing research and 
disseminating knowledge about the organisation and delivery of health care. 
 
A company that embraces evidence-based management sees their company as a laboratory.  
Crawford (2009) ran an experiment to answer a specific question.  Many businesses could do 
the same.  Wherever there are multiple units – multiple stores, warehouses, production lines 
or branches – the company can run experiments to find out what works.  This simple idea, 
“the company as a laboratory” is powerful one. 
 
Sutton (2009) says “Last week I spoke to a group of MBA students (the Santa Clara 
University Executive MBA class of 2007). Their comments and questions gave me food for 
thought. For starters, is evidence based management anything new? Is it a movement that 
should be enthusiastically promoted, or simply a day-to-day activity that people should be 
encouraged to do? And what should it be called (assuming it even needs a name)? Sutton 
(2009) wishes to avoid using “data-driven” as a substitute, because evidence doesn’t always 
arrive in the form of hard data. Likewise, he says not to call it “fact-based” management, 
because not everything can be reduced to a set of objective facts. Sutton (2009) thinks 
“research-based” management is a decent description, but worries that it that might trigger 
“the dreaded MEGO (My Eyes Glaze Over) response”. 
 
What each of the writers in paragraph 3.1 have done is provide a sense that evidence based 
management or “decision based on a careful appraisal of the best evidence available” is not 
only possible, but empowering.  Whilst it has at its heart an inquiring style of management, it 
is not cautious in approach.  If the manager were, say, the executive director in charge of 
twenty clinics, each with varied performance, the manager might reasonably conclude that 
the performance differences were due to something about the clinics or their administration.  
The executive director might even combine that presumption with a professional background 
in clinical or business disciplines to draw conclusions.  What these writers have told the NHS 
manager to do instead, is to look for systematic attention to local facts (ie, the best evidence 
available) and plan their response accordingly which may mean looking at patients, building 
stock, transport or public health, but to look at them quickly! 
 
The debate is evolving from managers use of ‘knowledge about knowledge’ in the private 
sector (Bailey and Clarke, 2000) to a broader NHS and health care discussion (Kovner 2006, 
2009).  The debate is also evolving from one about managers strategic uses of knowledge to 
secure competitive advantage for the organisation (Hamblin 2001) to an alignment between 
researchers and managers to apply evidence to a broad range of other uses (Alexander 2007).  
There is as yet, little empirical research evidence to inform efforts to develop models in real 
world settings and the debate is typified by academic rather than practitioner dispute 
(Learmonth, 2006 and Rousseau, 2006). 
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We can observe the substance and discipline behind the evidence based culture; two writers 
Lomas and Rist are found in the literature with a number of lessons that they prescribe for 
anybody wishing to understand whether the public actually want their decisions to be made 
on the basis of best evidence.  As a simple rule book this part of academic practice can be 
helpful in shaping an understanding for the later documents of how policy, public preference 
and management decision making come together.  The writers make some bold statements as 
follows: 
 
The relation between research and policy depends on the arena and, thus, the 
policymakers. Research evidence is more influential in central policy than local 
policy, where policymaking is marked by negotiation and uncertainty. Thirdly, the 
use of research depends on the degree of consensus on the policy goal. It is used if 
it supports the consensus and is used selectively if there is a lack of consensus. 
Fourthly, many researchers are politically naive. They have a poor understanding of 
how policy is made and have unrealistic expectations about what research can 
achieve. And, fifthly, policy-making is not an event but is “ethereal, diffuse, 
haphazard and somewhat volatile”.  (Lomas 2006, p1-6).  The consequences of 
failing to understand this are clear: “So long as researchers presume that research 
findings must be brought to bear upon a single event, a discrete act of decision 
making, they will be missing those circumstances and processes where, in fact, 
research can be useful”.  (Rist 1994, p546). 
 
3.2 Managers integrate data with other forms of knowledge 
 
In the NHS in the East Midlands senior managers can embrace a dialogue about evidence 
and, at the same time, lead organisations that actually perform well.  They are genuinely 
more interested in improving health care and organisational success than in power, prestige 
and being right.  Unfortunately, despite their penchant for inquiry and observation the 
decision making box (2.4), the Rousseau model (3.3) and the critical single piece of evidence 
(4.3) show that their acceptance of evidence based decision making does not translate into 
practicing it.  They feel compelled to act quickly and with direction in response to policy and 
the opportunity to consider evidence is ignored or lost. 
 
Williamson (2000) acknowledges that knowing seems to be “highly sensitive” to such factors 
as justification and reliability.  Taking each of these factors into consideration.   
 
Justification: the meetings of the Senior Managers (Appendix C) took on board the empirical 
experience of the room, the authority of the speakers and logical deduction.  Unfortunately, 
where evidence did occur within this rational sphere, it would be immediately discounted.  If 
the evidence does not improve the organisations standing – suppose for example that the 
evidence was that accountants cost more than they save in terms of the opportunity cost of 
health care foregone it was ignored. 
 
Reliability: the managers do attempt to make generalisable conclusions that will be reliable 
across many scenarios and organisations – for example, that the public want quicker and 
safer health care – but chose these scenarios in a culturally biased manner.  So evidence that 
staff need to work flexible hours to achieve this is discarded in favour of having more staff in 
the NHS. 
 
So it is possible to see an NHS that does use knowledge, but could still discount evidence.  
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Rousseau (2006 a, p1091) continues to address why evidence-based management is timely 
and practical.  An “evidence orientation” according to Rousseau shows that decision quality 
is a direct function of available facts, creating a demand for reliable and valid information 
when making managerial and organisational decisions. Improving information continues a 
trend begun in the quality movement giving systematic attention to discrete facts, indicative 
of quality (Rousseau 2006, p1091).  “This trend continues in recent developments regarding 
open-book management (Case,1995; Ferrante & Rousseau, 2001) and the use of 
organizational fact finding and experimentation to improve decision quality (Pfeffer & 
Sutton 2006).  In all the attention we now give to evidence, it helps to differentiate what 
might be called Big E Evidence from little e evidence. Big E Evidence refers to generalisable 
knowledge regarding cause-effect connections derived from scientific methods. Little e 
evidence is local or organisation specific, as exemplified by root cause analysis and other 
fact-based approaches the total quality movement introduced for organisational decision”. 
Evidence, according to Rousseau (2006, p1093) refers to data systematically gathered in a 
particular setting to inform local decisions. “As the saying goes, “facts are our friends,” when 
local efforts to accumulate information relevant to a particular problem lead to more effective 
solutions.   Rousseau distinguishes evidence with a little e from Evidence with a big E.  
Although decision makers who rely on scientific principles are more likely to gather facts 
systematically in order to choose an appropriate course of action fact gathering (“evidence”) 
doesn’t necessarily lead decision makers to use social science knowledge (“Evidence”) in 
interpreting these facts”. 
 
There are commentators on EBHM (Steward (2002), Paton (1999), Walshe (2001)) who say 
lack of evidence and lack of benefit are not the same, and that the more data are pooled and 
aggregated, the more difficult it is to compare the patients in the studies with the patient in 
front of the doctor — that is, EBHM applies to populations, not necessarily to individuals. In 
The limits of evidence-based medicine Tonelli (2001, p1435) argues that “the knowledge 
gained from clinical research does not directly answer the primary clinical question of what 
is best for the patient at hand.” Tonelli suggests that proponents of evidence-based medicine 
discount the value of clinical experience.   
 
The emergence of evidence based medicine in the early 1990’s led to some clinicians 
challenging managers and policymakers to be equally evidence based in their policymaking.  
(Black (2001), Haines (1998), Raine (1998)). This demand was shared by some health policy 
analysts: “At a time when ministers are arguing that medicine should be evidence based, is it 
not reasonable to suggest that this should also apply to health policy?  If doctors are expected 
to base their decisions on the findings of research surely politicians should do the same …. 
The case for evidence based policymaking is difficult to refute” (Ham, 1995, p71). 
 
The need to be seen to be making evidence based decisions has permeated all areas of British 
public policy.  The government has proclaimed the need for evidence based policing, and the 
1998 strategic defence review introduced evidence based defence.  In the health sector, the 
concept of evidence based policy has gained ground, and a journal has been launched 
devoted to this challenge (journal of Evidence Based Health Policy and Management). 
 
Walter (2004) is committed to developing and promoting evidence-based knowledge 
about good practice in social care. Understanding how research is used and how to 
improve its use is crucial for our work and the work of other organisations. This 
knowledge review focuses on the use of research by social care staff and how the 
use of research can be promoted in social care practice. It examines effective ways 
of promoting research use in social care, explores models of research use that 
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include staff at different levels and settings in social care, and looks at what 
organisational structures are needed to realise the aim of using research to improve 
practice.  
Four key conclusions emerged from the review Walter (2004) conducted on using 
knowledge to support social care:  
 
• There is much activity to promote the use of research in social care, but this needs 
to be coordinated to avoid duplication and to ensure best practice is shared.  
• The diversity of the social care sector, in terms of service delivery organisations, 
client groups and the workforce, demands that a variety of actions are used to 
promote the use of research. These actions also need to take into account 
multiagency and multidisciplinary working.  
• Robust evidence of what works in promoting research use in social care is limited 
and tends to focus on the professionally qualified workforce.  
• A whole systems approach, where the use of research involves a collaborative 
effort between organisations and individuals, would be a positive way forward.  
 
Ham (2007) said that “Experience and available evidence from Europe, New Zealand and the 
US indicates that in no system is commissioning done consistently well.  To be sure, there 
are examples of innovation in all systems, but equally there are examples of the limits to 
effective commissioning and the barriers that have inhibited commissioners from negotiating 
on equal terms with providers. As a review of New Zealand experience noted: Purchasing 
health services is inherently difficult in publicly financed health systems since purchasers are 
continually faced with the multiple and frequently conflicting explicit and implicit 
expectations of politicians, central government officials, managers, clinicians, patents and the 
pubic for the health system”, which  indicates how little of the NHS management task is 
understood in its international context. 
 
I have a paper by David Transfield and Ken Starkey (1988, p341-353) that emphasises the 
link between theory and practice and links to a craft versus engineering view of management.  
A quote they have is from Whitley (1984). 
 
 ‘the nature of management problems, as distinct from some manager’s problems, 
receives little attention…yet if management research is to be more than technical 
trouble shooting for current incumbents of dominant positions this distinction 
needs sustained analysis.  Considering management research as the study and 
improvement of co-ordination and control of human activities necessitates taking 
current structures and goals as problematic.  This view implies some framework 
in which existing arrangements can be conceived as needing improvement and 
some conception of what constitutes improvement.  It therefore has to transcend 
current beliefs and practices rather than reproduce them in formulating its 
problems and intellectual goals’ (p369). 
 
The need for evidence to shape organisational structure was promoted by Ham (2009) when 
he said “because of the importance of local context, the CQC should focus on the outcomes 
achieved by NHS organisations and local authorities and then use its leverage to stimulate 
partnership working where it can help to improve outcomes. Organisations that achieve poor 
or modest outcomes, and which function independently, should be challenged to work in 
partnership.  The outcomes used to assess the effectiveness of local public services can be 
drawn from the comprehensive area assessment framework developed by the Audit 
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Commission and the Vital Signs approach promulgated by the Department of Health. 
Improvements in health and wellbeing, and in the quality of health and social care services, 
are the outcomes that matter most, and the regulator should focus on these in its assessments 
of performance”; and in this he is consistent with Transfield and Starkey.  Ham has offered 
real leadership in this area by leading a detailed publicly funded study of the role of Medics 
in Management, Ham (2008) said in the research proposal “the research will provide 
practitioners and policy makers with a better understanding of:  
 
1) The types of structures which exist across England for engaging medical professionals in 
management and leadership;  
2) How different structures are associated with different patterns of working and 
relationships between doctors, nurses and managers in the triumvirate; and  
3) How different structures, roles and behaviours relate to organisational and directorate 
performance.  
 
3.3 A Model to frame this narrative 
 
So the problem is, how do I frame this rich narrative resource in a meaningful way?  I 
propose to use a synthesis of the Rousseau model. 
 
In paragraph 1.2 I quoted Morgan (2007, p48) who said that ethnography should also “render 
the collected data intelligible and significant to follow academics and other readers”.  My 
reasoning for selecting the Rousseau model as method is as follows.  It explains why 
managers might feel unable to move to an advanced state of evidence based manager.  It then 
says clearly that such an adherence to the status quo will stop the manager being a great 
manager in a great company.  The conclusion of the Rousseau model is that managers using 
evidence based decisions are better managers.  I am not accepting that conclusion by using 
this method.  I am using the tool to make the data intelligible.
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After Rousseau: A synthesis from the literature of Rousseau (2006 a, 2006 b) on the practice 
of Evidence Based Management. 
 
Management Issue With advanced knowledge of effective 
implementation of Evidence Based 
Management 
For evidence avoiding status quo 
The supervision of 
employees 
Managers acquire a systematic 
understanding of what productivity gains 
are most appropriately cultivated from 
their staff 
A manager may misuse threats and 
punishments or overuse positive 
encouragement with no reference to 
the outcome of either style or 
organisational performance 
Information available to 
managers on the 
consequences of their 
decisions 
Appropriate evidence and data base: 
perceptual gaps and misunderstandings 
are significantly reduced so that post 
implementation review is a valuable part 
of improving management 
Information is poor as data and 
evidence is not collected so that 
experiences are likely to be 
misinterpreted 
The delivery on promises 
to the public, employees, 
stakeholders/taxpayers 
customers and others 
Decisions are based on systematic causal 
knowledge conditioned by expertise.  
Decisions are legitimised by being made 
in a systematic and informed fashion 
more readily justifiable in the eyes of 
stakeholders 
In such settings, managers cannot 
learn why their decisions may have 
been wrong, nor what alternatives 
would have been right.  The public 
challenges decisions in the search 
for transparency 
Management style Managers have an understanding of the 
powerful impact their decisions have on 
the fate of their firms.  Managerial 
competence is recognised as a critical 
and often scarce resource 
Evidence based management seems 
to threaten managers personal 
freedom to run their organisations 
as they see fit 
Approach to academic 
research 
Managers read the academic literature 
regularly and the consultants who advise 
them are likely to do so also.  There is a 
recognition that this research exists 
Despite the explosion of research 
on decision making, individual and 
group performance, business 
strategy and other domains directly 
tied to organisational practice, few 
practising managers access this 
work 
Management culture Supervisors and managers respond to a 
belief system probably 100 years old, as 
far back as Fredrick Taylors structured 
methods for improving efficiency were 
classified under scientific management 
A belief that good management is 
an art - !the romance of leadership” 
school of thought where a shift to 
evidence an analysis connotes loss 
of creativity and autonomy 
In conclusion Managers have evidence on which to 
base their decisions and consequently 
what is at stake should the decision or 
implementation fail 
Managers are prevented from 
real learning by fads and 
falsehoods 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
The NHS manager must also consider the circumstances of the decision and the ethical 
concern that the management decision may provoke.  For example, immediately prior to a 
general election is not an easy time for an NHS manager to promote the idea that the NHS 
might improve its efficiency by paying cash incentives to drug users to attend Methadone 
clinics but to deny the ability of a woman to top-up her cancer treatment by co-payment for 
drugs.  Whilst both decisions may be made by contemporary NHS Chief Executives on the 
basis of a developing evidence base relevant to effective management practice neither 
decision alone (and definitely not when they are juxtaposed) will be considered appropriate 
to the circumstances of an election nor ethically appropriate when portrayed by the media.  
So I would be more blinkered about finding out what parts of the ‘time’ horizon it is 
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appropriate to take a Rousseau type decision in.  In this way, it is important to remember that 
my “After Rousseau Model” is only describing an hypothetical NHS organisation that uses 
Evidence Based Management.  Wildly in contrast to the same organisation as a hospital 
provider where Evidence Based Medicine will most likely actually exist.   
 
Is the method replicable but in a different situation?  It is important to ask the question as this 
document does not have a tightly controlled experimental design but the method should be 
generalisable to the wider NHS otherwise the conclusions cannot be tested again.  In all parts 
of the NHS there will be a cohort that can be reviewed individually and in groups to observe 
the use of evidence in decision making.  Critically there will always be a number that is 
accepted without refute – the single piece of evidence – that is applied differentially, not at 
all or even wrongly (in contravention of the evidence) and it will be possible to conduct a 
field study of why that is so.  Successful policies from repeated application of the method 
necessitate an NHS archive of the type typified by NHS evidence (www.evidence.nhs.uk). 
 
Would the model need to be different if considering a different part of the public sector?  I 
am not so confident that it could be considered ‘best practice’ and used again in, say, Adult 
Services of the local authority.  There are two reasons.  First, evidence based management is 
possible to juxtapose within the NHS with a prevailing demand for evidence based medicine.  
In this way there is some prior organisational support for the principles and methods.  
Second, the NHS has a unique governance structure within which there is no elected political 
representation at a locality level.  All managers may understand best practice – not all have 
the NHS freedom to experiment with evidence.
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
Research Methods 
 
Purpose 
 
To explain why I have chosen both a qualitative and a quantitative method of study. To 
identify two possible bias in the method – literature questioning the nature of the NHS 
manager and the potential scenarios within which managers answers may be vulnerable to 
gaming. 
 
Key Arguments and Conclusions 
 
4.1 The production of evidence to support my findings will include participant 
observation 
 
In paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2 I quoted Frankfort-Nachmias (1996), Denzin (1997), Byrman 
(2004) and Morgan (2007) to explain my method of participant observation, that I classified 
as an ethnography.  The method will include a large amount of qualitative data about 
managers.  Swan (2002, p494) said that “when confronted by the demands of a radical, 
networked innovation process.  Lacking the power to direct such a process, managers at (the 
PCT) adopted instead, the role of systems builder, working in an improvisational way across 
professional and organisational boundaries”.  The key thing I believe Swan is pointing out 
here, is that my research method may be susceptible to bias from managers who adapt their 
behaviour in response to being watched.  The key will be to classify as per Rousseau (2006) 
(paragraph 3.3) but mindful in reference to Swan (2002) of the “shift in management 
strategies and practice associated with innovation” during the observation.  Swan (2002, 
p477). 
 
Alexander (2007, p152) said that “evidence based management assumes that available 
research is consistent with the problems and decision making conditions faced by those who 
will use the evidence in practice”.  This method explores without hypothesis, the studied 
environment of NHS management.  The observer is part of the studied environment – having 
the same experiences as those being observed, but at the same time, taking a record 
(sometimes recorded by machine) of the process being undertaken.  The problem with this 
method is that it produced a large amount of data which is difficult to analyse in an unbiased 
way.   
 
I tested this assumption out by participant observation.  An additional method would be to 
take a single hypothesis about a single decision – for example the implementation of an 
instruction that is nationally mandated simultaneously and to review the effectiveness of the 
response to that instruction at all places in the NHS at the same time.  It would not be 
possible to have a randomised control trial of those who chose to implement the decision 
without evidence and to look at the harm/benefit that ensued because of the constraints of 
politics and time, but it has been possible to find a proxy for that task in the East Midlands.  
So I did that as well.  This aspect of participant observation is explained further in 4.3. 
 
The cohort I have studied; I conducted interviews and group observations in 2007 and 2008 
with (Appendix A and B) Chief Executives, Strategic Health Authority Directors, Directors 
and Managing Directors of organisations within the East Midlands NHS.  Notes were not 
 191 
taken in the meetings, but a recording machine was left on the to take a verbatim transcript of 
the meetings.  Structured, but limited questions were used in the interviews and all 
respondents were encouraged to engage in a free discussion of the subjects without being re-
directed.  Observations normally took two to three hours as did interviews, although no strict 
time limits were set. 
 
The East Midlands is one of the regions of England and consists of most of the eastern half 
of the traditional region of the Midlands. It consists of the combined area of Derbyshire, 
Leicestershire, Rutland, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire and most of Lincolnshire. Its 
main settlements are Nottingham, Leicester, Lincoln, Derby, Northampton, Mansfield and 
Chesterfield. Leicester is officially the largest city in the region, although the largest 
conurbation is the Nottingham Urban Area. For the purposes of this study the East Midlands 
represents a significant border for the division of delegated responsibility of the Department 
of Health. NHS East Midlands provides strategic leadership to NHS organisations in the 
counties of Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire and 
Rutland. These organisations have a total NHS budget of £4.1bn, and serve a combined 
population of 4.3 million. This study will concentrate the practical elements of the research 
on the East Midlands NHS.  
 
The writer is a participant in the National Health Service, the author holds a senior 
management position in the National Health Service.  The National Health Service being 
under transition affects the individual philosophically, professionally and individually, 
therefore there is a subjective bias in the analysis of change in the NHS.  
 
The study is a selected sample of subjects representing a spectrum of Executives in the NHS 
from different professional backgrounds including doctor, accountant, academic professor, 
statistician and nurse.  Subjects were recruited from the cohort of people working in the NHS 
in the East Midlands through personal contacts and in one case, referral by other subjects.  A 
preliminary interview schedule was developed and two pilot interviews were conducted with 
people from outside the cohort to test this method.  
 
The overall aim of this research is to enhance good practice in the craft of management in the 
NHS. To achieve this aim my objective in this piece of qualitative research is to conduct a 
systematic investigation into current perceptions of evidence based management including 
perceived barriers to its use and also including perceptions of good practice in the use of 
evidence based management.  It was also necessary to begin to ascertain perceptions of skill 
deficits in this area and factors viewed as contributions to these deficits.  The effect of the 
researcher as an observer is unknown.  It could have an effect on the interviews and it may 
inhibit parties who participated in the review of meetings.  A further limitation of the study is 
that I only included leaders from within the NHS East Midlands and it is possible that NHS 
regions may be more or less equipped to engage in a discourse about evidence based 
management.  The strength of this study is that observation and participation with individuals 
and the groups by the researcher on an ongoing basis in the NHS in East Midlands increase 
the credibility and trustworthiness of the findings.  Bryman (2009, page 3-4) says of the 
usefulness of triangulation “do not deny the potential of triangulation, instead they depict its 
utility in terms of adding a sense of richness and complexity to an inquiry.  As such, 
triangulation becomes a device for enhancing the credibility and persuasiveness of a research 
account”.  Although Bryman does acknowledge that “it (triangulation) is sometimes accused 
of subscribing to as naive realism that implies there can be a single definitive account of the 
social world”.  I am happy that my results can be triangulated and that this does not imply a 
single definitive account. 
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Individuals or the chairs of the groups to be recorded were initially contacted by email with a 
very prompt follow up by telephone.  I outlined the nature of the project and the contribution 
I felt the individual or group could make to my initial piece of qualitative research.  I 
explained that all interviews would be taped, but that the material gathered would be 
considered confidential by me, with no identification of individuals except by some implicit 
membership of the taped group meetings.  All of the individuals I approached were happy to 
help with this piece of the project, many suggesting this was an important discussion in the 
NHS that warranted further investigation.  All of the interviews were conducted at the 
interviewees’ work place.  The meetings that were recorded happened at normal monthly 
meetings with the agenda of the previous months meeting including an explicit discussion 
about my authority to record the events verbatim. 
 
4.2 The Interviewees, the groups and the meetings 
 
A preliminary interview schedule was developed and two pilot interviews were conducted 
with people from outside the cohort. The meetings that were recorded happened at normal 
monthly meetings with the agenda of the previous months meeting including an explicit 
discussion about what I was doing and my authority to record the events verbatim.  Five in-
depth interviews were held with leading managers in the NHS and three meetings of senior 
managers in the East Midlands were also recorded.  Four focus group meetings were held 
(three of them prior to the main meetings) as part of the process to understand the nature of 
the study I was involved in and any pre-conceived notions or approaches to evidence based 
management.  The results were triangulated by feeding back to the original five interviewees.  
Seven people who were senior managers in the NHS, but not part of the original interviews 
read the results to test for reasonableness.  Finally, I fed back to five group meetings the 
preliminary  results to test for reasonableness. 
 
 For the purpose of 
pilot 
For the purpose of data 
collection 
For the purpose of checking 
my understanding 
Interviews 2 5 7 
Focus Groups - 4 - 
Recorded Meetings -  3 5 
 
Table 3 
 
4.3  The method must be aware that in the literature review, some writers would 
question whether the studied cohort are managers or autocrats 
 
Collins (2001) labels ‘level 5 leadership’ as the ability to combine individual competence 
with unwavering resolve to confront the facts head on, fierce ambition (for the organisation) 
and personal modesty.  All these are needed because once the evidence is assembled, the 
only way of creating a customer-orientated organisation is to make it face the customer, not 
the leader.  Paradoxically, the only way for leaders to gain control of the system is to give up 
the idea of controlling people through authority and hierarchy (the leader-facing 
organisation) and enable customers and frontline workers to jointly reconfigure the system to 
deliver what customers want rather than what politicians specify.  As Robert Pfeffer and 
Jeffrey Sutton note in Hard Facts, Dangerous Half-Truths and Total Nonsense: Profiting 
from Evidence-Based Management (2006, page 187), if decision are made on facts, then 
everyone’s facts must be equal, but you don’t need ‘transformational leaders’ to do it.   
 
In a 2006 work informed by the work of French geographer Henri Lefebvre Learmonth 
(2006) suggests that in the long term the very study of evidence based management is likely 
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to inhibit rather than encourage, a fuller understanding of the nature of public services.  The 
author critically evaluates the phenomenon of ‘evidence based management’.  He goes on to 
suggest that the current approach, broadly informed by the pursuit of evidence based 
medicine, is misguided.  The reasoning behind this approach from Learmonth is that there is 
a weakness at the heart of evidence based management.  There is, quite simply, a deep debate 
to be had about the nature of ‘evidence’ within the discipline of management studies.  
Ultimately Learmonth moves to the conclusion that the pursuit of evidence based 
management has less to do with improving organisational effectiveness than it has to do with 
the transfer of certain management styles to the public service in spite of theoretical problems 
with their derivation. 
 
Learmonth is important not only because he is an academic and former NHS Manager, but 
because work like his 2006 piece are part of a continuum of investigations by the author into 
managerialism and NHS managers stretching back to his own doctoral thesis soon after 
leaving the NHS.  Learmonth (1997) presents the results of empirical work examining public 
attitudes towards UK NHS managers, with the author discussing possible explanations for 
the findings that there is a strong lack of sympathy for managers.  The preferred explanation 
is that NHS managers as a group, tend to share an ideology about the nature of the NHS and 
the role of management within the NHS which is at odds with the belief held by most 
members of the public on these matters.  Learmonth explores the origins and nature of 
managerial ideology (managerialism) in the NHS.  In both his 2006 and 1997 papers, 
Learmonth suggests that management styles are being imported to the NHS, based on little 
effectiveness and that his 2006 identification of the symptom is evidence based management.  
Winyard (2003) agreed with Learmonth and further added that the introduction of general 
management in 1984 created new fault lines between doctors, managers and politicians. 
 
Midway between these two dates of Learmonth lay the 2002 introduction of a code 
of conduct for NHS managers (Department of Health, 2002).  The idea of the code 
was developed in the aftermath of high profile scandals around the management of 
clinical safety (Bristol) and dignity of the treatment of the body parts of deceased 
children (Alder Hey).  The code set out the ethical and behavioural standards 
expected of managers.  Breaches were to be viewed as gross misconduct leading to 
dismissal.  Serious breaches such as financial fraud, supplying false information and 
negligence towards patient safety would result in the offender never being employed 
in the NHS again.  Nigel Crisp, the then NHS Chief Executive said “the vast majority 
of managers in the NHS are highly principled and value driven people who will 
welcome the code.  But we must deal with failure”. 
 
4.4 Using a critical single piece of evidence as managers to undertake a 
quantitative study 
 
The organisation within the NHS that the manager works in will be a variable construct of 
the history of rebuilding and redefining the NHS that will vary region to region and even 
county to county.  Despite this limit it is possible to ask the question, “faced with a verifiable 
piece of peer reviewed evidence that is relevant and significant to your organisations context 
and is nationally constant – what do you do with this as a manager?” 
 
Consider the following table and graph. 
 
Falls in the Elderly Population 
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Table 4 
 
Falls in the elderly population represent a serious and increasing issue in the UK and the 
subject area is attracting increased attention in current government policy development 
across different departments including health, social care and housing.  In January 2008 the 
Department for Communities and Local Government released a report entitled “Lifetime 
Homes, Lifetime Neighbourhoods” (2008).  This report highlights the following statistics: 
 
• One older person dies every five hours as a result of a fall 
• Falls in older people cost the NHS around three quarters of a billion pounds each year 
• 1.25 million falls a year result in hospital admissions. 
 
Ambulance services have a key part to play in tackling this issue.  The Department of Health 
Pathways for Older people with Complex needs (2007) states that: 
 
In summary, evidence suggests that a significant percentage of those who fall are elderly and 
that following transportation to hospital their support networks and infrastructures are 
switched off – hence they tend to be admitted to hospital.  On a practical level, the falls co-
ordination services provided and commissioned by PCTs do not co-ordinate well with EMAS 
and fail to recognise that a) EMAS is the first responder in most cases, b) fewer of these 
cases are Category A calls.  The method will study the context within which a response to 
this evidence data is possible for NHS managers. 
 
4.5   The method must be aware of a bias possible in responses because some   
 outcomes of the study may be perceived as less fortunate than others 
 
The NHS likes to league table.  Organisations are scored and re-ranked, then ranked against 
different criteria and all of this makes the validation of what is working difficult to say within 
the business cycle of a given year.  The key role of the performance and accountability 
framework in ensuring that this is used to explain why the bottom of the table finished 
bottom, rather than why the top finished top.  The reality is that within the performance 
framework (that holds that the complex organisational reasons for failure can be attributed to 
one Chief Executive) there is a tendency to use evidence to criticise others rather than to 
understand the success of leading (league tabled) organisations. 
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So what would happen if I came out clearly in favour of more evidence based decision 
making?  The effect on operational management of this would be: not all NHS organisations 
would be successful.  Failures of delivery occur within all organisations within all sectors of 
the economy.  The consequences range from minor inconveniences (a surgery opening late) 
to major catastrophe (the failure to vaccinate an entire population).  On the other hand, 
accepting that evidence and the iterative application of evidence, refreshed by trial and 
context, would prevent repeated service failures of the same type.  There will be an 
improvement in management.   
 
This would effect a medium term review of resource allocation.  A key part of public 
expenditure (fiscal) control is congruence between policy priorities and money given to 
priorities.  Implied is the sense that evidence would take place in a lengthy (continual) 
process in which the treasury is engaged in funding a range of policies aimed at meeting the 
health needs of the population: more significantly, the Department of Health would recognise 
that all of their policies for the NHS have financial implications and that the evidence base to 
back up these policies has to be justified and monitored. 
 
This would lead to a new evaluation of strategy.  Evidence would enable the debate about the 
NHS to mature.  Are the goals set by the department being achieved or not?  If the evidence 
suggests they are, then decision makers should be acknowledged and applauded.  If the 
evidence suggests this is as a result of using evidence then this should be communicated to 
public media and in the weekly Chief Executives bulletin.  If the evidence being collected 
suggests that strategy implementation is struggling, the traditional NHS response has been 
continual organisational and structural change.  The problem has been that the solution itself 
was not evidenced, piloted or given a priori evaluation that it would solve the diagnosed 
problem.  The transformational leap would be for senior NHS managers to see a shift that 
meant that what could be learned from strategic planning was always discussed and written 
down to make the next strategic plan more evidence based and efficient. 
 
4.6  The analytical methods used to provide a robust and valid interpretation  of 
the data 
 
Waring (2008) says that “Template Analysis makes use of codes and coding of data.  The 
complete analysis process of organising, connecting and corroborating/ 
legitimising is used to analyse large quantities of rich data collected from qualitative research 
using semi-structured, unstructured interviews or story telling data collection methods”.  The 
process involves; creating a code manual, hand or computer coding the text, sorting segments 
to get all similar text in one place and reading the segments and making the connections that 
are subsequently corroborated and legitimised. 
 
Template Analysis normally starts with some pre-defined codes to help guide analysis.  In 
my case, the code was the use of the Rousseau model and the conversion of the management 
issues in the Rousseau model to letters A to E.  The code also included letters F and G for 
management culture and conclusions respectively, although it soon became clear that these 
letters in the scheme were redundant or repetitious (paragraph 5.10 explains further).  
Rousseau was useful, not only as a synthesis of literature themes, but because it contained 
neither too many codes (blinkering the data) nor too few codes (which would lead to an 
overwhelming classification and coding of all of the rich and unstructured data). 
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Waring (2008) notes that “Template analysis is now well embedded in healthcare qualitative 
research (Kind, 2004: Crabtree and Miller, 1999).  However, it is not so well established in 
Business Management research and this is innovative yet challenging in itself, when applied 
to this different context.  Traditionally business research has emerged a positivist paradigm”.  
The reason this project uses Template Analysis can be found in a deep dissatisfaction with 
the NVivo software package.  As Waring (2008) says “(although) the software might allow a 
more comprehensive approach, we would argue that immersion in the data is an essential part 
of the interpretive process and use of technology can often act as a substantial barrier”.  That 
is not to say that NVivo did not have some merits; in the discussion on neuro-semantics 
(paragraph 6.3) and conclusions (9.4),some useful correlations were made, but in the heart of 
the data interpretation Template Analysis using the Rousseau model gave a richer, more 
complex and ultimately more useful tool than NVivo. 
 
The benefit of using Template Analysis – with a highlighter pen and post-it’s, reading, re-
reading and cross referencing lengthy transcripts – is that it recognises that the Rousseau 
themes were not hiding in the qualitative data waiting to be “discovered” the way the NVivo 
tool suggested.  The coding arose from my engagement as a researcher with those texts.  As 
such, it enabled the Rousseau model to act as a pragmatic tool to give a classified account of 
the data.  The classification would be meaningful to external readers and, just as importantly, 
to the cohort who participated in the data collection themselves. 
 
Having completed the first stages of Template Analysis (creating a Rousseau code, hand 
coding the text and sorting the segments) the ultimate state is corroboration to independently 
verify the relationship between the data and the coding. Independent scrutiny of the data was 
used when directors and assistant directors of NHS Derbyshire County were formed into an 
“expert panel” to challenge different readings and aspects of the data over their own 
conclusions.  Further the classified data was returned to the five in-depth interviewees, not 
for correction of transcript but to acknowledge the consistency of what they had said with the 
Rousseau classification. The Rousseau model, as well as being a coding system, also enabled 
the material to be presented in a reader-friendly form. 
 
Template Analysis was a useful analytical method that encouraged reflexivity.  Comments 
from the independent scrutinisers helped to reflect on the questions or assumptions being 
made by the researcher (me, especially as I am also a part of the population being reviewed).  
Keeping an audit trail of the highlighted documents, their annotations and the unused text, 
forced me to be explicit about the conclusions being made.  Template Analysis was 
particularly useful in moving data from Document 3 of the DBA to Document 5, when it had 
to be re-read and re-checked prior to inclusion again in Document 5.  Waring (2008) 
concludes that “I firmly believe that writing-up (using Template Analysis) should be seen as 
a continuation of the interpretative process.  In my experience the process of accounting for 
your analysis to your readers deepens your own understanding of your data”.
 197 
CHAPTER 5 
 
 
Research Findings 
 
Purpose 
 
To record the awareness of a need for evidence and the collection and evaluation of such 
evidence.  Where an interview is quoted, I have put a notation in the corner of the box 
denoting the letter in Appendix F.  Appendix F says more about who these people are. 
 
Key Arguments and Conclusions 
 
5.1 How to use evidence to enable staff 
 
Jbilou (2007, p185) concluded that “decision making in the health sector is affected 
by general elements such as economic constraints, political agendas, epidemiology, 
managers values and public environment”.  The paper explored the determinants of 
“research-based-decision-making” as a personal behaviour among managers and 
professionals in health administration in Canada.  The results suggested that “further 
research is needed to identify and evaluate effective incentives and strategies to 
implement so as to enhance RBDM adoption”. 
 
I framed a direct question to a Chief Executive of an Acute Hospital to try and get 
some specific answers to the question of how to use evidence in a way that is not 
threatening or coercive.  The responses indicate that sometimes leadership has to 
determine whether the individual has the capacity to understand. 
  
Can I explore one of those, and I’m not challenging what you say, it’s just this 
-  say the rule book, say the rule was the piece of evidence based practice, and 
the manager is just coming up against that, you know, the person that, are just 
not getting it as anything other than a limiting factor, what do they do with 
that?  Do they respect the evidence and back off, or do they try and work 
round it, or…….my guess, I’d say it depends on their capabilities, it’s a bit like one 
of these things in this document they’ve sent me – if you want to be a manager, get 
yourself educated in something, then get a job, just don’t pretend it will teach you to 
be a manager, I mean, it’s a bit like, don’t pretend that world class commissioning 
will teach you to be a commissioner.  Ok.  So, a good person would be able to see 
the sense in that situation, people without good sense had better just follow the rules 
‘cos they’ll be safer, do you know what I mean? I don’t know, it depends on the 
rules!...........it’s interesting about that, that follow the rules, because I think, a lot of 
that is a proxy for evidence based medicine isn’t it?  It’s the, you know, look, the vast 
majority of you will not be as good as the best, so follow the rules, and then the 
outcomes will be better for everyone.          RESPONDENT A 
 
Returning to the theme of the need for evidence.  The macroeconomic environment 
and political context for the NHS is changing.  Growth (in excess of GDP grown) for 
the NHS will not be able to be afforded without some changes (Wanless, 2008 b).  
So, if change is necessary, then the task is to identify new evidence and new 
information upon which to base management practice and management education.  
The National Institute for Health Research’s Service Delivery and Organisation 
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Programme (part of the NHS) is undertaking primary research (ref NIHR, Km 259) 
which will inform and extend knowledge about management practice to facilitate best 
practice and best use of resources.  Working within the programme, observers and 
researchers seek to generate creative processes for identifying, representing and 
accessing evidence of what evidence based practice is used. The objective is to 
ensure that management practice remains responsive to the changing financial and 
economic situation. 
 
But there must be a limit to the extent within which a rule becomes an end in itself.  
As the following statement from a clinically trained leader says, the key is to develop 
dialogue and understanding. 
 
And I have no problem with that, because what it tends to do is it generates a 
coherent conversation, you know, I mean for us; a lot of the rule following is very 
wasteful, labour intensive, and there are plenty of people who know the answer, 
without having to follow the rules, but there are a lot of people who don’t; and the 
good thing about rules is it encourages conversation, you know if we want to 
prescribe a drug that’s not on the protocol or the pathway, someone says, hey, this 
is what I want to do, and this is why I want to do it, a few great minds come together 
and will probably make what is the right decision, whether it follows the rules or not. 
RESPONDENT B   
 
5.2 The need to quantify risks and benefits of using evidence 
 
Some blocks to shared understanding about the usefulness of evidence are the blocks to a 
shared quantification of the risks and benefits.  The key here is that the accountants, the 
board, the matrons, everyone, must have some shared understanding that there is a risk to not 
using evidence and a shared understanding of the benefit of being evidence driven.  The 
Chief Executive of a Acute Trust, the same trust for many years gives an explanation of the 
importance of a shared understanding. 
 
For a manager to be accepted as something other than an irritation, getting in the way of 
clinical work, they have to demonstrate that they’re in it for the long haul themselves, and 
that’s very hard, and after the first three or four managers have gone your chances of 
making it as number five are really quite small.  But there’s a down-side to this longevity 
thing as well, and it’s this sort of practice being entrenched, that once, you know, we’ve done 
it this way for the last ten years, so you’re not going to change what we do, and also, the 
culture becomes quire unhealthy because of the longevity sometimes.       
RESPONDENT C 
 
So the very longevity of managers that enables clinical participation is seen as a limiting 
factor when getting clinicians across the East Midlands to lead and support required 
configuration and productivity improvements.  Here is the same Chief Executive again, 
talking about how a new to the NHS executive uses clinical evidence to provide an antidote 
to organisational inertia and antipathy towards him as an individual. 
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He just rolled his trousers up, put a knotted handkerchief on his head and said, ‘look – what 
do you want?  This is evidence based medicine, here’s the evidence, what are you all talking 
about?’  And still, it made a big impression, it got a lot of laughs, but it takes that, sort of 
real challenge, before a lot of that out of date evidence is discarded.  So evidence base – it’s 
sort of important, but it’s almost a culture rather than a reality sometimes.    
     RESPONDENT D 
 
That’s fascinating, and nobody’s mentioned, so, old evidence becomes dogma, so it’s 
established on an evidence base, and this is not just relevant to medicine, so it’s not just 
established on – it’s established on an evidence base, but then that becomes dogma which in 
its self evaporates over time and then the evidence isn’t refreshed, is that………    
     RESPONDENT B 
 
And even more telling was an acknowledgement that there was no post-implementation work 
done to evaluate the success of the initiative. 
 
Which of all the measures here, we have introduced, has worked because our infection rate 
has reduced……..I don’t know, if I’m honest, I don’t much care so long as it’s happened, it’s 
a number of things we’ve thrown at it.  I could play the experimental – I could take that one 
out and see if it makes a difference, but I’m not interested, it has had the desired effect.   
   RESPONDENT A 
 
5.3 The NHS is a complex structure that makes informed decisions difficult to 
       make 
 
And then there are some direct and lengthy quotations given by an individual in a group 
situation that are worthy of inclusion as individual quotes.  I like the one here that says the 
NHS is complex and cannot be easily modelled, but makes no reference to evidence. 
 
I do believe that most people can understand that that’s the world we work in, most people 
can understand that there isn’t a text book on the shelf of how to do this job, and most people 
in my experience, if you spend the time talking to them, will understand that, all we’re trying 
to do is what we believe to be the best, taking account of what everyone’s telling us, and from 
my perspective, in my job, it’s not opening holiday brochures, reading the small print and 
looking it up on the website, it’s talking to people, and you know, should we regrade nurses 
in surgery they’d say no, you ask some of the surgeons they’d say no and if you do I’m going 
on strike, and you know, you ask some other nurses and they go, well yes, fair enough, 
whatever, you get a whole wide variety of views, and you somehow have to make sense of it. 
            RESPONDENT E 
 
But the individual view is that there is sufficient evidence to make information and informed 
decisions that we can rely on. 
 
I don’t think evidence takes time to mature, evidence is there from when it’s presented .. 
...it’s then assessed, folk law, takes the time to mature, so I think evidence can come and be 
there, I think in management terms, new evidence rarely comes to light, but I think evidence 
itself, becomes evidence from the day it’s presented, it’s just a question of what category and 
what quality it is.  RESPONDENT F 
The problem as ever, again quoted in a group context, is that politicians and information do 
not fit nicely together. 
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Yes, it is really, I said to my board, just the other day, you know, working in the NHS is like 
living the world’s biggest experiment, and it is, you know, we’ll twiddle this, and I always 
used to think, particularly when we had Alan Milburn, I used to imagine, you know, the man 
stood in front of this big complex machine with fan belts and nuts and bolts, and cogs and 
things, turning the spanner in his hand, just kind of diving in and just loosening a bit, or 
tightening a bit, taking a bit off or adding a bit on, and going, oh, that didn’t work, we’ll 
have another go, you know?              RESPONDENT C 
 
5.4  The use of evidence to improve financial management 
 
It is clear that strong financial control is valued by executives, but in the following discussion 
by a leader who is no longer in finance, two things are worthy of note:  the absence of the 
word evidence in any reference to accountants in the NHS and (despite appreciation of their 
corporate contribution) a question mark hangs over their ability to influence group decision 
making. 
 
I think it depends on what sort of an accountant you are, I mean, I don’t think it was my 
natural bent to be honest, and I was heartily glad to get rid of it, because it was too precise 
for me.  But it taught me some things, it taught me a balance sheet is only balanced when it 
balances to zero.  Which is a good discipline; these people who go……..well, that’s about 
right! taught me you can approximate, but you need to know how you’re approximating, you 
know, when you round to the nearest million, you know what you’ve lost don’t you.  It 
doesn’t mean you have to mess around with pennies, it just means you need to know what 
you’re not taking account of.  It taught me some good practice around delving in the detail, 
which is not my natural bent, and for people that are, they do struggle to make good strategic 
decisions, and I have watched accountants struggle to do that; I’m not suggesting you’re one 
for a minute, but I have an ability to get into detail when I need to, in a way some people just 
can’t, and it’s given me an understanding in money that’s essential if you’re trying to do my 
job, it really is.  And there are many, many, many times, no disrespect to ‘B’ who’s been a 
great Director of Finance here, there are many times when we’re kicking numbers around, 
and it’s me who goes, ‘but hang on a minute, you know, if that’s going to drive that, and 
that’s that and that’s got to go there, then surely we’ve got a problem here’, and you can 
kind of see everyone going oh-yes!  And I couldn’t do that probably, if I’d been a 
Physiotherapist.  Ok, so your profession has been a tool that you’ve been able to use on 
an ongoing basis……..yes, hugely.  Ok.       
 RESPONDENT C 
 
But, the decision making by accountants was not the only one group to fail the executive test 
of reasonableness – so to the matrons.  Consider this Chief Executive of an Acute Trust. 
 
I went in very, very hard with the matrons last April about their cleaning audits, because 
what they were telling me back in March/April was that we were going to fail the health care 
commission standards, when we had all the matrons in, I said, I know it’s not like that, you 
know it’s not like that, what are you playing at.   
          RESPONDENT A 
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Sacket (1996) said that some fear that evidence based medicine will be hijacked by 
purchasers and managers to cut the costs of health care, McKeon (2009) said that nurses and 
doctors need to understand how NHS finance works, and Nolan (2006) says we must deal 
with funding the balances between quality and cost in healthcare.  What section 5.4 says, to 
juxtapose the literature, is that without an evidence based attitude towards costs and quality, 
the clinical model will be insufficient to deliver the sustainable cost and quality 
improvements required.  Instead of systems to improve the quality and reduce the cost of 
care, what is missing is an evidence based approach to improve the value of care. 
 
5.5 The effect on organisational performance 
 
The effect of evidence on organisational performance was considered by Hovmand (2008).  
They started their discussion by reference to administrators of mental health services who 
“may expect evidence based practices to offer strategic benefits”.  Concentrating on clinical 
research and randomised control trials, they drew a conceptual framework for considering 
how implementation affects organisational performance.  Although not strictly with the 
context of evidence based management, so much as organisational compliance with evidence 
based medicine, they still draw a useful conclusion.  That: “results from the simulations 
shows how gains in performance depended on organisations initial inertia and initial 
efficiency and that only the most efficient organisations may see benefits in organisational 
performance from implementing EBP”. 
 
Although Hovmand (2008) is referring to efficient organisations, I believe the quotation is 
still relevant for my study of effective management behaviour.  This is because in a publicly 
funded, cash limited, health system the output (efficiency) of number of patients treated is 
differentiated from outcome (effectiveness) of the number of patients for whom health 
improves after treatment.  The difference is a result of short term versus long term attitudes 
to evidence.  The difference between efficient and effective is not semantic – the former 
being concerned with performing tasks with reasonable resource, the latter with the extent to 
which objectives are met.  On the other hand, they are two of the three legs of value-for-
money (economy being the other) and the inclusion of this quotation is still valid. 
 
So finally, two quotations should be examined about the apex ‘group’ of the organisation: the 
board itself.  The decision making in the boardroom is expected to be, demonstrated to be, 
cognisant of evidence based decision making.  Both of the quotations below are from 
organisations that would be efficient (according to published ratings) and we can apply the 
Hovmand (2008) criteria. 
 
Imagine you’re in a boardroom and it’s one of those, where for some reason, you’re still in 
there at seven o’clock at night, and you know you’ve got locked into something, and you need 
to make a decision before the morning, and somebody says, shall we have a look at what the 
evidence says – is that a good thing to do at that moment, because it is a distraction and the 
evidence isn’t in the room; imagine, taking my scenario, the evidence isn’t in the room, so 
there was no reason you should have used it before, do you take a break and go and look for 
the evidence or do you say, no, we have sufficient skills to understand the context and 
consequences – in this room, of getting the decision right or wrong – we don’t need any 
evidence, what we need is a decision.  I would be shocked if the evidence wasn’t already 
there, and I would want to have the evidence if there was some evidence around, I certainly 
would want to know it was there and on certain decisions I would want the ‘show-me test’ as 
well.  On big things I want to see it.  So I would stop – go to the evidence, then consider the 
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evidence in the wider context of the decision we’re making.      
  RESPONDENT D 
 
And, this is true even when the whole board might be agnostic about the approach. 
 
Oohh, I think one or two of them would react positively, I think one or two of them, would I 
think not understand what I meant…ok…..and the rest would be agnostic in the middle.  But, 
I do think that self perception and review of one’s performance is something which leaders 
sometimes get a bit blasé about, and don’t do!   
          RESPONDENT C 
 
At a particular point in the conversation this rejection of the rules, this acceptance in the 
executive that rebellion was a tool in the chief Executive’s armour, was becoming clear so I 
asked an explicit question.  
 
Ok.  Do you think we back off, from the implementation of the rules sometimes?  I think 
we do, yes.  Well they are sort of political; some of it is a genuine means to an end, and I can 
see that: the reason we brought the private sector in and allowed them to be paid stupid 
amounts of money, is to get them in, and maybe the same as with practice based 
commissioning, now they’re talking about paying them tariff, albeit the same tariff at the 
very low end complex work, I suppose it’s a step in the right direction, but we usually do it 
because we’ve fallen flat on our face, rather than we ever had a grand plan.  
 RESPONDENT D 
 
5.6 The next part of these findings is to consider those who see “risk”, who 
      aren’t insiders - how does the NHS identify these outliers and what they 
      are saying? 
 
The sequence begins with the chair asking, prompted by me recording the interview, whether 
evidence would help at all.  On discovering that the group is willing to accept that the NHS is 
far from an ideal organisation, he asks some questions that get a more radical response than 
some of the strategic platitudes normally classified by the same individuals as ‘assurance’.  
The chair continues a light cross examination as well as inserting a supportive and friendly 
narrative throughout.  The Chair’s role was didactic – in order to get to what the people were 
saying the conversation was nurtured – on only one occasion did an individual specifically 
announce that he wanted to ask a question. 
 
The following is an example of when an ‘outsider’ (an off protocol doctor) is encouraged to 
move back into the fold of the use of evidence.  In the end, an absence of evidence was taken 
as a lack of legitimacy (by managers) to practice. 
 
And there will be occasions, you know, medicine’s instinctive, and there will be 
occasions, I think, where you don’t follow the protocol, because you don’t know why 
you don’t follow it, but you must have seen a patient somewhere similar; you 
wouldn’t expect it to be the norm, but you should be able to justify in your own mind 
why you’ve not followed best evidence, what you should never do is not follow best 
evidence.  If I take an example, we had here an anaesthetist prescribing some pain 
relief some years ago, and the evidence on it was no where near conclusive, no 
where near conclusive at all, and this was in the early days of clinical movements, 
and we looked at all the pros and cons, we looked at all the evidence, and in the 
end, we said to the anaesthetist, you will not prescribe.    RESPONDENT G 
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The effect of evidence on individual and group decision making.  Evidence at the individual 
level can be sufficient or insufficient and the conversations showed that this affected 
perceptions and motivations about the use of evidence based decision making.  It was not 
possible to say whether this had any direct effect on individual performance.  It is reported 
though, that perceptions of the task of senior leadership did not correlate with high use of 
evidence.  On the other hand, where a group was making a decision based upon a joint co-
operation of members (rather than simply attempting to provide confirmation to a 
recommendation) there was a strong desire to work with evidence and perception that group 
performance outperformed what it would have been without evidence. 
 
There is an explicit acceptance that the NHS cannot change without exploring the boundaries 
of the NHS.  In the following quotation there is a direct challenge to a doctor who believes 
that the NHS has attained an evidenced optimum. 
 
To what extent would evidence help you at all, or is it………it does a lot, it does a lot, 
there’s loads of things we use, I mean, to me, you know the job is a simple job, I 
always say to people, you know, that’s where we are now, that’s the NHS today, and 
that’s where we’re trying to get it, and I’ve only had one person in my whole life say 
‘it’s perfect now’, only one person – a pathology trainee I was talking to a Keele 
University, clearly, a strange man!       RESPONDENT H 
 
Let’s consider something that I want to reflect back to the managers.  The following is an 
extract from a 10 minute journey where a senior group of executives are trying to find the 
way to speak the unthinkable.  It is worth knowing from the start that this discussion starts 
with trying to find a way to consider the proposition that nurses in a particularly poorly 
performing hospital (on quality and economic performance) are not a solution to but a cause 
of the problem.  The outsider nature of this debate, challenging years of acquired cultural 
parameters about nurses is revealing.  What is interesting in the following quotation is that 
the outsiders in the following group meeting don’t use evidence to describe the need for 
change.  What they choose to explore are scenarios.  Much like a health economist they start 
off with an assumption. 
 
But let’s assume there’s a journey to be made, right, and you can begin to describe what’s in 
this future NHS, it’s less wasteful, there’s no healthcare associated infections, shorter waits, 
greater satisfaction, more motivated, you know, nicer buildings, better equipment, all the 
new drugs, whatever.  RESPONDENT I 
 
Further, this is picked up by the next person in the group.  Again, what the outsiders are 
trying to explore……or rather, what the NHS manager in a protected environment within 
which they can think of the future……are scenarios. 
 
And my job is to take this organisation on that journey, but it’s not just a simple more, more, 
more thing, as I think we all understand, and we all do that all the time at home, we’re all 
trying to get the best for our family, we have a limited income, we have circumstances, we all 
live in England – it’s cold!    RESPONDENT J 
 
Scenarios are by definition, alternative, plausible pictures of the future.  Scenarios are created 
that are definitely not forecasts but are free from organisational constraint. 
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You know, so you’ll say, we’ll have a holiday a year, and I’ll make sure I have central 
heating, and I can afford to keep paying the gas bill, and keep buying trainers for the retched 
kids feet that grow six inches every week, you kind of make those decisions to make that 
journey at home.        RESPONDENT K 
 
The scenarios are written in a deliberately provocative style to tease out the differences 
between the different pictures of the future.  The previous speaker was describing steady 
interactive change.  The following speaker, although using a comforting style and collegiate 
language is painting an alternative scenario which is clinically relevant but more challenging. 
 
And we have just the same to do at work, and we’ve kind of coined the phrase at the moment 
particularly about  best care and best value, it’s not just one, and it’s not just the other, it’s 
not just saving money at the expense of quality, it’s not pursuing quality, spending money we 
haven’t got, it’s got to be about best care and best value, and I think people can relate to 
that.      RESPONDENT J 
 
Then another more detailed description is ventured by the next reader.  Scenarios, as I said 
are alternative plausible pictures and the next readers picture should be read side-by-side 
with the others to understand the differences. 
 
‘With you so far’ they’ll say, as a tax payer, as a user of the service, of course I want it to be 
as good as it can get, if we’re wasting money seeing ten patients in a clinic when we could be 
seeing 20, somebody is missing out on something aren’t they – that’s an opportunity cost in 
terms of health gain.     RESPONDENT H 
 
Until finally, we craft an answer to the problem.  The staff can accept the analysis when 
applied in the abstract the actual implementation of the answer struggles when “the light is 
shown” on the problem.  Only at the very very last moment is the evidence 
stated…..’overpaid compared’.   
 
So, people are with you there, I mean, I’ve done lots of staff briefings and they’ve all left 
happy, what’s got them is when you’ve then pointed the light from the two towers into their 
department and said what’s more, you’re all overpaid compared to grades in other Trusts.  
        RESPONDENT I 
 
My understanding of this whole conversation is that the evidence that was there all 
the time is not used by the very people who need to use this evidence to win the 
‘outsider’ debate! 
 
5.7  Managers will only use evidence if it is persuasive 
 
To start with consider three responses from the interviewed cohort that show that evidence 
based decision making must not only be factually correct, it must also move people to a 
response based not only on fact, but also emotion.  To an extent persuasion is more important 
than evidence. 
 
The doctors’ view is, ok, 20 years ago, when you were building this hospital (because we’ve 
been here for 20 years, not 10 minutes), 20 years ago we said to you, the design of this 
wonderful new PFI was wrong, you’ve got too many beds for the footprint, so the beds are 
too close together, you get cross contamination, you can’t clean round the beds. Because 
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there aren’t enough beds, you’ve got too faster through put, so people with infections are 
moved around the hospital.   
          RESPONDENT E 
 
I don’t know who they asked, they picked the wrong things, but it kind of doesn’t matter, do 
you know what I mean?  If they are wanting to change perceptions, you know, if they said, 
paint your hospitals pink and it will deal with infection, we might have said what a load of 
crap, but if the public believed that pink hospitals were less likely to give them MRSA, it 
would have the desired effect.    RESPONDENT A 
 
I mean, I had this very argument with my technical directors, look, I said, look, if people will 
believe painting the hospital pink will make them safer, then we’ll do it.  I don’t care, that’s 
what we’ll do. (What is interesting here is that ‘painting the hospital pink’ has quickly and 
previously entered the groups language as a shorthand for any method chosen to deal with 
this problem that is organisationally robust, but evidence weak).    
      RESPONDENT C 
 
In the following quotation the use of a term pendulum is slightly confusing, as the respondent 
is making a point about the effort taken to persuade about the benefits of evidence being 
closely correlated to the impact of the change.  The metaphor pendulum may also be taken to 
be a subtle reference that once the persuasion stops the centre of gravity is the same in all 
cases. 
 
I think in organisational change type evidence around management tools, techniques, where 
the evidence can often be seen to be quite a subjective set of evidence, or the context when it 
was developed, might have been different from today – yes you know, the evidence around 
change management is, there’s lots of articles, lots of books and lots of research around 
change management, in my mind they come down to two things, one is it’s like a pendulum, 
you push it bloody hard and it will finish up where you want it, or the other way you just 
gently nudge it to where you want it.  Now, they are two total extremes, but you can find the 
evidence for both approaches.        
 RESPONDENT D 
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5.8  A practical example of the difference that using evidence would make in 
       the NHS 
 
Consider this single piece of data: the EMAS response to falls 
 
 
EMAS Responses to Falls in Over 65s: Type of Pick up Location 
Sample of data from 2006/7
Residential/Care Home
16.7%
Non-Residential Address
15.6%
Residential Address
67.7%
Table 5 
 
The sample set was 2700 records taken randomly from all EMAS calls received and non-
residential address includes things such as “outside”, “shops”, “pub”, as identified by the 
caller and where the location was clearly non-residential, such as outside a named business or 
factory.  What fascinated me was that people fell in their own homes.  Consistently and 
evidentially people fall in their own homes.  As a proportion of the population who live in 
residential care homes more people may be falling than those who live in their own home 
but, as an organiser of ambulance services, the evidence tells me we should start with what 
people are doing in their own homes not anywhere else.  So why the pre-occupation with 
everywhere else in the study of falls?  It became clear that the study of falls was time and 
again about the reason for falling or the avoidance of admission to Accident and Emergency 
Departments.  Close (1999) analysed individuals presenting at A&E following a fall; Crotty 
(2002) looked at the best medicine and treatment to get fallers home quickly; Tinetti (1999) 
looked at improved daily living skills to prevent falls and developed work done by Ebrahim 
(1997) and only Pardessus (2002) considered the modification of environmental hazards that 
might affect the propensity of an individual to fall.  I was therefore presented with a very 
simple piece of evidence that mattered in the planning of ambulance services, specific to the 
actual rather than theoretical experience and it told me something that we weren’t 
considering.  Whilst  undoubtedly there was an issue of people falling in the street, if we 
wanted to look at the reasons that the ambulance was called – in absolute rather than 
proportionate terms at least – then the answer for falls lay in peoples own homes. 
 
Ambulance calls are triaged from Category A (see immediately, danger to life and the 
individual) to Category C (traumatic to the person but requiring quick rather than immediate 
attention).  There is also an acknowledgement in the work that NHS Direct do that 
communicating in a way that is sensitive to gender norms may also facilitate adherence to 
interventions that improve health or avoid ill health.  So two reports were run as below. 
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EMAS Responses to Falls in Over 65's by Call Category 
April 2006 to March 2007
CAT A
9.4%
CAT B
49.8%
CAT C
40.9%
           Table 6 
 
 
 
Table 7 
 
These two pieces of data turned into information are really important because the context 
here is ambulance services not the general planning of falls.  Consider this quote from the 
NHS Direct website, (so this is the NHS talking about itself).  “Falls often result in serious 
injury, often to bones and joints and there are many fatalities particularly amongst older 
people ……. An estimated 1000 older people die each year from a fall on stairs.  Falls cause 
the most deaths and long-term health problems amongst older people”.  But for emergency 
ambulances as part of the NHS less than 10% of the work collecting falls is Category A 
(NOW!) and Category C (quick, but okay to wait) is over 40%.  However important falls are 
to the NHS, the Ambulance Service needs a different gradient to policy response for falls to 
other parts of the NHS.  An evidence based response to falls in the East Midlands Ambulance 
Service in 2006/07 would be – to paraphrase the NHS direct quotation above – “Falls often 
result in serious injury, often to bones and joints ….. but in most cases this will not require or 
receive a blue light response of a fast ambulance once we have assessed the comfort and risk 
of the fallen patient”.  I then engaged the question about whether this was a gender issue.  
Were there any issues that affected falls related to sex?  The figures showed that 2/3 of the 
responses were to women.  In an NHS where gender equality affects the general 
consideration of health status in the population the simple use of data analysed and identified 
EMAS Responses to Falls in Over 65's: Gender  
April 2006 to March 2007 
Female 
65.8% 
Male 
34.2% 
Unknown 
0.1
% 
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a service with a specific gender bias and yet little or nothing was being done to identify this 
as a “women’s issue” in the say that, say, breast cancer was (predominantly but not 
exclusively a female condition). 
 
This all matters to the wider use of NHS policy.  Some very rudimentary queries using data 
coding, already available in the minimum data set for ambulance call outs, was throwing up 
evidence for one region in one year that lead to different conclusions about the nature of 
service delivery than a planner might have had based on national policy alone.  Let me 
consider for a moment five truly admirable things that NHS Direct tell us about falls as they 
affect the NHS: 
 
6. Physical activity improves balance and prevents falls. 
7. Older people respond to life events such as retirement or becoming a grandparent in 
adjusting their perception of the need to manage risk to  
prevent falling. 
8. People like to work in groups on falls prevention, but these can be demanding if your 
hearing, sight or short-term memory isn’t the best. 
9. Self-management is better than dependence on professionals. 
10. Advice can be tailored using websites.   
 
Of these five, only one really mattered in the analysis of the EMAS response to falls, that in 
the over 65’s the effects of aging are critical.   
 
It has not been difficult to get access to a “body of knowledge” for East Midlands 
Ambulance Service.  A years data is stored and easy to access and operational procedures are 
clear.  It is clear from the EMAS dataset that concepts such as ‘choice’ and ‘customer’ do not 
easily fit into falls management.  Unfortunately, choice and a speedy response govern much 
policy and planning of the NHS.  EMAS on the other hand is a 10% glamour Category A 
service, but by majority it is an old lady who has fallen and calls 999 because she did, but can 
wait. 
 
5.9  Using the Rousseau model to classify the responses received from 
       Managers in a systematic way 
 
My intent was to hold up a part of the mirror to the “us” that I belong to (NHS managers in 
the East Midlands). I see that we draw upon our own experiences and the experience of 
generations of practitioners.  The sad thing is that much of our decision making has no real 
evidence base on which to justify various things that we do in the name of leadership. This 
diminishes the sense that we are engaged in professional practice. We do not have a gathered 
body of well organised knowledge. On a personal level nothing can be identified that 
eliminates unsound or excessively risky practices in favour of those that have better 
outcomes except my training as an accountant.   
 
The discussion of evidence based management is a valid question but it is not liked in the 
higher echelons of management, linked as it is to the notation that management can easily 
merge into administration when considering white collar tasks. 
 
5.10 I will not be considering management culture in my Rousseau  classification 
because it would only be a synthesis and repetition of  points made elsewhere 
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Management culture would be a synthesis or repetition of points made against the other 
Rousseau criteria.  Before I began this study, I was interested to know whether Chief 
Executives would consider evidence based decision making to be a luxury or an indulgence.  
This is consistent with what I call Management Issue F (a belief that good management is an 
art) so the intention would have been to look also at culture.  During the interviews however, 
I noted that there was not necessarily a degree of convergence between the leaders despite 
the fact that they were working in the same health market, with the same policy framework 
and were using each other as reference points for acceptable norms of behaviour. 
 
Let me explain why I will not be considering management culture because it is a synthesis of 
Issues A to E: whilst it is not credible to say that the NHS is unique, and indeed none of the 
respondents said this, there is a particular refrain that it does not compare to any other 
business.  Even if this manager or executive is relatively new to the NHS, it does not take 
long for this cultural reference point to represent itself in their behaviour.  The essential 
contradiction with reference to evidence based management is that, for example, the Chief 
Executives do value somebody holding the detail (Issue B), somebody having a handle on 
what is going on (Issue A, Issue C); but they themselves like to set direction with autonomy 
(Issue D).  Each of these issues – delegation, attitude to details, management discretion – are 
the elements of culture, so it is possible to say that Issue F (culture) will be seen in the 
analysis of results A to E rather than separately. 
 
I also consider management culture would be a repetition of points made under Issue A to E: 
Chief Executives and managers make it clear that they are skilled enough at organisational 
cascade to make it look like the final evidence based management is palatable, without 
making it happen.  In order to steer a successful course without recourse to evidence they 
need to be all or some alchemy of the following – politically astute, decisive and networked.  
All of these are attributable characteristics that are by definition attributed by others.  They 
are also a repetition of the elements of culture so again it is possible to say that Issue F 
(culture) will be seen in the analysis of the results A to E rather than separately. 
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First let me reproduce the table “After Rousseau” from Chapter 3. 
 
After Rousseau: A synthesis from the literature of Rousseau on the practice of Evidence 
Based Management 
 
Management Issue With advanced knowledge of effective 
implementation of Evidence Based 
Management 
For evidence avoiding status quo 
The supervision of 
employees 
 
A 
Managers acquire a systematic 
understanding of what productivity gains 
are most appropriately cultivated from 
their staff 
A manager may misuse threats and 
punishments or overuse positive 
encouragement with no reference to 
the outcome of either style or 
organisational performance 
Information available to 
managers on the 
consequences of their 
decisions 
 
B 
Appropriate evidence and data base: 
perceptual gaps and misunderstandings 
are significantly reduced so that post 
implementation review is a valuable part 
of improving management 
Information is poor as data and 
evidence is not collected so that 
experiences are likely to be 
misinterpreted 
The delivery on promises 
to the public, employees, 
stakeholders/taxpayers 
customers and others 
 
C 
Decisions are based on systematic causal 
knowledge conditioned by expertise.  
Decisions are legitimised by being made 
in a systematic and informed fashion 
more readily justifiable in the eyes of 
stakeholders 
In such settings, managers cannot 
learn why their decisions may have 
been wrong, nor what alternatives 
would have been right.  The public 
challenges decisions in the search 
for transparency 
Management style 
 
D 
Managers have an understanding of the 
powerful impact their decisions have on 
the fate of their firms.  Managerial 
competence is recognised as a critical 
and often scarce resource 
Evidence based management seems 
to threaten managers personal 
freedom to run their organisations 
as they see fit 
Approach to academic 
research 
 
E 
Managers read the academic literature 
regularly and the consultants who advise 
them are likely to do so also.  There is a 
recognition that this research exists 
Despite the explosion of research 
on decision making, individual and 
group performance, business 
strategy and other domains directly 
tied to organisational practice, few 
practising managers access this 
work 
Management culture 
 
F 
Supervisors and managers respond to a 
belief system probably 100 years old, as 
far back as Fredrick Taylors (1911) 
structured methods for improving 
efficiency were classified under scientific 
management 
A belief that good management is 
an art - !the romance of leadership” 
school of thought where a shift to 
evidence an analysis connotes loss 
of creativity and autonomy 
In conclusion 
 
G 
Managers have evidence on which to 
base their decisions and consequently 
what is at stake should the decision or 
implementation fail 
Managers are prevented from 
real learning by fads and 
falsehoods 
 
And this is what we find. 
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In the matter of: 
 
Using the Rousseau or After Rousseau model.  This is what we conclude about the nature of 
evidence based decision making within the NHS in the East Midlands during 2007-08.  I 
have notated a + to mean that the quotation favours an evidence based approach and a – to 
mean that the quotation means the lack of an evidence based approach to decision making or 
an = sign to say that it neither favours one conclusion or the other. 
 
In the approach to academic research 
 
An evidence based approach would conclude that managers read the academic literature 
regularly and the consultants who advise them are likely to do so also.  The alternative 
conclusion is that few practicing managers access this work. 
 
- “get yourself educated in something, then get a job, just don’t pretend it will teach 
you to be a manager” 
- “it’s a bit like practice based commissioning, you know, I mean they invent it as a 
concept because it seems to be a means to an end, the end being whatever it is we 
all want” 
+ “And sometimes reading things, I prefer talking to people really and I talk to a lot 
of management consultants who kind of say things, it’s not that it tells you 
something new, it’s just that it allows you to relate things in a different way” 
- In conditions which predispose to hospital acquired infection “you wont do any of 
the things of which there’s a very good evidence base that it would make a 
difference, and so your first engagement with us, is to come and tell us to do 
something for which there is no evidence that any infection has been prevented, 
anywhere in the world – ever, by doing this and you think that’s the most 
important thing that we should do” 
- “If I say to you academic evidence?  I think it makes me feel, you know, chance 
would be a fine thing” 
- “It will never be that developed in this experiment that is the NHS” 
+ “So places which have a worse winter than we do don’t have this, they have a 
little bit more mortality but not much and it’s all down to poor housing policy, 
benefits, insulation, social care, primary care access, all of these things” 
= “I think they’ll use clinical evidence, I think managers are very much into the 
development of clinical pathways, you know, working with clinicians and doing 
the best things in the best way, but as to how the NHS works, the sort of 
infrastructure, where services are located, how they’re delivered, I don’t think 
they do use evidence” 
- “No!  We almost steadfastly refuse to accept that it might possibly work and it 
was worth considering because it didn’t fit the positive framework of choice and 
competition” 
 
In the supervision of employees 
 
An evidence based approach would conclude that managers acquire a systematic undertaking 
of what productivity gains are most appropriately cultivated from their staff, in the 
alternative a manager would have a style with no reference to its outcome or organisational 
performance. 
 
+ “I went in very, very hard with the matrons about their cleaning audits, when we 
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had all the matrons in, I said, I know it (the evidence) is not like that, you know its 
not like that, what are you playing at” 
+ “We had a doctor here say to us, we don’t have to comply with the Health Care 
Commission standards because we’re not a hospital!  What’s that about?  
Certainly wasn’t about better patient care” 
= “My next Chief Execs column in the staff newspaper, urging them to write to me, 
and I will reply, and I will go and meet them” 
+ “You work up through your career (and to begin with) you have to be more and 
more evidence based because you haven’t built up the wealth of experience, the 
wealth of knowledge, the falling over, the making mistakes, to make the 
judgement call in the same way” 
+ “I think the processes that are used by administrators should have an evidence 
base for doing them, and a rationale defined by evidence, I think managers should 
use evidence in reaching their decisions and evidence based leadership I think 
would go the same” 
 
In the information available to managers on the consequences of their decisions 
 
An evidence based approach would conclude that there was appropriate evidence and data, a 
significant reduction in perceptual gaps and post implementation review is valued.  The 
opposite is, that information is poor and evidence is not collected. 
 
- “Old evidence becomes dogma.  So it’s established on an evidence base but then 
that becomes dogma which in itself  evaporates over time and then the evidence 
isn’t refreshed”  
- “Balanced scorecards.  It’s not foolproof.  I think it lulls you into a false sense of 
security.  A&E, not the wrong side of the line, my dashboard would say ok, but 
we tried to fill a post there, we shortlisted the people and one turned up, and that 
means it’s going to be breaking down some time in the future, it (the balanced 
scorecard) is not proactive enough again” 
- “I think world class commissioning, if we’re not careful, will give us a rigorous 
discipline on investment issues, even going down to an actuarial type approach.  
And I think that’s actually quite dangerous because context and consequences are 
two things that a manager and a leader need to continually take into account, the 
consequences of one decision on another set of decisions” 
= “I’d prefer things to be explained but things like that are very difficult to move in 
an organisation of 7,000 people, if they don’t very shortly afterwards appear on 
paper so you can do something with it” 
= “Taught me you can approximate, but you need to know how you’re 
approximating,  you know when you’re approximating you know what you’ve 
lost.  But I have an ability to get into detail (the evidence and the data) when I 
need to in a way that some people just can’t” 
= “I don’t think you’re ever totally crass to consider an evidence base, but to use it 
solely for decision making I think is crass in most situations.  I think it’s good in 
scientific situations, when I was a chiropodist, when it came down to the amount 
of chemical I put on to destroy something – there were tables of evidence about 
what was most effective, that was, to go outside of those, I can think of little 
context to go outside of those.  When it comes to an investment decision, or even 
a personnel decision, you know, you can use the evidence of whatever, that’s 
behind that decision, but if you don’t understand the people, the place, the politics 
the environment, you can make a bad decision; so for instance, be it an investment 
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decision around upgrading or changing a hospital, or buying or not buying a 
service, you need to understand the wider context that’s there; be it the N in 
National for NHS, the national targets, national regime, be it the local context 
around who was denied a drug six weeks ago, and now you’re spending £60,000 
on people that seem to be more spurious – even if the evidence for one is nil and 
the evidence for an investment in district nursing is high” 
- “The doctors’ view is, ok, 20 years ago, when you were building this hospital 
(because we’ve been here for 20 years, not 10 minutes), 20 years ago we said to 
you, the design of this wonderful new PFI was wrong, you’ve got too many beds 
for the footprint, so the beds are too close together, you get cross contamination, 
you can’t clean round the beds. Because there aren’t enough beds, you’ve got too 
faster through put, so people with infections are moved around the hospital”  
 
In the delivery on promises to the public, stakeholders and others 
 
An evidence based decision making would conclude that decisions are based on systematic 
causal knowledge conditioned by expertise.  Decisions in an evidence based conclusion 
would be systematic, informed and readily justifiable.  In the opposite environment the 
public challenges decisions in the search for transparency and managers cannot learn why 
their decisions may have been wrong nor what alternatives would have been right. 
 
- “Politicians, do politicians want evidence based decision making for the NHS?  
No, they want to be elected and that’s the bottom line and as long as you 
remember that, then everything they do is completely understandable!” 
- “Nice (the National Institute for Clinical Excellence) is a construct of a political 
approach to the NHS by a government that hasn’t changed political party and yet 
we don’t seem to be any closer than we were when we started” 
- “And what we always find is every time they introduce one set of priorities, 
another set emerges because they’ve been ignored by the first set” 
- “Yes, I think the public as body public, would expect evidence based decision 
making, and quite rightly expect that, and would want it as well.  I think the public 
as Joe-individual probably would expect, would want it, but when it came to them, 
would probably bring in other subjective assessment criteria.  I think politicians 
are a bit different, and I don’t think, whilst they would probably in a purer 
discussion say, of course we do, I think they will always, and evidence is always 
driven by context, they would always want their policy implemented – evidence or 
not” 
- “Pseudomonas is going to become an important infection.  Vancamycin resistant 
enterococci are going to become, TB is going to become one.  Because all of these 
infections are being ignored, because everyone’s focusing on MRSA” 
- “And we don’t even look at the vast of MRSA infections, we don’t look at all the 
MRSA infections that don’t get bacteremia, all the joint infections, the skin 
infections, you know, the ulceration that people get, we don’t look at the damage 
that that causes in the community.  So we’re looking at the tiniest tip of the 
smallest iceberg here” 
- “you clearly identify yourself as wanting to give the public confidence in you 
being a good custodian of their health service, versus the method that would do 
that is not really evidence based” 
 
In the matter of management style 
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In a conclusion erring towards evidence based decision making about the NHS, managers 
would have an understanding of the powerful impact of their decisions and managerial 
competencies would be recognised as critical and scarce.  The opposite conclusion would be 
that evidence based decision making seems to threaten managers personal freedom to run 
their organisations as they see fit. 
 
= “You know I mentor a lot of people and a lot of them are Directors in PCTs and 
over the years I’ve watched them do fantastic things, and I’ve watched them being 
stopped from doing fantastic things, because some rule book says it’s not allowed; 
do you know what I mean?  Yes.  I find it sad, I mean, and the big picture is 
probably, you know, progress, the little picture depressingly irritating backwards 
steps” 
+ “So there was no reason you should have used it before, do you take a break and 
go and look for the evidence or do you say, no, we have sufficient skills to 
understand the context and consequences – in this room, of getting the decision 
right or wrong – we don’t need any evidence, what we need is a decision.  I would 
be shocked if the evidence wasn’t already there, and I would want to have the 
evidence if there was some evidence around, I certainly would want to know it 
was there and on certain decisions I would want the ‘show-me test’ as well.  On 
big things I want to see it.  So I would stop – go to the evidence, then consider the 
evidence in the wider context of the decision we’re making” 
= “One of the things that’s happened of course to FTs is that they’ve attracted a 
different calibre and type of Chief Exec, arguably.  I think, you know, we’ve 
advertised for two director posts lately and there are a lot of people who want to 
work for an FT…..ok………there are a lot of people moving out of Trusts that 
wont make it to FT status, so you could say, what we’ve been doing is sapping the 
best management resource out of the non-FTs to maintain the performance of the 
FTs.  We’ve also attracted, I think,  some quite different people in Non-Executive 
roles and Chair roles; the Chairs of FTs, a lot of them are, like the freedom bit, 
like the get on and do run a business thing” 
- “I’m interested you’ve chosen evidence based management and not evidence 
based leadership, because I think there’s a difference between leadership and 
management.  I suppose, there’s something about management based around 
evidence and management decisions based around evidence, which might be 
different from evidence based management.  It depends how you define 
management, and evidence probably as well” 
- “Well, he reminded me what the end was, that’s what he ultimately did, he kind of 
made me think about what they were trying to do, yes they did it in a cack-handed, 
stupid, I wouldn’t have done it that way, kind of a way, but given that that’s what 
they were trying to do, it was really not helpful for us to jump up and down and 
say ‘there’s no evidence for this’, because it undermines the whole investment 
programme they’ve put in place, which wasn’t adding any value to anybody, it 
was just making it wasted money, instead of possibly purposeful money” 
 
So in Summary My Conclusion is 
 
In the matter of the approach to academic 
research (Against!) 
 
 
 
In the matter of supervision of employees 
 
There is a bias against using academic 
research by NHS managers in the East 
Midlands.  This is by no means universal, but 
is consistent in its presentation. 
 
There is a very strong preference for using 
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(For!) 
 
 
 
 
 
In the matter of the information available to 
managers on the consequences of their 
decisions (Against!) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the matter of management style (No 
preference either way) 
 
 
 
 
 
In the matter of the delivery of promises to 
the public, stakeholders and others (Against 
strongly!) 
evidence based decision making amongst the 
cohort of East midlands managers and use an 
appropriately cultivated management 
approach to support evidence based 
decisions. 
 
There is a bias against evidence based 
decisions.  Decisions have insufficient data 
and evidence for decision making, and little 
value is attached to post implementation 
review.  Some managers are neutral towards 
this subject but few, if any, show a preference 
for evidence based decision making informed 
by the consequences of their decisions. 
 
There is only an inconclusive result in the 
area.  There is no preference.  Some 
managers have a preference for evidence it 
seems but equally same would discredit it as 
a viable and realistic approach. 
 
Of all the areas this is the one where there is 
next to no examples of evidence based 
decision making, but there are multiple 
strong, lengthy and cross-referenced 
examples of decision making that is neither 
systematic nor developed by causal 
knowledge.  Decision making is opaque to 
the public and frequently challenged. 
 
 
 216 
CHAPTER 6 
 
 
Research discussion 
 
Purpose 
 
To understand how the research fits with what is happening in this field of study, the policy 
context of the study and the message that comes from this research. 
 
Key Arguments and Conclusions 
 
6.1 Adoption of innovation and research is a complex and often drawn out 
process 
 
An American (Stanford University) website in this field www.evidence-
basedmanagement.com exists with categories of “academic research”, “management 
practice” and “beliefs and assumptions”, attracting regular bloggers (contributors) to an on-
going discussion about evidence based management.  Run by Jeff Pfeffer and Bob Sutton, it 
includes five principles of evidence-based management in its homepage/masthead that 
encourages people to tell the truth even if it is unpleasant and being committed to getting the 
best evidence and using it to guide actions.  This site also includes a research and practice 
archive which is accessible and lengthy, but a couple of years out of date – an unfavourable 
comparison with the bloggers – and useful hyperlinks to relevant material and other evidence 
based movements. 
 
Maybe a way to view this is that rather than viewing evidence based practice as squeezed out 
of the prevailing value set of NHS managers, it is anticipated that evidence based decision 
making may become the mainstream approach of the near future.  There is a need therefore 
to review how the NHS managers accept or reject challenges that don’t fit the prevailing 
value system, how do values adapt?  If the NHS is living through an era that does not favour 
one or more potential methods of decision making this may be temporary.  How does NHS 
management introduce alternative approaches and consider whether they may become 
acceptable and even desirable?  Can the NHS managers allow themselves to have a critical 
account of their own management?  The record of the interviews says that this self critique is 
happening, but at the same time, the overall picture is one of the forces of orthodoxy 
maintaining the “status quo” (as portrayed in the Rousseau model).  Whilst it is possible to 
see that the NHS managers may be disposed to accept challenges that fit the value system, it 
is part of the natural balancing.  None of the managers expressed a desire to explore the 
‘eccentric’ (or abnormal) values that challenged the prevailing orthodoxy but they were 
willing to be flexible and accept challenges when they could point to something particular 
that prompted the change. 
 
The policy context of the study; I described the NHS in the East Midlands as if it was a 
single coherent organisation.   The point is that it is fractured into an internal market that 
splits the buyers and providers of health care from each other – and providers themselves are 
organised into a range of devolved and legally autonomous governance models that give 
them independence and usually some form of monopoly within a single urban area or county.  
So where we talk of ‘joined-up’ application of evidence and management recognising that 
complex problems transcend organisational boundaries, we are expecting a cross-sectional 
response at odds with the financial incentives of the payment by results regime.  This is the 
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main problem when trying to look at the general phenomena of evidence in NHS East 
Midlands – that the policy is predicated on unstable organisational competition and local 
monopolies. 
 
Falls in the elderly population (EMAS 2008) represent a serious and increasing issue in the 
UK.  This is gaining increased recognition in current government policy across different 
parts of government including social care and housing as well as the NHS.  The reason the 
executives in the NHS respond to this is because it is NHS Policy and Practice.  The key 
though is that at the very strategic level the NHS response via policy is, in this case, evidence 
based.  The report by the Department for Communities and Local Government released in 
January 2008, named “Lifetime Homes, Lifetime Neighbourhoods” highlighted the following 
statistics: one older person dies every five hours as a result of a fall; older peoples falls cost 
the NHS around three quarters of a billion pounds each year and 1.25 million falls a year 
result in hospital admissions.  The role of the individual executive in respect to evidence and 
with respect to EMAS in particular should be to ensure that however big these absolute 
numbers seem they should get an evidence based and proportionate share of resources. 
 
There is an implied pattern of policy making in all of this.  The essence of which is that 
evidence based management for the NHS is in conflict with policy making.  The nature of 
this conflict is essentially one between an NHS based solution founded on evidence and the 
politicians decision made in the context of taxpayer revenues, the maintenance of electoral 
authority (not losing votes) and consistency/precedent.  In order to resolve whether there is a 
conflict between politicians and managers view of an effective National Health Service the 
literature seems to direct us not to whether the conflict exists, but the extent to which this 
conflict is played out. 
 
What is the implied pattern of policymaking? In essence, protagonists assume that the 
relation between research evidence and policy is linear; a problem is defined and research 
provides policy options. Research is used to fill an identified gap in knowledge. This is 
consistent with both a positivist pattern of science and professional dominance, in which the 
views and priorities of healthcare professionals (and doctors in particular) dominate 
healthcare policies. It assumes research evidence can and should influence health policy. 
Lomas has suggested that the pattern is viewed as “a retail store in which researchers are 
busy filling shelves of a shop-front with a comprehensive set of all possible relevant studies 
that a decision-maker might some day drop by to purchase.” 
 
Turning to a respondent who is a clinician who moved to management early on in their 
career, talking about whether infection control should be governed by policy or evidence. 
 
Who should determine the evidence, I mean, you used a very, almost, the answer’s in the 
library approach, is that right, is it people who are skilled in research techniques, is it 
academics, who is it that gathers the evidence?  Well I think the evidence does tend to be 
gathered by academics, but then there’s a body of evidence which is experiential and 
gathered up by the individual.   RESPONDENT B 
 
What he is saying is that the answer to deep clean might be something that universities can 
be equipped to design solutions for.  Remember here we are talking about ‘deep cleaning’ to 
rid hospitals of deadly bacteria – a decision more closely related to laboratory control than 
most clinical interventions and yet the sense that it isn’t quite the whole picture prevails. 
 
6.2 The adoption of research evidence is not a single discrete event 
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One of the objectives of this project is to hold a mirror up to the cohort (of which I am a 
member) to identify perceptions of good NHS management practice.  Within this I wished to 
look at how the group (when it worked collectively) would make decisions.  It is amusing 
that interviewees found it easier to identify bad practices in the working of the group than 
highlight aspects of good practice.  The issue of the right environment within which to make 
an evidenced decision emerged as being something managers needed to ‘get right’.  It does 
not exist as a natural state in the group.  Describing and reflecting on the appropriate place 
and circumstance to make an evidence based decision as a group was highlighted by many of 
the cohort.  Good practice in relation to the presentation of evidence and the use of evidence 
involved on ability to engage this group, to be persuasive and to be credible despite 
limitations of data and knowledge.  There is a caveat however, in that the very diversity of 
group structures makes universal interpretation problematic. 
 
Clinicians were widely reported as helping negotiate quid pro quo deals to consolidate 
services such as stroke, trauma and maternity across sites.  But they did this for managers 
who had years of NHS experience more readily than newly introduced managers. 
 
You know, if somebody took a senior member of your team, if they came to you with an idea 
or a solution, would you rather they had it on paper or they were able to explain it to you in 
a conviction way.  I’d rather they explained it to me, but I think, what I usually say to people, 
and there’s a lot of people that kind of knock on your door and say …neh, neh, neh I’ve been 
thinking and neh , neh, neh when you haven’t got time to listen to it………ok……..  doesn’t 
really help, I’d prefer things to be explained, but  things like that are very difficult to move 
on in an organisation of 7000 people, if they don’t very shortly afterwards appear on paper, 
so you can do something with it.  So personally, I prefer the conversation, but practically to 
progress it, it needs to extend beyond jabbering on the corridor or whatever’s going on.   
         RESPONDENT C 
 
Note that the word evidence never appeared in the above quotation at all, but then 
the manager was talking about a member of their team.  Conversely when another 
executive talks about their own decision making (below) the word evidence appears 
time and again. 
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I think to be successful, you’ve got to be instinctive, you’ve got to make the 
decisions, you can’t think about it – right or wrong decision – any decision is better 
than no decision, you then have to back your decision to the hilt, you have to be big 
enough to say you’ve dropped a ullock if you’ve got it wrong and change it if 
necessary.  And probably every decision I’ve made I could retro-fit on evidence, but I 
didn’t make them on evidence at the time.   
I don’t think you’re ever totally crass to consider an evidence base, but to use it 
solely for decision making I think is crass in most situations.  I think it’s good in 
scientific situations, when I was a chiropodist, when it came down to the amount of 
chemical I put on to destroy something – there were tables of evidence about what 
was most effective, that was, to go outside of those, I can think of little context to go 
outside of those.  When it comes to an investment decision, or even a personnel 
decision, you know, you can use the evidence of whatever, that’s behind that 
decision, but if you don’t understand the people, the place, the politics the 
environment, you can make a bad decision; so for instance, be it an investment 
decision around upgrading or changing a hospital, or buying or not buying a service, 
you need to understand the wider context that’s there; be it the N in National for 
NHS, the national targets, national regime, be it the local context around who was 
denied a drug six weeks ago, and now you’re spending £60,000 on people that 
seem to be more spurious – even if the evidence for one is nil and the evidence for 
an investment in district nursing is high.      RESPONDENT D 
 
Note that there was no consistent base for saying the decision was evidence based, 
but there is clear reference to ‘evidence’ being the field or environment within which 
personal decision making takes place.   
 
6.3 Managers will only use research that improves the organisation’s standing 
 
The message that comes from this research is that the use of evidence has to, in some way, 
improve the organisation’s standing.  It may be a function of the negotiated use of evidence.  
Earned autonomy is a function of years of experimental learning that means the executive 
can trust the judgement call of the individual.  The hierarchical nature of the organisation and 
the relative distance from politicians will affect the use or flow of research evidence.  If you 
are junior and/or new and/or clinical you have less earned autonomy.  This organisational 
demarcation reflects the sharing of evidence. 
 
But I do think that you work up through your career, you have to be more and more 
evidence based because you haven’t built up the wealth of experience, the wealth of 
knowledge, the falling over, the making mistakes, to make the judgement call in the 
same way.           RESPONDENT D 
 
And earned autonomy through understanding the ‘culturally correct’ way to respond to the 
signals being given by operational managers. 
 
Yes, well, depends how you set yourself up really, I mean, you know, I and other 
managers get criticised a lot for not being out on the shop-floor enough, and indeed 
I’m not, but you pick up limited information about what’s going on on the shop-floor if 
you stay close to the people running the business, they can be clinical or 
managerial, they will, you know, they will tell you what they’re fretting about, they will 
say, ‘oh my goodness, we’ve now got five vacant posts in A&E and when this lot 
leave I don’t know what we’re going to do’, that’s what you need to know, but you 
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also need to create a culture in which that happens, because, we were talking about 
this the other day actually, we’ve imported some new managers from another trust 
not far from here, and they had this alarming habit of telling you everything’s alright, 
when it isn’t!          RESPONDENT C 
 
But broadly a consensus is achieved that evidence/science applies predominantly to 
clinicians and is a luxury few managers can afford. 
 
I think they’ll use clinical evidence, I think managers are very much into the development of 
clinical pathways, you know, working with clinicians and that’s fine, doing the best things in 
the best way, but as to how the NHS works, the sort of infrastructure, where services are 
located, how they’re delivered, I don’t think they do use evidence, I think there is some, some 
scientific evidence in there, they’ll look at journey times, and they’ll look at volume, 
populations and the needs of that population not been done very well until fairly recently, but 
they are doing that.  So they’ll do that sort of thing, but a lot of the decisions that are made, 
seem to be based more on history, on the views of politicians and key stakeholders, which are 
often not really evidence based.        RESPONDENT A 
 
Equally it was possible to distinguish a large amount of individual autonomy that would be 
given to and/or earned by people who worked even for some quite direct and authoritarian 
managers. 
 
And if somebody passionately believes that the answer’s right, then what I’ll never do to 
them is say ‘you’re wrong’; what I’ll say is, ‘well, just go away and have a think about this 
again’ and then sometimes you find they do come back and they’ve modified their view.  But 
I’m a big believer that when you put somebody in a position of, you know, authority to 
deliver, as one of your senior managers, you’ve got to give them their head, what you can’t 
allow them to do is to go off the edge, and I think one of the products about being at a place 
a reasonable amount of time, is that people know how to read you as well – this works both 
ways.   RESPONDENT B 
 
So the question remains about whether the NHS approach to evidence is borne of a desire to 
reproduce by template expected behaviours or is capable of changing through 
transformational leadership.  One answer is: 
 
You know I mentor a lot of people and a lot of them are Directors in PCTs and over the years 
I’ve watched them do fantastic things, and I’ve watched them being stopped from doing 
fantastic things, because some rule book says it’s not allowed; do you know what I mean?  
Yes.  I find it sad, I mean, and the big picture is probably, you know, progress, the little 
picture depressingly irritating backwards steps.        
   RESPONDENT L 
 
In summary, this section, whilst leading to few conclusions about the use of  evidence does 
suggest that if evidence based management is to blossom in managers in the NHS it will have 
to be given a foreign label, taught on management courses and lead to the same conclusions 
the boss wanted it to. 
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The bare below the elbows thing – ok – I was in a Board meeting with my Chairman, where 
he was adamant we’d got this letter from Alan Johnson saying that all hospital workers 
should be bare below the elbows, so they shouldn’t have watches and rings on and things like 
that, so that it would promote hand washing and it would reduce infection, he was adamant 
that, this is what the Health Secretary says therefore it’s policy, and we must do it, and he 
wanted us to write out to every clinician telling them that we’re going to do this and we’re 
going to come in and do spot checks in hospitals.  (Our eminent doctor (Respondent B), 
rebuts the policy that his own boss is using,  demonstrates a deep despondency with his 
bosses response to politicians and glumly reflects on the lack of evidence for the policy!). 
 
This paper has explored literature and data on evidence based decision making.  The rhetoric 
of evidence based management serves an essentially ideological function, obscuring the real 
difficulty in securing effective and sustainable change.  As considered earlier in this paper, 
the data exists, even with a simplistic analysis like mine to point to changing policy 
imperatives and a different prioritisation by age/sex/location of ambulance services.  In 
organisations with deeply engrained power structures the PCTs must only attempt to 
implement the evidence based approaches to EMAS when they meet collectively on a 
monthly basis.  Otherwise these ‘numbers’ I have found will not survive the challenge of an 
NHS hierarchy in a climate of turbulent change.  
 
To conclude this research discussion and its overall message, I would like to consider some 
neuro-semantics. 
 
Let’s consider some key words or phrases that are quoted in the interviews and taped group 
meetings.  To the left I have put them in their stated form and in the right, whether this was 
used frequently, infrequently, positively or largely negative.  I have also been clear where the 
phrase is used more than once but with no clear agreement about its value between managers. 
 
Evidence Based Management Frequent positive associations.  Seen as a good thing, but 
struggling for a consistent definition. Juxtaposition with 
Evidence Based Management easily understood. 
Evidence Based 
Administration 
Used only once.  A potentially semantic definitional 
distinction but very powerful when used by the 1 
respondent.  This is a metaphor for an idea expressed by 
many that the freedom to stray from evidence increases the 
higher up the organisation you go.  Distinguishes managers 
(higher) from administration (lower).  
Evidence Based Leadership Used occasionally.  Very negative associations.  Seen by 
some to be an oxymoron.  Seen to be an expedient at best 
and part of a value set that evaporates when applied to 
politicians. 
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Evidence Based Decision 
Making 
Used often, but not surprising given my questions.  The 
phrase ‘administration’ in this table above is key to 
distinguishing its positive and negative usage.  Seen to be 
cumbersome and more relevant to juniors than executives. 
Evidence Based Resource 
Allocation 
Occasional use.  Very positive associations.  Given that 
resource allocation is considered a rare, but significant 
strategic action by leaders the supportive evidence for this is 
seen as crucial.  Most persuasively used in gaining 
autonomy from the DH. 
Evidence Based Reporting Occasional use.  Mostly negative.  Seen to be a by-product 
of ‘administration’ rather than ‘management’ and much less 
importance in performance management than policy targets. 
Evidence Based Argument Occasional use.  Mostly negative.  Seen to be an insufficient 
basis upon which to make an acceptable decision.  Where it 
is used it is almost pejorative in its diminution of the quality 
of the argument.  
Evidence Based Learning Frequent positive association.  A clear value exists in the 
attempt to learn from the evidence.  To foster a culture with 
due regard to evidence is viewed as an overwhelming 
positive. 
Evidence Based Knowledge Frequent positive associations.  The organisation, 
communication and maintenance of knowledge are all seen 
to be ways within which the hierarchy of evidence is vital.  
 
These examples show most importantly the differences between managers in the way they 
respond to concepts.  The following concepts have no agreed definition. 
 
Information:  used to mean everything from public communication to a  
   relevant set of managerial numerics. 
Data:   seen as collected for purpose and objectively or the  
   arcane desire to count by bureaucracies that generates 
    meaningful information. 
Interpretation: seen by some as a meaningful contextualisation of the 
   evidence or by otherwise savvy managers as a means to  
   discredit the evidence or source. 
Protocol: 
Best Practice: From an attainable counsel of perfection to a normative  
   standard for all. 
Culture:  positive and enabling, stifling and disempowering 
   transformations only allowing reproduction. 
NHS:   An organised system of tax funded healthcare or just one  
   big experiment in political authority and social cohesion.   
   The backbone of the political offer or the basis of a  
   random importation of foreign fractions in healthcare  
management without necessary debate or evaluation. 
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6.4 Sharing the theory in a calm and authoritative way 
 
Subject to examination crediting this method, then I will take the following steps.  In the 
spring of 2010 I will present the results to the East Midlands Chief Executives Forum 
(EMLET) with summary and graphical information and a hard/full copy stored on an 
accessible sharepoint drive.  I will then follow the reactions wherever they take me – reacting 
to who is intrigued or dismissive by/of the conclusions.  I have already shared drafts with my 
peer directors in the East Midlands and tested the methodology and theory with the rest of 
the Executive Team in Derbyshire and my seven direct reports.  All have suggested 
modifications along the way. 
 
In this paper I have tried to convey accurate detail to influence the credibility of my 
arguments.  There are no superlatives about this paper – it is meant to be subdued in tone to 
give a quiet confidence that the tentative conclusions are neither obvious nor extreme, but 
worthwhile of consideration all the same.  If I had believed that I had found something 
extravagant and remarkable, I would have said so, but I do believe that my proofs do justice 
to the conclusions.  I wish to persuade, rather than excite, about the possibilities that arise 
from studying a small community of NHS managers. 
 
When I started this doctorate in 2006 the field of evidence based management was evolving, 
but had been growing out of the field of behavioural science for about seven years (taking 
Harries (1999) as the starting of a distinctly NHS management consideration of the subject).  
Indeed, the first Wikipedia reference in 2006 was a simple paragraph with one or two 
references that were three or four years old.  The page now has reference to two dozen 
references.  On the other hand, this is not an area of ferocious and dynamic debate.  The 
authors, Learmonth, Rousseau, Kovner, Pfeffer, Sutton and Rundall are still the same people 
who were actively engaged in 2006, so the statements made in this doctorate are sufficiently 
contemporaneous with the debate as it is today. 
 
The issues this had raised for managers is to open up the dialogue.  Who asks the “why” 
question if it is not the managers themselves?  Especially in a field such as the NHS where 
management and simple ‘administration’ of public policy can become increasingly blurred.  
What the debate about evidence based decision making says is that we need a vision about 
who we want to be in the NHS.  Do we want to be leaders in health policy and leave a 
distinct legacy – and do we want the decisions we made to be remembered?  If evidence and 
the use of informed data represents a characteristic we aspire to – and I think we do, even 
when we don’t practice it – then we need to remember that things like my study stop us from 
straying from who we want to be. 
 
An overview of the governance of the NHS has been shown diagrammatically (2.4, table 1) 
and this shows that evidence cannot exist without influencing the governance model in all its 
corners.  Without serious effort to address the social, economic and political aspects of the 
NHS, then the managerial consideration of evidence will amount, even at its best, to a form 
of patching-up of the quality of decisions made.  At the moment, there does not appear to be 
an effective arena for discussion between politicians – the public – medics – managers over 
how and whether we can be evidence based managers.  This is a governance weakness. 
 
The effect on NHS policy will be negligible unless there is a listening exercise.  This cannot 
be the traditional castigation of opposite ends of the management structure as bigots or with 
the rendition of the “how can we get them to listen”.  The problem is that all too often, the 
debate concentrates on the ‘them’ in the phrase rather than the listen.  Managers talk of 
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doctors as ‘them’, politicians talk of managers as ‘them’.  This is no way to consider the 
implementation of evidence on a system wide basis.  The environment of the NHS provides 
its own set of tensions between participants.  So the listening exercise must cover three areas: 
do doctors believe that managers are using appropriate language to advance evidence based 
management.  Is the language inclusive or a barrier to interpretation?; is the message being 
delivered to the public in the right context – do the public tell you they hear this as part of a 
compelling and consistent message that evidence is used to improve patient care; and do you 
listen to or dismiss the politicians understanding of the NHS?  Politicians know the NHS as a 
parliamentary funded system where evidence must accommodate their mandate to govern. 
 
6.5 Conclusions of the field study and published material since I completed the field 
study 
 
So what is evidence based management?  The short answer, is the belief that it makes sense 
for managers to act primarily on the facts about what works out there.  It is an explicit 
relegation of other forms of knowledge and a rejection of memory and ideology as 
management styles.  It is alien to the National Health Service.  In the NHS in the East 
Midlands, it is only part of the decision making process.  “I would want to have the evidence 
if there was some evidence around, I would certainly want to know it was there on certain 
decisions” and the telling “I’m interested you’ve chosen evidence based management and not 
evidence based leadership, because I think there’s a difference between leadership and 
management” – the closing remarks of two of the most experienced Chief Executives in the 
East Midlands. 
 
When and where is evidence based management used? 
 
There is a belief that up to middle management levels, evidence based decision making is 
useful, but not at more senior levels.  Senior managers approve of evidence as it gives them a 
systematic view of what their staff are qualified to do and a requirement for evidence based 
decision making is part of the scheme of delegation.  As the best quote said “you work up 
through your career (and to begin with) you have to be more evidence based because you 
haven’t (learned) to make the judgement call in the same way”, said a Chief Executive who 
started as a clinician. 
 
How is evidence based management perceived? 
 
There is a bias against using academic research by NHS managers in the East Midlands.  
Even where academic research can be found to recommend and justify an alternative course 
of action, and this evidence is supported by a senior clinical manager the forces of 
conservatism limited implementation opportunities.  In the matter of the information 
available to managers on the consequences of their decisions, there is a bias against evidence 
based decision support and little value is attached to post implementation review.  Within the 
NHS East Midlands there is no preference – some managers would value an evidence based 
approach, but the same numbers would not see it as viable or useful.  The craft of 
management is valued more through creativity and autonomy than in a response to evidence.  
“No! we almost steadfastly refuse to accept that it might possibly work and it was worth 
considering because it didn’t fit with the positive framework of choice and competition” was 
my favourite quotation. 
 
I recognise this: If the question was written not as ‘Why should we use evidence”, 
but “why shouldn’t we use evidence?” then we are nearer to the heart of this thesis.  
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Evidence based medicine is a prevailing organisational culture so in the study of the 
management culture of the same organisation, it is reasonable to see whether we 
are following fad or fashion.  They key is not to be swept along or swamped by this – 
let me use a surfing metaphor of “riding the wave”.  Instead of being drowned by the 
energy of the sea, you use a simple tool (a surfboard) to harness the energy of the 
ocean to transport you quickly.  The key is to see whether evidence based 
management is a surfboard that is harnessing the energy of the prevailing evidence 
culture in the NHS.  McDaniel (2009) says that “Facilitating meaningful conversation 
in health care organisations is often difficult, but it is important for making effective 
change (Jordan et al 2009).  Rather than applying evidence as indicated per an EBM 
model of organisational change, health care managers should rely on evidence to 
start creative, locally relevant dialogue.  Evidence from management research 
should be used to open the door to new conversations that can be used to propel 
organisations along positive paths of managerial action.  This would be significant if 
we want managers to make a difference”.  Paragraph 2.4 (table 1) suggested that 
managers have a limited opportunity to make a difference, bounded as they are by 
those who fund, use and provide clinical care in the NHS.  To facilitate meaningful 
conversation would enable the managers to talk coherently with politicians and the 
public about the best way to make difficult decisions and whether evidence would 
improve the acceptance of, and satisfaction with, the decision in the public domain.  
There is a prevailing evidence based medicine culture, the conversation would be 
whether management can take the opportunity this creates to be more evidence 
based too. 
 
Some additional reading on the subject highlights the following since I completed the 
field study – Arndt and Bigelow (2009) say that caution should be expressed about 
the use of evidence based management in healthcare.  In an illuminating discussion 
they say that “We raise a cautionary note about the assumptions underlying the calls 
for evidence-based management. Given the complexity of decision making and of 
the health care environment, as well as differences among health care 
organisations, decisions do not necessarily lead to expected outcomes, and results 
may not be replicable across organisations.  Moreover, evidence is an artefact of 
social interactions and limited by the difficulties inherent in studying complex 
organisational phenomena.  Research is needed into the diffusion of evidence-
based management in health care and into the results achieved by organisations 
that used the practice compared with organisations that did not.  Managers should 
use all available information and data when planning and implementing decisions, 
and evidence from research should play a role in that. At the same time, in a 
turbulent and uncertain environment, creativity and risk taking also will be important, 
and unanticipated outcomes may result from, among other factors, limits on human 
cognition, unknowable differences in initial conditions in organisations, and adaptive 
responses to change as it is implemented”. 
 
What I fundamentally disagree with Arndt and Bigelow (2009) about is that they claim their 
note for caution to be unique against a prevailing orthodoxy that “urges” us to adopt evidence 
based management as new and exemplary.  I think they overstate the ground of support for 
evidence based management and they ignore that writers such as Kovner and Rousseau were 
aware of the same caveats when they wrote.  So we see a developing debate in 2009 between 
the scale and pace of implementation.  Also, this study is not just happening in the NHS.  
Nutley (2009) writes about how important this is for research utilisation in social care – 
“This article draws on both a cross-sector literature review
 
of mechanisms to promote 
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evidence-based practice and a specific
 
review of ways of improving research use in social 
care. At
 
the heart of the article is a discussion of three models of
 
evidence-based practice: the 
research-based practitioner model,
 
the embedded research model, and the organisational 
excellence
 
model. The article concludes that the ideas contained within
 
each of these models 
are likely to be appropriate at different
 
times and for different service settings. There is a 
need to
 
build on such models to develop a coherent framework for strategies
 
to promote 
research use.”  She says that this needs supporters and intermediaries to make it happen 
“developing a culture that supports research use – these kinds of activities might include 
developing appropriate leadership and management practices; collaborations between 
researchers and research users; the creation of specific research brokering posts; and 
membership of intermediary organisations that aim to get research into practice.”  Ultimately, 
Banaszak-Holl (2009) is able to both commend and critique Arndt and Bigelow and say that 
although Arndt/Bigelow offer some useful caveats, they are actually providing arguments to 
progress, rather than halt, the debate about EBM in healthcare.  “Hence, the authors of 
Evidence-Based Management in Health Care Organisations: A Cautionary Note (Arndt and 
Bigelow, 2009) should be applauded for their timely contribution to raising critical issues in 
how to advance the field of evidence-based management in health care organisations (HCOs) 
while the evidence base is still in the early stages of evolution.  At this point, such criticisms 
should be raised because they help inform plans for systematically analysing, disseminating, 
and applying management evidence.  We, however, believe that the issue raised in the 
cautionary note provide compelling arguments for moving forward with developing EBM 
albeit in a manner that leads to the formalisation of both a better framework for discourse 
about our evidence base and a public knowledge library allowing greater sharing of 
management evidence across HCOs”.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
Issues for practice 
 
Purpose 
 
To develop a practical model for policy makers and managers on how and where evidence is 
used appropriately. 
 
Key Arguments and Conclusions 
 
7.1 Senior managers are close to department policies and use evidence less 
 
Senior managers are concerned about a volatile policy framework – where policy is either 
unclear strategically or unclear in the operational impact within the 12 month business cycle.  
Uncertainty in this context negates a primary use of evidence to inform decision making. 
 
And that’s kind of inevitable, but the way I kind of play managing this Trust, you know, if I 
see a journey, the way policy works, it’s seemingly, you know, I think we’re going there, the 
government says we’re going there, and all of a sudden, we’re off up here, or we’re off up 
there, or we’re going down here, and we’ll probably go back up there and then we’ll go 
down here.     RESPONDENT H 
 
You know, my job I always think is to translate policies, a bit like a pendulum, know where 
it’s going to settle, and it, you know, somebody keeps bashing it and it’s swinging around, 
you know where it’s going to settle, and the trick is I think, to describe what’s happening, 
which may seem a little strange, you know, introducing competitions, subsidising 
competition.       RESPONDENT E 
 
I can justify that to my organisation, in terms of it being the government wishing to give 
people choice, wishing to drive up quality, yes it’s tough, yes it has very difficult set of issues 
for us to handle, but they’re doing it because they want care to be better, and so you’re 
always describing the end point, and trying to make sense of it and what’s more trying to use 
it to get you to that point, and sometimes that means I sort of half ignore things I’ve been 
asked to do, or I throw myself at them with absolute huge enthusiasm because they seem to 
be going in the right direction. 
          RESPONDENT C 
 
According to supporting documentation from the NHS issued at this time, this would be 
consistent with an evidence based culture. This code of conduct could be contrasted with 
how models for organisation and management in health care over the last 20 years had been 
based on popular trends and fads rather than research on organisational and management 
practice. Strategic decisions, it was maintained, typically follow the recommendations of 
consultants with the information upon which these are based remaining unchallenged. As 
evidence based healthcare was popularized among health care professionals there would be 
increasing recognition that these ideas should be adopted in management. Management 
innovations that were not evidence-based included the use of organisational mergers in 
tackling service quality; decisions on the optimal size of organizations for capacity or 
financial viability; substitution of doctors with other health professionals and the move 
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towards home care as an alternative to hospital inpatient care. 
 
Managers in particular in this project, described a situation where their own control over the 
decision making process had been to some extent, lost through the requirements of audit and 
the promotion of certain themes consistently in the NHS.  Executives have to be seen to be 
performing in an overt and accountable way and their work must be visible and subject to 
audit and inspection.  A model of performance management is contrasted with maturity of 
thought and debate over the use of evidence.  The external pressure for conformity and 
consistency is seen to result in high quality decision making tainted by group think.  
Managers cannot always dwell on particular topics or pursue the evidence base for what they 
are doing (or being told to do).  There is a pressure to be overtly productive in the 
presentation of solutions rather than consideration of evidence.  The interview and meetings 
material touches upon some of the complex relationships between established management 
culture, career needs of the managers themselves and the conduct of evidence based decision 
making.  The pressure to obtain recognition for both themselves and their organisation may 
encourage a pursuit of more credible ‘target hitting’ and leaves insufficient time for a 
consideration of the evidence in shaping organisational structure.  In general, as described in 
this qualitative material, the current organisational form may discourage evidence based 
decision making and the need for reproduction will be perceived as less risky. 
 
Fashion.  The simple arcane practice of following the latest trend or idea, of importing 
behaviours from other societies was seen as damaging to an evidence based NHS.  In a way 
it is believed that evidence is crucial to an acceptance of organic (internally generated) 
change within the NHS, but even higher than evidence in the hierarchy is novelty or 
importation from other systems. 
 
7.2 Middle managers are more directly involved in supporting the uptake of research 
on effective management 
 
Let me start this section with a quotation from somebody who swapped between clinical and 
management roles. 
 
I think my need for an evidence base would have been different at different stages in my 
career; the fact I’ve come up the clinical route, I hope I’ve use an evidence base for my 
clinical work previously.  I’ve sought an evidence base for the interventions I’ve made to 
make things work and happen differently throughout my career, because it seems to me, if 
it’s worked somewhere else, ie, there’s evidence it’s actually helped somebody else gain 
objective or reach an objective, it’s probably worth trying here.  So the evidence might not 
be gold standard evidence, but there is some evidence base to what I do.  So I think that 
probably never peaked, but since I’ve been in management roles, I think I’ve always had, 
and considered evidence for the way I operate and what I do.      
  RESPONDENT G 
 
I think evidence based administration, to me administration is the application of 
processes to achieve an end, to me, that’s what an administrator is doing, with a 
small degree, often no degree of latitude or ability to make changes.  Management, 
managers have the ability to make changes to those processes, and leadership I 
think, is different.  I think leadership is about achieving an organisational goal, and 
taking the whole organisation forward to achieve corporate objectives.  So I do, 
evidence based administration, I think I would struggle with that, because I think the 
processes that are used by administrators should have an evidence base for doing 
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them, and a rational defined by evidence; evidence based management, I think 
managers should use evidence in reaching their decisions, and evidence based 
leadership I think would go the same as management.   RESPONDENT D 
 
So what we see revealed is that evidence is a consistent part of the framework of 
executive leadership, but the latitudes to err from the evidence or to even create the 
evidence afresh is denied to lower levels of manager – deemed to be administrators. 
 
Most fundamentally, detail and the use of detail in decision making was seen to be a product 
of where you were in the hierarchy.  In fact, detail was seen to positively inhibit the 
executive function. 
  
Different managers agreed that clinicians, their staff and indeed the politicians (perceived to 
be the source of this objective) needed to be exposed to multiple interpretations of why this 
decision was made.  Conversations with politicians concentrated on what was going on ‘out 
there’ in the media and the public discourse of the problem/decision.  Conversation with 
clinical staff often concentrated on the issue of the perception about what had caused this 
decision and differences between professionals interpretations of the solution/causes of the 
decision.  The decision did lend itself to evidence, but the conclusion from the views 
expressed is that consideration of the evidence was both vital and in fairly short supply.  
There was a thematic response that any evidence used in the decision should derive from 
both an outline theory of the nature of the problem, but relate closely to the practice of NHS 
management.  That means that given the potential lack of general management expertise in 
the area, any evidence ought to be accessible to NHS managers.  
 
 
7.3  The relationship between autonomy, pedantry and the use of evidence 
 
Referring back to earlier conversations it is possible to see quotations that talk of a negotiated 
use of evidence through acquired years of experiential and experimental learning.  This leads 
to the oft sought for “earned autonomy”.  The best quote to demonstrate this was the one that 
said “because you haven’t built up the wealth of experience, the wealth of knowledge, the 
falling over, the making mistakes, to make the judgement call in the same way”.  One of the 
conclusions of the project has been that at low levels of autonomy you use evidence a lot and 
at high levels of autonomy you use evidence a lot again if you can avoid the politicians (table 
1 refers) but somewhere in between it gets much more difficult.  The two quotations which 
summarise this are “it’s a yes and no.  If I am brutally honest, if you take them in an enclosed 
ecosphere when there are no consequences to their decisions.  Then they will always go with 
the evidence, then you put them back in the real world and….” Plus “a lot of decisions that 
are made, seem to be based more on history and on the views of politicians and key 
stakeholders, which are often not really evidence based”.  
 
Consider the definition of a pedant.  A person who is overly concerned with formation and 
precision and who makes a show of learning.  The corresponding notion is that the person is 
also a source of instruction or guidance.  The term can typically be used with a negative 
connotation indicating someone overly concerned with minutiae and whose tone is perceived 
as condescending but when it was first used by Shakespeare in 1588 it simply meant teacher.  
Some people take pride in being pedantic and may preface a sentence as such.  Therefore I 
believe there is a boundary where pedantry is an accepted form of evidence based decision 
making and that this is consistent with the amount of autonomy and status the individual has.  
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So if a table is drawn to show the relationship between pedantry, earned autonomy and a 
detailed use of evidence based management it would look something like this: 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                              Level of  
                detailed use 
                of EBM            
Table 8 
 
I have quartered the box not by quadrants but by triangles to show that this structure to an 
extent overlaps and is about occupying different zones of the autonomy/detail axis.  The key 
is that there are four zones.   
 
4. “Participative leadership”.  Experienced at all levels of autonomy, NHS managers try 
to use some degree of Evidence Based Management but they never explore it to its 
full extent.  The best they ever get is a ‘halfway’ experimentation with evidence.  
Indeed it is possible to make decisions without evidence at all. 
 
5. “Zone of pedantry”.  Evidence is used to develop and control the organisation but the 
manager never rises above the middle tier of autonomy.  Note the use of phrase 
autonomy rather than “authority” or “power” as even a powerful individual may find 
themselves in the zone of pedantry when working in a group because their autonomy 
is diminished in the meeting so that the use of evidence is seen to be picky or fussy in 
tone.  In this zone a very detailed application of evidence based decision making 
correlates negatively with autonomy – if you have to use a lot of detail to make a 
decision you don’t have much autonomy. 
 
6. “Zone of efficacy”.  The decision will use varying degrees of evidence in getting 
things done.  What is effective is not necessarily efficacious.  The efficacious 
decision is the one that produces a desired amount of the desired effect and the 
success in achieving a given goal.  It is imperative to note that in this zone, the 
complete acceptance of rejection of evidence based decision making are polar 
opposites but exist in their purest form where the manager has the ultimate autonomy. 
 
7. “Zone of effective evidence”.  The manager uses some, at least half of the available 
evidence based management insights at all levels of autonomy.  At lower levels of 
Level of 
Autonomy 
Zone 
zone 
Zone o f 
 
Zone of 
efficacy 
 
Zone of 
participative 
leadership 
Zone of 
effective 
evidence 
Zone of 
pedantry 
The Evidence Based Box of 
East Midlands NHS Managers 
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autonomy the manager does, or is compelled to, use a quite sophisticated level of 
detailed evidence to guide them as manager.  At higher level of autonomy the 
manager is not coerced by concerns of politicians and as the quotation says “then they 
will always go with the evidence”.  As we rise up the scales of autonomy we see two 
forces that push the detailed use of EBM backwards – one, the manager is not 
compelled to use evidence and can further explore a “romance of leadership” school 
of thought and two, decisions are increasingly made as a quotation says “on the views 
of politicians and key stakeholders” instead. 
 
7.4  The decision must be acceptable as well as efficient 
 
It is established by respondents that they have the technical skills to undertake evidence 
based decision making and to write a coherent ‘evidence based’ story.  The managers were 
also able to demonstrate that they understood the importance of reflexivity as a management 
competence.  Managers were not happy that the collection and evaluation of data was 
sufficient to help decision making.  The collective and evaluated information may go some 
way to enhance the quality of NHS management.  But the technical task of the assimilation 
of information may not be able to go far enough to convince NHS managers to move without 
a sceptical evaluation.  More generally it was also asserted that there will always need to be 
more resources in order to carry out training in the evaluation of information. 
 
I think World Class Commissioning, if we’re not careful, will give us a rigorous discipline on 
investment issues, even going down to an actuarial type approach, and I think that’s actually 
quite dangerous, because context and consequences are two things that a manager and a 
leader need to continually take into account, the consequences of one decision on another set 
of decisions.    RESPONDENT F 
 
So somebody has done some research, however subjective, to actually say those who scored 
highest on health commission scores, those who had most financial balance, those who were 
actually achieving the most important government targets.  What was common about them?  
      RESPONDENT I 
 
The cohort is efficacious.  By efficacy I mean that the effect of a given managerial 
intervention has to not only be economically efficient it must be ‘acceptable’.  Acceptable in 
the political and public context of the NHS.  The impact of an intervention by the Chief 
Executive or senior manager has been thought before the decision has been unleashed in the 
real world NHS.  Acceptable in that this decision is at least as good as any other. 
 
Referring back to earlier conversations we see quotations that talk of a negotiated use of 
evidence through acquired years of experiential and experimental learning.  This leads to the 
oft sought for “earned autonomy”.  The best quote was the one that said “because you 
haven’t built up the wealth of experience, the wealth of knowledge, the falling over, the 
making mistakes, to make the judgement call in the same way” (RESPONDENT D). 
 
7.5  Conclusion 
 
From my findings it is possible to say that evidence based management has an identified and 
discernible impact on NHS management but it is not common and is certainly not in good 
health as a prevailing philosophy.  It is not the managers who will keep it alive and any 
implementation of evidence based management on a wide scale will require the importation 
of external skills and political will to implement.  Davies (2009 pXV) said that senior 
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managers only react to external policy direction “targets have ruled the roost, pushing 
organisations to the edge, often to the neglect of patient care.  The past ten years have seen a 
plethora of incoherent initiatives and policy reviews, decreasing the ability of senior 
managers to display leadership, think and positively effect the delivery of services; and left 
governance confused and void of focus.  The autonomy associated with a business-like 
framework means nothing if all it is used for is finding more innovative ways of meeting 
central targets”. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
Issues for Management 
 
Purpose 
 
Does the use of evidence equate to developing a high quality knowledge base that should 
improve organisational effectiveness and to what extent can variations in the NHS be 
explained by differing uses of evidence? 
 
Key Arguments and Conclusions 
 
8.1 What is used is determined by what is planned to be used by the organisation to co-
ordinate 
 
The accumulation and the use of the following skills is necessary to use the available 
evidence. 
 
Thinking – if NHS management is to be evidence based at all, then it needs to spend time 
thinking about how evidence is used.  In particular, the management in the NHS must think 
about evidence and whether it reduces financial and delivery risk.  The key will also be to 
consider where evidence is relevant at the individual, organisational or pan East Midlands 
level. 
 
Reflections – managers in the East Midlands must have the skills (and time) to take a 
retrospective look at current decision making structures and question the reasons for doing 
things this way.  In a command and control structure where one of the key skills in 
organisational success is for the leader to correctly diagnose and horizon scan Department of 
Health indicators, this type of reflection is difficult. 
 
Research interpretation – the key here is to be impartial in the use of evidence as a means of 
finding truth.  Many topics are the subject of highly politicised dispute, but that does not 
mean there should be a bias towards the politically expedient solution.  The ability to 
interpret research and be clear when you are biased in judgement despite the evidence, is a 
key competence for leaders in the NHS in the East Midlands. 
 
Persuasion – this is not in short supply.  The leaders have shown themselves by reason of 
appointment and track record of delivery, to have a persuasive management style.  The 
adoption of that competence to individual or group based evidence is necessary if the 
available evidence is to be used for decision making. 
 
8.2 Evidence is not the primary or defining tool in successful NHS organisations 
 
The implication of blind prejudice for the objective of enhancing good practice in NHS 
management are profound.  What we perceive as ‘good practice’ itself is called into question.  
This would imply that there was error in the NHS managers themselves rather than the 
context in which they find themselves.  Whilst there will be a blurred distinction between 
heuristics and prejudice the term ‘blind prejudice’ might most usefully be applied to ignoring 
any conformity with accepted good practice.  Where evidence to inform the decision is 
simply not sought out.  The use of blind prejudice in this context is usually driven by a desire 
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to succeed in the political context – it is simply an exercise in power.  There are many 
potential decision makers out there, but only so many posts, awards, organisations and years 
in a career and in the competition for resources and power, blind prejudice is simply a 
rejection of evidence where it does not enhance the standing of the individual decision 
maker.  The individual is required to be a strong leader, not an evidenced decision maker. 
 
If evidence based practice is seen as something separate and distinctive from day to day 
decision making, then the prevailing management culture works against basing decisions on 
evidence.  On the other hand, evidence based practice may entail rejecting the accepted 
management orthodoxy and creating a separate quasi-autonomous enclave of interested 
practitioners.  It is not ‘evidence base’ alone that determines the value set and the discourse – 
it is the extent to which the evidence base is taken down through organisational views to a 
granular level before a decision is made.  In paragraph 5.9, I noted that senior managers 
valued an evidence based decision making model in their middle managers.  This does not 
equate to an application of the evidence based method themselves, nor an implicit sourcing 
of and funding of evidence for these middle managers to use. 
 
We must ask: not ‘do you understand the answer’? but ‘do you even know what the question 
is’. 
 
So, let’s compare that to the earlier discussion about deep cleaning of hospitals.  Managers 
found peace with the need for a structured political response by David Nicholson but here, in 
the case of winter death, he was avoiding even asking the question because the public wasn’t 
asking the question.  I therefore asked if that meant they thought Nicholson rejected evidence 
where it said uncomfortable things about subjects the public weren’t asking about.  The 
response: 
 
I would suggest that he uses an evidence base for what he’s done and how he’s moved things 
forward, along with a set of personal beliefs, so I feel comfortable with that.    
        RESPONDENT B 
 
8.3 Evidence is only part of a general method used to horizon scan 
 
In the organisation and planning of ambulance services in the East Midlands there is an 
inextricable link between organisational performance, organisational effectiveness and 
leadership.  Ambulance services and the importance of the ambulance response to older 
people who have fallen, has historically been poorly recognised within the wider NHS.  
Ambulance clinicians are in a unique position of attending this group of patients in their own 
home and as a result, are able to observe not only the condition of the patients, but also their 
living conditions including hygiene, diet etc.  In order to transform the service that EMAS 
provides to falls victims and those at risk of fall, the Chief Executives of both EMAS and 
their Commissioning Primary Care Trusts, the transformational leaders, need to adopt an 
evidence based approach to the data collected by EMAS itself.  Instead of a total focus on 
specific organisation objectives that is typical of the existing contractual relationship with 
EMAS, the management style should place an emphasis on evidence as a basis for innovation 
and a rationale use of resources. 
 
By using the evidence available about how falls should best be managed, how the use of 
ambulance resources can be maximised and the effects that an aging population will have on 
calls to ambulances the leaders in the NHS can help the public to navigate the system in a 
different way, but still be confident that the system will be delivered in line with NHS 
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standards and values.  The key is to respond to the evidence that has been collected, to park 
the targets of today (as their assistant directors and operational managers will achieve this) 
and to shape the targets of the next decade in line with the Ambulance clinicians.  
 
Some concepts are judged by the participants to have poor credibility.  If quantification, 
consistency, industrial level adoption and rigour are indicators of credibility then in our 
understanding of evidence based decision making it is possible to recognise items that have 
credibility.  Credibility is not validated by the researcher it is expressed as a judgement made 
by the participants.  Judgements of credibility are also seen to be influenced by particular 
(political) contexts so that what constitutes credible may change from period to period.  In 
the specific context of the evidence based manager, there was a strong correlation between 
credibility and one word/phrase – “NHS” and a poor correlation between “politics” and 
credibility.  I have included one quotation to illuminate that at the heart of this conflict is the 
role of the executive and whether they are agreed to be system leaders or system managers. 
 
Consider that since 2000/01 the government decided to increase public spending and the 
proportion of public spending spent on the NHS significantly, and this was sustained for 7/8 
years and yet politicians were given lots of negative associations such as the politician below, 
who is considered to be motivated by electoral majority not the NHS role in ‘reduce 
inequalities’ or even the NHS managers role in ‘best value for money’. 
 
He’s an MP like the ‘X’ guy, who isn’t local doesn’t know the area, he’s in for the 
ballot box, he’s in for the re-election; you take someone more local like ‘AB’, who’s a 
local lad, worked in one of the local schools, will always live in this town, he’s got the 
mix, because he’s precariously seated because of the ballot box, because despite 
the fact he’s been in twice, this is not a natural one party community, and at some 
stage it will move again.         RESPONDENT A 
 
Whilst as a researcher I was able to ask for clarification of particular aspects of the 
application of EBM, the elite manager must feel that a codification of EBM is not just 
adulterated into a form of Pedantic Control.  The traits that the Chief Executives and Senior 
Managers demonstrated were strong leadership, setting a good example, negotiating and 
navigating the future and co-ordinating disparate strands of policy into one coherent whole.  
In order for EBM to rise above the charge of pedantry into a system wide learning method it 
would have to enhance the ability to lead, negotiate, navigate and co-ordinate.   
 
The Chief Executives are demonstrating intelligence.  The elite has shown the ability to 
interpret policy and understand the business but they are relying on heuristics to drive 
solutions.  The reason this is good is that leadership is visible, to an extent charismatic and 
essentially a valued commodity.  In order to steer a successful course without recourse to 
evidence they need to be all or some alchemy of the following – politically astute, decisive, 
hardworking on networks. This demands in turn that they are perceived to be young in 
outlook, flexible/pragmatic, energetic and experienced.  All of these are attributable 
characteristics that leaders cannot acquire themselves – they are by definition attributed by 
others.  Crucially they are also consistent with the characteristics a Chief Executive or Senior 
Manager will want attributing.   
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CHAPTER 9 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
9.1  Messages from the field of study 
 
Cultural and altitudinal change is required 
 
Researchers and academics should be invited into the management process (5.9, 6.1) and we 
should be looking for evidence of what works to do the most optimal thing with our limited 
resources (5.5, 6.4).  The key here is that the management role is enhanced by the use of 
evidence based management and in such a way that the credibility and development of the 
subject area is enhanced. 
 
Develop a cadre of managers with the skills needed to use evidence more effectively 
 
Managers rely on the use of data.  But they are unlikely to be happy with data that has 
unknown interrelations (5.7, 6.3).  An unavoidable consequence of asking the sort of what-if 
questions is that it can lead to adverse reaction amongst managers.  Unlike performance data 
it may expose uncomfortable relationships between perceptions of excellence in the NHS 
target performance – attributed by others – and truly superior operational delivery (5.6, 6.5).  
The use of evidence prompts in longitudinal studies would only be possible were the 
competence of managers to use this evidence effectively developed also. 
 
Looking for evidence of success of evidence based decision making would be an innovation 
itself 
 
Evidence might be called the economic (opportunity) cost of the current solutions we use.  
Looking for evidence based enablers of the ‘central targets’ to be hit should also be pursued 
and we should not use targets as an excuse to avoid evidence based attitudes (5.2, 5.4, 5.8).  
Managers and policy makers have been prominent advocates of evidence based clinical 
practice, but have not been quick to apply the same principles to their own decision making.  
NHS Evidence should undertake this task with managers (3.4, 6.2). 
 
As an avoider of data the politician can still have the opportunity to identify key business 
processes and target opportunities 
 
The politician will not push for a multivariate analysis of the data (5.1, 5.3) and ultimately 
the problem is that the politician is concerned with abdicating control (8.3).  The politician 
fears contradictions with policy, false-positives or results that are good for the NHS but no 
use for the politician at all (8.1, 8.2). 
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9.2  Inferences from theoretical and other researchers perspectives 
 
Learmonth said (in my introduction) that managerialism was an imposed doctrine, and that 
evidence based decision making typified managerialism.  At the end of my journey I 
disagree.  (2.2, 4.4 and 6.5).  Alexander (2007, p152) said that “evidence based management 
assumes that available research is consistent with the problems and decision making 
conditions faced by those who will use evidence in practice”.  In his conclusions he notes 
that researchers must learn to think more like managers if their research is to be relevant and 
managers must learn to more effectively communicate their issues within the research 
community and frame their problems in researchable terms (4.1).  There is an on-going 
nature of the debate about managerialism and evidence.  The debate is evolving from 
managers use of ‘knowledge about knowledge’ in the private sector (Bailey and Clarke, 
2000) to a broader NHS and health care discussion (Kovner 2006, 2009).  The debate is also 
evolving from competitive advantage to an alignment between researchers and managers, but 
there is little empirical evidence to inform efforts to develop models in real world settings 
(3.1).  Walter (2004) says that a whole systems approach, where the use of research involves 
a collaborative effort between organisations and individuals, would be a positive way 
forward.  This is contradicted by Knowles (2008) in “command and control” to allocate 
resources; but both are consistent with the Rousseau Model (3.3).  Ultimately, the conclusion 
to be made from theory and other researchers, is that if you want to, you have tools available 
to do a Kovner (2009) style action research project, but that will not matter if the government 
is interventionist.  In this context – whether you are a Learmonth, Alexander or a Kovner – 
the key to using evidence or rejecting the use of evidence is the leader’s own decision to take 
charge of their destiny (7.5). 
 
Of all of my references, the most important to me has been Kovner (2009).  In his methods, 
he always espoused academic rigour.  When talking to managers in the field of healthcare he 
always took time to properly frame research questions, obtain evidence as to why 
intervention might/might not work in various contexts, evaluate evidence with a balance of 
viewpoints represented and consider when further evidence was needed to support a decision.  
If Pfefer (2006) is the consolidation of evidence based management in healthcare as a 
distinctive specialism in its own right, then Kovner (2009) is the place within which the 
specialism gains its first manual for operating in a field environment. 
 
9.3 Messages for the user of the study 
 
As to how the NHS works, where the services are located, how they are delivered I don’t find 
that managers use evidence.  I observe that there is some fact in there – for example in the 
use of joint strategic needs assessment, to inform decisions about need, but a lot of their 
decisions are based on history, politicians and key stakeholders and are not really evidence 
based (2.4).  I have drawn a model of the NHS with an evidence based organisation of 
knowledge that shows that NHS managers use decision making tools that reflect managers 
place as only one quadrant of the NHS structure.  If this diagram (2.4, table 1) is to be useful, 
it is to show that an NHS that moves on evidence based organisation of knowledge only to 
NHS managers, it will ignore the other players in the NHS – the politicians, patients and 
clinicians.  The NHS manager must also consider the circumstances of the decision and the 
ethical concern that the management decision may provoke.  Managerial freedom must also 
be considered when implementing an evidence based decision if it is likely to impact on the 
political cycle (3.4).   
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If evidence based practice is seen as something separate and distinctive from day to day 
decision making, then the prevailing management culture works it. On the other hand, 
evidence based practice may entail rejecting the accepted management orthodoxy and 
creating a separate quasi-autonomous enclave of interested practitioners.  Finally from my 
increased understanding and interpretation of findings it is possible to say that evidence 
based management has an identified and discernible impact on NHS management but it is not 
common and is certainly not in good health as a prevailing philosophy.  It is not the 
managers who will keep it alive and any implementation of evidence based management on a 
wide scale will require the importation of external skills and political will to implement.   An 
alternative approach is a willingness to take an evidence-based approach – and to use the bad 
news it brings as a stimulus for improvement.  For managers, looking at a service 
organisation for the first time from the customer’s point of view is a shock.  Typically they 
discover that the organisation is ticking all its boxes and still providing hopeless service to 
customers and citizens.  And from this comes another sobering revelation: the management 
methods used up to now are the problem, not the solution. 
 
9.4   Relationships between variables 
 
From paragraph 6.3 it is possible to construct the following simple table. 
 
“Evidence Based” 
Followed by the following 
word 
Is there a common 
agreement between NHS 
managers of the 
definition? 
Associations with this 
word or phrase  
0 being most negative, 
10 being the most 
positive 
Frequency of use of this 
word or phrase 
0 being very rarely, 
10 being very often 
Administration No 7 1 
Allocation Yes 9 3 
Argument No 3 3 
Decision Making Yes 4 9 
Leadership Yes 2 2 
Learning Yes 8 7 
Management No 7 8 
Reporting Yes 2 2 
 
So it is possible to say that the key pairings of evidence based are with learning and with 
management – although management itself is not clearly defined.  The most positive 
association is with evidence based allocations – the frequency of “decision making” may 
have been increased by my line of inquiry, but is the most common term. 
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Frank Blackler (2006) published in the Guardian Newspaper, his synopsis of what was 
good/bad in the political and managerial models of control in the NHS.  Taking that as a 
template, it is possible to say whether he was right or wrong from what I found in this 
project. 
 
Agree  or disagree x 
The present system of politically lead 
targeting is wasteful 
  An analysis of EMAS data shows an age 
bias in classification of patient need 
away/against the elderly (4.3) 
Targets are based on mistrust of managerial 
autonomy 
X It is a product of the managers not 
answering the ‘how do we know what 
we know’ consistently (3.1, 2.2) 
The NHS has enjoyed substantial increases in 
public funding and politicians are anxious 
about how the money is used 
 The craft of care has transformed into the 
machinery of the NHS supply system 
(8.3) 
Managers need to be treated with and behave 
with confidence 
 Otherwise, there will be a clash between 
prerogatives (7.1) 
Distinguish the strategic objective of a policy 
from day to day implementation 
X Targets are a political model, but the 
NHS is politically funded (2.4) 
Management in the NHS is not hard, it is 
why we have NHS management 
 The use of evidence is an exercise to 
control knowledge and choices (5.9) 
 
9.5  To finish 
 
If I were writing a note for the next Secretary of State for Health, the message I would give 
about evidence based management is: 
 “Dear Sir, as of today, there are 24 organisations that make up the NHS in the 
 East Midlands.  This ignores Government departments and refers only to  those 
organisations that are statutorily accountable and therefore, have a  Chief Executive.  In a 
three year study of this group, I have found them  capable, experienced and wise.  In the 
matter of making their decisions on  the basis of the evidence available to support their 
decisions the picture is  unfortunately, mixed.  The diagnosis of this is that elected 
parliamentarians,  the treasury and the public prefer to command the NHS to act in 
response to  NHS policy, rather than devolve to those Executive leaders the autonomy to 
 act upon evidence about the matter at hand.  The result is that we have an  NHS that 
is increasingly good at practicing evidence based medicine, but an  NHS in the East 
Midlands where managers are ambivalent about using  evidence based management.  
Some clinicians may make a great of this fact  to you.  Ignore them, the governance 
structure of the NHS does not allow  managers to be evidence based even if they wanted to”. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Distribution List: 
 
People who contributed to this study.  I would like to list them as a “thank you”, but also to assure the reader of 
the people who will vouch for me and the method pursued.  This is the failsafe that the quotations were 
collected and existed.  That the emails were sent and responded to.  That people knew this work was going on.  
That my peers, colleagues and superiors trusted me enough to also take part in this research willingly and at 
cost of their time.  Always with candour. 
 
 
Julie Acred – CEO Derby Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 
Tracy Allen Derbyshire County PCT 
Terry Allen Notts City PCT 
Terry Alty Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 
Paul Badger Derbyshire County PCT 
David Black Derbyshire County PCT 
Kathryn Blackshaw Derby City PCT 
Lee Bond Sherwood Forest PCT 
Maggie Boyd Derbyshire County PCT 
Derek Bray – CEO Derbyshire County PCT 
Brian Brewster East Midland Ambulance Service 
Paul Briddock Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 
Lisa Bromley Bassetlaw PCT  
Jayne Brown – CEO Doncaster PCT  
Andy Buck – CEO Rotherham PCT 
Danielle Cecchini Derbyshire Mental Health Services Trust  
Paula Clark – CEO Burton Hospital NHS Foundation Trust  
Nigel Clifton CEO – Doncaster & Bassetlaw  
Philip DaSilva NHS East Midlands  
Kate Davies Nottingham County PCT  
Cathy Edwards NORCOM  
David Goodall Doncaster & Bassetlaw PCT  
Catherine Griffiths – CEO Leicestershire County & Rutland  
Barbara Hakin NHS East Midlands 
Mike Harris Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust  
Sue Hitchenor NHS East Midlands 
Peter Homa – CEO Notts University Hospitals  
Brenda Howard NHS East Midlands  
Chris Kerrigan Notts County PCT  
Chris Linacre Sheffield Teaching Hospital  
David Lowe Derbyshire County Council  
Dave Marsden NHS East Midlands  
John McIvor – CEO Lincolnshire Teaching PCT 
Martin McShane Lincolnshire PCT  
Phil Mettam Bassetlaw PCT  
Eric Morton – CEO Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS Foundation Trust  
Oliver Newbould Leicester City  
Louise Newcombe – CEO Bassetlaw PCT  
Nigel Nice NHS Direct  
Kevin Orford NHS East Midlands;  
Paul Phillips East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust 
David Pitt Derbyshire Mental Health Services NHS Trust  
Neil Priestley – Sheffield Teaching Hospital  
Tim Rideout – CEO Leicester City  
Wendy Saviour – CEO Nottinghamshire County PCT 
Mike Shewan Derbyshire Mental Health Services NHS Trust  
Prem Singh – CEO Greater Derby PCT 
Chris Slavin Lincolnshire Partnership NHS Trust  
Nikki Tucker Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS Foundation Trust  
David Walker Regional Director of Public Health  
Sarah White Derbyshire County PCT 
Martin Whittle Derbyshire County PCT 
Jeffrey Worrall – CEO Sherwood Forest  
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APPENDIX B 
 
LETTER OF INVITE: 
 
 
Dear Colleague 
 
Help!   
 
I am currently undertaking a Doctorate of Business Administration.  Yes, I know all the 
typical “get a life” things you say, but the NHS is deeply engaged in the practice of Evidence 
Based Medicine and I wish to consider the extend to which evidence based practice is a norm 
or an ideal for daily professional management in the National Health Service.  To what extent 
do we, as practicing NHS Managers think Evidence Based Healthcare Management is an 
appropriate tool to resolve problems and what do we actually use?  (A copy of the full 
research outline is attached should you wish to understand my objectives in more detail). 
 
My reasons for writing to you are that I wish to make this more than a dusty academic 
treatment of the subject.  It is my hope to work with my NHS colleagues over the next couple 
of years in making this a project that listens to and informs our experiences as leaders in the 
NHS today. 
 
You can contribute in a number of ways.  By replying that you do or do not want to 
participate – even a positive “no” is very helpful to me in shaping cohorts to correspond with.  
If you are a “yes” then would you like to participate in the following ways: 
 
• As part of a focus group that will meet 2 or 3 times in the next 18 months involving 
8-10 people with a semi-structured agenda? 
• As a face to face 1:1 interviewee for about 2, 2 hour sessions over the next 18 
months? 
• As an e-mail and written responder to a structured set of questions a couple of times 
in the next 18 months? 
• Any of the above? 
 
I look forward to your replies. 
 
ps  If you can think of anybody else who you think would really enjoy getting involved in 
this, I would love to have their names. 
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APPENDIX C 
EMAIL FOR 1:1: 
 
 
 
Thanks for agreeing to give me some 1:1 time as part of my qualitative research towards my 
doctorate.  You don't need to do anything in preparation and will be one of a number people I 
am interviewing this autumn and winter.  In addition, I will be analysing a verbatim 
transcript part of 3 significant NHS meetings - most likely the Directors of Commissioning 
for the East Midlands, the East Midlands 18 Week group and either the Board or the 
Executive Management Team of Derbyshire PCT.  Through these methods I hope to gain 
some observations on the nature of "Evidence Based Management in the NHS".  I would 
expect to circulate the attached structured interview questions that I am using with you (the 
questions - not your answers) to a wider cohort of NHS leaders in the East Midlands for their 
written responses but only if our 1:1 interview(s) are a success. 
 
In Case you need reminding, this is the essential reason I am doing this doctorate.  Over the 
last few years I have been in a quandary about something and that is whether the notion of 
being a manager could be, within the NHS, grouped within an evidence based organisation of 
knowledge.  I made 20 years as a moderately successful NHS manager, having qualified as 
an accountant with the NHS.  On the one hand the discipline of the ‘balance sheet’ gave a 
respectability to the performance management methods used by me to help shape the patient 
care, but the use of that tool was necessarily shaped by the business and value model upon 
which it is based.  Not all companies that employ accountants are successes so where was the 
equivalent for an ‘evidence base’ within the literature? 
 
Anyway, in summary……a big, big thanks for giving up your time and I look forward to 
listening to you. 
 
Regards 
 
David 
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APPENDIX D 
QUESTIONS: 
 
 
A synopsis of Evidence Based Management for this meeting 
 
What is already known in this research area? 
 
Learmonth, an academic and former NHS manager, suggests that in the long term the very 
study of evidence based management is likely to inhibit rather than encourage a fuller 
understanding of the nature of evidence based management.  Pfeffer has managed to write a 
definition of evidence based management and says that this is not how managers make 
decisions but that they instead focus on their own thoughts.  Rousseau is entirely supportive 
of Pfeffer and, after exploring the promise that research offers for improved practice 
concludes that at present, it falls short.  Elliot in a study of NHS managers provides some 
explanations for the constraints upon managers that prevent the use of research evidence. 
 
What each of these writers say, is that the most successful NHS organisations would share 
one common strength – outstanding use of knowledge acquired through research (evidence).  
They would produce evidence the way that they need in order to inform decision making by 
management.  Using an expertise with evidence they would make the best decisions, minor 
and major, everyday. 
 
Opposing theoretical and methodological approaches to this research area? 
 
Pearson takes issue with Learmonth and says that the whole concept of what constitutes 
evidence is itself, full of inequality and prejudice.  Murphy, Mintzberg, Soltani may be taken 
as a direct challenge to the whole concept of evidence based management.  In any case, they 
argue that there is a reason for the craft of management and personal experience to 
supplement evidence based management in context specific ways.  Malterud manages to 
deconstruct the whole notion of a scientific approach to the knowledge of medicine. 
 
Writers such as Delbanco, Davies, Dopson and Mitten propose that organisational 
effectiveness is not a result of effective management process or people but instead a 
combination of both.  Issues such as organisational culture, leadership, total-quality 
management philosophies and innovative ways of budget setting are all claimed to have at 
least as great an impact on organisational outcomes as well researched decision making. 
 
Karl suggests that in adversarial process advocates seek to prevail through the enjoyment of 
power, rather than through evidence based solutions and develops an alternative practical 
model of collaboration through join fact finding is proposed.  Smith supports the search for 
alternatives because, in the author’s view, uncritical reliance on performance data can lead to 
a number of unintended and adverse consequences and Pearson says that evidence gathering 
is too slow to properly influence policy.  
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
My interpretation of SDO research and my connection to it. 
 
The National Institute for Health Research Services Delivery and Organisation Programme 
(NIHR SDO, commonly abbreviated to its shorter form SDO) has commissioned research on 
several themes concerned with management practice in health organisations.  Their 
overarching strategic aims are to “add to the evidence base that is relevant to the practice of 
managers” and  “the development of links between academic institutions and NHS 
organisations in this area”.  (www.sdo.ishtm.ac.uk/ecashome.html).  
 
Since April 2009 the management of the SDO programme has now transferred to the 
National Institute for Health Research Evaluations, Trials and Studies Co-ordinating Centre 
(NETSCC) based at the University of Southampton. 
 
There are six distinct research projects as follows: 
 
Reference Lead Researcher Duration Title 
 
08/1808/242 Professor Sue Dopson 1 July 2009 - 
31 July 2012 
Increasing the motivation and 
ability of Health Care 
Managers to access and use 
management research  
08/1808/241 Dr Paula Hyde 1 January 2009 
–  
1 July 2012 
Roles and behaviours of 
middle and junior managers: 
managing new organisational 
forms of health care 
08/1808/243 Professor Christine 
Edwards 
1 January 2009 
–  
2 March 2012 
Explaining Health Managers’ 
information seeking behaviour 
and use 
08/1808/244 Professor Jacqueline 
Swan 
1 January 2009 
–  
31 December 
2011 
Evidence in Management 
Decisions (EMD) – 
Advancing knowledge 
utilisation in healthcare 
management 
08/1808/236 Professor Chris Ham 1 March 2009 – 
28 February 
2011 
Models of medical leadership 
and their effectiveness 
08/1801/220 Professor Ewan Ferlie 1 October 2008 
–  
31 January 
2010 
Research utilisation and 
knowledge mobilisation – A 
scoping study 
 
 
My organisation is the field study for project 244 lead by a team from Warwick University 
with the principle on-site researcher being Emmanouil Gkeredakis.  The Lay Summary of 
this project is: 
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Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) receive the bulk of the NHS budget to allow them to 
commission health services for their local populations. They are charged with ensuring that 
healthcare provided to patients is "World Class." 
 
However commissioning decisions are very complex. They involve different kinds of experts 
(commissioning and finance managers, public health experts) and many different criteria 
(quality, cost, patient benefit), all of which have to be carefully weighed up when coming to 
agreements about the best evidence upon which to base decisions. There is a great deal of 
unexplained variation in 
the ways in which managers in different PCTs actually commission health services. 
 
Within the NHS, and internationally, a lot of thought and effort has gone into producing 
resources for managers so that they have the knowledge and information they need to 
commission services effectively.  
 
In this research SDO will undertake in-depth qualitative research (case studies and 
observations of decisions) to discover how, why, and when managers in different roles use 
knowledge and information in NHS commissioning decisions. SDO will use the findings 
from this stage of the research to design a survey to test findings on a wider sample of NHS 
managers. 
 
The results will be of direct relevance to the daily work of managers throughout the NHS, 
and of direct relevance to the public for whom services are commissioned. SDO will be 
better placed to identify the barriers and facilitators (organisational, cultural, and practical) to 
evidence-based practices in NHS management. 
 
SDO will disseminate their work widely in order to inform policymakers and managers. The 
aim is that managers can be best equipped to make good decisions for the health of their local 
populations. 
 
My organisation also supported an application for project 242 lead by a team from Keele 
University working with GPs in North Derbyshire and Chesterfield Royal Hospital which 
was ultimately unsuccessful.  This has been pursued as an internally funded consultancy 
project.  The lay summary of project 242 is: 
 
Despite much work on how clinicians use and enact clinical research which is now well 
known, there is less on health care managers' use of management research and how this 
might be evolving. Previous research has suggested that health care managers often lack the 
skills to access and process research findings and play a marginal role in the R&D area. It is 
possible that these findings are now dated and that a better-developed research base and 
culture is now emerging within health care management. We believe that this novel idea 
requires further investigation. Specifically, we wish to investigate under what circumstances 
and how do managers (both general managers and hybrid-clinical managers) access and use 
management research based knowledge in their decision-making. 
 
The design of the study uses mixed methods, having a linked, three-stage design which 
deliberately explores the boundary between management research and practice. The 
deliberate exploration of knowledge utilisation process in settings critical to the 21st century 
health economy will provide new research data to help policy makers and managers broadly 
defined, and benefit use
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The Interviewees What sort of person are they? What is their Profession? Period in the East Midlands 
A 
Paragraph 5.1, 5.2, 5.4, 5.7, 6.3 
 
Male, 50’s 
 
Accountant 
 
East Midlands 10 years + 
B 
Paragraph 5.1, 5.2, 6.3, 7.2, 8.3 
 
Male, 40’s 
 
Doctor 
 
East Midlands 3 years +  
C 
Paragraph 5.2x2, 5.5, 5.7, 6.2, 7.1 
 
Female, 50’s 
 
Accountant 
 
East Midlands 10 years + 
D 
Paragraph 5.2, 5.7, 6.2, 6.3, 7.2 
 
Male, 50’s 
 
Medical 
 
East Midlands 3 years + 
E 
Paragraph 5.3, 5.7, 7.1 
 
Male 50’s   
 
Doctor 
 
East Midlands 10 years + 
F 
Paragraph 5.3, 7.4 
 
Male 40’s  
 
Marketing and Supply chain 
 
East Midlands 3 years + 
G 
Paragraph 5.6, 6.3, 7.2 
 
Male 40’s  
 
Doctor 
 
East Midlands 10 years + 
H 
Paragraph 5.6, 7.1 
 
Male 40’s   
 
Law 
 
East Midlands 10 years + 
I 
Paragraph 5.6, 7.4 
 
Female 40’s 
 
MBA 
 
East Midlands 10 years+ 
J 
Paragraph 5.6 
 
Male 40’s.   
 
MBA 
 
East Midlands 3 years+ 
K 
Paragraph 5.6 
 
Female 30’s.   
 
Accountant/Audit 
 
East Midlands 10 years + 
L 
Paragraph 6.3, 8.4 
 
Male 50’s.   
 
Scientist 
 
East Midlands 10 years + 
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1.    A Theoretical Model to Apply 
In June 2009 I received the following notice – 
“In England, the majority of decisions about the organisation and provision of local 
health services are made by Primary Care Trusts (PCTs).  PCTs receive a significant 
proportion of the overall National Health Service (NHS) budget, which they use to 
commission health services for their local populations.  In this stud, we aim to 
understand how NHS managers make decisions about commissioning health 
services.  We want to know what information they use to make these decisions and 
whether NHS management can become more “evidence-based”.  By doing this we 
hope our findings can be used to inform the practice of commissioning in the future.”  
Emmanouil Gkeredakis – University of Warwick. 
It was rewarding to see that others were joining this field of study.  It is reassuring to 
see that this type of qualitative analysis is still worthy of study in the NHS, almost 
three years after I began my project.  What I think the Warwick study fails to 
understand and what I have based most of my study on, is the fundamental 
importance that the role of executive leaders have in setting organisational outcome 
in the NHS.  I therefore feel vindicated as I complete document 6 and reflect on my 
learning journey that my thesis had something important to say.  
1.1  Metacognition 
J. H. Flavell first used the word "metacognition" (1976).    
The reasons this has been important to me in my study is that I have been looking 
for a model that describes my learning process before and during this doctoral study 
The benefit of the metacognition model is that it helps me to understand the use of 
knowledge in my executive role in the NHS.  Executive management processes 
involve planning, monitoring, evaluating and revising one's own thinking processes 
and products. Strategic knowledge involves knowing what (factual or declarative 
knowledge), knowing when and why (conditional or contextual knowledge) and 
knowing how (procedural or methodological knowledge). Both executive 
management and strategic knowledge metacognition are needed to self-regulate 
one's own thinking and learning (Hartman, 2001). 
A significant issue during my DBA has been a metacognition one.  It has been 
difficult (and sometimes I have not been able) to distinguish between the why and 
the how of what I do as a manager in the NHS.  I thought that this part of the journey 
was very helpful at this stage in my life.  Halfway through a 45 year NHS career if it 
all goes to plan, I was making lots of decisions and here for the first time, thinking 
about why.  At Masters level, I described systems in a reductionist way as being 
passive, but the why was much more human and difficult to deal with.  This gave me 
the option to go different ways in different scenarios and managed to engage my 
passion for the NHS as well as being intellectually challenging. 
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1.2 Working in Groups or Alone 
Converse to the individual journey, I did not find working in groups to decide on a 
course of action at all revealing.  The cohort were all competent at debate and 
interaction and explaining the positions taken, but there was little collaboration 
except to retrace the ‘audit trail’ of the decisions we made to arrive at our choices.  
Possibly because I switched from cohort 7 (where I was struggling to keep up to 
time) to cohort 8 (where some group structure pre-existed my introduction) the 
experience I had of group work was magnified. 
I found the tutorials useful in thinking about how I got an answer.  In the NHS much 
of the data I receive is collected, graded and sifted before I see it.  Given the right 
algorithm to turn this data into information, I just write down the answer.  But, if you 
have to go right back to describing your method for data collection, you really do 
have to understand how you got your answer.  A novelty. 
The revelation to be honest, is that I am terrible at working with others.  It is not that I 
can’t do the team-player mindset at work (my 360° survey by peers, seniors and 
direct reports, suggests I am accessible and trusted and participate well) it is just that 
I like to be in the ‘me’ shell.  Sitting in a North American airport with six hours to kill to 
work on a DBA on my own is a treat and the time flies too quickly.  It is almost as if I 
feel that anything other than 1 to 1 conversation on part of the DBA (after the formal 
lecturing finished) is cheating me of time I could be doing something more interesting 
on the DBA. 
Throughout much of this study I have contemplated the nature of the lone research 
practitioner.  Individually I have found this a fascinating journey but it has caused me 
to question whether it was possible to do anything worthwhile whilst immersed in 
such an intensely personal topic. 
Adrian Bejan, a professor at Duke’s Pratt School of Engineering, argues that while 
the trend at major universities is the creation of large research groups focused on a 
particular problem, the individual researcher will not disappear.  
There is only one thing I can do about all of this.  That is to have courage and trust.  
To join a learning set of like minded individuals about evidence based management, 
or just management.  To engage often and maybe aim to be the positive one.  There 
is a real danger that my lethargy makes the group lethargic, so I resolve to be the 
project core not the periphery.  This should be more dangerous, more fun and in 
opening up my skills and opinions to greater and regular scrutiny, the quality of my 
academic work should improve too.  I realise that working with others is a start on 
the way to achieving my true potential. 
1.3 Being positive and actually writing the Doctorate 
The biggest learning for me is the need to be able to work with positive people.  If 
you have ever sat in a seminar doing some group work on an easy task then you 
know that nothing is worse than working with lethargic people.  The level of 
‘unmotivation’ in the room is stultifying.  The taught element of a DBA is the complete 
opposite.  You find yourself just as inspired as people around you.  In that kind of 
environment, I love group and partner work.  So the thing I am going to do differently, 
because of this DBA, is always to be the project enthusiast.  Encourage the group to 
put effort into what we are doing and, if the task is easy, re-define the group effort 
into something along the same lines, but that is able to inspire the talents of the think 
tank assembled for the next fifteen minutes.  My opening line now is and will be 
“you’ll find yourself having a lot more fun if you simply go with the flow and let the 
creativity flow”.  In addition, my own contribution will be higher quality. 
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Kamler and Thomson say this:  
“Writing the dissertation lies at the centre of doctoral education. It is through writing 
that students make their findings known to the public and develop a sense of 
themselves as authorised scholars. Yet, in many universities, writing is treated as 
ancillary to the real work of research - as the invisible and taken for granted labour of 
the doctorate (Kamler and Thomson 2001)”. 
The hardest part of this doctorate for me has been the writing.  It is clear that without 
help from my tutors the ideas and analysis would never have got to paper.  
Furthermore, I must complement my tutors on trying to make what I write an 
authentic form of what I say. 
As a successful student at professional, undergraduate and masters level, this has 
been a vital part of the doctoral journey. 
2.    Where the Research Question came from 
2.1  The Initial dilemma 
There was an episode of the BBC TV programme ‘Casualty’ on a couple weeks ago, 
and I caught a bit of it while working on some projects around the house. As I 
watched it became pretty clear that every episode is built around solving a complex 
medical problem. And 90% of the show is spent learning about the problem, finding 
new pieces of information, and testing incorrect assumptions.  
I think this is a pretty good description of lots of a lot of projects I’ve worked on as an 
NHS manager and project manager. Lots of doctors and managers want to get the 
“Problem Definition” done as soon as possible, and get on to the “real work” of 
solving the problem. But there’s real danger there, it’s easy to define and solve the 
wrong problem.  
I like the system they use in casualty - there’s a central whiteboard which contains a 
description of the problem they’re trying to solve. As the show progresses, the 
problem definition is continuously updated, and the diagnostic team comes up with 
various theories. I’ve worked on projects where we the managers didn’t have a clear 
understanding of the problem, or where our understanding of the problem was 
months and months out of date.  
The result was that we built the solutions and policies that solved the wrong problem, 
or in the best case, answers that solved the right problem in the wrong way. Either 
way, what we built fit the user stories we got for that iteration, but wasn’t “well 
designed” in terms of solving the core problem. In both cases, it was very clear as I 
talked to the patients, doctors and nurses, that we could have spent less time, and 
built better policies if we’d just had a clear and up to date picture of the clinical world.  
The National Health Service (NHS) is the "public face" of the three publicly funded 
health care systems of Great Britain (Northern Ireland does not use the title) and the 
full title of the national public health service for England. The NHS provides the 
majority of healthcare in England, from general practitioners to Accident and 
Emergency Departments, long-term healthcare and dentistry. It was founded in 1948 
and has become an integral part of English society, culture and everyday life: the 
NHS was once described by Nigel Lawson, former Chancellor of the Exchequer, as 
"the national religion". Private health care has continued parallel to the NHS, paid for 
largely by private insurance, but it is used only by a small percentage of the 
population, and generally as a top-up to NHS services. NHS services are largely 
"free at the point of delivery", paid for by taxes; the NHS's budget for 2006–07 is £96 
billion.  Employing over 1.3 million people, the NHS is the largest employer in Europe 
and one of the largest employers in the world, (believed to be third or fifth, according 
to different commentators).  So the NHS requires lots and lots of people to run it.  
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Within this I have been a manager and as a manager you can “administrate” and 
electively hide or be a proper manager and change things. 
Over the last few years I have been in a quandary about something and that is 
whether the notion of being a manager could be, within the NHS, grouped within an 
evidence based organisation of knowledge.  On the one hand the discipline of the 
‘balance sheet’ gave a respectability to the performance management methods used 
by me to help shape the patient care, but the use of that tool was necessarily shaped 
by the business and value model upon which it is based.  Not all companies that 
employ accountants are successes so where was the equivalent for an ‘evidence 
base’ within the literature? 
2.2  Getting in amongst the players 
The author holds a senior management position in the National Health Service.  The 
National Health Service being under transition affects the individual professionally 
therefore there is a subjective bias in the analysis of EBHM in the NHS. This issue of 
being a player in the system under review will qualify the judgements and 
interpretations of the researcher.  Significantly the researcher has been a player in 
the National Health Service system since 1987, during which time many theoretical 
and practical models have been applied to the NHS.  The National Health Service is 
an organisation that continues to deliver services.  As with all socio-economic 
models, it is not possible to hold the day to day experiences of patients and the 
public frozen, therefore it is not possible to experiment with the system which will 
affect people’s lives just for the purposes of observation. The organisation that 
employs the individual is part-funding this research, therefore the NHS has a 
discernable desire to achieve a piece of management information. 
Remembering that part of my essential purpose was to hold up a mirror to NHS 
managers in the East Midlands, what did I see in that mirror about myself?  What did 
I learn on a personal level about my response to evidence based management?  I 
learned that I was only capable of a low level of accommodation in response to 
changes in my environment.  My culture within this organisational culture had meant 
that I experienced a low level of assimilation.  Information from the wider 
environment would be accepted and processed, but it was never sought or 
accessed.  Any desire or awareness of the need to modify how things are currently 
done came as a response to a policy imperative and heavy central directions.  The 
appropriate environmental response was not to evidence, but policy and within that a 
forensic level of policy compliance.  So why did I do this?  My conclusion is that of 
two parts.  Part one is that, consistent with other senior managers, the NHS in the 
East Midlands did not contain the necessary knowledge from which to choose a 
more adaptive response and the prevailing group culture discourages attaining that 
knowledge.  Part two is that on a personal level, the culture had strictly punished me 
when my particular responses had been more adaptive.  At job recruitment, my 
answer of “the answer is in the library” as opposed to “my experience of answering 
the problem is” was deemed insufficient to get the job! 
I have worked high up and low down in the management hierarchy and my 
experience of EBM was that it faced/faces being squeezed by two forces that both 
oppose its very existence in the NHS management lexicon and toolbox.  Unlike 
Medicine and Nursing in the NHS, management is not a profession.  Put crudely, it is 
considered a task or an overhead.  With the exception of Finance roles there is no 
established legal or cultural requirement regarding education or knowledge for an 
individual to become a manager the way there is for Doctor, Nurse, Physiotherapist, 
Podiatrist, etc.  This does not mean that NHS managers are not legion in their 
BSC’s, their MBA’s, even their Doctoral qualifications but it does mean that no formal 
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disciplinary body or professional pressure exists to promote use of evidence by any 
manager who refuses to do so.   
2.3  Science or ambiguity: how I take decisions at work 
Are decision making tools disciplined or does it follow the hopes of the managers?  
The reason for reviewing this particular question in the literature is the juxtaposition 
of science and management.  This is important for the NHS because the practice of 
medicine is bounded by the scientific method.  Medical progress, the development of 
pharmaceuticals, the review of outcomes following a randomised control trial and 
even public health interventions are progressed using a cycle of observation-
recording-discourse and conclusion.  If that is true for the medicine then what of the 
management system that manages the medicine?   
The desire for managers in public services to portray that they know all they need to 
know to make decisions for the public, is very persuasive.  Ambiguity and research 
leading to conclusion may not be the model preferred by the public even if the NHS 
manager were to express such a preference.  Starting with the possible methods for 
conducting this literature review, I myself am demonstrating some of the bias 
inherent in NHS management to precise rather than deliberating decision making.   
Significant writers in the study of NHS management and evidence based 
management such as Learmonth and Rousseau are studied and a conceptual 
framework “The Evidence Based NHS Box” is discussed and used to reference 
ideas about the subject.  The key outcomes of the NHS such as improving health, 
value for money, wellbeing and better experience of care are taken as givens but the 
management responses to this problem are compared from the views of those who 
propose and oppose evidence based management. 
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2. 4 The role of the tutor in shaping this problem with me 
Preparation:  My preparation was poor for the DBA and for the individual documents 
within the DBA.  My goals were often poor and it was occasionally a struggle to fit 
clearly within the marking guidelines without help.  I say this not as a confessional, 
but because of something it taught me.  If you are not clear what you want out of the 
project, it is difficult to be clear about what you think is your bottom line.  This would 
have made it easier for me and my tutors to be clear about the point when I could 
offer no more.  It would have made it possible to be much clearer about which parts 
of the study I was willing to walk away from or even to be clear when we were in a 
stalemate position. 
The opportunity, both in and out of work, to spend time thinking about one’s work, 
one’s growth and development as a manager, and one’s growing edges was a novel 
and positive experience for all me.  I found that the space and time that was created  
allowed me to slow down and process, and be able to present different ideas.  The 
personal journal of learning (Cantwell & Holmes, 1994) provided an effective place 
for me to reflect on the multiple layers of my experience.  At the beginning of the 
doctorate I was reticent—and even unwilling—to keep a journal, yet, in the end was 
genuinely surprised at how helpful it was in keeping me focused on my own growth, 
and personally meaningful.   It was more than just an outlet for my reflections, it also 
became the vehicle by which I learned to be self-reflective, to struggle to identify and 
express one’s thoughts and feelings regarding my own development as an 
academic.  My tutor was incredibly useful in helping me to see the experience of 
study as important to my final thesis. 
2.5  How EBM has affected my working life 
Evidence-based management (EBMgt) is an emerging movement to explicitly use 
the current, best evidence in management decision-making. Its roots are in 
evidence-based medicine, a quality movement to apply the scientific method to 
medical practice. 
Evidence-based management entails managerial decisions and organisational 
practices informed by the best available scientific evidence. Like its counterparts in 
medicine (Sackett 2000) and education (Thomas & Pring, 2004), the judgments 
EBMgt entails also consider the circumstances and ethical concerns managerial 
decisions involve. In contrast to medicine and education, however, EBMgt today is 
only hypothetical. Contemporary managers and management educators make 
limited use of the vast behavioural science evidence base relevant to effective 
management practice (Walshe & Rundall, 1999; Rousseau, 2005, 2006; Pfeffer & 
Sutton, 2001). 
I now understand that as an NHS leader I respond slowly to changes in the 
environment of the NHS.  Without the study of the Masters and DBA I would be – 
and will have to avoid being in the future – closed to options other than the status 
quo.  NHS culture is (despite my professional and academic training) slow to 
respond to information from the environment or does not accept the data into the 
decision making model.  When it comes to evidence based management (the core 
subject of my thesis) the biggest problem was there is no desire or awareness of the 
need to modify how things are currently being done.  As a government department in 
the midst of major economic turmoil you might think that taking the time to ask “what 
works best?” would be vital, or at best valid.  The leadership and organisational 
response to this problem has been frustratingly slow. 
Critical theorists have raised objections to the movement (Learmonth & Harding, 
2006; Learmonth, 2006). In particular, it has been criticised for treating "evidence" 
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and "scientific method" as if they were neutral tools. From this perspective, 
"management" is not necessarily an automatic good thing - it often involves the 
exercise of power and the exploitation of others. Efforts have been made, however, 
to include a balanced treatment of such issues in reviewing and interpreting the 
research literature for practice (Rousseau, Manning & Denyer, 2008). 
Some of the publications in this area are Evidence-Based Management (Pfeffer & 
Sutton, 2006), Harvard Business Review (Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006), and Hard Facts, 
Dangerous Half-Truths and Total Nonsense: Profiting From Evidence-Based 
Management (Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006). Some of the people conducting research on 
the effects of evidence-based management are Jeffrey Pfeffer, Robert I. Sutton, and 
Tracy Allison Altman. Pfeffer and Sutton have recently opened a web site dedicated 
to the movement. 
On a personal level I have tended to lead successful teams of high performing 
individuals and usually inherited maturing or well established teams but have rarely 
been asked to establish new organisations when the NHS goes through its periodic 
regular re-organisation.  So a pattern emerges throughout my 20 year career in the 
NHS of being the director who succeeds the first Chief Executive in an organisation, 
the team player who replaces the first team leader when they leave and so on.  I 
have worked in parts of the NHS that used EBM sparingly.  For example the 
recruitment of leaders is supported by the evidence that it is possible to assess 
future leaders through competency based extrapolation of their past performance 
and also by evidence that emotional intelligence correlates with predictions of 
successful leadership.  EBM has existed in two ways, as a self critique by managers 
that some of the decisions or assertions are just plain errors which would improve if 
based on evidence of what works, and as an exploration of the differences in culture 
that exist between NHS doctors who are increasingly evidence based and NHS 
managers who are seen to make little progress in adopting the concept.  
2.6 Peer Approval 
Watching one’s peers work was helpful to me for a variety of reasons.   For one, 
observation was a way to learn new skills or techniques, and also provided a chance 
to compare one’s own style of working to another’s.  On an emotional level, watching 
others work was both calming and anxiety-provoking depending upon the 
perspective of my own work and the perception of the peer I was observing.    
The diversity within the group of NHS managers I studied with regard to age, 
race/ethnicity, level of experience as therapists, and theoretical orientation was also 
identified as an important facilitator of reflectivity. Diverse backgrounds allowed for 
multiple viewpoints and perspectives to be shared and discussed and often spurred 
further reflection in students’ journals.   
The attitudinal stances that I took were important factors in whether I could be 
reflective. It was easy for when I was being confident, self-efficacious, open to 
learning, and non-defensive about my work to be reflective.    For my tutors who 
were motivated by the challenges of the course rather than overwhelmed and 
defensive, being reflective seemed to come naturally.     
Personal difficulties, at times, played a role in encouraging reflective practice.  Life 
events such as the breakup of a significant relationship, a low grade on module 2, 
adjusting to a new city, becoming a parent, or struggling with parenting issues, 
tended to focus energy on an internal process of self-reflection.  In addition, my 
personal difficulties with anxiety, doubt, and struggling with one’s professional choice 
or not feeling competent stimulated a desire to be increasingly aware of one’s own 
approach to other NHS managers with a deeper understanding and empathy for the 
difficulties presented.     
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There were some constraints within the training context that hindered me from being 
reflective.  Some of these are consistent with the cognitive demands inherent in a 
DBA program in general, which places significant demands on students in terms of 
time and workload.  Sometimes I found the workload to be too great and left too little 
time to be reflective about one’s own growth.    As a less experienced student, the 
facilitator’s “hands-off style” was a factor that made it easy for me to maintain a 
reflective stance with my peers. 
3      What worked and didn’t work 
3.1 Worked: The literature review: conceptual framework and literature search           
drew me into a much wider community 
Accountants do not traditionally deal with qualitative data such as whether a patient 
was happy or sad or whether it looked like to him, that his father would die when a 
patient brought him to the emergency service.  Qualitative data is not objective.  It 
cannot be reliably verified.  Quantitative data can often be verified – you can see the 
evidence on paper that it is correct.  Accountants like myself, like things to be clear 
and unambiguous, for there to be no doubt, for the amounts presented to be clearly 
verifiable.  In the literature review and throughout document 3 and document 4, I 
followed a reflective journey concerned with the need to be more flexible, more 
willing to embrace new sources of data from qualitative sources.  There is still a 
problem that I face through traditional research designs that usually rely on a 
literature review leading to the formation of a hypothesis.   
I am drawn to the notion that the ultimate goal of the DBA is a blog and a facebook 
page, where I will join a community of like minded practitioners and that the DBA is 
the entry requirement for a journey rather than the end in itself.  The key to all of this 
is that the presence of trust is essential to the creation of this and I intend to shake 
the hands of as many of the participants as possible.  I do believe that as the NHS 
works through the next three to five years of a much harsher macro economic 
climate, then the creation of such an endeavour will fit nicely into the broader range 
of academic centres well able to support more formal knowledge exchanges.  The 
unique selling point of my facebook group, if there is to be one, will be to be clear 
about the bad knowledge. 
3.2   Didn’t Work: Making my new knowledge trusted and shared by my 
management colleagues 
The academics are best at the distribution of good knowledge, but there is a place 
for suitably qualities and trusted networks to run their/our own hierarchy of evidence 
within the cadre of NHS managers.  The question of whether the knowledge 
available to us is valid within our experience and needs as NHS managers, isn’t one 
that can be settled easily, because we have too little time to do it and anyway, 
experts themselves disagree.  Instead, we can run our own hierarchy by using our 
job positions to take some actions ourselves to test the validity of the knowledge.  
Evidence-based-management within the NHS will therefore be grounded in an 
emergent process of continuous learning that leads both to better choices and a “fail 
fast” culture that exposes the practices that are least able to improve things. 
The literature review offers the following insights. 
Discourse analysis (1952) is defined as “concerned with the interrelationships 
between language and societies and as concerned with the interactive or dialogic 
properties of everyday communication”.  To this are added two subdivisions – genre 
and ideology.  All of this is relevant in my study of management in the NHS because 
of genre and ideology.  What is vital for the reader to understand as we progress on 
to the analysis of a specific decision, is that, without retro-fitting onto my material 
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there was something that I hadn’t anticipated, that a real human narrative evolves 
and in the conclusion I use the Rousseau model to reveal that however the manager 
feels about ‘evidence’ as useful in their day to day behaviour they think they are 
playing a different game. 
So what does this tell me about the nature of knowledge?  The thing about the DBS 
is that it creates learning sets and tutorials and that is the thing that I found hardest 
to fit in with.  I acknowledge that knowledge flourishes in connections and 
relationships.  Part of my qualitative study was about the nature of facet or craft 
knowledge.  Different to explicit knowledge (that can be accessed and shared 
through many channels), this facet knowledge is shared by trusted colleagues 
showing a reciprocal desire to exchange knowledge with each other.  So the learning 
for me is that I must make the building of connections and relationships a priority and 
the challenge will be to network the conclusions of this DBA.  Tony Kovner told me to 
spend less time worrying what I said in my DBA thesis and more time figuring out 
how I was going to give it a presence afterwards. 
4     The personal Journey 
4.1 Personal Commitment – occasional and inspirational 
Personal commitment was a real issue throughout the doctorate.  I had planned for 
the doctorate to take me about 1200 hours or 8 hours a week x 50 weeks a year x 3 
years.  Would that it had been that simple to stick to the plan with work, family, 
redundancy and travel. 
Fulfilling obligations to the rest of my life as well as the doctorate were complicated 
when I had to move jobs, but I was my own problem maker, when in 2007 I was co-
opted to run an all ages football club in Nottinghamshire.  In the end though, the 
doctorate was the respite from the rest of my life. 
Proper training and explicit planning are the signs of a successful athlete and team, 
so I applied the same logic to the doctorate and it seems to work.  Early morning 
starts before the family had gotten up, proper diary management so that everyone 
knew when the doctorate deadlines were and always having my paperwork with me 
when I was sent away in hotels and on aeroplanes by work, broke the task down into 
the consumption of those hours.  At no time did I doubt my personal commitment, 
but I had to prioritise it by applying sports planning. 
Motivated by commitment to the NHS, this was what meant that the endeavour 
remained a pleasant, even fun, experience.  I am American by birth, indeed, still am 
a citizen of the USA, yet the thing that makes the UK better than the USA is the 
National Health Service.  The problem remains though how should we deliver rising 
standards of healthcare in a taxpayer-funded, free-at-the-point-of-use system, in 
which treatment is provided to all in the basis of need not ability to pay.  So I always 
felt that my doctorate would help contribute to the answer. 
Motivation and commitment to the doctorate came best when I had the protected 
time to do the work and think about what I was doing.  But is was a rare moment of 
alchemy that made the work progress – I remember 6 hours in a New York airport 
and one time when I just had to get up at 3.00am to write something I had been 
thinking about, as times when the time, the inspiration, the material and the 
conclusions all came together. 
Confidence and change within the DBA study programme was very slow.  All I ever 
managed to do was follow a steady linear line upwards, knocking off the tasks one 
by one, module by module, document by document.  The whole process will 
hopefully make more sense looking backwards, but whilst I have been in it the task 
  265 
has been harder than my other degrees or either of my professional qualifications, 
although the time frame has been similar for all of them. 
4.2 Changes in my personal life 
Some changes in my life during the doctorate hit my emotions very hard.  If I had 
known that I would go through two family deaths, redundancy, divorce, a new baby 
to add to my teenage children and moving house whilst doing the doctorate, I am not 
sure I would have thought it the best time to do a DBA.  Throughout it all though the 
timetable was always a couple of months behind, time I never caught up from the 
beginning, but never getting further behind either. 
Making decisions in my life and having some other things thrown at me, never 
stopped the sense of purpose that this was the right window of opportunity to be 
doing this particular type of study.  In the end my kids have remained supportive of 
the endeavour and my boss has kept writing the annual contributions to my tuition 
fees.  So I have been lucky with the level of external support I received.  It might be 
deep to call it all “tolerance and compassion” but that is the way that I think I have 
felt my family, friends, work and even my tutor have dealt with the DBA task as the 
rest of my life threw up myriad challenges.  I think they have helped me to re-
prioritise things and also understand when the final product delivery reflected 
multiple overlapping and competing objectives. 
Beliefs and culture play a large part in the attitude to education.  If you come from a 
tradition that values study as a form of leadership or even prayer, then it is 
philosophically much easier to find the time in the “noise” of life to continue with a 
doctorate.  I am lucky that I come from such a tradition. 
4.3  My Changing Value Set 
I have seen a lot of things and read a lot of things during the time of this study that I 
don’t want to be "tacking on" of some extra and dispensable information, but rather 
an integral part of the learning experience. I have been given the opportunity to 
rethink and refashion my beliefs as I confront a dilemma, without fear of any 
authoritative imposition of beliefs from others. As a student who has experienced a 
diversity of alternative ideas I have begun to develop a more global viewpoint and be 
able to consider different aspects of a problem.  Now I see that ethical thinking is 
neither a matter of pure intellect nor of gut feelings and prejudices. What is important 
here is one's reasoning and critical thinking skills. Thus, by strengthening and 
expanding these skills, I have been able to view our ever-changing policy world from 
a new perspective, and not be limited by the past or previous belief-systems.  I now 
understand my decision making to be something like the following and that my 
values adjust accordingly. 
1) What are the facts?  What is available at this time? 
2) Identify and define the ethical problem:  
3) Who are the stakeholders in the decision?  
4a) What options do you see are available to resolve this dilemma?  
4b) Which options are the most compelling? Why?  
5a) How would you resolve the dilemma?  
5b) What values did you rely on to make your decision?  
6) What consequences (if any) do you see your decision has on the others involved?  
7) Could you personally live with this decision? Remember that no decision is 
immune to pressures of time and how we feel either.  
5.    Where this all fits 
5.1 Anthony Kovner 
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Approach and Methods.  Let me be clear. Tony is a professor, his wife is a professor, 
his daughter is a professor, his son-in-law is a professor.  Tony is not an academic 
lightweight.  He is published and quoted and re-published.  Yet in amongst all of the 
people I read, Tony was the one who had a lifetime of being an administrator, 
researcher and teacher, so his perspective on the world of healthcare (even though 
he is regarding America) was the nearest I found to somebody “holding up a mirror” 
to themselves and their peer group.  Put simply, he takes a position on the current 
state of healthcare management, board governance and the importance of research 
in management practice.  In particular, he notes that decision makers would like 
evidence that is more applicable to their actual decisions, includes information of 
what needs to be done, is more easily accessible and that researchers and decision 
makers should consider long-term collaborations to help identify topics for and 
parameters of evidence development.  He has encapsulated all of this in a book – 
but one that retails in paperback at £50 a time.  After 20 years of looking at this issue 
of evidence based management, I would say that he has come to the following 
conclusions: that the case for evidence based management in healthcare remains a 
political judgement and that the return on investment calculation has not been, but 
could be, reliably made by any healthcare system.  It is important to note that his 20 
years of study are characterised by an increasing belief that hospital boards do not 
review the quality of managerial decisions, so would never know whether things 
need improving.  Underlying all of his way of working is an almost iconoclastic belief 
in the widespread use of evidence to shift power away from senior towards junior 
managers.  Tony was widely respected, that much is clear, but even in the NYU 
Wagner school within which he taught, his ideas were not necessarily mainstream.  
Finally though, in his methods he always espoused academic rigour.  When talking 
to managers in the field of healthcare, he always took time to properly frame 
research questions, obtain evidence as to why intervention might/might not work in 
various contexts, evaluate evidence with a balance of viewpoints represented and 
consider when further evidence was needed to support a decision. 
5.2 Confidence and Change 
 
First we must create awareness of the need to change. What are the compelling 
reasons to move away from the familiar and comfortable and move to something 
different and perhaps uncomfortable? 
 
In today's deficit funded NHS, more and more people are becoming aware of the 
need for improving the way or the NHS works. However, if we really want to turn up 
the heat on change, we must discuss internally the specific challenges facing the 
NHS.  
 
Who is our benchmark? What are they doing? What new products and services are 
they adding? Is the public support for the NHS expanding or contracting? What are 
our costs and revenues per employee versus other countries? Will our products be 
subject to new environmental controls? What will rapidly expanding 
telecommunications technology mean to us and our existing work processes? Can 
we reduce our overhead expenses to match those considered best in the world? 
Could we really become "paperless?" How could we reduce our basic work process 
by 10 steps this month? How could we improve turnaround time by 90%? 
 
It is my opinion that the more productive an organization is, the more creative it must 
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be in creating the appropriate challenge. One Chief Executive I worked with wanted 
to increase the rate of implementation of employee involvement, which for several 
years had been painfully slow.  What, I asked myself, would provide some motivation 
for these people to move forward? 
 
How I am linking into on-going research in EBM.  Support for diffusion fellows and 
academics is developing, but the key is the consistency of the key players.  If one 
were to consider that Kovner and Billings are at Wagner NYU and that Billings works 
closely with the Nuffield Trust in the UK, that Ham is at the HSMC in Birmingham 
and is a writer for Nuffield Trust and latterly has re-joined the Kings Fund, the same 
Kings Fund that was lead by Jo Boufford of Wagner NYU.  A pattern emerges that a 
grouping of these organisations, plus my favourite Rousseau of Carnegie Mellon and 
Pfeffer and Sutton of Harvard Business School would very quickly present a 
comprehensive coverage of the subject as it could be presented to the NHS.  It is my 
intention when the DBA is (hopefully) passed and completed, to email these key 
players with a simple question of whether they think the NHS provides a unique 
grounding for further study of this subject and whether they would each be willing to 
give me an hour of their time.  Some I have met already.  Only Rousseau is a 
logistical challenge to meet, but then Pittsburgh, PA is not that far away from my 
normal travel routes.  At the very least, I intend to present the answer to the question 
in the British Medical Journal and the widely read, but less academic Health Service 
Journal in late 2010/early 2011. 
 
5.3  Changing myself 
 
I learned something very useful about the nature of reflection.  I started off keeping a 
diary – as advised at the start of the DBA, it would help when it came to write 
Document 6.  This enabled me to record what was learned whilst the experience was 
very fresh (and in one lunchtime immediate).  This was necessarily collected 
chronologically.  What I learned though was that the most useful thing was not to try 
to make sense of all this until much, much later.  Collecting my observations together 
within the themes I set for Document 6, has given me much more insight into the 
learning experience, than if I had tried to make sense of this in the same 
chronological order that the observations were made (my previous or inherited 
learning form was like this).  When reading about this issue, I came across a thing 
called the eportfolio system which I will use to help me emphasise this type of 
learning in the future.  The eportfolio system should help me to build more of a 
retrospective about what I learned.  The reason that this is useful and significant, is 
that I am a qualified accountant and necessarily complete a mandatory cpd 
(continuing professional development) requirement each year.  This eportfolio 
system will enable me to describe my cpd, not as a series of task-and-finish 
seminars, but as a rounded reflection of the last one and last three years.  I will also 
be able to note where my competence acquired was actually different to what I 
thought it was when the learning experience was very recent. 
 
Becoming a broker between research and practice, I feel that I have found myself in 
a positive and comfortable slot where I am not an advocate (more of which below), 
but a potentially trustworthy broker.  I have shown in this DBA that research can be a 
powerful tool to improve the structure and practice of management in the NHS.  It 
can be argued that the emphasis on targets in the NHS is affecting decision making 
(and decision makers) by increasing the demand for evidence on the effectiveness of 
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various strategies for hitting these targets.  But as the broker, I do not hold with that 
argument.  In an era where the NHS is driven by the twin forces of performance and 
accountability, not much has been asked of management research.  The policy is 
centrally directed and the management task to deliver the target is as discretionary 
and varied as the accountable officer wants it to be.  So there is a space to broker in 
some academic content and research.  On the other hand, I have seen in my 
brokerage role that even ‘engaged’ managers have oversimplified the problem about 
translating research into evidence for/about management practice.  My brokerage 
role is therefore, also to promote a realism about what research evidence can do.  
The assumption that research is useless or that alternatively, evidence can simply 
tell managers what to do are commonly held – diametrically opposed positions.  Both 
are wrong.  Brokerage will close the gap. 
Not being an advocate.  Evidence based management is just another tool.  It is not 
the only tool.  It is not the toolbox itself.  So I say “lets try it” – the alternative is to 
follow another fad or fashion that doesn’t fit with the organisational culture.  
Learmonth would probably accuse me of hijacking the prevailing (superior) medical 
ethic and superimposing my own managerialist culture on the organisation, but he 
would be wrong.  In no way have I become an advocate for evidence based 
management in healthcare.  But then neither have the people I have read and 
enjoyed.  What supporters, if you can call then that, of evidence based management 
in healthcare say, is that there is a theoretical application of EBM to improve 
management decision making and that it is worthy of field study.  After all, the role of 
an advocate would be to intercede on behalf of EBM and it is not always clear how 
and when this opportunity would arise.  What I can be said to be, is a conspicuous 
follower and an intrigued supporter of the concept, who will offer this positively if 
asked to debate the matter. 
A development of my wider USA/International perspective has taken place in my 
working life.  The department I head up was chosen to be a year long study in how 
we use evidence.  Working with Warwick University and a grant from SDO (the NHS) 
it has been possible for our meetings, our 1 to 1’s, our phone conversations, our 
emails and our interviews to give qualitative data for the researchers to collect.  This 
will be classified into the tools that we use to make decisions and how we make 
decisions.  Researchers have been given organised and co-ordinated (but free and 
unrestricted) access to a department of 200 people and as much time as they 
wanted with senior people. 
Joining the Nottingham University CLAHRC (Collaboration for Leadership in Applied 
Health Research and Care) was also a significant event, as it entailed committing 
PCT funds of £180,000 over four years to become a member.  The CLAHRC has the 
remit to develop new approaches to healthcare research and to enable research to 
be implemented in ways that bridge the gap between the academic and the 
practitioner. 
5.4   In Conclusion 
In conclusion.  The DBA worked for me because the location of the university, the 
reputation of the course, the method of study, the resources invested by me and the 
university, the personal commitment of the tutor and the quality of supervision were 
all perfectly able to accommodate my needs.  For anyone undertaking this DBA I 
would say that by the time you have a clear idea of the research you wish to 
undertake, you will find you are in the right place, but figuring out your own research 
agenda may be as hard as the research itself.  There was a particular problem in my 
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situation in that the NHS had significantly funded half of the DBA which was the 
result of an exit payment from a senior post in the NHS.  So although the NHS had 
implicitly recognised the benefit of a DBA to the NHS, the NHS as a sponsor had not 
had to make the decision on the specific organisational issue they wished me to 
develop and research solutions for.  So I would recommend that anybody in my 
position again, gets themselves an internal sponsor or champion within the NHS to 
work with as well as the course tutors.  There is no doubt that a DBA was much 
better at exploring the organisational question of evidence in NHS management than 
a Phd, but I think the NHS organisation is more experienced in dealing with Phd’s.  
Ironically, Manchester Business School (Manchester Metropolitan) open up their 
DBA with a unit of evidence based management which says “in this unit you consider 
the case for research-informed management practice.  You review current evidence 
based practice in management, considering developments in other disciplines and 
establish understanding of processes and levels of such practice” 
(www.ribm.mmu.ac.uk).  But I still think I chose the right DBA course for me. 
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Abstract 
 
A decision making theory and process 
 
I undertook a qualitative assessment of the use of evidence based decision 
making from real-world participants in the NHS.  A qualitative approach was 
used because I wanted to develop a general categorisation of decision 
making that will enable me to develop topics for later thesis and qualitative 
study.  The study is a selected sample of subjects representing a spectrum of 
Executives in the NHS from different professional backgrounds including 
doctor, accountant, academic professor, statistician and nurse.  Subjects were 
recruited from the cohort of people working in the NHS in the East Midlands 
through personal contacts and in one case, referral by other subjects.  A 
preliminary interview schedule was developed and two pilot interviews were 
conducted with people from outside the cohort to test this method as well as 
the recording equipment.  
 
Little in depth research has been done into the implications of the 
philosophical approach that a practicing group of senior executives in the NHS 
have to the work of the NHS itself and its bases in evidence based decision 
making.  I wish to pursue the work of Rousseau on the difference in 
management response to management issues depending upon whether the 
decision maker was equipped with advanced knowledge of the effective 
implementation of Evidence Based Management or otherwise.  Sample 
selection for this testing of Rousseau in a field environment was essentially 
pragmatic, based upon people who knew me well enough to give frank 
disclosure, but not well enough to have perceptions about what I thought the 
“correct answer” is.  (I have no view on the “correct answer”). 
 
Grounded theory and qualitative material 
 
The overall aim of this research model is to enhance good practice in the craft 
of management in the NHS. To achieve this aim my objective in this piece of 
qualitative research is to conduct a systematic investigation into current 
perceptions of evidence based management including perceived barriers to its 
use and also including perceptions of good practice in the use of evidence 
based management.  It was also necessary to begin to ascertain perceptions 
of skill deficits in this area and factors viewed as contributions to these 
deficits.  The effect of the researcher as an observer is unknown.  It could 
have an effect on the interviews and it may inhibit parties who participated in 
the review of meetings.  A further limitation of the study is that I only included 
leaders from within the NHS East Midlands and it is possible that NHS regions 
may be more or less equipped to engage in a discourse about evidence 
based management.  The strength of this study is that observation and 
participation with individuals and the groups by the researcher on an ongoing 
basis in the NHS in East Midlands increase the credibility and trustworthiness 
of the findings. 
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So in Summary My Conclusion is 
 
In the matter of the approach to 
academic research (Against!) 
 
 
 
 
In the matter of supervision of 
employees (For!) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the matter of the information 
available to managers on the 
consequences of their decisions 
(Against!) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the matter of management style 
(No preference either way) 
 
 
 
 
 
In the matter of the delivery of 
promises to the public, stakeholders 
and others (Against strongly!) 
 
There is a bias against using 
academic research by NHS 
managers in the East Midlands.  This 
is by no means universal, but is 
consistent in its presentation. 
 
There is a very strong preference for 
using evidence based decision 
making amongst the cohort of East 
midlands managers and use an 
appropriately cultivated management 
approach to support evidence based 
decisions. 
 
There is a bias against evidence 
based decisions.  Decisions have 
insufficient data and evidence for 
decision making, and little value is 
attached to post implementation 
review.  Some managers are neutral 
towards this subject but few, if any, 
show a preference for evidence 
based decision making informed by 
the consequences of their decisions. 
 
There is only an inconclusive result in 
the area.  There is no preference.  
Some managers have a preference 
for evidence it seems but equally 
same would discredit it as a viable 
and realistic approach. 
 
Of all the areas this is the one where 
there is next to no examples of 
evidence based decision making, but 
there are multiple strong, lengthy and 
cross-referenced examples of 
decision making that is neither 
systematic nor developed by causal 
knowledge.  Decision making is 
opaque to the public and frequently 
challenged. 
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 5 
THE DYNAMICS OF DECISION MAKING IN GROUPS AND BY 
INDIVIDUALS 
 
A decision making theory and process 
 
I undertook a qualitative assessment of the use of evidence based decision 
making from real-world participants in the NHS.  A qualitative approach was 
used because I wanted to develop a general categorisation of decision 
making that will enable me to develop topics for later thesis and qualitative 
study.  The study is a selected sample of subjects representing a spectrum of 
Executives in the NHS from different professional backgrounds including 
doctor, accountant, academic professor, statistician and nurse.  Subjects were 
recruited from the cohort of people working in the NHS in the East Midlands 
through personal contacts and in one case, referral by other subjects.  A 
preliminary interview schedule was developed and two pilot interviews were 
conducted with people from outside the cohort to test this method as well as 
the recording equipment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are a few notes to say about the author.  My own personal baggage 
about Evidence Based Management is that; 
 
I have worked in services where EBM was a new or alien concept.  Although 
the hierarchy of evidence is vaguely understood by most if not all NHS 
managers the sense that evidence should support or instruct decision makers, 
as proposed by distinguished leaders in the NHS management such as Muir 
Gray (1997), is not commonly accepted.  To an extent the concept of 
evidence was mostly a binary rather than a linear concept.  By that I mean 
that the Randomised Control Trial or RCT was seen to be “evidence” and that 
anything other than an RCT was not.  In that way the concept of evidence was 
elevated to its most extreme version where an almost laboratory level of 
precision within its practice frightened lesser users.  I have performed the role 
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of Director and Chief Executive in NHS organisations that were deemed to be 
successful.  Although I am by no means a leading light amongst my peers the 
organisations I have lead either in the boardroom or as Accountable Officer 
(Chief Executive) have been surplus making, target hitting, award winning, 
highly credited by the auditors and demonstrably successful in the eyes of the 
regulators.   
 
On a personal level I have tended to lead successful teams of high performing 
individuals and usually inherited maturing or well established teams but have 
rarely been asked to establish new organisations when the NHS goes through 
its periodic regular re-organisation.  So a pattern emerges throughout my 20 
year career in the NHS of being the director who succeeds the first Chief 
Executive in an organisation, the team player who replaces the first team 
leader when they leave and so on.  I have worked in parts of the NHS that 
used EBM sparingly.  For example the recruitment of leaders is supported by 
the evidence that it is possible to assess future leaders through competency 
based extrapolation of their past performance and also by evidence that 
emotional intelligence correlates with predictions of successful leadership.  
EBM has existed in three ways, as a self critique by managers that some of 
the decisions or assertions are just plain errors which would improve if based 
on evidence of what works, as an exploration of the differences in culture that 
exist between NHS doctors who are increasingly evidence based and HNS 
managers who are seen to make little progress in adopting the concept and 
finally in a way to stop the NHS re-inventing the wheel and making repeated 
mistakes or even worse employing management consultants to make the 
same mistakes. 
 
I have worked high up and low down in the management hierarchy and my 
experience of EBM was that it faced/faces being squeezed by two forces that 
both oppose its very existence in the NHS management lexicon and toolbox.  
Unlike Medicine and Nursing in the NHS, management is not a profession.  
Put crudely, it is considered a task or an overhead.  With the exception of 
Finance roles there is no established legal or cultural requirement regarding 
education or knowledge for an individual to become a manager the way there 
is for Doctor, Nurse, Physiotherapist, Podiatrist, etc.  This does not mean that 
NHS managers are not legion in their BSC’s, their MBA’s, even their Doctoral 
qualifications but it does mean that no formal disciplinary body or professional 
pressure exists to promote use of evidence by any manager who refuses to 
do so.   
 
Secondly, even some senior (former) NHS managers such as Learmonth  
(2000) oppose the scientific method and suggest that management is not an 
automatically good thing as it is believed to involve the exercise of power and 
the exploitation of others.  These critics find some resonance in the media and 
popular cultural account that managers do not wish to consider the impact of 
their decisions on stakeholders. Ultimately, in my working life, I deal with 
these situations all the time, the adoption of evidence based practices is likely 
to be organisation specific where an NHS manager, typically an incoming 
Chief Executive or Director takes the initiative to build an evidence based 
culture.  Fads, fashion and management consultancy are more often seen in 
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the design of a decision making or decision support system than problem-
based reading and discussion of research summary.    
 
Before I began, I was expecting to find that the Chief Executives would 
consider evidence based decision making to be a luxury.  By luxury I meant 
that it was used sparingly and where a big decision/occasion merited detailed 
consideration.  Implicitly a luxury would not be something they used every 
day.  I also expected there to be a strong degree of convergence between the 
leaders given that they were working in the same health market, with the 
same policy framework and were using each other as reference points for 
acceptable norms of behaviour.  I had considered this beforehand, probably 
as it matched my own practice when I had been a Chief Executive, and 
thought what a terrible waste this was.  I declare that I remain neutral on the 
position of whether we should use evidence based decision making but with 
the amount of control we have as executives over risk, expenditures and 
investments it struck me as sad that we would not or could not practice an 
evidence based approach to these critical decisions. 
 
 
Relevance and Rigour: the Hierarchy of evidence and the realist 
synthesis 
 
Current schemes for evidence hierarchies were developed mainly for clinical 
research questions and therefore place major emphasis on randomised 
controlled trials as the main and most convincing evidence in the evaluation 
process.  These types of study are rarely available for lifestyle-related factors 
and might even not be feasible to obtain.  Arguments are advanced to support 
the notion that a modification of currently existing ‘levels of evidence’ as 
developed for clinical research questions might be necessary.  Thereby, one 
might be able to accommodate the specific aspects of evidence-related issues 
of recommendations for primary prevention through lifestyle changes, like 
dietary changes.  What I wanted to do in this study was to make sense of the 
evidence hierarchy for NHS managers to make sense of it, organise and 
follow their response to evidence given that the NHS is not a randomised 
control trial in total. 
 
Levels of evidence have been used widely in evidence-based medicine.  In 
this context, hierarchies of evidence have been further developed and 
modified.  During the past few years, several organisations have created their 
own version of a hierarchy of evidence.  Whilst in all these hierarchies the 
lowest level of evidence is given to expert opinion and the highest level of 
evidence to systematic reviews or meta-analyses of randomised controlled 
trials (RCTs), there is considerable variation among the categories in 
between.  Common to all of these modifications is the emphasis on RCTs and 
meta-analyses thereof.  But the question remains in the context of healthcare 
in England, how do the managerial leaders feel about this, is the meta-
analysis believed to be the prime, the apex of decision making tools in non-
clinical fields.  Is it even respected by these people in clinical settings? 
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This (in the clinical context) well-founded grading system based on RCTs is 
now commonly regarded the one and only way to provide reliable answers to 
all medical questions.  Even though it is stated in Cochrane Collaboration 
handbooks (2008) that reviews of other types of evidence can be helpful for 
decision-making, especially in areas where RCTs are either not available or 
not feasible, the stigma that everything else beyond RCTs is second – or even 
third-class evidence and therefore basically not credible is inherent to this not 
foreseen expansion.  By making the manager come alive I wanted to 
understand whether there was a contradiction between the stigmatisation of 
everything but RCT in the medical and managerial parts of the same 
organisation. 
 
A critical appraisal of the hierarchies of evidence and their application appears 
necessary, however, because a specific type of research question – mainly 
the evaluation of therapeutic effects – has driven the development of these 
hierarchies.  This has led to the specific order and inclusion of certain study 
types.  Only recently, levels of evidence have been published which take into 
account that different medical areas require different sets of levels of 
evidence.  The Canadian Task Force on the Periodic Health Examination  
(1979) differentiated the following research categories and now presents 
separate hierarchies of evidence for each of these categories: 
 
 Therapy/Prevention/Aetiology/Harm; 
 Prognosis; 
 Diagnosis; and 
 Economic analysis. 
 
In many of the grading schemes presented previously, observational research 
has been shifted to lower levels of evidence and/or the grading of 
recommendations attributed only second-or third-level grades to 
recommendations based on results from observational research.  In addition, 
different types of observational study were often listed together in one group 
without differentiation of study designs, and often were not presented in their 
completeness.  For example, several hierarchies of evidence do not even 
mention cohort studies at all. 
 
The widespread notion that only RCTs are a valid basis for type A 
recommendations might delay or even stop decision-makers in the public 
health sector from devoting attention or resources to primary preventative 
measures just because, according to certain schemes, no ‘grade A’ evidence 
is available.  If the sum of all evidence points in one direction and plausible 
alternative explanations are not present, the mere fact that ‘only’ observational 
studies are available should not automatically preclude one from deriving 
recommendations.  So it is clear that the individual experience of the NHS 
manager can credibly be different to the RCT model.  But by holding up a 
mirror to the people I talked to I wanted, in a non-judgemental way, to see 
where they sat on the spectrum of the credibility of evidence. 
 
Individuals or the chairs of the groups to be recorded were initially contacted 
by email with a very prompt follow up by telephone.  I outlined the nature of 
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the project and the contribution I felt the individual or group could make to my 
initial piece of qualitative research.  I explained that all interviews would be 
taped, but that the material gathered would be considered confidential by me, 
with no identification of individuals except by some implicit membership of the 
taped group meetings.  All of the individuals I approached were happy to help 
with this piece of the project, many suggesting this was an important 
discussion in the NHS that warranted further investigation.  All of the 
interviews were conducted at the interviewees’ work place.  The meetings that 
were recorded happened at normal monthly meetings with the agenda of the 
previous months meeting including an explicit discussion about my authority 
to record the events verbatim. 
 
I emphasise the mirror holding nature of this work and the questions this 
raises and the most suitable structural model for this is grounded theory 
(1967).  In addition, what excites me about grounded theory is that it analyses 
the data with no pre-conceived hypothesis.  Rather than searching for data 
that confirms or rejects my hypothesis, I can spend my time searching out the 
concepts behind “evidence based management” as they reveal themselves to 
my cohort of participants.  Maybe the answer or question is unclear, but I can 
conduct a study on the nature of evidence based decision making as it is 
judged and participated in by NHS managers.  A possible criticism of 
grounded theory is a lack of rigour due to careless interview techniques and 
the introduction of bias.  On the other hand, a working awareness of bias is 
imperative in all interview research and as long as the researcher genuinely 
has discarded any preconceived ideas before collecting and analysing data 
then the interview technique is a neutral tool.  For me, I have long gone past 
the point of wanting to introduce or reject evidence based management in the 
NHS – I simply wish to understand if, how, when and why it is used or rejected 
and to reflect that back to NHS managers themselves.  For this reason, 
grounded theory is an appropriate tool. 
 
After Rousseau 
 
The UK government (funder of the NHS) proposes an approach to 
management that involves executives making decisions through the provision 
of increased access to information and this is, in itself, consistent with the 
philosophy of evidence based medicine which features strongly in the 
compliance and governance process of clinical/medical care.  In practice the 
changing role of the executive in NHS management in this area is uncertain, 
despite being well researched as the literature review shows.  Despite the 
accountability of executives being very clear and that managers in the NHS 
are ideally placed between the aspirations of the public/taxpayer and 
practicing clinicians, they are still ultimately viewed as an addition to the 
medical-patient relationship rather than integral to it.   
 
Little in depth research has been done into the implications of the 
philosophical approach that a practicing group of senior executives in the NHS 
have to the work of the NHS itself and its bases in evidence based decision 
making.  I wish to pursue the work of Rousseau (2006) on the difference in 
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management response to management issues depending upon whether the 
decision maker was equipped with advanced knowledge of the effective 
implementation of Evidence Based Management or otherwise.  Sample 
selection for this testing of Rousseau in a field environment was essentially 
pragmatic, based upon people who knew me well enough to give frank 
disclosure, but not well enough to have perceptions about what I thought the 
“correct answer” is.  (I have no view on the “correct answer”). 
 
Elliot (2000) studied the paperwork of managers and clinicians in one region 
of the NHS and in depth interview and documentary analysis were used to 
collect evidence.  Elliot used the ‘one region’ method favoured in my research 
proposal for reasons of practical concern – time, money, co-ordination – and 
also because the concept of the region was meaningful in the NHS.  The 
region represented a natural cohort of NHS managers and a distinct area with 
a variable degree of autonomy from the Department of Health over how 
decisions about resource allocation are made. 
 
Giddens (2003) posed the point that - policy makers have to get something 
out of research if they are to use it.  Further, that it is necessary to consider 
which arguments are likely to be useful or gratifying to which policymakers.  
Giddens makes the point, significant for myself as an NHS employee studying 
the NHS, whilst part funded by the NHS to undertake the academic course 
and research, that it is still valid for the researcher to influence policy makers 
through an extended process of communication. 
 
A synthesis from the literature of Rousseau proposes a juxtaposition of 
management decision making between systems that adopt evidence based 
management and those that avoid the use of research.  The questions 
proposed by Rousseau are worthy of further discussion with practicing NHS 
managers.  Some additional ideas were encountered in the literature review.  
Learmonth and Sambrook (2006) both say that the significance and 
implications of management language are an important part of this study, but 
it is difficult to continue to pursue this area within the conceptual framework.  
Conversely, Mello (2007) writes about the preoccupation of management with 
norms and averages and this “myth of the mean” is a particular branch of 
decision making tools that is possible to consider further.  At the core of the 
conceptual framework is an evidence based organisation of knowledge, and 
supporters of this school of thought are sceptical about experience or wisdom.  
Sherman’s model of grading evidence from weak to strong, based on rules of 
scientific inference, would say that Mello was correct.  In Sherman’s (2002) 
view a manager who uses evidence but then ranks this evidence against 
normative performance/behaviour is guilty of weak decision making just the 
same. 
 
Medicine is a success story as the first domain within the NHS to 
institutionalise evidence based practice.  The literature says that more than 
scientific insight is needed to create evidence based practice.  Guidelines do 
not of themselves, equate to evidence of implementation.  An evidence base 
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can only improve outcomes with adherence and therefore it is necessary to 
note that the heart of the conceptual framework (an evidence based 
organisation of knowledge) is only a partial proxy for applied evidence based 
decision making. 
 
Tony Kovner (2008) commissioned 14 case studies on management 
interventions in health care organizations using an evidence-based approach.  
Kovner found the managers did not follow a rigid template but made 
significant attempts to properly frame research questions, obtain evidence 
with a balance of viewpoints represented, decide whether the intervention 
could be adapted to their organization, analyze what it took to make the 
intervention actionable, and consider whether further evidence was needed. 
 
The interventions involved: emergency preparedness, leadership 
development, the chief learning officer, forming a corporate university, criteria 
for hospital evacuation, chronic care management, improving pain 
management, improving health of underserved children, the business case for 
a hospital palliative unit, state Medicaid management, quality management in 
home health, inpatient planning, and improved operating room scheduling.  
The authors and editors of these cases studies believe that managers in these 
context had better evidence than is customary in considering these 
management interventions. 
 
Kovner concluded that evidence-based management is not widely used by 
health care managers for the following reasons;  first, the business case for 
return on investment has not yet been reliably made.  Second, widespread 
use would shift power away from senior toward junior managers.  Third, 
hospital boards do not regularly review the quality of the managerial decision-
making process.  David Fine suggests that in the field of management, unlike 
clinical medicine, students are not taught to value and depend on studies as 
physicians are, and in part because of the lower priority, there are fewer 
studies done. 
 
Whatever the merits of evidence-based medicine, it got off to a rocky start.  
When Guyatt began championing it back in the 1990’s, he called it “scientific 
medicine,” but he learned quickly that if you want to start a revolution, it helps 
to pick the right slogan.  Many of his colleagues were outraged by the implied 
insult to their expertise.  So he quickly went with “evidence-based”, and 
tempers cooled. 
 
Little in depth research has been done into the implications of the 
philosophical approach that a practicing group of senior executives in the NHS 
have to the work of the NHS itself and its bases in evidence based decision 
making.  I wish to pursue the work of Rousseau on the difference in 
management response to management issues depending upon whether the 
decision maker was equipped with advanced knowledge of the effective 
implementation of Evidence Based Management or otherwise.  Sample 
selection for this testing of Rousseau in a field environment was essentially 
pragmatic, based upon people who knew me well enough to give frank 
disclosure, but not well enough to have perceptions about what I thought the 
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“correct answer” is.  (I have no view on the “correct answer”). 
 
Grounded theory and qualitative material 
 
The overall aim of this research model is to enhance good practice in the craft 
of management in the NHS. To achieve this aim my objective in this piece of 
qualitative research is to conduct a systematic investigation into current 
perceptions of evidence based management including perceived barriers to its 
use and also including perceptions of good practice in the use of evidence 
based management.  It was also necessary to begin to ascertain perceptions 
of skill deficits in this area and factors viewed as contributions to these 
deficits.  The effect of the researcher as an observer is unknown.  It could 
have an effect on the interviews and it may inhibit parties who participated in 
the review of meetings.  A further limitation of the study is that I only included 
leaders from within the NHS East Midlands and it is possible that NHS regions 
may be more or less equipped to engage in a discourse about evidence 
based management.  The strength of this study is that observation and 
participation with individuals and the groups by the researcher on an ongoing 
basis in the NHS in East Midlands increase the credibility and trustworthiness 
of the findings. 
 
Even champions of evidence-based practice acknowledge that the approach 
has limits.  “Some things can’t be tested in randomzed trials, and some things 
are so obvious, they don’t need it, “says Dr. Paul Glasziou, director of the 
Center for Evidence-Based Medicine in Oxford, England.  (2007) There have 
never been randomized trials to show that giving electrical shocks to a heart 
that has stopped beating saves more lives than doing nothing, for example.  
Similarly, giving antibiotics to treat pneumonia has never been rigorously 
tested from a scientific point of view.  It’s clear to everyone, however, that if 
you want to survive a bout of bacterial pneumonia, antibiotics are your best 
bet, and nobody would want to go into cardiac arrest without a crash cart 
handy.  “Where randomized trials are most important is where you’re trying to 
affect a long-term condition, like stroke or cancer, “Glasziou says. 
 
Finally, the very definition of evidence-based medicine is something of a 
moving target.  Physicians who encouraged their female patients to take 
hormone-replacement therapy to prevent heart problems later on were 
practicing a kind of evidence-based medicine, since the best available 
evidence at the time – observational studies and the like suggested a benefit.  
Of course, when a randomized controlled trial showed otherwise, the advice 
changed.  Even at that, the case is not entirely closed.  Some researchers 
now believe there may be a window of opportunity right around the years of 
menopause during which hormone-replacement therapy could help the heart.  
Proving that would, naturally, require another study. 
 
All the same, few people deny that the trend in medicine is increasingly to be 
guided, if not governed, by the date an idea that is spreading to other fields as 
well.  Evidence-based practice is now being taught in nursing, general 
education and even philanthropy, thanks to the influence of the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation, a results-based group if ever there was one.  You 
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could see even the political fights over global warming as the birth pangs of 
the new practice of evidence-based policy. 
 
But it is in medicine that the practice will have the most emotional impact.  All 
patients would probably benefit if their doctors were abreast of the latest data, 
but none would benefit from being reduced to one of those statistical points.  
“You have to be able to take a good history and do a physical examination,” 
Guyatt says.  “And you have to have an understanding of patients’ values and 
preferences.”, there is still as much art to medicine as there is science.   
 
Revealing the role of the manager in the NHS 
 
Five in depth interviews were held with leading managers in the NHS.  Three 
meetings of senior NHS managers in the East Midlands were also recorded.  
Interviews were transcribed verbatim and interpreted with the aid of template 
analysis based on the Rousseau model as summarised above.  The 
interviews and the meetings were structured around three major themes from 
this analysis concerning the extent to which the participant believed evidence 
based practice is a norm or an ideal, what tools they and other NHS 
managers actually used and whether public and politicians want decisions 
made on the basis of the best evidence possible.  Let me start the reporting of 
this interview with two of the leaders who have been on both sides of the 
clinical and managerial debate, starting as clinicians but latterly attaining real 
top jobs as executives. 
 
Right, well I think in medicine, it’s sort of the norm in that there is a real status 
to understanding the evidence base in medicine, so the medical hierarchy is 
based on a sort of expert model, if you know the most, you’re the most 
important and so they work very hard to demonstrate that they know the 
evidence base; you see it in junior doctors particularly, they are very keen to 
say, not just that they know what they’re doing but that …d…d…d….d – 
here’s the evidence base to support it and therefore promote me!  That’s the 
sort of view you get. (Respondent 5 is a doctor of some seniority working 
outside of the hospital environment who has transferred to a managerial role 
by career progression but is well respected by colleagues for technical 
understanding of medicine). 
 
For senior managers, oh I suppose consultants in the Health Service, it’s a 
kind of expected thing, but that’s all about the management of patients; and 
although people profess that, if you really pin them down on the evidence, a 
lot of the time the evidence is not what’s supporting it, it’s a sort of dogma 
around the subject that often isn’t challenged very often, and I think that’s one 
of the reasons we have lots of variations in clinical practice, because the 
evidence 20 years ago, is know very well by some consultants, and they’ve 
carried on doing the same thing regardless of what’s happened. (5 again, this 
time revealing one of the hidden aspects of  this dispute between doctors and 
managers – whether evidence still counts as evidence over time or whether its 
value diminishes rapidly, more rapidly than career progression). 
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You write a letter to an MP and you can get an intervention tomorrow can’t 
you so!  But they don’t want to intervene based on evidence though, they 
want to intervene based on electoral support.  Ok.  So if you look at the things 
that’ve been prioritised by Health Secretaries lately, they’ve all been around 
what the public say they want; the public say they want cleaner hospital, 
they’re frightened, so that’s top of the list; they want shorter waiting times, ok, 
so that’s top of the list.  And, what’s the latest one, I don’t know, but anyway, 
that’s how it works – they haven’t looked at the whole system, what does 
reducing the waiting time to a certain level do to the rest of the system, what 
things are not prioritises as a result?  So they haven’t taken a scientific 
approach to what would make things better. (5 in response to a question 
about whether there was any respect for evidence based decision making 
amongst political leaders). 
 
I think that’s a very narrow definition of management …carry on…..to me, 
that’s a definition of planning.  My definition of planning is about ensuring that 
those who have responsibility for resource and allocation, do so in an 
informed manner, that’s almost the same as what you’ve called management 
– the allocation of resources, scarce resources.  To me, management is the 
function of achieving organisational, or achieving the objectives which are set 
for you, you do that by management, and that can be about resources, it can 
be about resource utilisation, it can be about service provision, it can be about 
moving the chair from one side to the other, moving 100 chairs, I think you 
need management tools, techniques and processes, and that to me is what 
management is about, it’s about a set of tools, techniques and processes 
which achieve an objective.  (Respondent 4 is a clinical who, though 
successful in that arena, decided to move into a more generalist managerial 
role rather than lead a team of clinicians.  He is answering a question about 
whether their skill set acquired in clinical settings had benefited their 
managerial practice.  The respondent disagrees with my concept of 
management). 
 
Grounded theory and qualitative material 
 
The overall aim of this research model is to enhance good practice in the craft 
of management in the NHS. To achieve this aim my objective in this piece of 
qualitative research is to conduct a systematic investigation into current 
perceptions of evidence based management including perceived barriers to its 
use and also including perceptions of good practice in the use of evidence 
based management.  It was also necessary to begin to ascertain perceptions 
of skill deficits in this area and factors viewed as contributions to these 
deficits.  The effect of the researcher as an observer is unknown.  It could 
have an effect on the interviews and it may inhibit parties who participated in 
the review of meetings.  A further limitation of the study is that I only included 
leaders from within the NHS East Midlands and it is possible that NHS regions 
may be more or less equipped to engage in a discourse about evidence 
based management.  The strength of this study is that observation and 
participation with individuals and the groups by the researcher on an ongoing 
basis in the NHS in East Midlands increase the credibility and trustworthiness 
of the findings. 
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The use of qualitative material as a quantitative person 
 
Accountants do not traditionally deal with qualitative data such as whether a 
patient was happy or sad or whether it looked like to him, that his father would 
die when a patient brought him to the emergency service.  Qualitative data is 
not objective.  It cannot be reliably verified.  Quantitative data can often be 
verified – you can see the evidence on paper that it is correct.  Accountants 
like myself, like things to be clear and unambiguous, for there to be no doubt, 
for the amounts presented to be clearly verifiable.  In this document and 
throughout document 3 and document 4, I will be following a reflective journey 
concerned with the need to be more flexible, more willing to embrace new 
sources of data from qualitative sources.  There is still a problem that I face 
through traditional research designs usually rely on a literature review leading 
to the formation of a hypothesis.  The literature review (this document) has 
not, however, helped me to create a test capable of experimentation in the 
real world as I had hoped.  I have read about grounded theory and discourse 
analysis and hope that they may prove appropriate tools to keep some 
discipline and structure in my thesis despite the problems I am facing. 
 
The literature review offers the following insights. 
 
Discourse analysis (1952) is defined as “concerned with the interrelationships 
between language and societies and as concerned with the interactive or 
dialogic properties of everyday communication”.  To this are added two 
subdivisions – genre and ideology.  All of this is relevant in my study of 
management in the NHS because of genre and ideology.  What is vital for the 
reader to understand as we progress on to the analysis of a specific decision, 
is that, without retro-fitting onto my material there was something that I hadn’t 
anticipated, that a real human narrative evolves and in the conclusion I use 
the Rousseau model to reveal that however the manager feels about 
‘evidence’ as useful in their day to day behaviour they think they are playing a 
different game. 
 
Through critical thinking or philosophy about the condition of management has 
existed throughout the study of NHS management, I find discourse analysis 
as created by Zellig Harris very useful in the analysis of the interviews I 
undertook.  Harris was a true innovator because he maintained that the ‘sense 
making’ or classification system used is more subjective interpretation that is 
conditioned by social surroundings and the dominant ideas of its time.  
Alternative writers such as Poster (1990) or Steele (1997) say that discourse 
analysis is actually impossible to do with my level of training in the subject.  
Such alternative writers take a fundamentalist position, that with my 
interviews, discourse analysis cannot provide definitive answers and the best I 
can hope to achieve is an insight about any continuous debate but that it 
would lack conclusion or authority.  For me though, what Harris offers is a 
useful low technology tool that can lead to a fundamental change in the 
“practice of an institution, a profession or even society as a whole” (Harris).  I 
also like the Harris method because ultimately it showed that it could evolve 
from its low technology source.  It was developed into a system for computer 
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analysis of natural language by New York University (NYU) and in particular 
applied to medical informatics.  Known as the Medical Language Processor, it 
is widely used in the field of evidence based medicine which ignited my 
original concept of a study of evidence based management in the NHS. 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF A PARTICULAR DECISION 
 
How was the particular decision bounded? 
 
Investigating the criteria used to assess the quality of a decision is a key 
objective of the research presented here.  The way in which evidence is 
assessed is closely related to the perceived status and credibility of the 
evidence itself.  It is possible to provide an idea of some broad areas the 
respondents seemed to take into account when assessing the quality of the 
evidence.  The following comments reflect the extent to which the evidence 
reflects technical expertise in this area and also the neutrality of judgement 
when faced with the evidence.  I chose to focus on a particular decision.  The 
cohort being followed were charged with conducting a deep clean of clinical 
areas in the NHS in response to high profile media and political concerns 
about infection rates and the effect they were having on patients.  The worst 
outcome for patients is for those with poor health and reduced immunity due 
to a range of factors (age, diet, morbidity) that proximate exposure to these 
infections would in fact kill them.  That much was agreed by the cohort but the 
decision was around the way they approached the instructed solution of a 
‘deep clean’, and the extent to which the assessment of the quality of 
evidence is used in that decision.  A subset of this observation is the extent to 
which the use of evidence is seen as intuitive decision making rather than the 
systematic application of criteria. 
 
Turning first to respondent 4 who is, you will remember, a clinician who moved 
to management early on in their career. 
 
Who should determine the evidence, I mean, you used a very, almost, the 
answer’s in the library approach, is that right, is it people who are skilled in 
research techniques, is it academics, who is it that gathers the evidence?  
Well I think the evidence does tend to be gathered by academics, but then 
there’s a body of evidence which is experiential and gathered up by the 
individual.   (4 what he is saying is that the answer to deep clean might be 
something that universities can be equipped to design solutions for there is 
something even more important in the role of the individuals that interprets 
and develops the academic model.  Remember here we are talking about 
‘deep cleaning’ to rid hospitals of deadly bacteria – a decision more closely 
related to laboratory control than most clinical interventions and yet the sense 
that it isn’t quite the whole picture prevails). 
 
The bare below the elbows thing – ok – I was in a Board meeting with my 
Chairman, where he was adamant we’d got this letter from Alan Johnson 
saying that all hospital workers should be bare below the elbows, so they 
shouldn’t have watches and rings on and things like that, so that it would 
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promote hand washing and it would reduce infection, he was adamant that, 
this is what the Health Secretary says therefore it’s policy, and we must do it, 
and he wanted us to write out to every clinician telling them that we’re going to 
do this and we’re going to come in and do spot checks in hospitals.  (5, our 
eminent doctors, rebuts the policy that his own boss is using.  5 demonstrates 
a deep despondency with his bosses response to politicians and glumly 
reflects on the lack of evidence for the policy!). 
 
Next, we turn to our first recording of a group response.  Group responses are 
always bound by a box in this report to enable the reader to understand that 
such things were said in a meeting, rather than by one person.  In a meeting, 
ideas diverge and converge and the linear pattern I give to the quote is a 
faithful representation of the idea, but that the people speaking may have 
been numerous. 
 
3 is a group of people who meet monthly to review how their own 
organisational response to the NHS might work with other NHS organisations 
to smooth any avoidable conflicts and contradictions.  Remember that, 
although all part of the NHS system, these people are executives in charge of 
statutorily independent authorities and accountable to the public as such. 
 
And I went to the Chief Execs column ergo, seminar in London, David 
Nicholson (the Chief Officer of the NHS nationally)  was up on his feet and he 
said, I go round the country, and he said, some people would rather have an 
argument with me about whether there is any evidence base about deep 
cleaning, than get on and do it, they need to just do it.   I thought, what an 
arrogant pig that man is; well he isn’t, because he’s a great guy, but from their 
perspective, they have a different viewpoint on the world, their viewpoint is, 
the public have lost confidence in the NHS, the public must have their 
confidence restored in the NHS for their own good and for the good of the 
politicians.  (What is of note here is that the whole group of 3 reflects what 
respondent 5 said that the policy was more important than the evidence.  In 
fact, the de-facto top manager in the NHS was saying so and despite some 
initial disquiet about the personal motives of David Nicholson, even he is 
distanced from the politicians in the implementations of policy.  Ultimately, the 
political imperative is and was respected though). 
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So you need to disentangle the means and the end, and focus on the end, so 
I guess the end in this case was restore public confidence, and it might have 
looked like strange move, like throwing money down the drain, strange way of 
improving the service, but in the eyes of the department, it was getting there, 
but what they sometimes fail to acknowledge is down at my level, the 
credibility is then so low.  (6 – the same subject, but discussed at another 
meeting a week later, 6 are a different, but similar group to 3 and they reflect 
two things.   One, that a week later the group are a lot calmer than 3 about the 
lack of evidence for the policy, but two, they demonstrate more concern that 
the level they are operating at – though still very high – is a level at which the 
politicians ‘just do it’ imperative is beginning to lack credibility). 
 
Did the decision lend itself to evidence? 
 
Different managers agreed that clinicians, their staff and indeed the politicians 
(perceived to be the source of this objective) needed to be exposed to multiple 
interpretations of why this decision was made.  Conversations with politicians 
concentrated on what was going on ‘out there’ in the media and the public 
discourse of the problem/decision.  Conversation with clinical staff often 
concentrated on the issue of the perception about what had caused this 
decision and differences between professionals interpretations of the 
solution/causes of the decision.  The decision did lend itself to evidence, but 
the conclusion from the views expressed by the interviewees is that 
consideration of the evidence in making a decision was both vital and in fairly 
short supply.  There was a thematic response that any evidence used in the 
decision should derive from both an outline theory of the nature of the 
problem, but relate closely to the practice of NHS management that means 
that given the potential lack of general management expertise in the area, any 
evidence ought to be accessible to NHS managers if they were to paint an 
organisational map that helped them to make decisions. 
 
And that’s typical of a political response, and the medical view of that is 
absolutely damming, and the difference view is that the politicians are saying 
– look – we know this works it’s completely sensible, the politicians want it to 
happen, we know the public want it to be done; what’s so special about these 
doctors that they can’t wear short sleeved shirts and just do it for the patients’ 
benefit.  And it’s not acceptable for them to say no, they should just do it, and 
we can manage this, we can make it happen.  (1 returns to the earlier 
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concerns that 5 had about short sleeved shirts.  1 though, if not a doctor, but a 
practicing manager, who comes from a non-NHS background in industry, but 
one has been a ground breaking respected NHS executive/leader for 7 years 
now). 
 
Well, it’s an interesting thing, I mean, I guess I’ve learnt a bit over this, we all 
got it and went, how ridiculous is that, you know, do they think we don’t deep 
clean areas, you deep clean it, and the minute somebody sets foot in it it’s 
contaminated, it’s stupid, witter, witter as you do.  (7 is a group of people 
tasked with the actual implementation at the sharp end.  They have roles that 
have given them accountability for operational delivery of this policy in clinical 
environments). 
 
And it is clean, we threw some measures at it, we’ve increased our antibiotic 
prescribing policing, we put a half time post in there, we’ve made such a 
saving on the antibiotic prescribing alone, that we’ve made that up to full time 
now and it’s still releasing cash which we are putting into cleaning; so I’m not 
looking to take money out, I’m looking to reinvest it, the place is a lot cleaner. 
(1 manages to take a pragmatic and organisationally beneficial response – a 
cleaner hospital – to a policy which, as a member of 3 (group) he would have 
accepted was flawed from an evidence base). 
 
The uniforms are important, because that’s about visibility, so that’s what we 
are doing internally.  (1 deliberately develops this opportunistic response.  The 
public has in its mind a fixed view that dirty uniforms or uniforms worn outside 
of hospital, contribute to the spread of infection.  Whilst disagreeing both 
individually and collectively as part of 3 with the evidence, respondent 1 is 
again willing to take the opportunity to make some pragmatic and necessary 
changes to maintain public confidence). 
 
I asked the individual executives about how they had appointed the person to 
do this job.  What were the characteristics of success they sought for this job.  
Respondent 2 is somebody who has occupied top executive roles in the NHS 
for the last 20 years and is, in this case, commenting upon somebody who is a 
member of group 7. 
 
They all did their numeracy test, their verbal reasoning, and went through 
some 1:1 interviews, 15 minute talk when I told them what I wanted, and then 
they went through a formal interview.  The person who scored the highest on 
the numeracy, never had a chance at the job because he didn’t have the 
personality; the one who scored the highest on verbal reasoning, was ok, but 
would never have convinced people of the direction to go in; ‘A’ scored pretty 
badly on both, had a blazing interview and she got the job on personality and 
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potential.  I only ever appoint people who can’t do the job, because if they can 
do the job I won’t appoint them because they have no where to go.  (2, so it is 
very clear that personality is considered a vital attribute in carrying out this 
policy and that the individual who carries out the implementation must have 
developmental capacity.  Worth noting is that 2 is pragmatic about how the 
leader for the task is chosen and whether evidence was of any relevance to 
the policy anyway). 
 
Take infection control, because you mention that as being one of the greatest, 
ambitious gains be this government over the next six months to try and 
restore public confidence, but as you’ve said, no real evidence base, that 
anything we’re doing is going to affect the world, how does that play out 
because you clearly identify yourself as wanting to give the public confidence 
in you being a good custodian of their health service, versus the method that 
would do that is not really evidence based.  No it isn’t, and what we’ve done is 
made, we’ve taken some decisions none of which were evidence based. (2) 
 
In summary, I will leave my answer to whether the decision lent itself to 
evidence to my respondent 4 – the clinician in the past. 
 
And we’ve seen that already, time after time, the decision on cleaning wards, 
deep cleans, is not an evidence based decision, it’s a decision based around 
context as much as anything else.  I agree, it’s good, it’s cheap actually, it 
improves the reputation of the NHS and gets the public off our back, around 
something that evidence will say will always be there called MRSA, it’s 
actually not bad, the fact is a bad decision on one bit of evidence; so I think 
subjectivity and judgement of different evidence to make decisions is a real 
subtle art.  (4, I emphasise again that bacteraemia are laboratory tested and 
counted.  This is as near to medicine – by – numbers as it is possible to find in 
the NHS in 2008 and yet there was no agreement that evidence clinically 
backed the managerial response.  But it was accepted as the right thing to do 
despite explicit knowledge by managers that this was the case). 
 
Links back to Rousseau and my learning process are available in many ways: 
 
This has changed the way I see things in the following ways.  Rousseau starts 
from a principle that Evidence Based Management will enhance the overall 
quality of organisational decisions through deliberative use of relevant and 
available scientific evidence.  What is omitted is that NHS managers have a 
vast behavioural science base relevant to effective management practice on 
which to draw and yet they choose or one forced to choose by politicians, 
experimentation and redesign of practices, structures and remuneration that 
reflect on ever changing (dynamic) social value and mission for the NHS.  
Therefore, what Rousseau overlooks for the NHS is that the single most 
important part of Evidence Based Management in the NHS is educating 
current and future managers and politicians in power and politicians in waiting 
about evidence-based practices applied in running the NHS.  I am a clear 
supporter of the Rousseau method to describe the world with/without an 
evidence base but it is not sufficient in itself without using organisation such 
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as the NHS Institute and HHS Library as a repository of cares and tools that 
can inform the distribution of evidence based management in the NHS. 
 
If anybody else takes on this research I would start with a tighter definition of 
the area to be considered.  Whilst in an earlier literature review it was 
important to contextualise all of the players in the NHS using the “decision 
making box” it is clear from that work that evidence has different meaning to 
taxpayers – the media – patients – politicians and NHS managers.  The 
Canadian Health Education and Research Foundation, the centre for Health 
Management Research and the Health Research and Educational Trust of the 
American Hospital Association all have structures to begin building 
management communities promoting Evidence Based Management.  My 
recommendation is that a future researcher working with a similar cohort in 
this area asks the question of whether their study group has the 
characteristics of a receptiveness to EBM that would enable them to 
undertake just such an initiative.   
 
It is possible to block out or be more blinkered about Rousseau in the 
following ways, like evidence based medicine the Rousseau model needs to 
consider that the professional is not a robot.  Education about the method still 
requires judgement in its application.  The NHS manager must also consider 
the circumstances of the decision and the ethical concern that the 
management decision may provoke.  For example, immediately prior to a 
general election is not an easy time for an NHS manager to promote the idea 
that the NHS might improve its efficiency by paying cash incentives to drug 
users to attend Methadone clinics but to deny the ability of a woman to top-up 
her cancer treatment by co-payment for drugs.  Whilst both decisions may be 
made by contemporary NHS Chief Executives on the basis of a developing 
evidence base relevant to effective management practice neither decision 
alone (and definitely not when they are juxtaposed) will be considered 
appropriate to the circumstances of an election nor ethically appropriate when 
portrayed by the media.  So I would be more blinkered about finding out what 
parts of the ‘time’ horizon it is appropriate to take a Rousseau type decision in.  
In this way, it is important to remember that Rousseau is only describing an 
hypothetical NHS organisation that uses Evidence Based Management wildly 
in contrast to the same organisation as a hospital provider where Evidence 
Based Medicine will most likely actually exist.   
 
What 5, the eminent doctor, brings to the discussion about evidence, is that it 
is bought into at one level but not implemented.  5 returns to a theme used 
earlier by him, that evidence needs not only to be relevant to the decision, but 
time sensitive as well.  Here he discusses the causes of hospital acquired 
infection and whether it was preventable. 
 
I know in several cases clinicians sat down with the architects and drew in 
what needed to be done, but of course, by the time the PFI arrives, it’s all 
been taken out through cost savings, so the doctors’ view is, so you managers 
are putting us in this position, in conditions which predispose to hospital 
acquired infection, you won’t do any of the things of which there’s a very good 
evidence base that it would make a difference, and so your first engagement 
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with us, is to come and tell us to do something for which there is no evidence 
that any infection has been prevented, anywhere in the world – ever – by 
doing this, and you think that’s the most important thing that we should do.  
Furthermore, you’re effectively saying it’s our fault, you’re blaming us for the 
infections, when actually it’s all your fault!  (What 5 has done here is to draw 
together two ideas seen earlier – that an idea needs to use evidence, but 
evidence can be too early to be c** or too late to still be valid.  5 concurs with 
the idea that 3, 1 and 6 had that the politicians damage managerial credibility). 
 
Yes, I think the public as body public, would expect evidence based decision 
making, and quite rightly expect that, and would want it as well.  I think the 
public as Joe-individual probably would expect, would want it, but when it 
came to them, would probably bring in other subjective assessment criteria.  I 
think politicians are a bit different, and I don’t think, whilst they would probably 
in a purer discussion say, of course we do, I think they will always, and 
evidence is always driven by context, they would always want their policy 
implemented – evidence or not. (1, the industry transfer to the NHS concurs 
with 5 – anybody can buy into the idea but nobody wants to deal with the 
inconvenient application.  Further, I heard that:) 
 
Ok.  So the black and white, the gold standard, the RCT’s and so on, that is 
an academic gathering, and some of the big research studies, you know, we 
all go back to Mintzberg and all this sort of stuff don’t we?  So you look at 
some of the big bits of work that they’ve done, that is the academics, but I 
think there’s also something about as you move up through a career, you 
gather experiential evidence, because the context in which we’re all operating 
is continually changing, and none of us enjoy the context in which the 
research for x was done.  So, you know, the operating of the context in the 
NHS from the political to the economic to the sociological, never mind the 
technological, the demographic and all the other bits of changes that are 
happening. (4 is saying that there are good reasons why the RCT basis for a 
solution to hospital acquired infection may be scientifically robust but 
organisationally naive). 
 
Mainly for the good of the politicians, but, it would help the public if they didn’t 
feel scared to death every time they came into hospital.  Therefore, we must 
do something to restore that confidence, what shall we do? (3, the group 
acknowledges that the public are concerned with confidence rather than 
evidence, but what group 7 conclude is that with a little more patience, we 
could have restored public confidence and been scientifically robust). 
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So, what worries me about that is, was it for the public or was it for the 
politicians?  If it’s for the public, I think they’d have thought about it a bit 
longer, a bit harder and picked a better thing!  But then I’m just cynical!!  ( 7 )  
 
Finally, this issue of buying into the evidence at one level but not 
implementing it, is given a humorous twist by 2.  Maybe, evidence is only the 
retro-fitting of lunatics and prejudice after all. 
 
The number of times, and as an accountant you can probably relate to this, 
the number of times when you look at something, and you come out with the 
answer, and then you spend time working it up to demonstrate the answer’s 
right and question it, and when you get to the end of the process, you came 
up with the right number in the first place, and there is something inside 
people, I have this sort of belief that there is something inside your brain that 
assembles evidence (2   ) 
 
The decision making structure 
 
Managers demonstrated a world view in terms of their preference or otherwise 
for evidence-informed decision making.  The decision making structure was 
seen to reflect a theme that analysing, presenting and delivering this task 
within the NHS required considerable charismatic management not just an 
evidence based focus.  Occasionally the cohort singled out a specific group 
who in their eyes particularly needed help in understanding of and/or 
participating in the decision. 
 
The doctors’ view is, ok, 20 years ago, when you were building this hospital 
(because we’ve been here for 20 years, not 10 minutes), 20 years ago we 
said to you, the design of this wonderful new PFI was wrong, you’ve got too 
many beds for the footprint, so the beds are too close together, you get cross 
contamination, you can’t clean round the beds. Because there aren’t enough 
beds, you’ve got too faster through put, so people with infections are moved 
around the hospital.  (5  ) 
 
I don’t know who they asked, they picked the wrong things, but it kind of 
doesn’t matter, do you know what I mean?  If they are wanting to change 
perceptions, you know, if they said, paint your hospitals pink and it will deal 
with infection, we might have said what a load of crap, but if the public 
believed that pink hospitals were less likely to give them MRSA, it would have 
the desired effect.  (3) 
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I mean, I had this very argument with my technical directors, look, I said, look, 
if people will believe painting the hospital pink will make them safer, then we’ll 
do it.  I don’t care, that’s what we’ll do. (3, what is interesting here is that 
‘painting the hospital pink’ has quickly and previously entered the groups 
language as a shorthand for any method chosen to deal with this problem that 
is organisationally robust, but evidence weak). 
 
I’m a Chief Exec who is not one who will try to lead totally by charisma, I will 
try to do it by persuasion as well, and persuasion has a body of evidence 
behind it – even with my directors, when I want things to go different ways, I 
will often work with them on a 1:1 basis and show the evidence, so that I can 
get a quick decision later.  You know, and there’s something about, I think the 
evidence has got a role and responsibility.  (4 manages to show that evidence 
takes time to consider and that a speedy decision making process may 
necessitate protected time to consider the evidence.  That means implicitly 
that evidence does not inherently present to decision makers in an easily 
digestible form). 
 
1 makes a vital distinction about the nature of decision making in the following 
quotation.  When asked about who and who wouldn’t  use evidence he draws 
the answer towards whether you want to make a transformational change to 
the NHS or simply be a good leader in the mould of the NHS of that day. 
 
It’s interesting Nissan for an example, on their in-house college, they’re very 
clear at saying to people, good leaders will keep this company afloat, great 
leaders will write a new chapter in the history of this company; do you want to 
be a good leader, or a great leader – because they will train you to be both, 
but they ask them very, because you know, are you willing to have an 
ambition for writing a new chapter in the history of Nissan, or do you just want 
to be the person who keeps the shareholders happy.  ( 1  ) 
 
THE APPLICATION OF A VALUE SET AND DISCOURSE 
 
What part does blind prejudice play 
 
The implication of blind prejudice for the objective of enhancing good practice 
in NHS management are profound.  What we perceive as ‘good practice’ itself 
is called into question.  This would imply that there was error in the NHS 
managers themselves rather than the context in which they find themselves.  
Whilst there will be a blurred distinction between heuristics and prejudice the 
term ‘blind prejudice’ might most usefully be applied to ignoring any conformity 
with accepted good practice where evidence to inform the decision is simply 
not sought out.  The use of blind prejudice in this context is usually driven by a 
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desire to succeed in the political context – it is simply an exercise in power.  
There are many potential decision makers out there, but only so many posts, 
awards, organisations and years in a career and in the competition for 
resources and power, blind prejudice is simply a rejection of evidence where it 
does not enhance the standing of the individual decision maker.  The 
individual is required to be a strong leader, not an evidenced decision maker. 
 
And that’s kind of inevitable, but the way I kind of play managing this Trust, 
you know, if I see a journey, the way policy works, it’s seemingly, you know, I 
think we’re going there, the government says we’re going there, and all of a 
sudden, we’re off up here, or we’re off up there, or we’re going down here, 
and we’ll probably go back up there and then we’ll go down here. 
 
You know, my job I always think is to translate policies, a bit like a pendulum, 
know where it’s going to settle, and it, you know, somebody keeps bashing it 
and it’s swinging around, you know where it’s going to settle, and the trick is I 
think, to describe what’s happening, which may seem a little strange, you 
know, introducing competitions, subsidising competition.  (3 ) 
 
I can justify that to my organisation, in terms of it being the government 
wishing to give people choice, wishing to drive up quality, yes it’s tough, yes it 
has very difficult set of issues for us to handle, but they’re doing it because 
they want care to be better, and so you’re always describing the end point, 
and trying to make sense of it and what’s more trying to use it to get you to 
that point, and sometimes that means I sort of half ignore things I’ve been 
asked to do, or I throw myself at them with absolute huge enthusiasm 
because they seem to be going in the right direction. 
 
How do you think you respond to oratory? You know, if you see a great 
speech does it leave you cold, does it leave you questioning?  I can be 
admiring of it, I can be motivated by it on a good day, although I tend to be 
quite analytical and I reflect on things.  My nephew said the other day, we 
were going to see a film at the pictures, and he said he didn’t want to go with 
anyone, he wanted to go on his own, because he didn’t like talking about it 
afterwards, the way you all do, I think I’m a bit like that really, I like to kind of 
mull things over, and allow things to connect.  (3) 
 
Do you read at all?  Hardly ever, only on holiday; I never read papers, never, 
I only open the pages quickly in the Health Service Journal.  I used to read the 
Health Service Journal more than I do, but now I just sort of flick over the 
news and see what’s in there, and put them in a pile to read until it falls over, 
and I throw them in the bin! – recycling, nowadays.  (3  ) 
 
We had a doctor here say to us, we don’t have to comply with the Health Care 
Commission standards because we’re not a hospital!  What’s that about?  
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Yes.  What end is that a means to?  Certainly wasn’t about better patient care.  
The trouble is I think, we half bake the rules and that’s even worse than not 
having any at all because people can make things fit.   (3  ) 
 
Trillion times more complicated than a car engine, but there is no manual for 
the NHS, so I kind of take the view that there is no evidence on which you can 
call; when you evidence assess drugs, I mean there are lots of drugs you use 
for lots of different things, but it’s only evidence when you’ve tested it in 
circumstances in which you want to draw a conclusion – ok – so it’s got to be 
the drug in that category of patients, and not the same drug in a different 
category of patients, so it’s very specific, and we never, ever have that. (3   ) 
 
So as a reader I conclude that the cohort will use clinical evidence, I think 
managers are very much into the development of clinical pathways, working 
with clinicians and doing the best things in the best way.  But as to how the 
NHS works, the sort of infrastructure, where services are located, how they’re 
delivered, I don’t conclude that they do use evidence, I observe there is some, 
scientific evidence in there, they’ll look at journey times, and they’ll look at 
volume, populations and the needs of that population (not been done very 
well until fairly recently).  So they’ll do that sort of thing, but a lot of the 
decisions that are made, seem to be based more on history, on the views of 
politicians and key stakeholders, which are often not really evidence based.  
 
So what I as reader need to be careful on evidence of course, as always, is to 
make sure it doesn’t just fit in with their own values and your own beliefs and 
actually be a bit more critical about that appraisal.  That’s one of the reasons 
for having a narrative conversation, is so that you don’t have to pull all your 
sources out at the same time, but the method seems to have gained some 
understanding of the role of blind prejudice.  To conclude from group 6.   
 
I think in organisational change type evidence around management tools, 
techniques, where the evidence can often be seen to be quite a subjective set 
of evidence, or the context when it was developed, might have been different 
from today – yes you know, the evidence around change management is, 
there’s lots of articles, lots of books and lots of research around change 
management, in my mind they come down to two things, one is it’s like a 
pendulum, you push it bloody hard and it will finish up where you want it, or 
the other way you just gently nudge it to where you want it.  Now, they are two 
total extremes, but you can find the evidence for both approaches.  (6) 
 
The acceptance or rejection of challenges that don’t fit the value system 
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Let me start this section with a quotation from ‘4’ who swapped between 
clinical and management roles. 
 
I think my need for an evidence base would have been different at different 
stages in my career; the fact I’ve come up the clinical route, I hope I’ve use an 
evidence base for my clinical work previously.  I’ve sought an evidence base 
for the interventions I’ve made to make things work and happen differently 
throughout my career, because it seems to me, if it’s worked somewhere else, 
ie, there’s evidence it’s actually helped somebody else gain objective or reach 
an objective, it’s probably worth trying here.  So the evidence might not be 
gold standard evidence, but there is some evidence base to what I do.  So I 
think that probably never peaked, but since I’ve been in management roles, I 
think I’ve always had, and considered evidence for the way I operate and what 
I do.  (4) 
 
Maybe a way to view this is that rather than viewing evidence based practice 
as squeezed out of the prevailing value set of NHS managers, it is anticipated 
that evidence based decision making may become the mainstream approach 
of the near future.  There is a need therefore to review how the NHS 
managers recorded accept or reject challenges that don’t fit the prevailing 
value system, how do values adapt?  If the NHS is living through an era that 
does not favour one or more potential methods of decision making this may 
be temporary.  How does NHS management introduce alternative approaches 
and consider whether they may become acceptable and even desirable.  Can 
the NHA managers allow themselves to have a critical account of their own 
management?  The record of the interviews says that this self critique is 
happening, but at the same time, the overall picture is one of the forces of 
orthodoxy maintaining the “status quo” (as portrayed in the Rousseau model).  
This, whilst it is possible to see that the NHS managers may be disposed to 
accept challenges that fit the value system, it is part of the natural balancing.  
None of the managers expressed a desire to explore the ‘eccentric’ (or 
abnormal) values that challenged the prevailing orthodoxy but they were 
willing to be flexible and accept challenges when they could point to 
something particular that prompted the change. 
 
At a particular point in the conversation this rejection of the rules, this 
acceptance in the executive was becoming clear so I asked an explicit 
question.  
 
Ok.  Do you think we back off, from the implementation of the rules 
sometimes?  I think we do, yes.  Well they are sort of political; some of it is a 
genuine means to an end, and I can see that: the reason we brought the 
private sector in and allowed them to be paid stupid amounts of money, is to 
get them in, and maybe the same as with practice based commissioning, now 
they’re talking about paying them tariff, albeit the same tariff at the very low 
end complex work, I suppose it’s a step in the right direction, but we usually 
do it because we’ve fallen flat on our face, rather than we ever had a grand 
plan.  (8, who was an executive recently arrived in the NHS after 3 years away 
in the private sector, and a successful 20 year NHS career beforehand).   
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So I asked the same question to 5 and there was broad agreement that 
sometimes the rules needed to be broken but because the rules themselves, 
although based on an orthodoxy were stupid! 
 
There was something Melvin Brag was whittling on about on the radio whilst I 
was driving, about people who believe there was black blood and red blood 
and all about bloods being out of balance, and they used to bleed you, oh for 
Gods sake!  But then we used to burn witches at the stake too didn’t we!  (4) 
 
This wasn’t the first time BBC radio 4 was used as a source of reference and 
this stimulated most noticeably a quotation I heard almost as an aside from 1 
when we were just starting our talk together. 
 
I’m just listening on audio, to the Blair Diaries from Alistair Campbell and I’m 
not so sure there, I haven’t got far enough into it, so great leaders, I think, do 
have an evidence base and do consider the evidence, whether they - keep on 
going back to it, how they then fit that into the context of the situation of where 
they are, I think decides on how much credibility they give to the evidence. (1) 
 
It became clear that these executives did not stand alone in their decision to 
accept or reject challenges to the prevailing orthodoxy, they were very 
concerned that ‘we’ (the cohort of NHS managers) had sometimes used the 
wrong benchmarks in assessing performance and evidence. 
 
Another thing is, we get complacent about, we compare ourselves with 
ourselves, we talk about world class commissioning but we never look at 
what’s happening in the world, we look at what’s happening down the road, so 
if you look at Children’s Services for example, our Children’s Services, our  
best Children’s Services are some of the best in the world, but our worst 
Children’s Services are terrible.  And if we look at outcomes compared to 
Europe, and the Unicef study compares us with most major economies, not 
just in Europe, and we’re right at the bottom of the heap for Children’s 
Services, why should that be, when we know that our best services are 
absolutely up there with the best. (5) 
 
To that end the self-critique is not just of their own approach to evidence, but 
a critique of whether the group they identified as we had got their own 
orthodoxy wrong and that they were trying to evolve an answer or change 
from within rather than shouting from outside the team. 
 
Finally, the conversations turned to people who were considered to be outside 
the value system.  Firstly the politicians and their motivations were seen as a 
major challenge to whether evidence based decision making was welcome. 
 
Politicians, do politicians want evidence based decision making for the NHS?  
No, they want to be elected, and that’s the bottom line, and as long as you 
remember that, then everything they do is completely understandable!    (5) 
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And then the public – who despite being patient, customer, taxpayer and 
friend to the NHS: 
 
The public has very limited perceptions as to what the NHS is, and if you say 
to people, just list me the NHS from 1-10, it’ll be ambulances, A&E, GPs, 
maybe surgery, and that’s about it.  Where’s drug and alcohol abuse, where’s 
mental health, where’s learning disabilities, where’s speech and language 
therapy, where’s GUM, aren’t anywhere to be seen, and that’s because as a 
society we foster it, don’t we, where are the bright lights, they’re on an 
ambulance, they’re outside A&E and the GP down the road, and of course on 
TV.  (2 were considered to have little to add to the evidence based debate not 
because they couldn’t cope with the debate, but that ‘they’, including it must 
be said, those who worked within the NHS in some cases, had a fundamental 
lack of insight into what the NHS down). 
 
Lastly, and probably telling in this consideration of challenges that don’t fit with 
the current system, is the sense that evidence based decision making cannot 
ever win the day by hegemony but it cannot be disregarded either. 
 
I’d expect them to do nothing which is contrary to the evidence………..ok, I’m 
interested now………firstly I’d not expect them to do anything that’s contrary, 
I’d expect them, if they don’t follow best practice, to have thought why not, and 
to be able to justify that to themselves, and therefore to the organisation.  (2) 
 
The hegemony of organisational structure – reproduction and 
transformation 
 
Managers in particular in this project, described a situation where their own 
control over the decision making process had been to some extent, lost 
through the requirements of audit and the promotion of certain themes 
consistently in the NHS.  Executives have to be seen to be performing in an 
overt and accountable way and their work must be visible and subject to audit 
and inspection.  A model of performance management is contrasted with 
maturity of thought and debate over the use of evidence.  The external 
pressure for conformity and consistency is seen to result in high quality 
decision making tainted by group think.  Managers cannot always dwell on 
particular topics or pursue the evidence base for what they are doing (or being 
told to do).  There is a pressure to be overtly productive in the presentation of 
solutions rather than consideration of evidence.  The interview and meetings 
material touches upon some of the complex relationships between established 
management culture, career needs of the managers themselves and the 
conduct of evidence based decision making.  The pressure to obtain 
recognition for both themselves and their organisation may encourage a 
pursue of more credible ‘target hitting’ and leaves insufficient time for a 
consideration of the evidence in shaping organisational structure.  In general, 
as described in this qualitative material, the current organisational form may 
discourage evidence based decision making and the need for reproduction 
will be perceived as less risky. 
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What I was really trying to say is, why I guess, why do we not have a think 
tank of credibility to have these debates, it always seems to come from a 
policy angle; no matter what the policy sub-group is called, you scratch below 
the surface and it’s always either right wing, left wing, drug funded, you know.  
There doesn’t seem to be an appetite for any environment within which this 
debate can actually happen. (5) 
 
Fashion.  The simple arcane practice of following the latest trend or idea, of 
importing behaviours from other societies was seen as damaging to an 
evidence based NHS.  In a way it is believed that evidence is crucial to an 
acceptance of organic (internally generated) change within the NHS, but even 
higher than evidence in the hierarchy is novelty or importation from other 
systems. 
 
I mean, we do have experience, we do have learning, we do have other 
places and other countries doing it differently to us, from which you can learn 
things, but it doesn’t mean that you can straight forwardly apply them.  And it 
fascinates me in a way, because we do the whole army of, the House of 
Commons is traipsing around the world visiting China and wherever.  When 
ever I meet our local MPs, they’ve always been somewhere abroad to learn 
how to do something, and yet, when we do find things that work, it was all 
Kaiser, wasn’t it?  Which was an integrated primary and secondary care 
service, and did we learn from it?  No!  You know, we almost steadfastly 
refused to accept that it might possibly work and it was worth considering, 
because it didn’t fit the positive framework of choice and competition.  (8) 
 
We put people in positions which are very difficult to back down from, and 
we’ve now exposed them in a way, and I think, the fear of world class 
commissioning will expose the leaders again, and that’s why people 
sometimes abreact when it’s suggested that we need to examine our own 
portfolios, our own evidence base, our own tool box, and actually check it’s 
correct for world class commissioning.  (4)   
 
But there was one part of the organisational transformation from importation of 
ideas that was widely admired – the model of foundation (semi-autonomy) 
trusts imported from Spain. 
 
One of the things that’s happened of course to FTs is that they’ve attracted a 
different calibre and type of Chief Exec, arguably.  I think, you know, we’ve 
advertised for two director posts lately and there are a lot of people who want 
to work for an FT…..ok………there are a lot of people moving out of Trusts 
that wont make it to FT status, so you could say, what we’ve been doing is 
sapping the best management resource out of the non-FTs to maintain the 
performance of the FTs.  We’ve also attracted, I think,  some quite different 
people in Non-Executive roles and Chair roles; the Chairs of FTs, a lot of them 
are, like the freedom bit, like the get on and do run a business thing.  (3) 
 
The key distinction between a leader who had risen in confidence and 
therefore had the ability to avoid simple replication, is that they were given 
protected time to personally develop. 
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I think there would be nine very close opinions of what management is, 
because I think leaders, or people who have got to leadership positions at any 
part of the organisation with some development behind them, as opposed to 
just by natural progression, tend to have been on development programmes, 
where they have spend a lot of time considering leadership as opposed to 
management.  Management is a tool and a technique, leadership is a bit more 
than that.  (4) 
 
Equally it was possible to distinguish a large amount of individual autonomy 
that would be given to and/or earned by people who worked even for some 
quite direct and authoritarian managers. 
  
And if somebody passionately believes that the answer’s right, then what I’ll 
never do to them is say ‘you’re wrong’; what I’ll say is, ‘well, just go away and 
have a think about this again’ and then sometimes you find they do come 
back and they’ve modified their view.  But I’m a big believer that when you put 
somebody in a position of, you know, authority to deliver, as one of your 
senior managers, you’ve got to give them their head, what you can’t allow 
them to do is to go off the edge, and I think one of the products about being at 
a place a reasonable amount of time, is that people know how to read you as 
well – this works both ways.  (2) 
 
So the question remains about whether the NHS approach to evidence is 
borne of a desire to reproduce by template expected behaviours or is capable 
of changing through transformational leadership.  One answer is: 
 
You know I mentor a lot of people and a lot of them are Directors in PCTs and 
over the years I’ve watched them do fantastic things, and I’ve watched them 
being stopped from doing fantastic things, because some rule book says it’s 
not allowed; do you know what I mean?  Yes.  I find it sad, I mean, and the big 
picture is probably, you know, progress, the little picture depressingly irritating 
backwards steps.  (8) 
 
But even 8, who looked for the transformational leader returns to the problem 
identified by 2 – you may want the manager to make transforming decisions 
but the executives wants them to be the same decisions they would have 
made. 
 
Well, he reminded me what the end was, that’s what he ultimately did, he kind 
of made me think about what they were trying to do, yes they did it in a cack-
handed, stupid, I wouldn’t have done it that way, kind of a way, but given that 
that’s what they were trying to do, it was really not helpful for us to jump up 
and down and say ‘there’s no evidence for this’, because it undermines the 
whole investment programme they’ve put in place, which wasn’t adding any 
value to anybody, it was just making it wasted money, instead of possibly 
purposeful money.  (8) 
 
In summary, this section, whilst leading to few conclusions about the use of  
evidence does suggest that if evidence based management is to blossom in 
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managers in the NHS it will have to be given a foreign label, taught on 
management courses and lead to the same conclusions the boss wanted it to. 
 
How the system could learn, this is what my study so far has said 
 
Chief Executives and the elite managers of the NHS must be fellow travellers 
in the creation of the concept before they will be judged by it.  Whether they 
trust anybody else to lead this type of NHS management evolution is 
debatable.  Whilst it is not credible to say that the NHS is unique, and indeed 
none of the respondents said this, there is a particular refrain that it doesn’t 
compare to any other business.  Even if the manager or executive is relatively 
new to the NHS it does not take long for this cultural reference point to 
represent itself in their behaviour.  There is an innate nervousness about 
introducing a concept such as EBM to the NHS management structure, with a 
worry about how it will be perceived in the press and no recognisable 
communication method to ensure that their credibility is maintained or 
enhanced by fulfilling a commitment to EBM.  In order for a learning system to 
evolve around EBM the Chief Executive must engage with it emotionally 
displaying interest and pleasure in the message being cascaded.  The type of 
incentives not only include a demonstrated generation of public service ethos 
but also an emotional attachment and pleasure in autonomy, applause, status 
and plaudits for their organisation where it achieves its targets.  It is clear that 
money (personal or organisational) may help them to embrace an 
organisational approach to Evidence Based Management but that the benefits 
to patients makes them more responsive to system learning than money.  If 
Evidence Based Management were to find itself imposed upon rather than 
developed by Chief Executives and locum? Managers it is clear that they are 
skilled enough at organisational cascade to make it look that they find it 
palatable without actually making it happen. 
 
In order for the NHS managers to ‘learn’ then the contradictions and ambiguity 
that are thrown up need to be accepted without feelings of loss of status or 
embarrassment.  The essential contradiction with reference to Evidence 
Based Management is that the Chief Executives do value somebody holding 
the detail, somebody having a handle with what is going on but they 
themselves like to set direction with autonomy, expressing their judgement 
and decisiveness even when they confess to having little idea what is going 
on.  For example, the managerial response to policy may not be coherent 
when compared to the surplus or deficit financial position of the organisation.  
The managerial response from the Chief Executive need not take into account 
the best way to improve efficiency on an evidenced basis nor how to make 
investments on an evidenced basis (for example opportunity cost or Quality 
Adjusted Life Years QALY’s) only that they have an active leadership role in 
the decision.  So to the ambiguity inherent in adopting a learning approach to 
system development.   
 
Whilst as a researcher I was able to ask for clarification of particular aspects 
of the application of EBM, the elite manager must feel that a codification of 
EBM is not just adulterated into a form of Pedantic Control.  The traits that the 
Chief Executives and Senior Managers demonstrated were strong leadership, 
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setting a good example, negotiating and navigating the future and co-
ordinating disparate strands of policy into one coherent whole.  In order for 
EBM to rise above the change of pedantry into a system wide learning model 
it would have to enhance the ability to lead, negotiate, navigate and co-
ordinate.  The risks from adopting a learning system are to appear 
disengaged and not genuinely enthusiastic about looking at alternatives for 
each decision based only on best available evidence. 
 
So from this section is it possible to conclude that such a change cannot come 
from internal experience based actions or mangers sharing experience and 
evidence from current practice?  To be honest, that is the only conclusion that 
can be drawn.  Take this in the context for the introduction of a policy by a 
director that they know to be evidence based or the opposition for a policy 
known not to be evidence based by the same director.  It is imperative that the 
manager is prepared to respond to challenges based upon a conviction that 
evidence is ‘the best’ policy not simply using an evidence-based-approach 
common to the team. 
 
This result could be seen to be good from this perspective.  The Chief 
Executives are demonstrating intelligence.  The elite has shown the ability to 
interpret policy and understand the business but they are relying on heuristics 
to drive solutions.  The reason this is good is that leadership is visible, to an 
extent charismatic and essentially a valued commodity.  In order to portray 
this behaviour the executive or senior manager has shown the following 
competencies/behaviour. 
 
In order to steer a successful course without recourse to evidence they need 
to be all or some alchemy of the following – politically astute, decisive, 
hardworking on networks to extend and share political authority.  This 
demands in turn that they are perceived to be young in outlook, 
flexible/pragmatic, energetic and experienced.  All of these are attributable 
characteristics that leaders cannot acquire themselves – they are by definition 
attributed by others.  Crucially they are also consistent with the characteristics 
a Chief Executive or Senior Manager will want attributing.  There is one 
characteristic that this rejection of the Evidence Based Approach will attribute 
and that is ‘hard working’.  There is no doubt that evidence based decision 
support is not seen to be ‘hard work’ but equally it is not clear whether ‘hard 
working’ is a positive or negative connotation for the managers and 
executives.  On the other hand, a rejection of EBM could be seen to be bad 
from the following perspective. 
 
Despite a range of data sources, the organisation will struggle to assert that it 
is a demonstrable learning system or entity.  Given the complex/adaptive and 
evolutionary nature of organisational survival this inability to learn from the 
evidence is a drawback.  Decisive management without Evidence Base can 
evolve easily into autocracy and egocentric leadership.  Typically this will be 
bad in that decision making will essentially be short term as the time horizon 
without evidence about what works is at best 2/3 years (the possible time 
horizon of NHS organisation stability) but most likely the 12 months of the 
annual NHS planning and performance management cycle.  Significantly the 
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leader will design systems without the ability to learn from failure or weakness.  
Charismatic management characteristics demand the rejection or re-
interpretation of failures that deny the heroism of the leader.  Similarly the 
inability to learn from failure sets the decision making system of the NHS 
manager at odds with the medical and nursing equivalents that are at the 
clinical core of the very same organisation that they lead.  This will only 
continue communication and delegation and restrict decision making to an 
elite inner circle not a distributed evidence based allocation of power to 
different levels of decision makers. 
 
 
When is fine detail important to the decision? 
 
If evidence based practice is seen as something separate and distinctive from 
day to day decision making, then the prevailing management culture works 
against the objective of basing decisions on the basis of evidence.  On the 
other hand, evidence based practice may entail rejecting the accepted 
management orthodoxy and creating a separate quasi-autonomous enclave of 
interested practitioners.  The key to understanding this ‘community wide’ 
approach to evidence based decision making versus setting up evidence 
based practitioners as appellant micro communities, is the degree to which 
the cohort sample says fine detail is important to the decision.  It is not 
‘evidence base’ alone that determines the value set and the discourse – it is 
the extent to which the evidence base is taken down through organisational 
views to a granular level before a decision is made. 
 
The first part of fine detail that is important to the decision is what we must 
ask: not ‘do you understand the answer’? but ‘do you even know what the 
question is’. 
 
Because sixty thousand more people die each winter than in summer – why?  
At a journalistic level we’d say, well, of course they do it’s winter – it’s cold, so 
more people die in the cold, they don’t die of hyperthermia, they die of 
respiratory disease, more heart attacks.  We’d say, we can’t change the 
weather, that’s the way it is.  But, they don’t do that in Siberia, they don’t do 
that in Norway, they don’t do that in Sweden, Canada or Germany.   So 
places which have a worse winter than we do don’t have this, they have a little 
bit more mortality but not much, and it’s all down to poor housing policy, 
benefits, insulation, social care, primary care access, all of those things.  So if 
we were to look at it and say, ok, it’s a really big health issue, we could save 
sixty thousand lives a year.  I mean if sixty thousand people died in plane 
crashes a year what would we do?  We’d throw billions at it.  So it’s happening 
and we’re doing nothing, the answers are out there, other people are doing it 
– it’s very easy.  So that’s one example.  5, so, let’s compare that to the earlier 
discussion about deep cleaning of hospitals.  Managers found peace with the 
need for a structured political response by David Nicholson but here, in the 
case of winter death, he was avoiding even asking the question because the 
public wasn’t asking the question.  I therefore asked if that meant they thought 
Nicholson rejected evidence where is said uncomfortable things about 
subjects the public weren’t asking about.  The response: 
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I would suggest that he uses an evidence base for what he’s done and how 
he’s moved things forward, along with a set of personal beliefs, so I feel 
comfortable with that.  (4) 
 
And further I was satisfied that 4 was clear that Nicholson had to respond to 
each decision differently with a fine level of distinction between each. 
 
So, I think you can use interventions which often conflict.  Ok. (4) 
 
And in any case Nicholson was clearly not alone in using the public to get to 
the fine detail of a problem.  Vox Pop even in its most rudimentary form was 
useful in focussing down on the detailed part of a decision. 
 
And sometimes reading things, I prefer talking to people really, and I talk to a 
lot of management consultants who kind of say things, it’s not that it tells you 
something new, it’s just that it allows you to relate things in a different way.  
But so can stood in a queue at a supermarket, when you hear a conversation, 
in front of you, or behind you – you can just have one of those ‘ah-ha’ 
moments, that just kind of chrysalises something, and I think a lot of it is in 
your in heritability to be able to relate things, and relate to people and put 
yourself in other people’s positions, I don’t think it’s a learnt thing.  (3) 
 
Most fundamentally, detail and the use of detail in decision making was seen 
to be a product of where you were in the hierarchy in fact, detail was seen to 
positively inhibit the executive function. 
 
How much do you use email, phone, internet, you know, those sorts of 
media?  Hardly ever, well, hardly ever at work and all the time at 
home…….ok, tell me, that’s an interesting one!........well I’ve worked out 
over the years, I mean, I did have a computer at one time, and I worked out, I 
can type about 20% of the rate of my PA, the very process of opening and 
closing, and looking for and finding – she can probably do twice as fast as me, 
and what I find it does is it fails to flag up priorities for me, particularly because 
I work on two sites.  I’ll go into my office, I haven’t got one on my desk at the 
moment, because I dealt with them all up there, but there will be a file on the 
top of my tray that says urgent, and it might have an email from last week, I 
wasn’t in, or I missed, or that’s become urgent, because somebody’s rung, it’ll 
have a phone message, it’ll have something that came in the post, it’ll have a 
note from somebody who walked by, you know, a patient’s just about to shoot 
me, and I’d better know, and, so I’ve got the ten things that I’ve go to deal with 
in the next five minutes, in that tray, there is no way on God’s earth that I can 
process by hearing anything in that way; at home, I’m a shambles!  I do it all 
myself, I do half my emails, and fall asleep and leave it, I’ve missed the one 
that said, ‘can you let me know by tomorrow’ and I didn’t and……ok………so 
it’s a kind of needs must thing, I mean I find it very tedious anyway, because 
it’s very detailed.  (1) 
 
And this was corroborated by the colleague executive when they said: 
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I think it’s good theory, it probably makes good papers and I don’t think it does 
the job, that doesn’t mean that I totally rubbish it, but I think it depends on 
where you sit in an organisation very often, and I think the evidence becomes 
less important the higher up the tree you go.  The higher up the more it 
becomes intuition and more it becomes esp, the more it becomes knowledge 
that you don’t know you’ve go.  (4) 
 
So we can see that fine detail is important in defining the question, crafting an 
answer and showing an ethical management style in the NHS but is given little 
credence in the day to day practice of top executives. 
 
WHAT CONSTITUTES EVIDENCE? 
 
Key words or phrases that are most used 
 
Discourse analysis is a methodological approach that can be used in the 
study of communication by NHS managers.  Activity type analysis permits the 
identification of characteristic forms of talk in the use of evidence and decision 
making.  It is possible to recognise patterns of awkward or critical 
moments/words.  The transcripts have been selected for their representative 
nature and simplified for presentation and ease of reading in the ‘Rousseau 
Box’ style appendices of this report and in the conclusions. 
 
What I want to do here is to focus on the use of the word ‘evidence’ and 
consider its nature. 
 
Let’s consider some key words or phrases that are quoted in the interviews 
and taped group meetings.  To the left I have put them in their stated form and 
in the right, whether this was used frequently, infrequently, positively or largely 
negative.  I have also been clear where the phrase is used more than once 
but with no clear agreement about its value between managers. 
 
Evidence Based 
Management 
Frequent positive associations.  Seen as a 
good thing, but struggling for a consistent 
definition. Juxtaposition with Evidence Based 
Management easily understood. 
Evidence Based 
Administration 
Used only once.  A potentially semantic 
definitional distinction but very powerful when 
used by the 1 respondent.  This is a metaphor 
for an idea expressed by many that the 
freedom to stray from evidence increases the 
higher up the organisation you go.  
Distinguishes managers (higher) from 
administration (lower).  
Evidence Based Leadership Used occasionally.  Very negative associations.  
Seen by some to be an oxymoron.  Seen to be 
an expedient at best and part of a value set that 
evaporates when applied to politicians. 
Evidence Based Decision 
Making 
Used often, but not surprising given my 
questions.  The phrase ‘administration’ in this 
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table above is key to distinguishing its positive 
and negative usage.  Seen to be cumbersome 
and more relevant to juniors than executives. 
Evidence Based Resource 
Allocation 
Occasional use.  Very positive associations.  
Given that resource allocation is considered a 
rare, but significant strategic action by leaders 
the supportive evidence for this is seen as 
crucial.  Most persuasively used in gaining 
autonomy from the DH. 
Evidence Based Reporting Occasional use.  Mostly negative.  Seen to be a 
by-product of ‘administration’ rather than 
‘management’ and much less importance in 
performance management than policy targets. 
Evidence Based Argument Occasional use.  Mostly negative.  Seen to be 
an insufficient basis upon which to make an 
acceptable decision.  Where it is used it is 
almost pejorative in its diminution of the quality 
of the argument.  
Evidence Based Learning Frequent positive association.  A clear value 
exists in the attempt to learn from the evidence.  
To foster a culture with due regard to evidence 
is viewed as an overwhelming positive. 
Evidence Based Knowledge Frequent positive associations.  The 
organisation, communication and maintenance 
of knowledge are all seen to be ways within 
which the hierarchy of evidence is vital.  
 
These examples show most importantly the differences between managers in 
the way they respond to concepts.  The following concepts have no agreed 
definition. 
 
Information:  used to mean everything from public communication to a  
   relevant set of managerial numerics. 
Data:   seen as collected for purpose and objectively or the  
   arcane desire to count by bureaucracies that generates 
    meaningful information. 
Interpretation: seen by some as a meaningful contextualisation of the 
   evidence or by otherwise savvy managers as a means to  
   discredit the evidence or source. 
Protocol: 
Best Practice: From an attainable counsel of perfection to a normative  
   standard for all. 
Culture:  positive and enabling, stifling and disempowering 
   transformations only allowing reproduction. 
NHS:   An organised system of tax funded healthcare or just one  
   big experiment in political authority and social cohesion.   
   The backbone of the political offer or the basis of a  
   random importation of foreign fractions in healthcare  
management without necessary debate or evaluation. 
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I’ll leave the final comment in this section to group 3 and a quote from one 
individual in the group. 
 
But what we tend to not have is enough rules, it’s a bit like practice based 
commissioning you know, I mean, they invent it as a concept, because it 
seems to be a means to an end, the end being whatever it is we all want – 
better everything – and we haven’t made up the rules, I mean to me there are 
three criteria, does it give a better service?  Does it offer better value for 
money?  And is it sustainable?  (3, after a long meeting of fierce debate and 
intellect, the silence around this definition was telling). 
 
How do you identify your outliers and what they are saying? 
 
Conversational attempts by the outsiders or outliers included assertions of 
academic knowledge, professional training and experience.  The extracts 
illustrate a sequence of the type that was common during the interviews and 
the meetings.  The sequence begins with the chair asking if, prompted by me 
recording the interview, whether evidence would help at all.  On discovering 
that the group is willing to accept that the NHS is far from an ideal 
organisation, he asks some questions that get a more radical response than 
some of the strategic platitudes normally classified by the same individuals as 
‘assurance’.  The chair continues a light cross examination as well as inserting 
a supportive and friendly narrative throughout.  The Chair’s role was didactic – 
in order to get to what the people were saying the conversation was nurtured 
– on only one occasion did an individual specifically announce that he wanted 
to ask a question. 
 
The following is an example of when an ‘outsider’ (an off protocol doctor) is 
encouraged to move back into the fold of the use of evidence.  In the end, an 
absence of evidence was taken as a lack of legitimacy (by managers) to 
practice. 
 
And there will be occasions, you know, medicine’s instinctive, and there will 
be occasions, I think, where you don’t follow the protocol, because you don’t 
know why you don’t follow it, but you must have seen a patient somewhere 
similar; you wouldn’t expect it to be the norm, but you should be able to justify 
in your own mind why you’ve not followed best evidence, what you should 
never do is not follow best evidence.  If I take an example, we had here an 
anaesthetist prescribing some pain relief some years ago, and the evidence 
on it was no where near conclusive, no where near conclusive at all, and this 
was in the early days of clinical movements, and we looked at all the pros and 
cons, we looked at all the evidence, and in the end, we said to the 
anaesthetist, you will not prescribe.  (2) 
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But on the other hand, there is an explicit acceptance that the NHS cannot 
change without exploring the boundaries of the NHS.  In the following 
quotation there is a direct challenge to a doctor who believes that the NHS 
has attained an evidenced optimum. 
 
To what extent would evidence help you at all, or is it………it does a lot, it 
does a lot, there’s loads of things we use, I mean, to me, you know the job is a 
simple job, I always say to people, you know, that’s where we are now, that’s 
the NHS today, and that’s where we’re trying to get it, and I’ve only had one 
person in my whole life say ‘it’s perfect now’, only one person – a pathology 
trainee I was talking to a Keele University, clearly, a strange man!  (3) 
 
Let’s consider something that I want to reflect back to the managers.  The 
following is an extract from a 10 minute journey where a senior group of 
executives are trying to find the way to speak the unthinkable.  It is worth 
knowing from the start that this discussion starts with trying to find a way to 
consider the proposition that nurses in a particularly poorly performing hospital 
(on quality and economic performance) are not a solution to but a cause of the 
problem.  The outsider nature of this debate, challenging years of acquired 
cultural parameters about nurses is revealing.  What is interesting in the 
following quotation is that the outsiders in the following group meeting don’t 
use evidence to describe the need for change.  What they choose to explore 
are scenarios.  Much like a health economist they start off with an assumption. 
 
But let’s assume there’s a journey to be made, right, and you can begin to 
describe what’s in this future NHS, it’s less wasteful, there’s no healthcare 
associated infections, shorter waits, greater satisfaction, more motivated, you 
know, nicer buildings, better equipment, all the new drugs, whatever. (3) 
 
Further, this is picked up by the next person in the group.  Again, what the 
outsiders are trying to explore……or rather, what the NHS manager in a 
protected environment within which they can think of the future……are 
scenarios. 
 
And my job is to take this organisation on that journey, but it’s not just a 
simple more, more, more thing, as I think we all understand, and we all do that 
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all the time at home, we’re all trying to get the best for our family, we have a 
limited income, we have circumstances, we all live in England – it’s cold!  (3) 
 
Scenarios are by definition, alternative, plausible pictures of the future.  
Scenarios are created that are definitely not forecasts but are free from 
organisational constraint. 
 
You know, so you’ll say, we’ll have a holiday a year, and I’ll make sure I have 
central heating, and I can afford to keep paying the gas bill, and keep buying 
trainers for the retched kids feet that grow six inches every week, you kind of 
make those decisions to make that journey at home.  (3) 
 
The scenarios are written in a deliberately provocative style to tease out the 
differences between the different pictures of the future.  The previous speaker 
was describing steady interactive change.  The following speaker, although 
using a comforting style and collegiate language is painting an alternative 
scenario which is clinically relevant but more challenging. 
 
And we have just the same to do at work, and we’ve kind of coined the phrase 
at the moment particularly about  best care and best value, it’s not just one, 
and it’s not just the other, it’s not just saving money at the expense of quality, 
it’s not pursuing quality, spending money we haven’t got, it’s got to be about 
best care and best value, and I think people can relate to that.  (3) 
 
Then another more detailed description is ventured by the next reader.  
Scenarios, as I said are alternative plausible pictures and the next readers 
picture should be read side-by-side with the others to understand the 
differences. 
 
‘With you so far’ they’ll say, as a tax payer, as a user of the service, of course 
I want it to be as good as it can get, if we’re wasting money seeing ten 
patients in a clinic when we could be seeing 20, somebody is missing out on 
something aren’t they – that’s an opportunity cost in terms of health gain.  (3) 
 
 41 
Until finally, we craft an answer to the problem.  The staff can accept the 
analysis when applied in the abstract the actual implementation of the answer 
struggles when “the light is shown” on the problem.  Only at the very very last 
moment is the evidence stated…..’overpaid compared’.   
 
So, people are with you there, I mean, I’ve done lots of staff briefings and 
they’ve all left happy, what’s got them is when you’ve then pointed the light 
from the two towers into their department and said what’s more, you’re all 
overpaid compared to grades in other Trusts.  (3) 
 
My understanding of this whole conversation is that the evidence that was 
there all the time is not used by the very people who need to use this 
evidence to win the ‘outsider’ debate! 
 
The quantum of support and the critical single piece of evidence 
 
Managers took every opportunity to offer advice and support.  The advice was 
often resisted or rejected by one of the other participant(s) in the discussion 
and advice was often given in the absence of any stated problem by the 
manager.  Active resistance was very rarely shown to the giving or receiving 
of advice and managers did not call on any higher authority such as “the law” 
or the Department of Health.  There were times when the critical single piece 
of evidence was sought by all contestants.  That is where the advice was felt 
to have the potential to undermine and threaten the managers assumed 
competence amongst their peers.  As important as evidence, were questions 
of integrity and self regulation by the group. 
 
The next quotation shown that policy makers and commissioners do try to rise 
above their entrenched positions to agree a joint plan aimed at making the 
health services safe and high quality in a cost effective fashion. 
 
Yes, I think one of the problems is actually what we measure, and so the 
information that we have to deal with.  I mean, when you think about health 
and the paradigm, the NHS where we have performance data about activity, 
and we have some health data.  But the system looks a lot different if you 
actually focus on some of the outcome data which is not routinely known.  And 
if we were to focus on that, and ask why the system is failing these particular 
bits, then we might get a different view.  (5) 
 
But when it came to the acceptance of clinicians to allow quality-based 
benchmarking and to take part in the specialisation of these databases this 
was seen to be damaged by the political and policy pressure to do something 
based on a single précis of  evidence – about public attitudes to infection in 
this case – or even no evidence at all. 
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If I said to you, evidence based, does it elicit a reaction in you, does it make 
you go ‘no’ or ‘yes’, does it, is it a neutral phrase, is it a pejoratively bad 
phrase, is it a phrase that you would want to follow?  I think it makes me feel, 
you know, chance would be a fine thing, but surely we ought to do our best, 
that’s what I would say, because there is too much that isn’t, you know, deep 
cleaning a case in point.  (3) 
 
Information about acquired infection is readily available to patients and has 
had a real impact on their choice of provider, but the general attitude to the 
quantum of support for evidence based decision making, was in total 
undermined by this pre-occupation with a limited evidence base.  There was 
no doubt that this was made worse by the media spotlight focussed on 
healthcare. 
 
The political, health and social care agenda shifted in 2007/08 to focus 
policies and accountabilities on patient experience.  There is a telling desire 
though to still trust that there is an evidence based solution that is better than 
random political interactive and that, even given the political desire to make 
this policy, evidence might be the best way to allocate resources to the policy. 
  
If they had looked at the evidence, they could have made the best choice 
about how to spend that money, and if we don’t even try, if will be purely 
chance.  (3) 
 
Further there was an explicit request to use evidence locally.  There was 
broad acceptance that the choice of policy might not be evidence based but 
its effective implementation should still use the evidence of the best way to 
proceed. 
 
So, I have two feelings about it, one is that we shouldn’t see it as the solution 
for all of our problems, because it will never be that well developed in this 
experiment that is the NHS, and two, we should acknowledge that in the 
absence of evidence, we should do our very best to get the approximation for 
best knowledge to drive our decisions, that’s what I think.  (3) 
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My understanding of what happened here is that the ambition is for joint 
planning to be devolved to regional level and the East Midlands to become a 
role model for implementation of a national policy through evidence of best 
method. 
 
Then the media spotlight was discussed.  The media spotlight was accepted 
as staying focussed on healthcare – indeed it was hoped that in the next five 
years the ‘diabesity’ (diabetes and obesity) epidemic could be curbed by being 
the most common topic of TV debates and cooking programmes focussed on 
healthy eating. 
 
There was however, a sanguine response to the media.  In total, the 
population was able to deal with complex issues, but the newspapers (as the 
next three quotes show) are seen to maintain an adversarial stance even 
when the readers of their own papers were more sophisticates. 
 
The Editorial stance of the paper, is not the same as those people who 
comment, so for example, when we talked about scrapping the air ambulance.  
(3)  
 
The Editorial stance of the newspaper was totally a terrible thing, this is a 
bureaucratic decision, the comments on the website, were broadly in support 
of our policy.  (3) 
 
In terms of, let’s have less flash, so it’s almost like the media was slightly out 
of step to the people it sells.  (3) 
 
So in total, we see a desire by the managers to gain competence and control 
even in the most trying of times and they did, consistently refer to evidence as 
the basis of authority and control. 
 
How many times was something given negative or positive 
associations? 
 
The project here tries to conceptualise the issue of credibility.  Some concepts 
are judged by the participants to have poor credibility.  If quantification, 
consistency, industrial level adoption and rigour are indicators of credibility 
then in our understanding of evidence based decision making it is possible to 
recognise items that have strong positive or negative responses.  Credibility is 
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not validated by the researcher it is expressed as a judgement made by the 
participants.  Judgements of credibility are also seen to be influenced by 
particular (political) contexts so that what constitutes credible may change 
from period to period so it is difficult to say that the evidence base is able to 
avoid the temporal nature of credibility.  In the specific context of the evidence 
based manager, there was a strong correlation between credibility and one 
word/phrase – “NHS” and a strong correlation between “politics” and the 
absence of credibility.  I have included one quotation also to illuminate that at 
the heart of this conflict between credibility and two words/ideas, is the role of 
the NHS executive and whether they are agreed to be system leaders or 
system managers. 
 
Consider that since 2000/01 the government decided to increase public 
spending and the proportion of public spending spent on the NHS 
significantly, and this was sustained for 7/8 years and yet politicians were 
given lots of negative associations such as the politician below, who is 
considered to be motivated by electoral majority not the NHS role in ‘reduce 
inequalities’ or even the NHS managers role in ‘best value for money’. 
 
He’s an MP like the ‘X’ guy, who isn’t local doesn’t know the area, he’s in for 
the ballet box, he’s in for the re-election; you take someone more local like 
‘AB’, who’s a local lad, worked in one of the local schools, will always live in 
this town, he’s got the mix, because he’s precariously seated because of the 
ballet box, because despite the fact he’s been in twice, this is not a natural 
one party community, and at some stage it will move again.  (1) 
 
NHS East Midlands commissioners are occasionally taken to judicial review 
for restricting access to new drugs yet a request for Labour MPs to be 
collegiate with government policy results in the following frustration. 
 
And then you’ve got Dennis, who’s Dennis! and Dennis will only ever do what 
Dennis thinks is right, irrespective of which Party’s suggested it.  (2) 
 
What the NHS managers are identifying are examples of how they feel 
disaffected because politicians, as seen earlier, are only too keen to dictate 
NHS policy, but are absent, even when in government, when the policy needs 
public support as it is conducted and implemented by managers.  Further: 
 
But it’s fostered by television, and if you look at all the newspaper coverage, 
where’s all the noise in the Health Service about, it’s either GPs or it’s 
hospitals?  It isn’t anywhere else is it!  It’s all a perception affair, that whole 
feeling of that perception is about hospitals, ambulances, GPs.  (5) 
 
Managers in that quote are noting that politicians know a vote-winning part of 
the NHS when they see it, and vote winning areas don’t often coincide or find 
congruence with the methods used by managers to optimise quality, share 
risk and deliver cost efficiency. 
 
But the connotations of management and even the less valued ‘administration’ 
compared unfavourably with what was considered to be the (small p) 
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politically charged leadership.  There was a general trend to emphasise 
leadership, but equate management with bureaucracy.  
 
I’m interested you’ve chosen evidence based management and not evidence 
based leadership, because I think there’s a difference between leadership and 
management.  I suppose, there’s something about management based 
around evidence and management decisions based around evidence, which 
might be different from evidence based management.  It depends how you 
define management, and evidence probably as well.  (4) 
 
The question about why politicians behave in the way (to see if positive 
associations are possible) was considered and the NHS dilemma of policy 
being set by politicians who were weak in defence of the policies – was seen 
to be no better or worse than democracy itself. 
 
It’s a yes and no if I’m brutally honest on this, if you take them in an enclosed 
ecosphere, where there are no consequences to their decisions, then they will 
always go with the evidence, then you put them back in the real world, and 
there are all sorts of other pressures and constraints that come into play, and 
democracy is an imprecise science, but it’s the best that we’ve got.  (2) 
 
The question was then put about the political closure of an unsafe hospital. 
 
There will be the mother and father of a job to close it, the MP will be up, the 
population will be up in arms about it.  (8) 
 
And when the same issue came up in a group meeting, the managers could 
see only equivocation coming from the local MP even after a lengthy 1:1 with 
the NHS executive. 
 
She’s new, so first and only time I’ll ever speak to her live, you know it was a 
bit like the André Previn bit on Morecombe and Wise, you know all the right 
notes, not in all the right order, I’m sure I said all those words, but did I put 
them together in that way, no I certainly did not!  (3) 
 
Due to lobbying and marketing from providers, drug companies and patient 
organisations, the population now expects the NHS to provide an extensive 
care package and, remembering that co-payments are minimal in the NHS, 
the media has become a key driver in setting the expectations of the 
population for the NHS and newspapers critique the role of the manager.  
Whilst the media are accepted or supported, there is a particular loathing of 
‘the local’ paper by all the NHS managers.  The quality of journalism is seen 
as low and overtly personal in their attacks. 
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And of course it’s been hugely, you know, people saying, ‘how dare she say 
this’, not the first time that’s happened to me, but, they kind of generated a 
level of, you know, misery that didn’t exist before, and they’re loving it, and 
they want me to enter into a conversation with my staff on their website, you 
know, more people are writing, you really ought to get on, and I’ll go, ‘no’.  (6) 
 
One Chief Executive even went so far as to say that local print media had lost 
all relevance and that the key task of talking to people was direct not through 
the print news. 
 
I said I shall be writing my next Chief Execs column in the staff newspaper, 
urging them to write to me, and I will reply, and I will go and meet with them.  
(7) 
 
The motivation for press participation in the NHS is importantly considered to 
be opportunistic and not driven by values. 
 
I’m not doing it on your website.  No doubt I’ll get another rotten story out of 
that, but I really don’t care!  Chief Executive refuses….you know!  So, but they 
do, that’s what they’re trying to do, they’re trying to create the news that sells 
newspapers, even if they sometimes get it wrong.  (7) 
 
So, if politicians and the media have frequent negative associations who 
gained from positive credit by the NHS manager.  In one word – Doctors! – 
are viewed favourably regularly and consistently.  Although, as you can see 
from earlier readings there was a worry that nobody was willing to take on real 
clinical leadership or instigate innovative thinking the comment below is typical 
of a sympathetic attitude to doctors who are viewed to be in a predicament.  
 
Well, I think we’re not in a position where it would be true in any system 
because the potential demand on the NHS is limitless now because there’s so 
much we can do, and it’ll get worse and worse.  (5) 
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East Midland’s clinicians are praised for their clinical innovations.  Noted 
examples were the Patients’ Medical information is available on-line and that 
virtual communication has lowered the patient threshold for seeking 
consultation and is increasing demand.  Doctors were praised for their swift 
adoption of new technologies. 
 
But I think it’s a cultural thing about the way doctors are trained, and they’re 
sort of inducted into a system, very early on in medical school, whereby you’re 
taught the important thing is the doctor patient relationship, so they work for 
the patient, they don’t work for the NHS, and that’s the difference.  (3) 
 
And the doctors association with the NHS was considered to be broadly 
altruistic as opposed to entrepreneurial and venal in their behaviours. 
   
They’ll buy into the idea of the NHS, because it’s got egalitarian, utilitarian 
values, but they don’t buy into that from a management point of view.  (7) 
 
The question even arose about GPs motivation to work for the NHS and 
managers could see a way clinicians could abandon NHS employment to 
work from Chambers like other professionals, but this was given a positive 
light and association. 
 
I think most GPs would quite happily work privately outside the NHS, because 
they could still maintain their doctor patient relationship.   (6) 
 
The only worry in all this was that clinicians could drive the use of information 
technology as a method of achieving higher quality and effective care, but 
could not progress from excellence in the treatment of individuals to a wider 
treatment of the population more effectively using technology. 
 
 And the managers see the value of the NHS, in my mind the managers are 
more the champions of the peoples’ health than the doctors are, but the 
doctors don’t see that.  (5) 
 
How does a decision blossom and develop? 
 
The responses indicate that the interviewees and meetings participants are 
not applying a consistent criteria when making a decision.  The decision 
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blossoms and develops in a quite unexpected way.  In contrast to the 
perception that a decision would be clear in its use of evidence the reality is 
that the decision must be evidence based but the decision point itself is 
iterative, nobody is really sure when the decision is made.  The idea evolves, 
contorts, negotiates, makes decisions, re-checks expectations.  Even within a 
single organisation there are different interpretations contingent upon issues 
of hierarchy in the organisational structure.  Thus, for example, the same idea 
may be evaluated by different people in terms of the extent to which it makes 
a decision necessary or possible.  It may be that as an executive becomes 
very experienced in organisational leadership, they develop their own list of 
criteria which although not formally written down, are used as a heuristic 
device to make sense of the decisions they have to make or even whether 
they need to make a decision at all. 
 
You know, if somebody took a senior member of your team, if they came to 
you with an idea or a solution, would you rather they had it on paper or they 
were able to explain it to you in a conviction way.  I’d rather they explained it 
to me, but I think, what I usually say to people, and there’s a lot of people that 
kind of knock on your door and say …neh, neh, neh I’ve been thinking and 
neh , neh, neh when you haven’t got time to listen to it………ok……..  doesn’t 
really help, I’d prefer things to be explained, but  things like that are very 
difficult to move on in an organisation of 7000 people, if they don’t very shortly 
afterwards appear on paper, so you can do something with it.  So personally, I 
prefer the conversation, but practically to progress it, it needs to extend 
beyond jabbering on the corridor or whatever’s going on.  (3) 
 
Note that the word evidence never appeared in the above quotation at all, but 
then the manager was talking about a member of their team.  Conversely 
when another executive talks about their own decision making (below) the 
word evidence appears time and again. 
 
I think to be successful, you’ve got to be instinctive, you’ve got to make the 
decisions, you can’t think about it – right or wrong decision – any decision is 
better than no decision, you then have to back your decision to the hilt, you 
have to be big enough to say you’ve dropped a bollock if you’ve got it wrong 
and change it if necessary.  And probably every decision I’ve made I could 
retro-fit on evidence, but I didn’t make them on evidence at the time.  (2) 
I don’t think you’re ever totally crass to consider an evidence base, but to use 
it solely for decision making I think is crass in most situations.  I think it’s good 
in scientific situations, when I was a chiropodist, when it came down to the 
amount of chemical I put on to destroy something – there were tables of 
evidence about what was most effective, that was, to go outside of those, I 
can think of little context to go outside of those.  When it comes to an 
investment decision, or even a personnel decision, you know, you can use the 
evidence of whatever, that’s behind that decision, but if you don’t understand 
the people, the place, the politics the environment, you can make a bad 
decision; so for instance, be it an investment decision around upgrading or 
changing a hospital, or buying or not buying a service, you need to 
understand the wider context that’s there; be it the N in National for NHS, the 
national targets, national regime, be it the local context around who was 
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denied a drug six weeks ago, and now you’re spending £60,000 on people 
that seem to be more spurious – even if the evidence for one is nil and the 
evidence for an investment in district nursing is high.  (4) 
 
Note that there was no consistent base for saying the decision was evidence 
based, but there is clear reference to ‘evidence’ being the field or environment 
within which personal decision making takes place.  Now consider the same 
executive in response to another prompt. 
 
I think evidence based administration, to me administration is the application 
of processes to achieve an end, to me, that’s what an administrator is doing, 
with a small degree, often no degree of latitude or ability to make changes.  
Management, managers have the ability to make changes to those processes, 
and leadership I think, is different.  I think leadership is about achieving an 
organisational goal, and taking the whole organisation forward to achieve 
corporate objectives.  So I do, evidence based administration, I think I would 
struggle with that, because I think the processes that are used by 
administrators should have an evidence base for doing them, and a rational 
defined by evidence; evidence based management, I think managers should 
use evidence in reaching their decisions, and evidence based leadership I 
think would go the same as management.  (4) 
 
So what we see revealed is that evidence is a consistent part of the 
framework of executive leadership, but the latitudes to err from the evidence 
or to even create the evidence afresh is denied to lower levels of manager – 
deemed to be administrators. 
 
The use of decision by individuals? 
 
In considering the way that individuals rather than organisations apply 
evidence to the decision making process, of particular interest is the 
underlying assumptions about the career of the NHS manager and the life 
stages they go through with regard to autonomy.  The way in which individuals 
define the use of evidence is important in that it shapes their perceptions 
about who should be free to use judgement and who needs to concur with the 
evidence base (and indeed seek out the evidence base) before making a 
decision.  From the responses and the recordings it is clear that a variety of 
individual decision making methods are in use and there is no general 
consensus about the nature of evidence in decisions by individuals within the 
NHS.  What is clear though is that rather than being a restrictive or indeed 
exclusionary practice of some NHS managers, there is a body of support for 
evidence based decisions, with the right evidence by the right individuals in 
the right context. 
 
Can I explore one of those, and I’m not challenging what you say, it’s 
just this -  say the rule book, say the rule was the piece of evidence 
based practice, and the manager is just coming up against that, you 
know, the person that, are just not getting it as anything other than a 
limiting factor, what do they do with that?  Do they respect the evidence 
and back off, or do they try and work round it, or…….my guess, I’d say it 
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depends on their capabilities, it’s a bit like one of these things in this 
document they’ve sent me – if you want to be a manager, get yourself 
educated in something, then get a job, just don’t pretend it will teach you to be 
a manager, I mean, it’s a bit like, don’t pretend that world class commissioning 
will teach you to be a commissioner.  Ok.  So, a good person would be able to 
see the sense in that situation, people without good sense had better just 
follow the rules ‘cos they’ll be safer, do you know what I mean? I don’t know, it 
depends on the rules!...........it’s interesting about that, that follow the rules, 
because I think, a lot of that is a proxy for evidence based medicine isn’t it?  
It’s the, you know, look, the vast majority of you will not be as good as the 
best, so follow the rules, and then the outcomes will be better for everyone.  
(3) 
 
And I have no problem with that, because what it tends to do is it generates a 
coherent conversation, you know, I mean for us; a lot of the rule following is 
very wasteful, labour intensive, and there are plenty of people who know the 
answer, without having to follow the rules, but there are a lot of people who 
don’t; and the good thing about rules is it encourages conversation, you know 
if we want to prescribe a drug that’s not on the protocol or the pathway, 
someone says, hey, this is what I want to do, and this is why I want to do it, a 
few great minds come together and will probably make what is the right 
decision, whether it follows the rules or not.  (3) 
 
To the two quotations above which talk of a negotiated use of evidence is the 
concept of earned autonomy.  Earned autonomy first through acquired years 
of experimental learning. 
 
But I do think that you work up through your career, you have to be more and 
more evidence based because you haven’t built up the wealth of experience, 
the wealth of knowledge, the falling over, the making mistakes, to make the 
judgement call in the same way.  (2) 
 
And earned autonomy through understanding the ‘culturally correct’ way to 
respond to the signals being given by operational managers. 
 
Yes, well, depends how you set yourself up really, I mean, you know, I and 
other managers get criticised a lot for not being out on the shop-floor enough, 
and indeed I’m not, but you pick up limited information about what’s going on 
on the shop-floor if you stay close to the people running the business, they 
can be clinical or managerial, they will, you know, they will tell you what 
they’re fretting about, they will say, ‘oh my goodness, we’ve now got five 
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vacant posts in A&E and when this lot leave I don’t know what we’re going to 
do’, that’s what you need to know, but you also need to create a culture in 
which that happens, because, we were talking about this the other day 
actually, we’ve imported some new managers from another trust not far from 
here, and they had this alarming habit of telling you everything’s alright, when 
it isn’t!  (3) 
 
But broadly a consensus is achieved that evidence/science applies 
predominantly to clinicians and is a luxury few managers can afford. 
 
I think they’ll use clinical evidence, I think managers are very much into the 
development of clinical pathways, you know, working with clinicians and that’s 
fine, doing the best things in the best way, but as to how the NHS works, the 
sort of infrastructure, where services are located, how they’re delivered, I don’t 
think they do use evidence, I think there is some, some scientific evidence in 
there, they’ll look at journey times, and they’ll look at volume, populations and 
the needs of that population not been done very well until fairly recently, but 
they are doing that.  So they’ll do that sort of thing, but a lot of the decisions 
that are made, seem to be based more on history, on the views of politicians 
and key stakeholders, which are often not really evidence based.   (5) 
 
The making of decision by groups? 
 
One of the objectives of this project is to hold a mirror up to the cohort (of 
which I am a member) to identify perceptions of good NHS management 
practice.  Within this I wished to look at how the group (when it worked 
collectively) would make decisions.  It is amusing that interviewees found it 
easier to identify bad practices in the working of the group than highlight 
aspects of good practice.  The issue of the right environment within which to 
make an evidenced decision emerged as being something managers needed 
to ‘get right’ it does not exist as a natural state in the group.  Rather than 
making a decision that focused on technical constraints, describing and 
reflecting on the appropriate place and circumstance to make an evidence 
based decision as a group was highlighted by many of the cohort.  Good 
practice in relation to the presentation of evidence and the use of evidence 
involved on ability to engage this group/a group, to be persuasive and to be 
credible despite limitations of data and knowledge.  There is a caveat 
however, in that the very diversity of group structures makes universal 
interpretation problematic. 
 
Clinicians were widely reported as helping negotiate quid pro quo deals to 
consolidate services such as stroke, trauma and maternity across sites.  But 
they did this for managers who had years of NHS experience more readily 
than newly introduced managers. 
 
For a manager to be accepted as something other than an irritation, getting in 
the way of clinical work, they have to demonstrate that they’re in it for the long 
haul themselves, and that’s very hard, and after the first three or four 
managers have gone your chances of making it as number five are really 
quite small.  But there’s a down-side to this longevity thing as well, and it’s this 
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sort of practice being entrenched, that once, you know, we’ve done it this way 
for the last ten years, so you’re not going to change what we do, and also, the 
culture becomes quire unhealthy because of the longevity sometimes.  (5) 
 
But the very longevity of managers that enables clinical participation is seen 
by some as a limiting factor when getting clinicians across the East Midlands 
to lead and support required configuration and productivity improvements.  
Here is 5 again, talking about how a new to the NHS executive uses clinical 
evidence to provide an antidote to organisational inertia and antipathy towards 
him as an individual. 
   
He just rolled his trousers up, put a knotted handkerchief on his head and 
said, ‘look – what do you want?  This is evidence based medicine, here’s the 
evidence, what are you all talking about?’  And still, it made a big impression, 
it got a lot of laughs, but it takes that, sort of real challenge, before a lot of that 
out of date evidence is discarded.  So evidence base – it’s sort of important, 
but it’s almost a culture rather than a reality sometimes.  (5) 
 
It is clear that strong financial control over medical cost increases is valued by 
executives, but in the following discussion by a leader who is no longer in 
finance, two things are worthy of note:  the absence of the word evidence in 
any reference to accountants in the NHS and despite appreciation of their 
corporate contribution a question mark hangs over their ability to influence 
group decision making. 
 
I think it depends on what sort of an accountant you are, I mean, I don’t think it 
was my natural bent to be honest, and I was heartily glad to get rid of it, 
because it was too precise for me.  But it taught me some things, it taught me 
a balance sheet is only balanced when it balances to zero.  Which is a good 
discipline; these people who go……..well, that’s about right! taught me you 
can approximate, but you need to know how you’re approximating, you know, 
when you round to the nearest million, you know what you’ve lost don’t you.  It 
doesn’t mean you have to mess around with pennies, it just means you need 
to know what you’re not taking account of.  It taught me some good practice 
around delving in the detail, which is not my natural bent, and for people that 
are, they do struggle to make good strategic decisions, and I have watched 
accountants struggle to do that; I’m not suggesting you’re one for a minute, 
but I have an ability to get into detail when I need to, in a way some people 
just can’t, and it’s given me an understanding in money that’s essential if 
you’re trying to do my job, it really is.  And there are many, many, many times, 
no disrespect to ‘B’ who’s been a great Director of Finance here, there are 
many times when we’re kicking numbers around, and it’s me who goes, ‘but 
hang on a minute, you know, if that’s going to drive that, and that’s that and 
that’s got to go there, then surely we’ve got a problem here’, and you can kind 
of see everyone going oh-yes!  And I couldn’t do that probably, if I’d been a 
Physiotherapist.  Ok, so your profession has been a tool that you’ve been 
able to use on an ongoing basis……..yes, hugely.  Ok.  (3) 
 
But, the decision making by accountants was not the only one group to fail the 
executive test of reasonableness – so to the matrons. 
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I went in very, very hard with the matrons last April about their cleaning audits, 
because what they were telling me back in March/April was that we were 
going to fail the health care commission standards, when we had all the 
matrons in, I said, I know it’s not like that, you know it’s not like that, what are 
you playing at.  (1) 
 
Finally, let’s consider two quotations about the apex ‘group’ of the 
organisation – the board itself.  The decision making in the boardroom is 
expected to be, demonstrated to be, cognisant of evidence based decision  
making. 
 
Imagine you’re in a boardroom and it’s one of those, where for some reason, 
you’re still in there at seven o’clock at night, and you know you’ve got locked 
into something, and you need to make a decision before the morning, and 
somebody says, shall we have a look at what the evidence says – is that a 
good thing to do at that moment, because it is a distraction and the evidence 
isn’t in the room; imagine, taking my scenario, the evidence isn’t in the room, 
so there was no reason you should have used it before, do you take a break 
and go and look for the evidence or do you say, no, we have sufficient skills to 
understand the context and consequences – in this room, of getting the 
decision right or wrong – we don’t need any evidence, what we need is a 
decision.  I would be shocked if the evidence wasn’t already there, and I 
would want to have the evidence if there was some evidence around, I 
certainly would want to know it was there and on certain decisions I would 
want the ‘show-me test’ as well.  On big things I want to see it.  So I would 
stop – go to the evidence, then consider the evidence in the wider context of 
the decision we’re making.  (4) 
 
And, this is true even when the whole board might be agnostic about the 
approach. 
 
Oohh, I think one or two of them would react positively, I think one or two of 
them, would I think not understand what I meant…ok…..and the rest would be 
agnostic in the middle.  But, I do think that self perception and review of one’s 
performance is something which leaders sometimes get a bit blasé about, and 
don’t do!  (5) 
 
Is information collected and evaluated? 
 
It is established by respondents that they have the technical skills to 
undertake evidence based decision making and to write a coherent ‘evidence 
based’ story.  The managers were also able to demonstrate that they 
understood the importance of reflexivity as a management competence.  What 
is less clear is that managers were happy that the collection and evaluation of 
data was sufficient to treat the data as information to help aid decision 
making.  Given the political context (and the consequent implications of 
decision making) the collective and evaluated information may go some way 
to enhance the quality of NHS management.  But the technical task of the 
assimilation of information may not be able to go far enough to convince NHS 
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managers to move without a sceptical evaluation.  More generally it was also 
asserted that there will always need to be more resources in order to carry out 
training in the evaluation of information. 
 
I think World Class Commissioning, if we’re not careful, will give us a rigorous 
discipline on investment issues, even going down to an actuarial type 
approach, and I think that’s actually quite dangerous, because context and 
consequences are two things that a manager and a leader need to continually 
take into account, the consequences of one decision on another set of 
decisions.  (4) 
 
So somebody has done some research, however subjective, to actually say 
those who scored highest on health commission scores, those who had most 
financial balance, those who were actually achieving the most important 
government targets.  What was common about them?  (4) 
 
So I pushed the respondents to explore this idea with the following question: 
 
You know when they talk about ideas like balance scorecards or even 
the idea that you spin up your machine in the morning and there’s like a 
dashboard of dials in front of you telling you – how does that type of 
model play with you? 
 
And, the most illuminating quotations were as follows: 
 
Well it works to a degree, I mean, you know, I have one on my car, and it says 
ok when I switch it on, and sometimes it says ok and I go down the road and it 
stops, or brakes or the tyre goes flat, or you know, it’s not foolproof.  But I 
think it lulls you into a false sense of security because, if I take one of my 
current pressures at the moment, A&E, not the wrong side of the line, but 
dangerously close!  And it’s, well its the right side of the line, my dashboard 
would say ok, but what I know is, I’ve got a whole middle grade rota missing 
down there, because we can’t appoint middle grade staff, because of all the 
MMC debacle etc, etc, so I know, you know, we tried to fill a post, we 
shortlisted 14 people and one turned up, and that’s telling me that my car’s 
going to be breaking down some time in the future, and there’s no point 
switching on my engine; it’s not proactive enough again.  (3) 
But, soon within this discussion arose the spectre of the ill-informed politician 
again. 
 
Have you seen that joke, it was in the Health Service Journal a couple of 
weeks ago, about …..’look minister, they look like they’re achieving now, ok, 
time for a reorganisation!’, so we’re retrofitting the evidence to see what’s 
failed, as opposed to it’s working and let’s destabilise it.  (3) 
 
And, to that was added a long narrative reconsideration, in great technical 
detail, of the case against politicians with regard to NRSA.  The information 
was collected and evaluated by the NHS it was ignored by politicians.  Even 
worse, politicians used a partial dataset about hospital acquired infection upon 
which to determine their policy response. 
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And what we always find is every time they introduce one set of priorities, 
another set of priorities emerges because they’ve been ignored by the first 
set!  Carry on with that, it’s fascinating.  Well, it’s just the way of the world.  I’ll 
tell you what’s going to happen next year if you like?!  Yes.  Yes, we’re 
focusing on healthcare acquired infections, but we’re only focusing on two, 
we’re focusing on MRSA and Cdif, ok, which together account for about 25% 
of hospital acquired infections, so what’s going to happen when we’ve sorted 
those two out?  Well, all of a sudden, Pseudomonas is going to become an 
important infection.  Vancamycin resistant enterococci are going to become, 
TB is going to become one.  Because all of these infections are being ignored, 
because everyone’s focusing on MRSA.  And you may say, ok, but the 
measures we take to reduce hospital infections are generic, so if we take 
action against MRSA it’ll work for every thing – but it doesn’t, they’re different, 
and what we already see is that the hospitals are dong well on MRSA and not 
doing well on Cdif and vice versa.  I mean, MRSA bacteremia for an average 
hospital in this region, we’re talking about 30 cases a year, of all the hundreds 
of thousand, or millions of patients we treat every year, we’re trying to reduce 
30 to 25, what the hell’s that all about, you know, and yet that’s the top of the 
priority.  And we don’t even look at the vast of MRSA infections, we don’t look 
at all the MRSA infections that don’t get bacteremia, all the joint infections, the 
skin infections, you know, the ulceration that people get, we don’t look at the 
damage that that causes in the community.  So we’re looking at the tiniest tip 
of the smallest iceberg here, it’s no way to do things, and yet that’s the target, 
so the target culture enables then to say we’re making progress against 
infection.  Whereas we’re sort of, it’s like pushing the lumps down on the 
carpet you know, we’re making progress on that one there, but this mound’s 
appeared over here.  (5) 
 
And even more stringently the individual asserted that political policy without 
reference to the NHS clinician or manager was no more informal than that of a 
seven year old. 
 
I asked a bunch of seven year olds, ‘what do you think hospitals are for?’ and 
they came up with pretty much the standard answer, it’s where you go to 
when you’re poorly so that you can get better.  I thought, brilliant yes.  So 
where in our performance management system is anything that tells us if that 
is actually happening.  You know, when people go in with chronic obstructive 
airways disease, do we make them better than if they’d just stayed at home?  
Why aren’t we measuring whether we make people better; we measure how 
many people die.  (5) 
 
At stages of the interview I asked whether the 7th of the stages of a system 
implementation (post implementation) was a feature of management policy. 
 
Is the impact of a decision evaluated by post implementation review in 
the short and/or long term?  Is empirical evidence used? 
 
As stated in the introductory chapter of this project, one of the key objectives 
is to develop a narrative about evidence based management that encourages 
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informal and reflexive practice in NHS management research.  To this end, 
the seventh stage of system implementation (post-implementation review) 
needs to be identified in the responses.  Whilst the objectives of each of the 
participant managers may be different in content for each individual, the 
exercise of post-implementation review should be evaluated.  The question is 
the degree to which participants and/or the wider NHS draw upon their own 
extant work to stimulate experimental learning. 
 
The first negative response to the question of whether the NHS was 
appropriate evidence said:  
 
That’s fascinating, and nobody’s mentioned, so, old evidence becomes 
dogma, so it’s established on an evidence base, and this is not just relevant to 
medicine, so it’s not just established on – it’s established on an evidence 
base, but then that becomes dogma which in its self evaporates over time and 
then the evidence isn’t refreshed, is that………  (5) 
 
And even more telling was an acknowledgement that there was no post-imp 
limitation work done to evaluate the success of the initiative. 
 
Which of all the measures here, we have introduced, has worked because our 
infection rate has reduced……..I don’t know, if I’m honest, I don’t much care 
so long as it’s happened, it’s a number of things we’ve thrown at it.  I could 
play the experimental – I could take that one out and see if it makes a 
difference, but I’m not interested, it has had the desired effect.  (1) 
 
And 5 again returns to the sense that this is all irrelevant in a system 
determined by politicians and political favours. 
 
Carry on with that, that’s fascinating!  We work in a system where most of 
the levers that we’ve got were actually worked through with politicians in the 
first place, weren’t they?  Yes.  NICE is a construct of a political approach to 
the NHS, by a government that hasn’t changed political party in the last 11 
years, and yet we don’t seem to be any closer to political tolerance to this 
system than we were when we started; so that thing about, all they want to do 
is be elected.  (5) 
 
The alternative is to give some well resourced people the time to plan, model 
and shape systems and more importantly, review what we have learned from 
what we have already done. 
 
And I think everything else was left to – let’s see what happens, we’ll give 
some clever people and see if they come up with something, and that’s what 
seems to happen with the NHS, the politicians either seem to go for a 
structural reform, on the grounds that it’ll take a couple of years to do, and we 
can always claim – yes we know the system isn’t working, we’re doing this 
massive review, we’re doing all this work to restructure, and it’s going to work 
– just you wait and see, and then of course it takes three or four years to 
come through, doesn’t work, and so they have to do it all over again!  And if 
you look at the last three or four reorganisations, I don’t think there’s any 
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evidence that any of then have benefited the NHS at all.  And certainly they 
didn’t start off with any aspirations for that evidence.  (5) 
 
And then there are some direct and lengthy quotations given by an individual 
in a group situation that are worthy of inclusion as individual quotes.  I like the 
one here that says the NHS is complex and cannot be easily modelled, but 
makes no reference to evidence. 
 
I do believe that most people can understand that that’s the world we work in, 
most people can understand that there isn’t a text book on the shelf of how to 
do this job, and most people in my experience, if you spend the time talking to 
them, will understand that, all we’re trying to do is what we believe to be the 
best, taking account of what everyone’s telling us, and from my perspective, in 
my job, it’s not opening holiday brochures, reading the small print and looking 
it up on the website, it’s talking to people, and you know, should we regrade 
nurses in surgery they’d say no, you ask some of the surgeons they’d say no 
and if you do I’m going on strike, and you know, you ask some other nurses 
and they go, well yes, fair enough, whatever, you get a whole wide variety of 
views, and you somehow have to make sense of it. (3) 
 
But the individual view is that there is sufficient evidence to make information 
and informed decisions that we can rely on. 
 
I don’t think evidence takes time to mature, evidence is there from when it’s 
presented .. ...it’s then assessed, folk law, takes the time to mature, so I think 
evidence can come and be there, I think in management terms, new evidence 
rarely comes to light, but I think evidence itself, becomes evidence from the 
day it’s presented, it’s just a question of what category and what quality it is.  
(4) 
 
The problem as ever, again quoted in a group context, is that politicians and 
information do not fit nicely together. 
 
Yes, it is really, I said to my board, just the other day, you know, working in 
the NHS is like living the world’s biggest experiment, and it is, you know, we’ll 
twiddle this, and I always used to think, particularly when we had Alan 
Milburn, I used to imagine, you know, the man stood in front of this big 
complex machine with fan belts and nuts and bolts, and cogs and things, 
turning the spanner in his hand, just kind of diving in and just loosening a bit, 
or tightening a bit, taking a bit off or adding a bit on, and going, oh, that didn’t 
work, we’ll have another go, you know? (3) 
 
And to the final observation on the use of information is a sense that however 
we focus on results – information – evidence and outcome, it will never be 
enough to identify the critical success factors in any post implementation 
review. 
 
But you don’t know precisely what measure resulted in that success.  Ok.  I 
think it’s probably a bit of all of those things.  I think some of the writers say, 
you know, just give it up because you’ll never be able to diagnose the causes, 
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any one person can claim it’s one thing, but it’s a mixture of culture, ability and 
structure.  This about hugely energetic capable people, do you think that, that 
almost gives them to reach an optimum outcome, irrespective of which path 
they follow?  (3) 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
I would like to draw my conclusion back to the original concept of Rousseau.  
There has been a broad discussion in the paper of Rousseau and in amongst 
my hours of narrative I think it is most useful to classify my findings as follows: 
 
First let me reproduce the table “After Rousseau” from my literature review. 
 
After Rousseau: A synthesis from the literature of Rousseau on the practice of 
Evidence Based Management 
 
Management Issue With advanced knowledge of 
effective implementation of 
Evidence Based Management 
For evidence avoiding status 
quo 
The supervision of 
employees 
 
A 
Managers acquire a systematic 
understanding of what productivity 
gains are most appropriately 
cultivated from their staff 
A manager may misuse 
threats and punishments or 
overuse positive 
encouragement with no 
reference to the outcome of 
either style or organisational 
performance 
Information available to 
managers on the 
consequences of their 
decisions 
 
B 
Appropriate evidence and data 
base: perceptual gaps and 
misunderstandings are significantly 
reduced so that post 
implementation review is a valuable 
part of improving management 
Information is poor as data 
and evidence is not collected 
so that experiences are likely 
to be misinterpreted 
The delivery on 
promises to the public, 
employees, 
stakeholders/taxpayers 
customers and others 
 
C 
Decisions are based on systematic 
causal knowledge conditioned by 
expertise.  Decisions are 
legitimised by being made in a 
systematic and informed fashion 
more readily justifiable in the eyes 
of stakeholders 
In such settings, managers 
cannot learn why their 
decisions may have been 
wrong, nor what alternatives 
would have been right.  The 
public challenges decisions in 
the search for transparency 
Management style 
 
D 
Managers have an understanding 
of the powerful impact their 
decisions have on the fate of their 
firms.  Managerial competence is 
recognised as a critical and often 
scarce resource 
Evidence based management 
seems to threaten managers 
personal freedom to run their 
organisations as they see fit 
Approach to academic 
research 
 
E 
Managers read the academic 
literature regularly and the 
consultants who advise them are 
likely to do so also.  There is a 
recognition that this research exists 
Despite the explosion of 
research on decision making, 
individual and group 
performance, business 
strategy and other domains 
directly tied to organisational 
practice, few practising 
managers access this work 
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Management culture 
 
F 
Supervisors and managers respond 
to a belief system probably 100 
years old, as far back as Fredrick 
Taylors (1911) structured methods 
for improving efficiency were 
classified under scientific 
management 
A belief that good 
management is an are - !the 
romance of leadership” school 
of thought where a shift to 
evidence an analysis connotes 
loss of creativity and autonomy 
In conclusion 
 
G 
Managers have evidence on which 
to base their decisions and 
consequently what is at stake 
should the decision or implantation 
fail 
Managers are prevented from 
real learning by fads and 
falsehoods 
 
And this is what we find. 
 
In the matter of: 
 
So, in conclusion, using the Rousseau or After Rousseau model.  This is what 
we conclude about the nature of evidence based decision making within the 
NHS in the East Midlands during 2007-08.  I have notated a + to mean that 
the quotation favours an evidence based approach and a – to mean that the 
quotation means the lack of an evidence based approach to decision making 
or an = sign to say that it neither favours one conclusion or the other. 
 
In the approach to academic research 
 
An evidence based approach would conclude that managers read the 
academic literature regularly and the consultants who advise them are likely to 
do so also.  The alternative conclusion is that few practicing managers access 
this work. 
 
- “get yourself educated in something, then get a job, just don’t pretend it will 
teach you to be a manager” 
- “it’s a bit like practice based commissioning, you know, I mean they invent 
it as a concept because it seems to be a means to an end, the end being 
whatever it is we all want” 
+ “And sometimes reading things, I prefer talking to people really and I talk 
to a lot of management consultants who kind of say things, it’s not that it 
tells you something new, it’s just that it allows you to relate things in a 
different way” 
- In conditions which predispose to hospital acquired infection “you wont do 
any of the things of which there’s a very good evidence base that it would 
make a difference, and so your first engagement with us, is to come and 
tell us to do something for which there is no evidence that any infection 
has been prevented, anywhere in the world – ever, by doing this and you 
think that’s the most important thing that we should do” 
- “If I say to you academic evidence?  I think it makes me feel, you know, 
chance would be a fine thing” 
- “It will never be that developed in this experiment that is the NHS” 
+ “So places which have a worse winter than we do don’t have this, they 
have a little bit more mortality but not much and it’s all down to poor 
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housing policy, benefits, insulation, social care, primary care access, all of 
these things” 
= “I think they’ll use clinical evidence, I think managers are very much into 
the development of clinical pathways, you know, working with clinicians 
and doing the best things in the best way, but as to how the NHS works, 
the sort of infrastructure, where services are located, how they’re 
delivered, I don’t think they do use evidence” 
- “No!  We almost steadfastly refuse to accept that it might possibly work 
and it was worth considering because it didn’t fit the positive framework of 
choice and competition” 
 
In the supervision of employees 
 
An evidence based approach would conclude that managers acquire a 
systematic undertaking of what productivity gains are most appropriately 
cultivated from their staff, in the alternative a manager would have a style with 
no reference to its outcome or organisational performance. 
 
+ “I went in very, very hard with the matrons about their cleaning audits, 
when we had all the matrons in, I said, I know it (the evidence) is not like 
that, you know its not like that, what are you playing at” 
+ “We had a doctor here say to us, we don’t have to comply with the Health 
Care Commission standards because we’re not a hospital!  What’s that 
about?  Certainly wasn’t about better patient care” 
= “My next Chief Execs column in the staff newspaper, urging them to write 
to me, and I will reply, and I will go and meet them” 
+ “You work up through your career (and to begin with) you have to be more 
and more evidence based because you haven’t built up the wealth of 
experience, the wealth of knowledge, the falling over, the making 
mistakes, to make the judgement call in the same way” 
+ “I think the processes that are used by administrators should have an 
evidence base for doing them, and a rationale defined by evidence, I think 
managers should use evidence in reaching their decisions and evidence 
based leadership I think would go the same” 
 
In the information available to managers on the consequences of their 
decisions 
 
An evidence based approach would conclude that there was appropriate 
evidence and data, a significant reduction in perceptual gaps and post 
implementation review is valued.  The opposite is, that information is poor and 
evidence is not collected. 
 
- “Old evidence becomes dogma.  So it’s established on an evidence base 
but then that becomes dogma which in itself  evaporates over time and 
then the evidence isn’t refreshed”  
- “Balanced scorecards.  It’s not foolproof.  I think it lulls you into a false 
sense of security.  A&E, not the wrong side of the line, my dashboard 
would say ok, but we tried to fill a post there, we shortlisted the people and 
one turned up, and that means it’s going to be breaking down some time in 
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the future, it (the balanced scorecard) is not proactive enough again” 
- “I think world class commissioning, if we’re not careful, will give us a 
rigorous discipline on investment issues, even going down to an actuarial 
type approach.  And I think that’s actually quite dangerous because 
context and consequences are two things that a manager and a leader 
need to continually take into account, the consequences of one decision 
on another set of decisions” 
= “I’d prefer things to be explained but things like that are very difficult to 
move in an organisation of 7,000 people, if they don’t very shortly 
afterwards appear on paper so you can do something with it” 
= “Taught me you can approximate, but you need to know how you’re 
approximating,  you know when you’re approximating you know what 
you’ve lost.  But I have an ability to get into detail (the evidence and the 
data) when I need to in a way that some people just can’t” 
= “I don’t think you’re ever totally crass to consider an evidence base, but to 
use it solely for decision making I think is crass in most situations.  I think 
it’s good in scientific situations, when I was a chiropodist, when it came 
down to the amount of chemical I put on to destroy something – there were 
tables of evidence about what was most effective, that was, to go outside 
of those, I can think of little context to go outside of those.  When it comes 
to an investment decision, or even a personnel decision, you know, you 
can use the evidence of whatever, that’s behind that decision, but if you 
don’t understand the people, the place, the politics the environment, you 
can make a bad decision; so for instance, be it an investment decision 
around upgrading or changing a hospital, or buying or not buying a 
service, you need to understand the wider context that’s there; be it the N 
in National for NHS, the national targets, national regime, be it the local 
context around who was denied a drug six weeks ago, and now you’re 
spending £60,000 on people that seem to be more spurious – even if the 
evidence for one is nil and the evidence for an investment in district 
nursing is high” 
- “The doctors’ view is, ok, 20 years ago, when you were building this 
hospital (because we’ve been here for 20 years, not 10 minutes), 20 years 
ago we said to you, the design of this wonderful new PFI was wrong, 
you’ve got too many beds for the footprint, so the beds are too close 
together, you get cross contamination, you can’t clean round the beds. 
Because there aren’t enough beds, you’ve got too faster through put, so 
people with infections are moved around the hospital”  
In the delivery on promises to the public, stakeholders and others 
 
An evidence based decision making would conclude that decisions are based 
on systematic causal knowledge conditioned by expertise.  Decisions in an 
evidence based conclusion would be systematic, informed and readily 
justifiable.  In the opposite environment the public challenges decisions in the 
search for transparency and managers cannot learn why their decisions may 
have been wrong nor what alternatives would have been right. 
 
- “Politicians, do politicians want evidence based decision making for the 
NHS?  No, they want to be elected and that’s the bottom line and as long 
as you remember that, then everything they do is completely 
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understandable!” 
- “Nice (the National Institute for Clinical Excellence) is a construct of a 
political approach to the NHS by a government that hasn’t changed 
political party and yet we don’t seem to be any closer than we were when 
we started” 
- “And what we always find is every time they introduce one set of priorities, 
another set emerges because they’ve been ignored by the first set” 
- “Yes, I think the public as body public, would expect evidence based 
decision making, and quite rightly expect that, and would want it as well.  I 
think the public as Joe-individual probably would expect, would want it, but 
when it came to them, would probably bring in other subjective 
assessment criteria.  I think politicians are a bit different, and I don’t think, 
whilst they would probably in a purer discussion say, of course we do, I 
think they will always, and evidence is always driven by context, they 
would always want their policy implemented – evidence or not” 
- “Pseudomonas is going to become an important infection.  Vancamycin 
resistant enterococci are going to become, TB is going to become one.  
Because all of these infections are being ignored, because everyone’s 
focusing on MRSA” 
- “And we don’t even look at the vast of MRSA infections, we don’t look at all 
the MRSA infections that don’t get bacteremia, all the joint infections, the 
skin infections, you know, the ulceration that people get, we don’t look at 
the damage that that causes in the community.  So we’re looking at the 
tiniest tip of the smallest iceberg here” 
- “you clearly identify yourself as wanting to give the public confidence in 
you being a good custodian of their health service, versus the method that 
would do that is not really evidence based” 
 
In the matter of management style 
 
In a conclusion erring towards evidence based decision making about the 
NHS, managers would have an understanding of the powerful impact of their 
decisions and managerial competencies would be recognised as critical and 
scarce.  The opposite conclusion would be that evidence based decision 
making seems to threaten managers personal freedom to run their 
organisations as they see fit. 
 
= “You know I mentor a lot of people and a lot of them are Directors in PCTs 
and over the years I’ve watched them do fantastic things, and I’ve watched 
them being stopped from doing fantastic things, because some rule book 
says it’s not allowed; do you know what I mean?  Yes.  I find it sad, I 
mean, and the big picture is probably, you know, progress, the little picture 
depressingly irritating backwards steps” 
+ “So there was no reason you should have used it before, do you take a 
break and go and look for the evidence or do you say, no, we have 
sufficient skills to understand the context and consequences – in this 
room, of getting the decision right or wrong – we don’t need any evidence, 
what we need is a decision.  I would be shocked if the evidence wasn’t 
already there, and I would want to have the evidence if there was some 
evidence around, I certainly would want to know it was there and on 
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certain decisions I would want the ‘show-me test’ as well.  On big things I 
want to see it.  So I would stop – go to the evidence, then consider the 
evidence in the wider context of the decision we’re making” 
= “One of the things that’s happened of course to FTs is that they’ve 
attracted a different calibre and type of Chief Exec, arguably.  I think, you 
know, we’ve advertised for two director posts lately and there are a lot of 
people who want to work for an FT…..ok………there are a lot of people 
moving out of Trusts that wont make it to FT status, so you could say, what 
we’ve been doing is sapping the best management resource out of the 
non-FTs to maintain the performance of the FTs.  We’ve also attracted, I 
think,  some quite different people in Non-Executive roles and Chair roles; 
the Chairs of FTs, a lot of them are, like the freedom bit, like the get on 
and do run a business thing” 
- “I’m interested you’ve chosen evidence based management and not 
evidence based leadership, because I think there’s a difference between 
leadership and management.  I suppose, there’s something about 
management based around evidence and management decisions based 
around evidence, which might be different from evidence based 
management.  It depends how you define management, and evidence 
probably as well” 
- “Well, he reminded me what the end was, that’s what he ultimately did, he 
kind of made me think about what they were trying to do, yes they did it in 
a cack-handed, stupid, I wouldn’t have done it that way, kind of a way, but 
given that that’s what they were trying to do, it was really not helpful for us 
to jump up and down and say ‘there’s no evidence for this’, because it 
undermines the whole investment programme they’ve put in place, which 
wasn’t adding any value to anybody, it was just making it wasted money, 
instead of possibly purposeful money” 
 
 
 
 
 
So in Summary My Conclusion is 
 
In the matter of the approach to 
academic research (Against!) 
 
 
 
 
In the matter of supervision of 
employees (For!) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the matter of the information 
 
There is a bias against using 
academic research by NHS 
managers in the East Midlands.  This 
is by no means universal, but is 
consistent in its presentation. 
 
There is a very strong preference for 
using evidence based decision 
making amongst the cohort of East 
midlands managers and use an 
appropriately cultivated management 
approach to support evidence based 
decisions. 
 
There is a bias against evidence 
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available to managers on the 
consequences of their decisions 
(Against!) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the matter of management style 
(No preference either way) 
 
 
 
 
 
In the matter of the delivery of 
promises to the public, stakeholders 
and others (Against strongly!) 
based decisions.  Decisions have 
insufficient data and evidence for 
decision making, and little value is 
attached to post implementation 
review.  Some managers are neutral 
towards this subject but few, if any, 
show a preference for evidence 
based decision making informed by 
the consequences of their decisions. 
 
There is only an inconclusive result in 
the area.  There is no preference.  
Some managers have a preference 
for evidence it seems but equally 
same would discredit it as a viable 
and realistic approach. 
 
Of all the areas this is the one where 
there is next to no examples of 
evidence based decision making, but 
there are multiple strong, lengthy and 
cross-referenced examples of 
decision making that is neither 
systematic nor developed by causal 
knowledge.  Decision making is 
opaque to the public and frequently 
challenged. 
 
 
So how does this help in building up a grounded theory and how is the 
process of grounded theory working?  The NHS is reflected by the cohort 
interviewed to be an industry whose growth is entirely government 
determined.  It is not to say that it is a matter of ideology and indeed all three 
political parties support the NHS models in the provision of public healthcare 
but wherein lies the grounded theory of NHS management that emerges from 
these observations and interviews? 
 
The following issues show that some similar concepts exist.  All of the NHS 
executives interviewed and the group exercises recorded indicate that NHS 
managers in the east midlands are working for common, popular approaches 
to decision making that enable them to share and compare and to bargain 
and negotiate with each other or with politicians and the media.  The public 
are a real challenge to their sense of comfort but there is no model or general 
methodology for generating theory to be tested out with the public and 
stakeholders.  The group is numerate and the decisions by the individuals or 
bigger meetings are grounded in data that is collected and analysed even if 
that is never validated or best available evidence or best decision making tool.  
So in the round ideas are grouped into popularity – general 
application/applicability and – grounding in data.  If and when public spending 
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growth in the NHS slows it is these grounded concepts – is the decision 
“popular, general and data driven” that emerge as a grounded theory. 
 
Considering these examples, it is possible to form a collection of categories.  
The data used for decision making must have joint ownership between those 
collecting it and those being performance managed by it.  This joint collection 
and analysis is a key to the evolution of a grounded theory of the relationship 
between NHS elites and the organisations, especially the clinical 
organisations that they lead.  The data analysis is conducted in a system 
which seeks theoretical consistency no matter whether the evidence supports 
the theory.  So for example data is compared against evidence about choice, 
competition, privatisation (plurality) and contracts (contestability) which is 
saturated imposition of neo-classical economics theory on the NHS even if 
there is no evidence for how it improves the organisational effectiveness of all 
or even part of the NHS.  What is clear is that there is a constant desire for 
compassion. 
 
Thinking about different ways to look at the evidence these are emerging 
themes and trends.  It is clear that this piece of qualitative research was able 
to examine the individual and group behaviours of the current elite east 
midlands vision of the NHS manager.  Other forms of qualitative research may 
have been applied.  Ethnography might have lead to a way of understanding 
the daily life of NHS executives but there is a bias in this method to seek 
methods that improve the probability of success, conversation analysis may 
have explored the turn taking and power relationships at play and evaluation 
research applied would have lead to a consideration of the interests and 
values of NHS managers relative to the general and public welfare.  
Consistent with my position as a participant in the system and my desire to 
not only observe the cohort but to create a generalisable theory about us then 
grounded theory (the generation of theory from data has proven to be the 
most successful tool.     
 
If the manager is a decision analyst then what do they count?  All decision 
making, the direct costs of which are met by NHS funds collected by the 
taxpayer, should: provide new knowledge or direction needed to improve their 
performance and the performance by their part of the NHS.  This should 
improve the health and/or healthcare of the population for which they are 
responsible. 
 
If an NHS manager were to fill up a box that says ‘EBM’ what would they put 
in it and what would they throw out?  Does this lead to the viable creation of a 
theory that can be concluded to arrive from grounded research? 
 
The manager is willing to use evidence to argue their case and protect 
themselves.  This in turn would mean that the findings of an EBM decision 
would be in the box only if they result from the following condition:  The 
evidence was from a source that is generalisable for others in the NHS cohort 
to use – either by having adopted others sources or added to the 
commonwealth of resources.  That the decision followed a protocol that was 
clear even to the layman/non-executive and was bounded by clear limits of its 
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applicability.  An EBM box would include things that they were happy for 
everyone – their peers, their staff, politicians, taxpayers, patients to review for 
its evidential consistency.  The box would have in it only those ideas that were 
ethically accepted as consistent with NHS values, rejecting those that are 
efficient but not effective in achieving organisational mission and goals.  Given 
that the cohort in study are Chief Executives and senior managers, they will 
have demonstrated that these are clearly structured methods for 
implementation of their decision and that a cascade system exists for the 
dissemination of their decision. 
 
How does this fit with my model and is it possible to create another diagram to 
show the relationship between these elements? 
 
Let us consider the differences exhibited by groups and individuals, that 
groups were happier with evidence than individuals.  Consider the definition of 
a pedant.  A person who is overly concerned with formation and precision and 
who makes a show of learning.  The corresponding notion is that the person is 
also a source of instruction or guidance.  The term can typically be used with 
a negative connotation indicating someone overly concerned with minutiae 
and whose tone is perceived as condescending but when it was first used by 
Shakespeare in 1588 it simply meant teacher.  Some people take pride in 
being pedantic and may preface a sentence as such.  Therefore I believe 
there is a boundary where pedantry is an accepted form of evidence based 
decision making and that this is consistent with the amount of authority and 
status the individual has. 
 
From the conversation I think through grounded theory, I can say that; 
 
The cohort treats EBM in the following ways to display that the cohort itself is 
efficacious.  By efficacy I mean that the effect of a given managerial 
intervention has to not only be economically efficient it must be ‘acceptable’.  
Acceptable in that the political and public context of the NHS means that the 
impact of an intervention by the Chief Executive or senior manager has been 
thought through in an evidence based way before the decision has been 
unleashed in the real world NHS.  Acceptable in that there is concerns that 
this decision is at least as good as any other. 
 
That EBM in the cohort is alive in the following ways.  If you consider the 
diagram below it is clear that there are some places where EBM is effective.  
Referring back to earlier conversations we see quotations that talk of a 
negotiated use of evidence through acquired years of experiential and 
experimental learning.  This leads to the oft sought for “earned autonomy”.  
The best quote was the one that said “because you haven’t built up the wealth 
of experience, the wealth of knowledge, the falling over, the making mistakes, 
to make the judgement call in the same way”. 
 
But that EBM is dead to the cohort when you consider that managers in 
particular in this project, described a situation where their own control over the 
decision making process had been to some extent lost through the 
requirements of audit.  At low levels of autonomy you use evidence a lot and 
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at high levels of autonomy you use evidence a lot again but somewhere in 
between it gets much more difficult.  The best two quotations to summarise 
why EBM might be dead to the cohort are “It’s a yes and no if I am brutally 
honest, if you take them in an enclosed ecosphere when there are no 
consequences to their decisions.  Then they will always go with the evidence, 
then you put them back in the real world and …” plus “a lot of decisions that 
are made, seem to be based more on history and on the views of politicians 
and key stakeholders, which are often not really evidence based. 
 
So in later study I would take the following defined tool and go back to the 
cohort in a challenging way. 
 
 
                                                                                              Level of  
                detailed use 
                of EBM            
 
This model is emergent rather than solid and concrete and how I can look at it 
and define it is something like this.  I have quartered the box not by quadrants 
but by triangles to show that this model to an extent overlaps and is about 
occupying different zones of the autonomy/detail axis.  The key is that there 
are four zones.   
 
1. “Participative leadership”.  Experienced at all levels of autonomy, NHS 
managers try to use some degree of Evidence Based Management but 
they never explore it to its full extent.  The best they ever get is a 
‘halfway’ experimentation with evidence.  Indeed it is possible to make 
decisions without evidence at all. 
 
2. “Zone of pedantry”.  Evidence is used to develop and control the 
organisation but the manager never rises above the middle tier of 
autonomy and authority.  Note the use of phrase autonomy rather than 
“authority” or “power” as even a powerful individual may find 
themselves in the zone of pedantry when working in a group because 
Level of 
Autonomy 
Zone 
zone 
Zone o f 
 
Zone of 
efficacy 
 
Zone of 
participative 
leadership 
Zone of 
effective 
evidence 
Zone of 
pedantry 
The Evidence Based Box of 
East Midlands NHS Managers 
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their autonomy is diminished in the meeting.  In this zone a very 
detailed application of evidence based decision making coreless 
negatively was autonomy – if you have to use a lot of detail to make a 
decision you don’t have much autonomy. 
 
3. “Zone of efficacy”.  The decision will use varying degrees of evidence in 
getting things done.  What is effective is not necessarily efficacious.  
The efficacious decision is the one that produces a desired amount of 
the desired effect and the success in achieving a given goal.  It is 
imperative to note that in this zone, the complete acceptance of 
rejection of evidence based decision making are polar opposites but 
exist in their purest form where the manager has the ultimate 
autonomy. 
 
Finally from my increased understanding and interpretation of findings it is 
possible to say that evidence based management has an identified and 
discernible impact on NHS management but it is not common and is certainly 
not in good health as a prevailing philosophy.  It is not the managers who will 
keep it alive and any implementation of evidence based management on a 
wide scale will require the importation of external skills and political will to 
implement.   
 
Given that my intent way to hold up a part of the minor to the “us” that I belong 
to (NHS managers in the East Midlands) this makes me feel that we are using 
a body of care that draws upon our own experiences and the experience of 
generations of practitioners.  The sad thing is that much of it has no real 
evidence base on which to justify various things that we do in the name of 
leadership and decision making.  This only diminishes the sense that we are 
engaged in professional practice, that we have a gathered body of well 
organised knowledge that on a personal level nothing can be identified that 
eliminates unsound or excessively risky practices in favour of those that have 
better outcomes except my training as an accountant.  Throughout this 
process I decided to slow the mirror in a way that enabled a true reflection not 
to study the effect of an evidence based intervention.  Using the question of 
an “evidence based approach: does it exist? Had a number of advantages 
because it enabled all of the NHS managers to avoid truisms that are socially 
acceptable but which would prove not to be true when I sought the 
corroboration.  For example the demand to provide evidence can simply be 
used as an excuse to avoid options and scenario’s which have not yet been 
evaluated or which because of their nature are very difficult to evaluate. 
 
Whatever my conclusions it was possible to say that I defined the mirror as 
the method by which our productivity as NHS managers might be enhanced in 
our own eyes.  There is no doubt that a lack of an evidence base for a 
profession has left the door open to amateurish practice by charlatans and 
rogues.  Therefore what I found fascinating (and led to the reused diagram) is 
that the evidence base is widely recognised as the means to provide sound 
validation for the work of middle managers.  The Chief Executives and senior 
managers were not supportive of an imposed evidence based methodology 
but did acknowledge and support the control of junior staff to preserve the 
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integrity of the NHS management profession.  My own personal observation of 
what this means to “us” is that we should like evidence based decision making 
but remember that EBM is a philosophical approach that denies the true value 
of experience and heuristics.  I take comfort that examples of reliance on the 
“way it has always been done” can be found in almost every profession – 
including medicine and nursing – even when those practices are contradicted 
by new and better information.  I admire that the NHS leaders I met 
remembered that no evidence can be better than the use of poor quality, 
contradicting or incomplete evidence, so ultimately making sense of what I 
see in the mirror for the reader is: the model is considered valid by elite 
people but for control and direction not for personal accountability because 
they see themselves being their own person.  They don’t want evidence to be 
the concrete block that holds the elite down, they want freedom. 
 
The discussion of evidence based management is a valid question but it is not 
liked in the higher echelons of management, linked as it is to the notation that 
management can easily merge into administration when considering white 
collar tasks. 
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1 An Introduction to the problem 
 
1.1 Why this is worthwhile to me as a matter to study 
 
In my professional life I am a planner and purchaser of Emergency Ambulance 
Services.  So I spend a great degree of time analysing and considering data about 
performance of ambulance responses to emergencies, the most efficient ways to do 
things and looking for insights that will either improve quality for the same price, or 
get me the same quality for a lower price.  What I buy is affected by the reasons that 
people call for ambulances – dangerous personal behaviours, the frailty of the 
human body in times of extreme weather (heat and cold), biological factors such as 
disease or the contra-indicators of drugs, age and disability.  In the response to a 
particularly difficult performance period it becomes clear that “falls” were a key 
reason for the despatch of ambulances.  Although few trials have been carried out in 
the UK, the prevention and management of falls in the older population is a key 
government target in reducing ill health.  This is a key target of the national service 
framework for older people.  “Reduce the number of falls which result in serious 
injury and ensure effective treatment and rehabilitation for those who had fallen”.  
(NSF 2001). 
 
So I asked for a simple binary analysis of the response to falls in the over 65 
population.  Using the previous 12 months data the query was asked – was the 
person you picked up as a result of a fall and if so, where did you pick them up 
from?  The received wisdom was that residential care homes were prone to call for 
ambulances to avoid picking up fallen clients for reasons of potential hazardous 
injury to the care staff and that the older population – particularly in cold weather – 
was prone to fall in the street.  So a simple analysis of the results was carried out 
and that is given in the figure below. 
 
Figure 1 
EMAS Responses to Falls in Over 65s: Type of Pick up Location 
Sample of data from 2006/7
Residential/Care Home
16.7%
Non-Residential Address
15.6%
Residential Address
67.7%
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The sample set was 2700 records taken randomly from all EMAS calls received and 
non-residential address includes things such as “outside”, “shops”, “pub”, as 
identified by the caller and where the location was clearly non-residential, such as 
outside a named business or factory.  What fascinated me was that people fell in 
their own homes.  Consistently and evidentially people fall in their own homes.  As a 
proportion of the population who live in residential care homes more people may be 
falling than those who live in their own home but, as an organiser of ambulance 
services, the evidence tells me we should start with what people are doing in their 
own homes not anywhere else.  So why the pre-occupation with everywhere else in 
the study of falls?  It became clear that the study of falls was time and again about 
the reason for falling or the avoidance of admission to Accident and Emergency 
Departments.  Close (1999) analysed individuals presenting at A&E following a fall; 
Crotty (2002) looked at the best medicine and treatment to get fallers home quickly; 
Tinetti (1999) looked at improved daily living skills to prevent falls and developed 
work done by Ebrahim (1997) and only Pardessus (2002) considered the 
modification of environmental hazards that might affect the propensity of an 
individual to fall.  I was therefore presented with a very simple piece of evidence that 
mattered in the planning of ambulance services, specific to the actual rather than 
theoretical experience and it told me something that we weren’t considering.  Whilst  
undoubtedly there was an issue with homes and people falling in the street, if we 
wanted to look at the reasons that the ambulance was called – in absolute rather 
than proportionate terms at least – then the answer for falls lay in peoples own 
homes. 
 
1.2 Why does this matter to the study of evidence based decision 
making in NHS management? 
 
Let me begin with two more data queries that were run on the same sample data, 
almost immediately after the first query.  Ambulance calls are triaged from Category 
A (see immediately, danger to life and the individual) to Category C (traumatic to the 
person but requiring quick rather than immediate attention).  There is also an 
acknowledgement in the work that NHS Direct do that communicating in a way that 
is sensitive to gender norms may also facilitate adherence to interventions that 
improve health or avoid ill health.  So two reports were run as below. 
 
Figure 2 
EMAS Responses to Falls in Over 65's by Call Category 
April 2006 to March 2007
CAT A
9.4%
CAT B
49.8%
CAT C
40.9%
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Figure 3 
 
These two pieces of data turned into information are really important because the 
context here is ambulance services not the general planning of falls.  Consider this 
quote from the NHS Direct website, (so this is the NHS talking about itself).  “Falls 
often result in serious injury, often to bones and joints and there are many fatalities 
particularly amongst older people ……. an estimated 1000 older people die each 
year from a fall on stairs.  Falls cause the most deaths and long-term health 
problems amongst older people”.  But for emergency ambulances as part of the 
NHS less than 10% of the work collecting falls is Category A (NOW!) and Category 
C (quick, but okay to wait) is over 40%.  However important falls are to the NHS, the 
Ambulance Service needs a different gradient to policy response for falls to other 
parts of the NHS.  An evidence based response to falls in the East Midlands 
Ambulance Service in 2006/07 would be – to paraphrase the NHS direct quotation 
above – “Falls often result in serious injury, often to bones and joints ….. but in most 
cases this will not require or receive a blue light response of a fast ambulance once 
we have assessed the comfort and risk of the fallen patient”.  I then engaged the 
question about whether this was a gender issue.  Were there any issues that 
affected falls related to sex?  The figures showed that 2/3 of the responses were to 
women.  In an NHS where gender equality affects the general consideration of 
health status in the population the simple use of data analysed and identified a 
service with a specific gender bias and yet little or nothing was being done to identify 
this as a “women’s issue” in the say that, say, breast cancer was (predominantly but 
not exclusively a female condition). 
 
This all matters to the wider use of NHS policy.  Some very rudimentary queries 
using data coding, already available in the minimum data set for ambulance call 
outs, was throwing up evidence for one region in one year that lead to different 
conclusions about the nature of service delivery than a planner might have had 
based on national policy alone.  Let me consider for a moment five truly admirable 
things that NHS Direct tell us about falls as they affect the NHS: 
 
EMAS Responses to Falls in Over 65's: Gender 
April 2006 to March 2007
Female
65.8% 
Male 
34.2% 
Unknown 
0.1% 
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1. Physical activity improves balance and prevents falls. 
2. Older people respond to life events such as retirement or becoming a 
grandparent in adjusting their perception of the need to manage risk to  
prevent falling. 
3. People like to work in groups on falls prevention, but these can be demanding 
if your hearing, sight or short-term memory isn’t the best. 
4. Self-management is better than dependence on professionals. 
5. Advice can be tailored using websites.   
 
Of these five, only one really mattered in the analysis of the EMAS response to falls, 
that in the over 65’s the effects of aging are critical.  As the next graph shows this is 
a material issue for EMAS. 
 
Figure 4 
EMAS Responses to Falls by Quinary Age Band and Call Category 
April 2006 to March 2007
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The response by quinary age band and call category tells us that in the over 65’s the 
call category is also related to age.  Responses to older people who have fallen are 
more likely to be coded as less urgent responses.  The frequency of Category B and 
C responses to falls increases exponentially in the older age groups.  In contrast, 
Category A responses increase only slightly in the older age groups.  As the human 
condition becomes frailer with age the urgency of the response by EMAS diminishes 
– more people fall as they get older but they fall in less traumatic ways – requiring a 
measured, rather than a “NOW!” response. 
 
1.3 The collection and storage, or use of data 
 
‘Performance’ has long been the NHS – including EMAS – term coined to the task of 
extracting useful information from the clinical data collected.  As new despatch and 
call handling methods have been introduced to ambulance services progressively 
since the 1980’s the increasing volume of data that is collected has lead to 
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computer-based approaches for the storage of this data.  The degree and method 
for applying query software to this data for information, discovery and knowledge 
can be obscured by the drive for ‘performance’ in the NHS.  ‘Performance’ in effect 
is a very specific set of numerical responses to NHS policy and targets that extracts 
the data and compares/juxtaposes it with plans in a very structured way.  What my 
first couple of introductory paragraphs have shown though is the dominance of 
performance can limit the use of simple algorithms to identify attributes of the NHS 
and identify opportunities to improve processes that we might have got from the 
same data. 
 
Let us consider the “Evidence Based Box”.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Starting with the principle that the ambulance data set has already given us four 
pieces of knowledge that we didn’t have before – the location where falls happen, 
that falls happen to women rather than men, that most calls are not critically urgent 
and that the older you are the more likely it is that you will fall but it won’t be a fall 
requiring a “NOW!” response from the ambulance crew.  Asking the four corners of 
the evidence based box about why they didn’t know this says some important thing 
to the use of evidence based management based on quantitative date in the NHS. 
 
“Politicians” – The NHS is an exercise in political power.  The politician will identify 
trends in public policy that go beyond simple analysis.  The politician is naturally 
distrustful of ever more detailed algorithms about delivery for a part of the NHS, 
being concerned with the ‘National’ nature of the NHS and consistency of policy 
application.  As an avoider of data the politician can still have the opportunity to 
identify key business processes and target opportunities but will not be able to push 
for a multivariate analysis of the data.  Ultimately the problem is that the politician is 
concerned that abdicating control over the usefulness of data to the statistician to 
explore knowledge in this way may result in contradictions with policy, false-positives 
or results that are good for the NHS but no use for the politician at all. 
 
“Public” – Ambulances are an emergency service.  The call for an ambulance is 999.  
The same as for Fire or the Police.  The public want their police visible and their fire 
service quick.  It follows that the public want ambulances – glamorised by the media 
portrayal – to be there quickly whatever the circumstances.  The public has made 
Innovation                Professional Practice          Decision 
& Change in                 making  
Clinical Practice                tools 
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the ambulance service part of the taxpayers compact with the NHS and a forecast or 
predictive modelling based approach to the use of EMAS data is of low regard for 
the public.  The same data – mining and prediction techniques puts ambulances and 
modern response vehicles on road sides rather than ambulance stations and the 
public may be distrustful of the road-side ambulance opined to be “doing nothing”, 
when it has actually been statically placed.  Data is, in effect, linked to targets – 
themselves a perceived corruption of a clinically lead NHS. 
 
“Clinicians” – The clinician, as has been seen in the short literature search identified 
in paragraph 1.1, is most concerned with the nature of the fall.  The ambulance 
service is seen as a scoop and run service, bringing the patient efficiently to the 
trauma centre.  To the clinician the policy response of the NHS is consistent with the 
patient experience.  Falls are ubiquitous and deadly, require immediate response 
and palliation for pain.  EMAS will transport patients who require moving to the 
centre for excellence in this area.  Continuous innovation in the clinical pathway, 
dramatically increasing the accuracy of diagnosis and prediction of likely outcomes 
for patients for different interventions makes them satisfied they are doing the best 
for falls: that the ambulance is likely to be the first responder;  that falls are rarely life 
threatening; that there is a gender bias in those who fall and that getting to people at 
home before they fall, not in the street after they have fallen, would be economically 
sensible; none of this will matter to the clinician. 
 
“Managers” – Managers rely on the use of data.  But they are unlikely to be happy 
with data that has unknown interrelations.  An unavoidable weakness of asking the 
sort of what-if questions posed about the EMAS data is that it can lead to two 
adverse reactions amongst managers.  Unlike performance data it may expose 
uncomfortable relationships to be observed between perceptions of excellence in the 
NHS target performance (attributed by others) and real questions about operational 
policy and superior operational delivery.  Secondly it can expose the pursuit of an 
information data source that has never been observed and leads to the torment of 
the professional administrator – a request for more form filling and data capture.  
Managers are also concerned about issues of data security given that significant 
data loss in the NHS is now a dismissible offence for all grades of NHS manager. 
 
2 Subjects under study 
 
2.1 A brief introduction to East Midlands Ambulance Service (EMAS) 
 
I wanted to complete the analytical quantitative part of my study of evidence based 
management by looking at EMAS, as the only clinical service organisation that 
covered the whole of the East Midlands.  EMAS also provides services in the South 
Humber areas of North and North East Lincolnshire which is outside the definition of 
East Midlands used elsewhere in this project.  When I talk of the East Midlands in 
regards to ambulance service I will be talking about the area co-terminus with the 
East Midlands Strategic Health Authority and the Government Office for the East 
Midlands, not the whole of the service area covered by EMAS including South 
Humber.  EMAS provided emergency and urgent care, patient transport, call 
handling and clinical triage services.  EMAS employ 3000 staff and have 70 
locations they operate from and an annual budget of £137 million in financial year 
2008/09. 
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Accident and Emergency crews responded to over 500,000 calls this year.  In 
addition, patient transport and volunteer ambulance car drivers provide care and 
transport on 5000 journeys to and from routine NHS appointments each day.  
Community Paramedics and Emergency Care Practitioners treat people in their own 
homes following an emergency response if a hospital visit is not required. 
 
The requirement is for all NHS ambulance services to respond to the most serious 
and life threatening injuries (what was called Category A earlier) within eight 
minutes.  Ambulance Trusts must also arrive at the home of patients within 15 
minutes if requested by a GP.  The publication of “Taking Healthcare to the Patient – 
transferring NHS Ambulance Services” (2005) also started a process of change 
which shifted the focus from simply response times to the quality of clinical care 
when response staff from EMAS reach a patient.  So measures are monitored for 
example: how many heart attack patients have been given clot busting drugs (for 
heart attach and stroke patients this is vital to be given as quickly as possible to 
prevent long term damage); how well pain has been managed for patients by the 
use of scales and EMAS performance also includes an active duty to make referrals 
under child protection guidelines as a first responder to families in varying degrees 
of distress. 
 
EMAS is organised as an NHS Trust and the ultimate objective of the organisation 
would be to sustain a sufficient track record of financial and quality performance over 
a number of years that they were authorised to be an NHS Foundation Trust.  They 
receive their annual income from Primary Care Trusts.  In that way EMAS can only 
be paid in competition/opportunity cost with every other possible disbursement of 
NHS resources.  The amount that EMAS receives is settled in exchange for services 
provided but will be in the same way exclude GPs, urgent care centres, some private 
providers and other NHS hospitals who might have thought they could use that 
money for the same patients in a better way.  To that extent, EMAS must constantly 
improve and re-prove itself to maintain the contract income it receives as well as 
place itself in the contest for additional resources within the NHS by way of 
innovation and good clinical quality.  EMAS has grown both organically and by 
merger from previous ambulance service that served the counties of Derbyshire, 
Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire and Rutland.  
Before 2000 these would have been separate organisations. 
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2.2 A brief introduction to the studied population 
 
Figure 5: Deaths from avoidable injury by age group in the East Midlands (2001-
2005)i 
 
 
With a population of nearly 4.2 million, 7% of the UK total, the East Midlands is 
geographically the third largest region in England.  The area faces diverse 
challenges including dependence on manufacturing industries and ongoing 
problems of urban deprivation.  The south of the region is more prosperous due to 
close links with the South East but there are parts of the region affected by rural 
deprivation and isolation.  Specifically, the East Midlands is the third most rural 
region in England with 29% of the population living in rural areas.  The region has a 
similar age structure to the England average with 18% of residents of school age, 
63% of working age and 19% of pensionable age.  The population is projected to 
increase between 2003 and 2028, with the principal driver of this growth being the 
group of pensionable age.  In the East Midlands there are slightly more women than 
men at 51% compared to 49%.  In the 2001 Census, 9% of the region’s population 
classified themselves as having an ethnic minority background.  Residents of Indian 
origin make up the largest group in the East Midlands accounting for 3% of the total 
population.  There is considerable sub-regional variation with ethnic minority 
communities making up 39% of the population of Leicester City, but only 3% in 
Derbyshire.  A statistical overview of the East Midlands region shows that it is the 
second smallest region in terms of population.  29.5% of the population is resident in 
rural areas, which is 10 percentage points higher than the England average.  In 
2004, 19.8% of the East Midlands working age population self-described themselves 
as having a disability, which is one percentage point higher than the UK average.    
According to the 2001 Census of Population 72% of the population self-identified at 
Christian.  1.7% of the population described themselves as Muslim and 1.6% as 
Hindus.  The Government estimates that between 5-7% of the UK population is gay, 
lesbian or bisexual.  In June 2007 76.2% of the working age population of the East 
Midlands was in employment.  This compares favourably with the average UK rate 
of 75.8%.  The employment rate was higher in rural areas than urban areas.  The 
regional NVQ3 rate for working age adults is 48.8% compared with the UK average 
of 50.5%. 
 
 11 
 
2.3 A brief introduction to the falls problem 
 
Figure 6: Main causes of avoidable injury admissions in 2005/6 (all ages) - East 
Midlands residentsii 
 
 
Falls in the elderly population represent a serious and increasing issue in the UK 
and the subject area is attracting increased attention in current government policy 
development across different departments including health, social care and housing.  
In January 2008 the Department for Communities and Local Government released a 
report entitled “Lifetime Homes, Lifetime Neighbourhoods” (2008).  This report 
highlights the following statistics: 
 
• One older person dies every five hours as a result of a fall 
• Falls in older people cost the NHS around three quarters of a billion pounds 
each year 
• 1.25 million falls a year result in hospital admissions. 
 
Ambulance services have a key part to play in tackling this issue.  The recent 
Department of Health guidance on Urgent Care Pathways for Older people with 
Complex needs states that: 
 
“The importance of the ambulance response to older people who have fallen has 
historically been poorly recognised within the wider NHS.  Ambulance clinicians are 
in a unique position of attending this group of patients in their own home and as a 
result are able to observe, not only the condition of the patients, but also their living 
conditions (hygiene, food etc).” 
 
“Lifetime Homes, Lifetime Neighbourhoods” commits the government to the following 
action: 
 
• “We will improve joined-up assessment, service provision and commissioning 
across these three sectors (health, housing and social care) in order to deliver 
better outcomes for older people.” 
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Falls in the East Midlands 
 
Against this national back drop it is important to understand the ‘picture’ of falls in 
our area and what we can do as a service to reduce the number of falls, through 
partnership working or by managing our response to them more effectively.  The 
East Midlands falls data reinforces the national view and therefore there is a need to 
pay particular attention to falls. 
 
3 Patterns of data 
 
3.1 Presentation of the data 
 
Several types of statistical/data presentation tools exist, including: charts displaying 
frequencies (bar, pie charts); charts displaying distributions (histograms) and charts 
displaying associations on an x-y scale (scatter or frequency diagrams).  Throughout 
this paper I will try to use the simplest diagram available to enable the data to be 
understood, with summary values and graphical presentation.  I have limited my 
presentation to summary values to illuminate the discussion for the reader.  It is 
important if a deeper understanding of this data were to be had, to look not only at 
absolutes and means, but also to look at distribution, median, mode, range and 
standard deviation.  It is important too to look at summary statistics along with the 
whole data set to understand the entire picture.  Descriptive statistics can be 
illustrated though in an understandable fashion by presenting them graphically.  It is 
important to note that this paper is an exercise in a consideration of evidence based 
management and the NHS management response not a classification of attribute 
and variable data so the data analysis is presented here with the following questions 
in mind.  What am I trying to communicate?  Who is my audience?  What might 
prevent them from understanding this display?  Does the display tell the entire story? 
 
I am trying to communicate that even a simple analysis of data readily available at 
source from a clinical service – in this case – EMAS provides evidence that the NHS 
find it complicated to respond to, so to that extent, I want the conclusions presented 
simply and to be quickly understood. 
 
The audience is the reader of a senior management level paper who can be 
presumed to be able to manipulate and interpret data but is not working in this 
circumstance to a high degree of technical specification and will not necessarily 
need to know confidence intervals in the data to draw conclusion about its 
usefulness as evidence.  What might prevent them from understanding the display is 
if the scale or origin of the data was skewed in presentation.  Bar and pie charts are 
particularly useful to compare the sizes, amounts, quantities or proportion of various 
items or groupings of items.  When I have presented data I can be confident it tells 
the entire story.  Bar and pie charts (which predominate in this paper) can be used in 
defining or choosing problems to work on, analysing problems, verifying causes or 
judging solutions.  Bar and pie charts are particularly helpful in presenting results to 
peers and managers, mixed in as they are with a written narrative.  As part of the 
presentation here they can be particularly useful with variable data that have been 
grouped.  Bar charts work best when showing comparisons among categories, while 
pie charts are used for showing relative proportions of various items making up the 
whole. 
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3.2 An analysis of the data 
 
Consider the following table: 
 
Figure 7: Population Changes by Government Regioniii  
 
 
 
 
The office for national statistics predicts that the East Midlands will be the 
government region that experiences the greatest growth in its elderly population in 
the next 25 years.  The regions male population over 85% years is expected to 
increase by over 200% in the same 25 year period.  So we have an ageing 
population.   
 
Now consider the next table: 
 
Figure 8 
EMAS Unadjusted Emergency Response Rates by Age and Sex 
April 2006 to March 2007 
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Falls in the elderly have a significant impact on EMAS service provision.  Different 
age groups use the ambulance service in different ways.  This can be seen in the 
unadjusted emergency response rates for intervals of five-year age groups.  The 
unadjusted rate of EMAS responses to females in the 85 and over age group is 
480.2 responses per thousand population.  This is over 6 times the response rates 
to teenage females which in itself is 5 times more than the response rate to females 
who are of primary school age.  Any sense that the risk taking behaviours of school 
children in playgrounds or the lifestyles of teenagers  are more dangerous than 
simply being elderly, are not borne out by the data at all.  So, in this data rich area 
what is it possible to say about the data and not just the results?  The first point is 
about the source of the data: each and every ambulance call is collected, coded and 
despatched by a team of trained handlers who complete a minimum summary data 
set of the transaction.  This can be supplemented with other data but it does 
represent the same data used to provide published performance data, operational 
planning data for EMAS and contract (invoice) settlement data for the payers, the 
Primary Care Trusts.  The data from which the sample is drawn is used for planning 
and performance of EMAS services.  The queries may not always be the same as in 
the study, but the data is.  There is no question of bias in the data capture, as this is 
not trial data it is a random sample of the whole database (subject of course to type 
1 and type 2 errors as all samples are).  The sample represents about 0.5 of 1 
percent of the whole database of journeys over a financial year.  The data and the 
results have not been peer reviewed by other professionals.  Nevertheless, the data 
has been audited by external and internal auditors and is used in the publication of 
Healthcare Commission scores by the independent Healthcare Commission each 
year.  Manipulation or falsification of data is a breach of the code of conduct for NHS 
managers.  The combination of ethical, performance and legal controls combined 
with the use of the same data set for internal and external reporting gives confidence 
that EMAS do not have an incentive to hide data that contradicts their organisations 
position.  This paper is part of a whole research project that works within the NHS 
framework on ethical and peer reviewing of research, governed by the NRES.  The 
data used here is not an audit of an existing standard of management practice or an 
evaluation of a specific organisational changes but makes up part of a survey using 
multiple methods to test a thesis and generate new knowledge.  To that extend the 
data has been accessed rather than created and can be treated as a sound base 
upon which to draw conclusions. 
 
3.3 Validation of the results 
 
There are a number of possible limitations to the validity of the results despite the 
unequivocal analysis of the quality of the data.  This will be discussed further in 
paragraphs 6.1-6.3 but before drawing conclusions and considering the implications 
for NHS policy and practice, I want to be clear about the range within which these 
results are valid.  First of all the data is a self-selected sample.  It is made up of 
people who called the East Midlands Ambulance Service in the 2006/07 year.  True, 
there were 500,000 + calls for an emergency response that year, but the population 
is of people who called the EMAS emergency numbers.  The conclusions are only 
valid in responding to evidence about the use of EMAS services therefore.  As an 
exercise in understanding the response wider of NHS management and NHS policy, 
it is valid but the conclusions are drawn from evidence that is valid only about 
EMAS.  In simple epidemiological terms this is a study about ‘disease’ (emergency  
medicine and nursing) that didn’t go out and collect data itself I have used source 
data that already existed and looked for meaningful patterns in the data to find 
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something interesting or revealing about the nature of management by evidence in 
the NHS.  In order to avoid doubt this study, which sampled data for 2006/07, would 
need to redraw boundaries to check that the conclusions were true for periods less 
than a year and in other years before and after the same year too.  This type of 
meta-analysis of all the years would increase the validity of my conclusions drawn 
from a longitudinal study of only one year.  I chose the year 2006/07 as this was the 
last full year available when I undertook the literature review and the qualitative 
interviews of NHS executives so there is consistency of methodology.  I have tried to 
avoid regression analysis despite the attractiveness of correlation because I do not 
have a null hypothesis about causation that that I want to test – and in the act I have 
also excluded ‘spurious correlation’ as a problem.  Finally, the entire study has tried 
to draw conclusions using EMAS data about the nature of EMAS services.  Only in 
forecasting population growth have I had to go to another data source (the East 
Midlands Government Office).  What must be acknowledged about the validity of the 
results, is that it is not possible to have a ‘double-blind’ sample of people who did 
NOT call EMAS over the calendar year 2006/07.  Let me draw an illustrative 
conclusion.  EMAS has been sharing data with Nottingham City PCT in older to 
improve services for older people who have fallen.  EMAS drew a pictorial 
representation of responses to falls in the over 65’s.  The local acute teaching 
hospital (Nottingham University Hospital) drew a similar map which demonstrates 
the residential address for hospital admissions due to falls.  Because the transport 
rates for falls varies between 30 to 50 percent of EMAS calls in response to a fall we 
have two similar but different populations.  The percentage of people over 65 who 
have fallen and the percentage of people over 65 who have fallen who require 
transport to hospital.  Add to this the cohort of people who fell but did not call EMAS, 
either because the incident was trivial or self-managed or they were transported 
independently or privately and we have four possible cohorts.  All people who fell, 
were over 65 and used NHS services and/or EMAS.  With ALL of this data – 
prohibitive if not possible to collect – not all extrapolation of the results I have found 
will be valid.   
 
3.4 Significance of the results 
 
A number of interventions exist that address the problem of falls.  Home assessment 
and modification reduces the risk of falling by adapting homes of individuals at risk 
(introducing grab rails and ramps, removing loose rugs).  Pharmacy reviews can 
address the pharmacological risk factors for falls.  Other interventions soften the 
impact of falls – hop protectors are shields worn over the hip designed to distribute 
impact forces away from the hip into the soft tissues.  Hip fracture appears to be a 
rare event when hip protectors are worn at the time of the fall. 
 
Whilst the above interventions are effective against falls, they are expensive to 
administer.  Resources are limited and therefore must be allocated to those 
interventions that bring the greater benefit.  Currently we have a significant 
understanding of the magnitude of the problems that falls amongst the elderly 
creates, in terms of acute and long term needs.  So what does an evidence based 
approach to the numbers we have seen so far mean to the ever growing knowledge 
of falls in the NHS.  We have seen seven pieces of data so far.  The evidence based 
significance of the results in a responsive NHS would be: 
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Pie chart, graph or table already 
displayed 
Significance of the results to the 
debate about on NHS management 
that is evidence lead (+) and (-) not 
evidence based and  to show which 
is most likely 
EMAS response to falls in over 65’s: 
by call category 
+ Work with family and friends to 
develop a minimal lifting policy to 
differentiate recovery from traumatic 
injury. 
-Treat all falls as traumatic 
irrespective of carer () 
EMAS response to falls in over 65’s 
by call category 
+ Ambulance staff are recognised as 
normally the health and social care 
‘first contact’ with fallers and triage is 
scaled appropriately. 
- PCTs invest in falls managers to 
fulfil the older people’s national 
service framework only.   No work 
with EMAS.  No work with EMAS () 
EMAS responses to falls in over 65’s 
by gender 
+ Implement falls initiatives that 
positively impact on falls preventative 
issues recognising this is a major 
female use. 
- Undifferentiated service leads to low 
quality patient experience () 
EMAS response to falls in the 
population that is over 80 years old 
+ Following transportation to hospital 
the support networks including family 
are continually engaged around the 
patient. 
- Admission to hospital the norm () 
Population changes by government 
region 2004-2029 (male) 
+ Recognise gender is an issue in 
that the service mix changes from 
predominantly female. 
- Fail to tailor information on hop 
protectors to a male audience() 
Population changes by government 
region 2004-2029 (female) 
+ Implement commercial policing of 
alarms systems or alert systems to 
cope with prevalence of low impact 
falling () 
- Despatch ambulances to aging 
female population 
EMAS unadjusted emergency 
response rates by age and sex 
+ Ultimately reduce ambulance 
responses to those who fall. 
- Despatch ambulance as only source 
of care () 
 
So in only one area do we see anything like a positive likely evidence based 
outcome. 
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3.5 How do the results answer the problem? 
 
As with much of the discussion about evidence based management in the NHS, I 
find two things to be true.  1 – using the Rousseau model (below) it is quite clear, 
quite quickly that the evidence based response can be differentiated from the non-
evidence based response.  It is also quite clear, quite quickly that the non-evidence 
based response is sub-optional in the opportunity cost of patient care and wasted 
resources.  2 – that somebody somewhere will have drawn the conclusion and be 
implementing a pilot or innovative local solution but that this will not be normalised 
behaviour for the NHS. 
 
After Rousseau: A synthesis from the literature of Rousseau on the practice of 
Evidence Based Management. 
 
Management Issue With advanced knowledge of 
effective implementation of 
Evidence Based Management 
For evidence avoiding status 
quo 
The supervision of 
employees 
Managers acquire a systematic 
understanding of what productivity 
gains are most appropriately 
cultivated from their staff 
A manager may misuse 
threats and punishments or 
overuse positive 
encouragement with no 
reference to the outcome of 
either style or organisational 
performance 
Information available to 
managers on the 
consequences of their 
decisions 
Appropriate evidence and data 
base: perceptual gaps and 
misunderstandings are significantly 
reduced so that post 
implementation review is a valuable 
part of improving management 
Information is poor as data 
and evidence is not collected 
so that experiences are likely 
to be misinterpreted 
The delivery on 
promises to the public, 
employees, 
stakeholders/taxpayers 
customers and others 
Decisions are based on systematic 
causal knowledge conditioned by 
expertise.  Decisions are 
legitimised by being made in a 
systematic and informed fashion 
more readily justifiable in the eyes 
of stakeholders 
In such settings, managers 
cannot learn why their 
decisions may have been 
wrong, nor what alternatives 
would have been right.  The 
public challenges decisions in 
the search for transparency 
Management style Managers have an understanding 
of the powerful impact their 
decisions have on the fate of their 
firms.  Managerial competence is 
recognised as a critical and often 
scarce resource 
Evidence based management 
seems to threaten managers 
personal freedom to run their 
organisations as they see fit 
Approach to academic 
research 
Managers read the academic 
literature regularly and the 
consultants who advise them are 
likely to do so also.  There is a 
recognition that this research exists 
Despite the explosion of 
research on decision making, 
individual and group 
performance, business 
strategy and other domains 
directly tied to organisational 
practice, few practising 
managers access this work 
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Management culture Supervisors and managers respond 
to a belief system probably 100 
years old, as far back as Fredrick 
Taylors structured methods for 
improving efficiency were classified 
under scientific management 
A belief that good 
management is an art – “the 
romance of leadership” school 
of thought where a shift to 
evidence an analysis connotes 
loss of creativity and autonomy 
In conclusion Managers have evidence on which 
to base their decisions and 
consequently what is at stake 
should the decision or implantation 
fail 
Managers are prevented from 
real learning by fads and 
falsehoods 
 
Let me consider again the table in 3.4.  In summary, evidence suggests that a 
significant percentage of those who fall are elderly and that following transportation 
to hospital their support networks and infrastructures are switched off – hence they 
tend to be admitted to hospital.  On a practical level, the falls co-ordination services 
provided and commissioned by PCTs do not co-ordinate well with EMAS and fail to 
recognise that a) EMAS is the first responder in most cases, b) fewer of these cases 
are Category A calls.  So the evidence based solution would be to adjust NHS policy 
and operational response to this issue.  Which is just what the NHS in Plymouth did.  
In one ambulance station; this innovative team who have access to a specialist 
clinical support vehicle and access to the most modern lifting equipment, prevent 
other emergency vehicles and resources being sent to non-injury falls patients who 
do not need to be conveyed to hospital.  In a 20 day period during December 2006 
the method was used to respond to 24 falls and 95 GP urgent admissions. 
 
Unfortunately the NHS response is NOT to industrialise this good practice on a 
larger scale.  The pilot in the ambulance station was nominated for a prestigious 
award by the Ambulance Service Institute and beat off national tough competition to 
win the ‘Award for Innovation’ which was marked by a ceremony at the House of 
Commons on 3 May 2008.  An MP presented the awards.  This year coming 
(2009/10 financial year), some moves will be made to introduce this pilot to 
Bournemouth, Yeovil, Exeter and Truro.  I will try to introduce it to EMAS for the East 
Midlands, but they have said, quite frankly, that they want to see the four pilots of the 
South West completed before they consider a change.  Falls just aren’t that 
influential it seems. 
 
Compare this to Ambulance Crew Reading to Cardiac Unit.  A new system for 
treating patients who have suffered from heart attacks is to be rolled out across 
Scotland after the success of a pilot project at Edinburgh Royal Infirmary.  In 
conjunction with the Ambulance Service for Scotland the hospital has been giving 
patients an automatic admission to operating theatres where on-call surgeons 
unblock the heart’s arteries.  Timing is very fast.  Ironically, this is done by the 
ambulance crew sending an ECG reading straight to the cardiac care unit.  The 
Medical Director of EMAS advises that EMAS stopped doing this 3 years ago as the 
decision was to trust ambulance staff to read and therefore no need to transmit. 
 
In summary, a proven method of preventing falls being a drain on ambulance 
resources is struggling to get beyond pilot stage, despite evidence (and awards and 
acclaim) whilst an unproven pilot, the evidence of which is patchy for the East 
Midlands, is being rolled out across the whole of the NHS in Scotland.  The answer 
to the problem is that evidence is less important than policy. 
 
 19 
4 Implications for NHS Policy and Practice 
 
4.1 Practical Implications for Leaders in the NHS 
 
Who does what?  In the organisation and planning of ambulance services in the East 
Midlands there is an inextricable link between organisational performance, 
organisational effectiveness and leadership.  Ambulance services and the 
importance of the ambulance response to older people who have fallen, has 
historically been poorly recognised within the wider NHS.  Ambulance clinicians are 
in a unique position of attending this group of patients in their own home and as a 
result, are able to observe not only the condition of the patients, but also their living 
conditions including hygiene, diet etc.  In order to transform the service that EMAS 
provides to falls victims and those at risk of fall, the Chief Executives of both EMAS 
and their Commissioning Primary Care Trusts, the transformational leaders, need to 
adopt an evidence based approach to the data collected b EMAS itself.  Instead of a 
total focus on specific organisation objectives that is typical of the existing 
contractual relationship with EMAS, the management style should place an 
emphasis on evidence as a basis for innovation and a rationale use of resources. 
 
How do they do it?  The NHS is the name of the Government policy not just a 
service.  The NHS identify can help patients and public access and understand this 
new system and the NHS can provide continuity of pathway planning.  By using the 
evidence available about how falls should best be managed, how the use of 
ambulance resources can be maximised and the effects that an aging population will 
have on calls to ambulances the leaders in the NHS can help the public to navigate 
the system in a different way, but still be confident that the system will be delivered 
in line with NHS standards and values.  The key is to respond to the evidence that 
has been collected, to park the targets of today as their assistant directors and 
operational managers will achieve this, and to shape the targets of the next decade 
in line with the Ambulance clinicians.  
 
When do they do it?  This paper has explored literature and data on evidence based 
decision making.  As we have seen in earlier papers, the rhetoric of evidence based 
management serves an essentially ideological function, obscuring the real difficulty 
in securing effective and sustainable change.  As considered earlier in this paper, 
the date exists, even with a simplistic analysis like mine to point to changing policy 
imperatives and a different prioritisation by age/sex/location of ambulance services.  
In organisations with deeply engrained power structures and as complex and 
intransient in-year performance function as the NHS the executive of the East 
Midlands – particularly the PCTs – must only attempt to implement the evidence 
based approaches to EMAS when they meet collectively on a monthly basis.  
Otherwise these ‘numbers’ I have found will not survive the challenge of an NHS 
hierarchy in a climate of turbulent change created by the volatility of government 
policy. 
 
Why do they do it?  Falls in the elderly population represent a serious and increasing 
issue in the UK.  This is gaining increased recognition in current government policy 
across different parts of government including social care and housing as well as the 
NHS.  The reason the executives in the NHS respond to this is because it is NHS 
Policy and Practice.  The key though is that at the very strategic level the NHS 
response via policy is, in this case, evidence based.  The report by the Department 
for Communities and Local Government released in January 2008, named “Lifetime 
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Homes, Lifetime Neighbourhoods” highlighted the following statistics: one older 
person dies every five hours as a result of a fall; older peoples falls cost the NHS 
around three quarters of a billion pounds each year and 1.25 million falls a year 
result in hospital admissions.  The role of the NHS executive in respect to evidence 
based management in the East Midlands NHS and with respect to EMAS in 
particular should be to ensure that however big these absolute numbers seem they 
should elicit an evidence based and proportionate share of resources to their 
answer. 
 
4.2 Clinical Practice and Managerial Practice 
 
Let me consider what the implications of quantitative analysis of East Midlands 
Ambulance Service referrals says about the development of evidence-based 
approaches to NHS management and policy. 
 
Cultural and attitudinal change 
 
Researchers and academics should be invited in to the commissioning cycle.  At the 
moment there is strong participation from clinicians, executives and accountants in 
setting a robust planning and contract negotiation framework.  There is some 
preference expressed for the use of data analysis – including to do some data 
mining – but the application of best management practice, knowledge management 
(or even a structured response to the research questions that the data throws up) is 
very difficult within the current make-up of the EMAS contract. 
 
Look for evidence based enablers of the ‘central targets’ hitting should also be 
pursued.  The key is here that the central targets for Category A response times, 
falls and patient transport are not going to disappear.  My pie-charts say some 
interesting things, even that we may be missing the strategic overview of the 
direction for EMAS services by hitting central targets.  Nevertheless, we should not 
use this as an excuse to avoid evidence based culture and attitudes.  We should 
instead be looking for evidence of what works to do the most optimal things based 
upon ambulance resource usage and hitting the targets not making them mutually 
exclusive. 
 
Invest in developing the infrastructure to support evidence-based decision making 
 
Organise contract management boards that focus on clinical quality rather than 
adversarial performance assurance.  The debate about what works from an 
evidence point of view will be enhanced by putting clinicians into the 
commissioning/planning arrangement.  This is stimulated by the use of evidence 
based knowledge.  If this is called “Therapeutic knowledge” then the use of 
management evidence is moved to that which makes best use of scarce resources 
for EMAS in pursuit of the optimal therapeutic interventions.  Reducing waste is very 
good for EMAS and the NHS and patient education and communication being 
enhanced will make it better for patients to.  This infrastructure would necessarily 
mean that the summary monitoring information (necessary for assurance about 
central target hitting) moves from weekly to monthly collection to free up the time for 
the saved intellectual and data processing to be applied to evidence based decision 
making. 
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Develop a cadre of managers with the skills needed to use evidence more effectively    
  
Epidemiology and the patterns of population, falls, diseases that affect ageing 
(hearing, eye sight, bone density), age-sex ratios, population growth, morality and 
morbidity underlie a good use of data.  This does not obviate the need for Financial 
Planning which has tended to be used for EMAS previously but it does mean an 
alterative from cost to a detailed understanding, not only of efficiency and economy 
to include effectiveness too.  Evidence might be called the economic (opportunity 
cost) of the current solutions we use.  A lack of managers ability to use epidemiology 
‘outcomes measurement’ is probably a big leap but the use of evidence based 
prompts in longitudinal studies would only be possible were the competence of 
managers to use this evidence effectively also developed.  Should plan whether 
something is feasible before we begin to do it.  This looks at the probability of 
success, risks, timescales and critical paths.  By simply saying that the data I have 
found about falls and EMAS should be applied to a feasibility analysis of an 
evidence based solution versus a policy solution to each project the cadre of skilled 
managers increases. 
 
Look for evidence of success of evidence based decision making as an innovation 
itself 
 
Managers and policy makers have been prominent advocates of evidence based 
clinical practice, but have not been quick to apply the same principles to their own 
decision making.  In terms of the best commissioner performance, there is a post-
hoc rationalisation of what was successful and what was not successful (normally in 
response to published performance ratings) but the key would be to show that by 
applying evidence based decision making, this lead to an evidence based increased 
in the performance and planning of EMAS.  An early proxy such as “Increased 
interest in the area from other planners and providers of ambulance services” could 
be taken to mean that the data for EMAS has been successfully data-mined to 
improve performance in such a way that use greater appreciation of the value of 
management and its role in patient care.  The key here is that the management role 
is enhanced by the use of evidence based management and in such a way the 
credibility and development of the subject area is enhanced. 
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4.3 Patient Behaviour 
 
Consider the following pie charts.   
 
Figure 9 
EMAS Responses to Falls in 2006/7: 
Age Group of Main Patient
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Figure 10 
 
EMAS Emergency Responses by Age Group in 2006/7: 
Age Group of Main Patient
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Whilst it is true that in both charts the use of the EMAS service increases with age, 
this is much more pronounced when it comes to falls than when the wider set of 
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emergency response is looked at.  That therefore means the patient behaviour that 
needs to be developed is not the same for falls as it is for EMAS as a whole.  The 
key here is to enhance communication between planners like myself, ambulance 
clinicians, control room dispatchers and most importantly patients.  In the planning of 
EMAS the policy for Category A responses should be explored to understand in the 
East Midlands, how older people view and respond to the challenges of independent 
living.  As earlier graphs have shown – without this communication about patient 
behaviour, the elderly will call EMAS but the very senior age-group, of 75+, will have 
a diminishing proportion of their falls treated as Category A.  The commissioning 
policy for EMAS should collect information from the public about what they view as a 
successful outcome to their 999 call, but the data source should skew heavily 
towards the proportions outlined in the age - profile of falls – not the age profile of 
the population as a whole nor even the age population for which EMAS responds in 
a wider sense.  Note that further work is required on the effectiveness of tailoring 
health advice in changing patient behaviour for the better is nevertheless clear that 
the normal sense of tailoring to address inequalities in access by ethnicity and 
location, overlook the tailoring that is required here to address age and very senior 
aging.  The policy response for EMAS is not whether tailoring works as a model, but 
what the evidence tells us about when it is most effective, given the pie charts 
above.  For example, large advertising campaigns need to be using technology and 
environments appropriate to the population at risk.  Thus, the increasing vogue for 
mobile technology as opposed to traditional billboards on public transport and in 
supermarkets may not reach the target population.  It is also true as noted before, 
that as hearing and eye-sight weakens with advanced age, video and one to one in-
person interventions could be more successful.  As the very least, the EMAS and 
PCT response to this dilemma should be to check that written materials designed to 
encourage participation by the very senior age group(s) are usable and address the 
basic needs for autonomy and competence that motivates us all. 
 
4.4 A checklist of Evidence Based conclusion 
 
Frank Blackler of the University of Lancaster in 2006, published in a media interview 
in the Guardian newspaper, his synopsis of what was good/bad and hard in the 
political and managerial models of control of the NHS.  Taking that as a template it is 
possible to draw something of a framework for how the evidence based conclusions 
can be accommodated.  I will specifically address what this means for the subject I 
am studying, EMAS, and the response to falls. 
 
 
Blackler’s Contentions (My 
comments) 
What I observe as the Evidence Based 
Conclusion of my data on EMAS and 
falls 2006/07 
1. Central controls have eroded the 
capacity of managers to lead (I 
disagree – central controls mean 
we now use our data better). 
1. The evidence collected shows that 
 in 2006/07 just under half of all 
 deaths from avoidable injury are in 
 people who are 75 or older.  Prior to 
 national policy setting the role of 
 ambulances in this area has been 
 poorly recognised. 
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2. The present system of politically 
lead target setting is wasteful.  (I 
agree). 
2. Our evidence indicates that the call 
 category of emergency responses 
 is also related to age.  Responses 
 to older people who have fallen are 
 less likely to be coded as Category 
 A. 
3. Targets represent an instruction to 
manager and are based on a 
mistrust of managerial autonomy  (I 
disagree – the requirements to deal 
with over 85 year old females is 
neither promoted by nor limited by 
national targets). 
3. Falls in the elderly population have a 
significant impact on EMAS service 
provision.  Different age groups use 
ambulance services in different 
ways.  For example, the adjusted 
rate of EMAS responses to females 
in the 85 and over age group is 480 
responses per thousand population. 
4. The NHS has enjoyed substantial 
increases in public funding and 
politicians are anxious about how 
this money is used (I agree). 
4. The office for national statistics 
predicts that the regions male 
population over 85 years is expected 
to increase by over 200% between 
2004 and 2029.  Therefore the 
unequivocal substantial increases in 
public funding may be overtaken by 
an ageing growing population. 
5. Targets are a conduit for politicians 
that negates local prioritization (I 
agree). 
5. The data collected shows that 51% 
of all avoidable injury admissions in 
the East Midlands are due to falls.  
This has little to do with government 
policy that requires more joined-up 
assessment and service provision. 
6. Managers need to be treated with 
and behave with confidence (I 
agree). 
6. If the managers use the evidence 
drawn from the data sample, then 
confidence is increased.  Evidence 
rather than opinion will increase 
confidence in decisions. 
7. It is difficult to distinguish the 
strategic objective of a policy from 
its day to day working (I disagree). 
7. The national policy reflects that falls 
are more common in the older 
population.  The EMAS response to 
falls in over 65s by type of pick-up 
location is a day to day tactical East 
Midlands issue alone. 
8. Targets should be fashioned locally 
(I agree). 
8. EMAS has been sharing data with 
Nottingham City PCT in order to 
improve services for older people 
who have fallen. 
9. The difficult shift in the NHS doesn’t 
make management in the NHS hard 
– it is why we have NHS 
management (I agree). 
9. In 2006/07 EMAS made 
approximately 42,000 responses to a 
person of 65 years or over who had 
fallen at an average cost of £193.  
This requires both increased 
recognition in policy and 
management action. 
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10. “Go towards the gunfire” (I agree). 10. Responses to falls in the 65 and over 
age group during 2006/07 cost 
approximately £8.1 million – this is 
worthy of getting involved in an 
evidence debate about. 
 
5 Conculsions 
 
5.1 How this data has stretched our body of knowledge about EBM in the 
 NHS 
 
a. It has not been difficult to get access to a “body of knowledge” for East 
Midlands Ambulance Service.  A years data is stored and easy to access and 
operational procedures are clear.  It is clear from the EMAS dataset that 
much of what the NHS says about information and choice for the millennial 
generation that require power and choice itself – doubts the power and 
authority of myself and calls itself a customer.  That governs much policy and 
planning of the NHS.  EMAS on the other hand is a 10% glamour Category A 
service, but by majority it is a senor lady who has fallen and calls 999 
because she did, but can wait. 
 
b. In our efforts to continually and refine the body of knowledge, guidelines 
exists for where evidence is and is not appropriate.  There is a culture of 
target hitting, self-regulation and rooting out dangerous clinical practice that 
has it’s origins in criminal and unsafe clinicians such as Harold Shipman.  But 
there is also a fear of evidence that pervades any hope of a structural 
response to the issue.  There is also as we have seen far more complexity in 
the NHS.  We have pressures to avoid all clinical hazard whatever the 
opportunity cost is we have pressures and incentives for institutional growth 
over best patient care.  We have consumerism and we have pre-occupation 
with financial costs over economics or ‘whole system/whole life’ costs. 
 
c. It soon became clear that the challenge for evidence based management is 
both simple and complex at the same time.  Quite quickly, data can be 
manipulated to draw evidence based conclusions but these are multiple sub-
tests.  Our patients whom we are analysing are also the patients whose 
behaviour we must modify and adapt if the changes are to be made to a more 
evidence based planning and funding of services.  Above all, what has 
changed in this report about EBM in the NHS, is that nobody can do it on their 
own.  The tasks of responding, collecting and treating the population of the 
East Midlands with Ambulances and Paramedics have passed the capacity of 
any single human mind to plan the service, no matter how skilled or altruistic 
or self monitoring they are. 
 
d. Our knowledge base is changing.  A definition of a ‘profession’ such as 
ambulance clinicians including paramedics as people reserving the right to 
judge the quality and appropriateness of their services is over.  It is clear that 
the politicians believe the bond of public trust to be broken.  The reason we 
get politicians using evidence based numerics in a heavy and dogmatic way 
is that the assumption of professionalism amongst paramedics has lost the 
confidence of politicians.  Transparency about data has shown itself to benefit 
the management of falls in the over 65’s in the East Midlands region, but at 
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the same time the complexity of the NHS system means that simple-easy to 
communicate – policies are seen as the antidote to complexity not the use of 
evidence. 
 
e. Our best effort to date would look like this: the evidence would be generated 
to pose questions for negotiated change in EMAS services.  The work I do as 
a funder/commissioner of services has not stopped, fraying confidence in the 
public at large, of politicians and people like myself.  Who, neither of us are 
immune to the charge that we use data and targets to peddle the untruths of 
politicians and the half-truths of managers like myself advertising success 
from data. 
 
f. NHS Direct said a lot about falls, but too much has been made about 
boundaries and who owns the body ‘body of knowledge’ about falls and the 
area is replete with professional rivalry.  Organisations like NHS Direct and 
EMAS cannot thrive alone, but will thrive only in interdependency.  The parts 
of the NHS – acute trust – EMAS – NHS Direct – PCT – politician – clinician, 
can only use evidence properly if they ask less about ‘what do I do?’ and 
more about ‘what am I part of?’ 
 
5.2 Did this match what I thought in the introduction 
 
a. I spend a great degree of time analysing and considering data about 
performance of ambulance responses to emergencies, but the question of 
‘how do we know what we know’ keeps coming up.  I – and the patients for 
who I buy services – have now become irrevocably part of something far 
larger than myself.  The craft of care has transformed into the machinery of a 
supply system.  By simply returning again and again to the question of what 
the evidence is telling us, will we answer the question of how we “know”.  In 
earlier papers it has been shown that leaders in the NHS prefer judgement to 
evidence, but in the matter of East Midlands Ambulance Service, I am not as 
clear as I was at the introduction, that craft of management can explain the 
totality of the machinery of care simply by judgement.  Data throws up some 
counter intuitive truths for us to act on. 
 
b. People fall in their own homes, but it is still not clear with whom do we share 
our knowledge.  Nobody has doubled my data, but the problem is the fact that 
there is a clash of prerogatives between Chief Executives and Doctors.  
Political knowledge and policy may be more about power and influence than it 
is about distribution and seeking the wisdom of leaders.  The thing that I didn’t 
realise at the introduction, was that it was less about the data than it is about 
what happens when the evidence shines a spotlight on something.  It is not 
the evidence that will effect clinical change, it is what the funder (me) and the 
clinician does when the light is shone on the data and what I do is visible to 
myself, to others, to strangers even, even when I don’t want it to be visible. 
 
c. Despite all the writers about falls, it is clear that knowledge does not equate to 
value.  Maybe nobody knew that night-time was less dangerous for falling 
than Saturday morning?  Maybe everybody knew you were more likely to 
suffer a fall in your own home than outside a pub?  But now we do know and 
so too do the clinicians delivering the service.  But it seems that without 
political support or the glare of media publicity, the gap between evidence and 
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action is still large.  There is no altruistic reason for EMAS to respond to the 
data creatively.  I had expected altruism and care paramount but it became 
clear that the targets were a shield against deeper engagement with the 
public and although I have generated new knowledge, the value was being 
questioned.  People in EMAS do not trust me or the politicians to use the data 
without prejudice or manipulation. 
 
d. Ambulances use clinical best practice to categorise patients from A (high 
need) to C (low need) but in many ways I saw knowledge differ in education 
and practice.  There is evidence of unexplained variations in the pattern of 
treatment, evidence that was easily generated.  Why do so many more 
women than men fall – is this merely the age/sex ratio being played out in a 
harsher analytical gaze or is it that nobody has used the data before.  The 
conclusions are not stark, but eh implications for service delivery are quite 
profound.  If I thought that clinicians and politicians would respond positively 
to data based evidence, I misread the effect that a loss of control would have 
for them.  Combining this data with the literature and my qualitative research 
about NHS managers attitudes to evidence, it is clear that what I thought at 
the introduction – those who define themselves by control over simple date – 
will not like the loss of control. 
 
e. ‘Evidence’ suggests that what I am engaged in is an exercise to control 
knowledge and choices and patient pathways that before only the politician 
and the paramedic controlled.  The reality is that I too cannot control the 
situation any more than they can.  I have some weakness of mind – of any 
mind – that means my response to evidence can only add value if I and the 
same team know what I need to know in order to help. 
 
5.3 What the picture looks like at the end of the analysis 
 
Figure 11 
EMAS Responses to Falls in Over 65s: Hour of Call
April 2006 to March 2007
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Figure 12 
EMAS Responses to Falls in Over 65s: Day of Week
April 2006 to March 2007
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If we take the tables above.  We can say that the EMAS responses to falls in the 
over 65’s is likely to be by a woman at 9.30 on a Saturday and the call is not very 
likely to result in a Category A call, but will be made as a result of a fall in the home.  
This in no way negates the importance that one older person dies every five hours 
as a result of a fall, but it does obviate the thought that this should be the most 
pressing and uppermost thought of the ambulance clinician.  Simple methodical 
application of data using pie charts and bar charts has given us a much, much richer 
analysis of the organisation of East Midlands Ambulance than the ‘blue light fallen 
trauma’ cliché that exists in the public imagination. 
 
It is clear that we cannot conclude with any clear consensus about what constitutes 
a body of evidence for the East Midlands Ambulance Service, but we can agree that 
decision making is improved by the context of using evidence based judgements.  It 
is true that a body of evidence or knowledge is multi-faceted and depends on one’s 
perspective.  Government policy may be based on evidence, but it can be alarmist 
and distorting of local prioritisation unless the Primary Care Trust takes a measured 
and evidence based response to the problems that EMAS face in implementing 
national policy.  The definition of evidence likely changes when we use it to regulate 
the delivery of a particular clinical service for a particular community – even one as 
big as the East Midlands. 
 
Sometimes a problem under consideration is advanced not by answering a question, 
but by better defining the question.  At this level the data analysis has been 
successful and I will consider in Chapter 7 the implications for further research. 
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6 Limitations of the approach 
 
6.1 Methodological limitations 
 
All of my conclusions about evidence depend upon good quality data.  The first 
problem is that I have used a secondary database.  I have asserted that this data is 
both relevant and complete and that has been audited as such.  I chose a random 
sample from the source data set.  Nevertheless, in the absence of good primary data 
collection, my method would be improved by repeated sampling to gain greater 
confidence that there is no inherent bias in the data I am sampling.  The method 
would be improved by panel studies or group consideration to validate in the 
absence of primary data. 
 
The indicators that I selected were fields already in existence in the data set 
(age/sex/time of call/category of response/location of incident) and the evidence gain 
came from the juxtaposition of the data against existing policy – including where no 
policy existed.  In selecting these indicators, I did not check the completeness of 
these data fields and whether there was any inherent bias towards that or this 
classification because of simple administrative routine. 
 
I have also used pie charts and histograms rather than regression analysis and it 
may be true that in a multifactorial situation, the relationships I have recorded are 
not, in actual fact, relationships between two variables, but reflect their variability 
when compared to a third (as yet hidden) variable.  I do not, therefore, attest to 
having detected statistically significant results and if they do exist I have not sought 
to prove any significant correlation.  The choice of simple presentation methods 
means that different risk factors play different roles in the evidence collected.  I have 
not tried to seek the major or determining variable around which the correlation of 
the ‘most efficient ambulance service’ should be organised.  Similarly, I have not 
tested this longitudinally using a ‘traditional’ surveillance model that public health 
would use.  I draw the conclusions from 2006/07 only, but presume generalisable 
conclusions across different time periods and this may be questioned. 
 
To improve the results I would also have tried to organise comparison with other 
samples from other ambulance services.  This is an NHS (National health system) 
about which we are trying to make conclusions without reference to habits and 
behaviours that are valid only in the East Midlands.  I have also, in respect to the 
same habits and behaviours, made the case that in response to evidence, the habit 
(for example of senior women over 75) to call 999 when they fall, rather than their 
GP before they fall) can be changed so that the patient behaviour is the most 
favourable for patient and EMAS. 
 
The last thing is that a lack of cross-sectional studies means that, although I have 
used population data going forward 25 years, the effect of short-term exposures 
such as a particularly mild winter or a flu outbreak, can distort the numbers, despite 
other more significant variables (clinician behaviour, family and carer response or 
training of paramedics in first response) heading in a different direction.  In 
epidemiological terms the effect of environment fluctuations can affect population 
behaviour in the short, but rarely the long term. 
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6.2 Data Capture 
 
Let us consider what high quality data would be: it would be accurate, up-to-date, 
quick and easy to find and free from duplication.  As I have said previously, this is 
true for the EMAS dataset that I have used.  Similarly the data was free from 
fragmentation (where different parts of the patient’s records are held in different 
formats). 
 
There are however some limits in the data that was captured.  Firstly, the patient 
unique identifier is too weak to make a consistent electronic patient record by 
individual patient.  So the data set is built around the ‘event’ of the ambulance 
journey, call and despatch.  The NHS Care Records Service (NCRS), part of the 
NHS National Programme for IT in the NHS being delivered by NHS Connecting for 
Health will create a care record for every one of England’s 50 million plus patients 
and allow information to be shared securely between all NHS organisations. 
 
This will mean that whenever and wherever a patient seeks an ambulance including, 
out of hours and away from home elsewhere in England, the people caring for them 
will have access to their health information 24 hours a day, seven days a week.  
That means that files, scans, x-rays and general patient information that was 
traditionally ‘fragmented or found in different places’ will now/then be available to 
somebody repeating my research.  This will include demographic data such as 
name, address, NHS number and date of birth and clinical information such as 
allergies, adverse reactions to drugs and basic details of any visits to hospital.  This 
will provide an opportunity to put the EMAS data through the Information Assurance 
Quality Programme (IQAP) which has produced guidance to help with migration to a 
care records data service. 
 
The NHS number is important as a unique identifier; in that it will be possible to trace 
and verify patients using the NHS number which is specific to them.  At the moment, 
it would not be possible to build up a pattern of information where an individual 
seeks medical help at two different sites without the NHS number.  Creation of 
duplicate records for the same fall is a problem of data capture.  This is a particular 
problem for data capture without an NHS record as patients do not identify 
themselves in a consistent way when they use NHS services.  For example, EMAS 
may know that an individual can be linked to a certain address, but data matching to 
use the consistent record of address field if you are looking for a person called 
William, who is sometimes also known as Bill, to check that this is the same patient 
each time.  At the moment, without the NHS number, EMAS care for falls is not 
based on a complete, accurate and up to date record. 
 
6.3 Deliberate boundaries on the question 
 
I have defined the scope of the research to generate new and novel insights to an 
area that is compatible with my work as an NHS Commissioner.  I have attempted to 
make it reasonably comprehensive within the study of falls collected by EMAS.  The 
study of falls or emergency ambulance service is a much wider field than would be 
appropriate, given the limits of this particular study.  This problem is bounded by 
being about the use of, and response to, evidence by decision makers in the East 
Midlands of the NHS.  The question was whether using some very rudimentary 
queries using data coding, it was possible to make different decisions using the 
evidence that these data queries threw up, than decisions that would be made using 
 31 
national prescribed policy alone.  To that extent the deliberate boundary on the 
question was that it had to be so complicated that only sophisticated data 
management techniques could solve the calculation.  More could have been made 
about how national policy changes have affected the treatment of fallers favourably 
or unfavourably, how these changes have or have not affected the elderly 
differentially and how East Midlands Ambulance Service have responded to legal 
developments in the training for lifting and handling in homes that the elderly have 
fallen in.  This would have strayed outside of my essential concept of using only that 
data which has been generated from the day to day delivery of emergency 
ambulance services by EMAS.  I did not want to look for data that was available in 
academic books and journal articles, because they would not have covered the 
same operational period – remember what I was trying to review was something 
relevant to recent decision making by EMAS.  I did not want to be concerned with 
articles from the popular press as they were pre-occupied with service delivery 
failure, not the upper decile of service delivery successes.  I did not wish to conduct 
a longitudinal study over too great a length of time as this was about primary 
sources of data still affecting service delivery today, not primary historical sources 
about the changing role of ambulances in the delivery of emergency patient care.  In 
the end the answers to the questions are aided by the use of essential data from the 
source of operational management by EMAS.  These deliberate boundaries on the 
question do not, I believe, limit the usefulness of the conclusions. 
 
7 Implications for further research 
 
7.1 Topics to be studied 
 
There are some interesting topics to be studied as a result of this research.  There is 
no doubt that falls and the integration of effective clinical strategies (in hospital and 
out) expands the range of successful services, but little is understood about how 
EMAS fit into this framework.  In particular, because there is a social norm to dial 
999 upon the occurrence of a fall, it would be worth studying the extent to which 
EMAS are the appropriate organisation within the NHS system to most easily 
influence the behaviour of individuals.  If the key is falls avoidance and falls 
management , it would be worthy of study to understand the level of influence that 
EMAS have to make the utilization of all available services most effective compared 
to the existing community based approach to falls management. 
 
A further development of this study would be to pilot the linking of hospital and 
EMAS and community systems by computer such that referrals are automatically 
made from the hospital to EMAS as well as vice-versa, so that individuals at risk of 
falling are tracked by EMAS in the community prior to falling. 
 
Another combination of effective interventions would be to combine our knowledge 
of effective strategies for dietary management in the elderly, with the categories of 
call that are affected (A-B-C) by the quality of diet in an over 65 faller (in effect the 
ability of diet to give resilience to the consequence of falls).  This leads to the 
interesting work that could be done using “integrated care” models that put falls 
management by EMAS, the acute hospitals, community NHS providers and some 
GPs into the same organisational and operational structure.  This would be less 
passive in response to the evidence than this study indicated would be the case 
where only EMAS can respond fully.  If this were to be attached to a study about 
cost-effectiveness and magnitude-of-impact of EMAS interventions in falls, then this 
 32 
could rank the effect of EMAS utilization upon the total cost of falls management in 
the East Midlands NHS region.   
 
A similar intervention initiative that compares the value of EMAS’ treatment and 
patient delivery services after a fall with the cost effectiveness of interventions from 
Adult Social Services could help.  By looking at commissioning PCTs to determine 
the appropriate mix of NHS and population (Social Service) based support to 
improve the outcome for the patient, the NHS could be moving further along the 
evidence-based spectrum. 
 
7.2 Different regions or countries 
 
There would be nothing to prevent this study being repeated in other regions of the 
National Health Service and would throw in further relevant factors to improve the 
applicability of the outcomes of this project.  What could be added to this study were 
it to be conducted in another country would be; the establishment of reimbursement 
methods to suppliers that benefited from better use of this data for example as an 
income generation activity, increasingly possible as the NHS moves towards the use 
of an individual patient tariff; the development of suitable organisational 
arrangements in the private sector that can respond to evidence more quickly than, 
and in preference to, prescribed national policy; the development of environmental 
and ecological factors that stop ambulances being despatched on unnecessary 
journeys where the personal pain of NHS treatment (or treatment foregone) could be 
compared with the ecological aspects of responding to distress quickly, but in fossil 
fuel burning vehicles; the enlistment of the elderly communities in co-production 
solutions that do not use expensive emergency ambulance services without being 
aware of the opportunity cost of using specialised health services, essentially for a 
transport-to-health solutions for the elderly. 
 
7.3 Foundation for further study of EMAS 
 
In terms of further study of EMAS, it would be useful to do a study of documents 
pertaining to the treatment, transportation, classification and prevention of people 
having falls/fallen.  Documents could be letters, memoranda, agendas, 
administrative documents, newspaper articles and would all be used to 
triangulate/corroborate the evidence found in this study.  The use of documents to 
test the evidence in this study rather than to draw new hypothesis, would prevent or 
at least severely reduce the falls leads that could arise from an unstructured 
document review.  It would be possible also, to repeat this study, supplemented by 
archival records and/or using structured interviews with executives and paramedics 
in EMAS themselves.  Finally, this study of EMAS could be improved by direct 
observation in the field over a limited period and even when the researcher or a 
member of the family has a fall, to keep a diary of the period of the contact with 
EMAS in a detailed way from beginning to end! 
 
 33 
Bibliography 
 
 
 
Association of Public Health Observatory (2007) Indications of Public health in the English regions: Number 9 – 
Older People 
 
Blacker Frank.  “Leading Questions” Guardian 31.12.2006 
 
Campbell, A J.  Falls in Epidemiology in Old Age. S Ebrahim and A Kalache (Eds.) British Medical Journal 
Publishing Group, London (1996) 361-368 
 
Close JCT, Ellis M, Hooper R, et al. Prevention of falls in the elderly trial (PROFET): a randomised controlled 
trial. Lancet 1999, Vol 353 p93-97 
 
Code of Conduct for NHS Managers.  Department of Health 9 October 2002 
 
Crotty M, Whitehead CH, Gray S, Finucane PM. Early discharge and home rehabilitation after hip fracture 
achieves functional improvements: a randomized controlled trial. Clin Rehabil 2002, Vol16  p406–13 
 
East Midlands Public Health Observatory (2007) Profile of Avoidable Injury in the East Midlands: All Ages All 
Causes 
 
Falls in the Elderly Population.  EMAS June 2008 
 
Guidance on Urgent Care Pathways for Older People with Complex Needs.  Department of Health Nov 2007 
 
Ibid EMAS 
 
Information Assurance Quality Programme (IQAP).  www.connectingforhealth.nhs.uk 
 
Lifetime Homes, Lifetime Neighbourhoods.  Department for Communities and Local Government 2008 
 
NHS Care Records Service.  www.nhscarerecords.nhs.uk  
 
NHS Direct.   www.nhsdirect.nhs.uk/falls 
 
NHS National Programme for IT (NPFiT) 26 March 2007. 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmpubacc/390/390.pdf  
 
NRES.  NHS Research Ethics Committees.  www.NRES.npsa.nhs.uk  
 
National Service Framework for older people 2001 
www.dh.gov.uk/en/publicationsandstatistics/publications  
 
Pardessus, V MD; Puisieux, F; Di Pompeo, C; Gaudefroy, C; Thevenon, A; Dewailly, P.American.  Benefits of 
Home Visits for Falls and Autonomy in the Elderly: A Randomized Trial Study.  Journal of Physical Medicine & 
Rehabilitation April 2002, Vol 8, issue 4 p247-252 
 
Rousseau, Denise M, (2006).  Keeping an open mind about evidence-based management: A reply to 
Learmonth's commentary: (Mark Learmonth).  Academy of Management Review 0363-7425 Oct 2006, Vol. 31, 
Issue 4, p1091-3  
Taking Healthcare to the patient – Transforming NHS Ambulance Services.  Department of Health June 2005 
Taylor, Fredrick (1911).  Principles of Scientific Management.  Harper and Row 1911  
 
Tinetti M E, T M Gill, C S Williams and J T Robison (1999) A population-based study of environmental hazards in 
the homes of older persons.  Am J Public Health.  April 1999, Vol 89, issue 4 p553–556 
  
 34 
 
 
References:
                                             
i
 East Midlands Public Health Observatory (2007) Profile of Avoidable Injury in the East Midlands: All 
Ages All Causes 
 
iiIbid 
 
iii
 Association of Public Health Observatory (2007) Indications of Public health in the English regions: 
Number 9 – Older People 
 
 1
David Sharp 
July 2010 
 
 
 
 
Exploring evidence based management in the National 
Health Service 
 
 
 
 
Document 5 is submitted in part fulfilment of the 
requirements at the Nottingham Trent University for the 
degree of Doctorate of Business Administration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cohort 8 
 2
CONTENTS 
 
1.   Introduction 
1.1  The research is exploratory in an emerging field 
1.2  Why a specific research question would be inappropriate 
1.3 Why an ethnographic account was used 
1.4  The effect of the patient and the politician upon NHS managers 
1.5  A changing definition of management and professionalism 
1.6  Using my professional role to validate academic insights 
1.7  Conclusion 
 
2.  Context 
2.1  Evidence encompasses codified and non-codified sources of 
 knowledge 
2.2  There is a recognised corpus of knowledge for NHS managers 
2.3  Those who comment on the NHS don’t use evidence to do so 
2.4  A way to represent this as a diagram 
 
3. Concepts and Conceptual Framework 
3.1  The primary use of research is in shaping ideas not in the solution of 
 immediate problems 
3.2 Managers integrate data with other forms of knowledge 
3.3 A Model to frame this narrative 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
4. Research Methods 
4.1 The production of evidence to support my findings will include 
 participant observation 
4.2 The Interviewees, the groups and the meetings 
4.3 The method must be aware that in the literature review some writers 
would question whether the studied cohort are managers or autocrats 
4.4 Using a critical single piece of evidence as managers to undertake a 
quantitative study 
4.5 The method must be aware of a bias possible in responses, because 
some outcomes of the study may be perceived as less fortunate than 
others 
4.6   The analytical methods used to provide a robust and valid interpretation 
  of the data 
 
5. Research Findings 
5.1 How to use evidence to enable staff 
5.2 The need to quantify risks and benefits of using evidence 
5.3 The NHS is a complex structure that makes informed decisions difficult 
to make 
5.4 The use of evidence to improve financial management 
5.5 The effect on organisational performance 
5.6 The next part of these findings is to consider those who see “risk”, who 
aren’t insiders – how does the NHS identify these outliers and what they 
are saying? 
5.7 Managers will only use evidence if it is persuasive 
 3
5.8 A practical example of the difference that using evidence would make in 
the NHS 
5.9 Using the Rousseau model to classify the responses received from 
Manager in a systematic way 
5.10 A note for a researcher repeating the observation method 
 
6. Research discussion 
6.1 Adoption of innovation and research is a complex and often drawn out 
process 
6.2 The adoption of research evidence is not a single discrete event 
6.3 Managers will only use research that improves the organisation’s 
standing 
6.4 Sharing the theory in a calm and authoritative way 
6.5 Conclusions of the field study and published material since I completed 
the field study 
 
7. Issues for practice 
7.1 Senior managers are close to department policies and use evidence 
less 
7.2 Middle managers are more directly involved in supporting the uptake of 
research on effective management 
7.3 The relationship between autonomy, pedantry and the use of evidence 
7.4 The decision must be acceptable as well as efficient 
7.5 Conclusion 
 
8. Issues for Management 
8.1 What is used is determined by what is planned to be used by the 
organisation to co-ordinate 
8.2 Evidence is not the primary or defining tool in successful NHS 
organisations 
8.3 Evidence is only part of a general model used to horizon scan 
 
9. Conclusions 
9.1 Messages from the field of study 
9.2 Inferences from theoretical and other researchers perspectives 
9.3 Messages for the uses of the study  
9.4 Relationships between variables 
9.5 To Finish 
 
 
References 
 
Appendix A People who contributed to this study 
Appendix B Letter of invite to participate 
Appendix C Email for 1:1 
Appendix D A synopsis shared with participants 
Appendix E The importance of SDO research to the ongoing debate 
Appendix F The interviewees, a pen picture  
Appendix G Person Specification 
 
 
 4
ABSTRACT 
 
Purpose and Aims of the study 
 
To contribute to the on-going debate over whether the use of evidence could and 
should improve organisational effectiveness.  This is especially important in the 
context of the health service that has, since (May 1997) enthusiastically adopted 
evidence based medicine as its method of health delivery.  To develop a practical 
explanation for policy makers and managers on how and where evidence based 
management is used appropriately. 
 
Justification 
 
Kovner and Rundall (2006 p3) said “the sense of urgency associated with improving 
the quality of medical care does not exist with respect to improving the quality of 
management decision making.  A more evidence based approach would improve the 
competence of the decision makers and their motivation to use more scientific 
methods when making a decision”.  The paper reviews the conclusion of Kovner and 
Rundall (2006) (an American study) within the context of the UK National Health 
Service.  There is a need to develop a theoretical framework of how and why 
evidence is (or is not)used by managers in the NHS.  
 
Motivation 
 
The author holds a senior management position in the National Health Service.  The 
author has performed the role of Director and Chief Executive in NHS organisations 
since 2000.  These organisations have been surplus making, target hitting, award 
winning, credited by the auditors and successful in the eyes of the regulators.  
Unfortunately over the last few years the author has been in a quandary about 
something.  Are NHS managers as a group of professionals, using policies that 
solved the wrong problem or solving the right problem, but still in the wrong way?  
Following this line of thought, the author wanted to ask “why don’t executives in the 
NHS make evidence based decisions?” 
 
Methodology 
 
A survey was conducted of the most senior NHS managers in the East Midlands.  A 
set of interviews and participant observations of senior managers when making key 
decisions around current policy initiatives was recorded.  This explored how the 
concept of evidence based management is perceived by the managers.  The studied 
group were taken to have had career success and to be taken to be leaders in their 
field.  The researcher was a senior manager within the same region of the NHS.  
The method additionally studied the effect of a discrete, but accepted piece of data 
upon the NHS as it struggled to adopt an evidence based response to the 
operational issue the data highlighted.  The researcher was a planner within the 
same region that this data was being used and was responsible for responding to 
the data.  The ontology used Bryman (2004) and Morgan (2007) to attach meaning 
to the views that members of that part of the NHS had of their world. 
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Methods 
 
Through taped recordings of meetings and verbatim transcripts of 1 to 1 interviews 
with senior managers the study recorded the awareness of a need for evidence (or 
not) and also analysed the collection and evaluation of evidence where such 
awareness did exist.   Using a model developed by Rousseau (2006) the study 
classified the responses.  Interpretation of the responses was shared with the 
participant and conclusions drawn against the Rousseau based model. 
 
Findings 
 
Senior managers approve of evidence as it gives them a systematic view of what 
their staff are qualified to do and a requirement for evidence based decision making 
is part of the scheme of delegation. 
 
Adoption of innovation and research is a complex and often drawn out process.  The 
adoption of research evidence is not a single discrete event.  Managers will only use 
research if it improves the organisations standing.  Finally, it is shown that there are 
credible and complex reasons for the failure in NHS managers to use evidence very 
often, despite the prevailing orthodoxy of evidence based medicine.  The researcher 
agrees with McDaniel (2009) that evidence should be used to start new creative 
methods of working.  Although Arndt and Bigelow (2009) raise objections against 
evidence based decision making as “decisions do not necessarily lead to expected 
outcomes” The researcher finds their work cautionary rather than impeding to what 
Banaszak-Holl says are “compelling arguments for moving forward with developing 
EBM”.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Purpose 
 
This work explains why an ethnographic account was used to record and then 
classify the conversations and decisions of current NHS managers.  To develop an 
understanding of the NHS that is enhanced by professional insight from working in 
the NHS. 
 
Key arguments and Conclusions 
 
1.1 The research is exploratory in an emerging field 
 
The nature of exploratory research is to provide an insight into and comprehension 
of an issue or situation.  This research is exploratory because a problem has not 
been clearly defined, nor can it even be shown that a perceived problem (managers 
should/should not use evidence in the NHS) really exists.  The study holds up a 
mirror to the cohort I work in.  Components of this exploratory research will include a 
thorough literature review, informal discussions and in-depth interviews.  It is to be 
hoped by the exploration, that a research design, data collection method and subject 
selection will arise.  That would further the study of management in the National 
Health Service.  This issue of the mirror being held up to the cohort itself is important 
because exploratory research is not typically generalisable to the population at large.  
The cohort of managers should be able to reveal what is going on with management 
in the health service during the period 2007 to 2010 and is investigated without 
explicit expectations.  This methodology is sometimes referred to as a grounded 
theory and is an attempt to unearth a theory from the data itself, rather than from a 
pre-disposed hypothesis. The overall aim of this research is to enhance good 
practice in a craft of management in the NHS.  The study will spend time searching 
out the concepts behind “evidence based management” as they reveal themselves 
to the participants. 
 
The Department of Health (2009 a and Appendix E) note that this is an emerging 
field when they say that “many of the research studies commissioned by the SDO 
over the last eight years have direct relevance to healthcare managers.  However, 
rather less of our past research has been directly focused on exploring the roles, 
work, performance, effectiveness and development of healthcare managers and 
healthcare management itself.  At the same time there is increasing recognition of 
the potential for research evidence to improve managerial practice and decision 
making (Shortell, Rundall and HSU 2007)”.  Further they say that “the rise of the 
evidence-based healthcare movement, the increasingly explicit use of research 
evidence….have all helped to focus attention on the way that healthcare managers 
and leaders use evidence in their decision making”.  Additionally one might say this 
is an emerging field because there are important differences between the culture, 
research base and decision-making processes of clinicians and managers so that 
the ideas of evidence-based medicine whilst relevant need to be translated for 
management rather than simply transferred. 
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1.2 Why a specific research question would be inappropriate 
 
To emphasise the mirror holding nature of this work and the questions this raises.  
What excites in this research is to analyse the data with no pre-conceived 
hypothesis.  Rather than searching for data that confirms or rejects my hypothesis, a 
template analysis can search out the concepts behind “evidence based 
management” as they reveal themselves to my participants.  Maybe the question is 
unclear, but by conducting a study on the nature of evidence based decision making 
as it is judged and participated in by NHS managers questions will appear.  A 
working awareness of bias is imperative, but the author has long gone past the point 
of wanting to introduce or reject evidence based management in the NHS – so the 
paper simply wishes to understand if, how, when and why it is used or rejected and 
to reflect that back to NHS managers themselves.  In early stages the document 
also avoided using such questions as “does an evidence based approach exist?” 
because inherent in that question is a narrowing down of options and scenarios that 
the executives have not yet evaluated or which, because of their nature, are very 
difficult to evaluate.  This was because the evaluation did not want to impose a 
question that implied a thesis that was supportive of an evidence based 
methodology.  The reader should remember that evidence based management is a 
philosophical approach that denies the true value of experience and heuristics.  
There had to be scope for the NHS leaders interviewed and recorded to say that 
they remembered, for example, that “no evidence” in decision making can be better 
than the use of poor quality, contradicting or incomplete evidence.  The discussion of 
evidence based management is a valid research area, but whether there is a single 
valid research question is uncertain.  There are undoubtedly key questions that arise 
in the research.  The paper does ask whether evidence based practice is a norm or 
an ideal for daily professional management in the National Health Service?  To what 
extent do practicing NHS managers think evidence based healthcare management 
is an appropriate tool to resolve problems and what do they actually use?  Is there a 
conflict between politicians’ views of an effective National Health Service and the 
view of NHS managers?  If so, where is the conflict and would application of 
evidence based healthcare management resolve the conflict?  What is intended to 
be gained from these questions though, is a understanding of and to draw 
conclusions about, the nature of the preferences and decisions expressed by the 
cohort.  Ultimately, the reason why the specific research question would be 
inappropriate, therefore, is that a question that implies best practice would typically 
only uncover case studies related to that practice and all other experiences would be 
under reported.  The mirror is much more use if it reveals things about the cohort 
(the nature of relationships, power, eagerness to learn etc) than if it was a didactic 
about best practice case studies. 
 
1.3 Why an ethnographic account was used 
 
In April 2009 the NHS created a web portal, NHS Evidence (Department of Health 
2009a), “to provide online access to high quality information about health and social 
care to all staff who are making decisions about care they provide to patients”.  The 
objective is to help to make informed decisions about treatments and resources.  A 
key differentiation is made between ‘evidence’, clinical and public health ‘guidance’, 
and government ‘policy’.  This differentiation is at the heart of document 5.  
According to Walshe and Rundall (2001 p 429), “the rise of evidence based clinical 
practice in health care has caused some people to start questioning how health care 
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managers and policy makers make decisions and what role evidence plays in the 
process”.  Further, Walshe and Rundall say that (p 431) “though managers and 
policy makers have been quick to encourage clinicians to adopt an evidence-based 
approach, they have been slower to apply the same ideas to their own practice”.  
Yet, there is evidence that the same problems (of the under use of effective 
interventions and the over use of ineffective ones) are as widespread in health care 
management as they are in clinical practice.  According to the NHS, surveys done by 
the Department (Department of Health 2009 a, b) went on to say that the NHS had 
spent (08/09) £912 million on clinical research, £350 million on management 
consultants and yet had spent only £4 million on research and disseminating 
knowledge about the organisation and delivery of health care.   
 
Pfeffer (2006, p 6) says that “evidence based management is a commitment to 
finding and using the best theory and data available at the time, to make decisions”.  
This definition arose from study by Pfeffer (2006) of the “knowing-doing” gap and 
why managers “do things that were at odds with the best evidence of what works”.  
This is the definition that I am settled on for this paper. 
 
My own personal baggage about Evidence Based Management is that; I have 
worked in services where EBM was a new or alien concept.  Although the hierarchy 
of evidence is vaguely understood by most if not all NHS managers the sense that 
evidence should support or instruct decision makers, as proposed by distinguished 
leaders in the NHS management such as Muir Gray (1997), is not commonly 
accepted.  To an extent the concept of evidence is mostly a binary rather than a 
linear concept.  By that I mean that the Randomised Control Trial (RCT) is seen to 
be “evidence” and that anything other than an RCT is not.  In that way the concept of 
evidence is elevated to its most extreme version where an almost laboratory level of 
precision within its practice frightens lesser users.   
 
I have performed the role of Director and Chief Executive in NHS organisations.  It is 
significant that as a qualified accountant with a masters degree I should put an 
emphasis on craft knowledge.  The use of evidence was seen not as a tool, but part 
of the ‘craft’ of a few researchers who could cope with the rigours of the RCT.  The 
study of what other health systems outside the NHS could offer in terms of evidence 
was seen to be the role of specialised divisions of the health system, not mainstream 
NHS management.  I broke into this through visits to Europe and to America.  I was 
able to discuss the concepts of evidence based management with leading advocates 
of the idea, such as Dave Knutson at Minnesota, Tony Kovner and Jon Billings at 
NYU, Johanna Brared-Christensson at Sahlgrenska and James Roosevelt Jr at 
Tufts Medical. 
 
Young (2005), Mitton (2003) and Wait (2005) have all presented models that allow 
for an international analysis of health outcomes, responsiveness and financing.  This 
is not a crude league tabling, but a mixture of simulations and benchmarking, that 
allow for managers to not only understand how much is spent on health care, but 
how the resources are being applied.  Indifference to such work typified the use of 
international comparative data by NHS management.  Mitton (2003) considers the 
problem of applying a “rationing process” based on national allocation judgements, 
as opposed to the crude application of private sector management concepts from 
alternative health systems. 
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On the other hand, this baggage had the bonus that I could negotiate a quite 
privileged level of direct access to senior managers within my region of the NHS.  
Professional experience within that region over the last 10 years, plus my engaged 
discussions (socially) with these managers about me studying for a doctoral level 
qualification, gave me confidence that I had a cohort to study.  But there needed to 
be a method of study and implicitly a preceding methodology to gather the best data 
from this research.  I was drawn to the work of Frankfort-Nachmias (1996, pp12-13) 
that said “logical empiricists take the position that social scientists can attain 
objective knowledge in the study of the social as well as the natural world.  Social 
and natural sciences can be investigated by the same scientific methodology.  
Furthermore, logical empiricism sees empathic understanding as a helpful route to 
discovery”.  As I worked through the methodology – one thing troubled me about the 
method.  Under Frankfort-Nachmias (1996) the research process starts with a 
hypothesis.  “But discoveries must still be validated by empirical observations if they 
are to be integrated into the scientific body of knowledge”.  So I carried on with the 
methodology and was more easily reconciled to a method when I read Atkinson 
(1990, page 9).  Atkinson talks of ethnography as a “method and a genre” but just as 
importantly, Atkinson writes about the “poetics of authoritative accounts”.  Under 
method and genre, he said “it is therefore necessary to perform the equivalent of a 
‘phenomenological reduction’; that is, to step back and bracket or suspend our 
taken-for-granted assumptions about how ‘facts’ and ‘realities’ come to be 
represented as they are in our monographs and papers”.  This appealed as it spoke 
to me of the way to observe my world as if I were an outsider despite being an actor 
in the system.  Then Atkinson added “everyday commonsense tends to make a 
radical distraction between facts at one extreme and at the other subjectivity.  If 
anyone were to adopt such a perspective then they would be guilty of gross over-
simplification.  Science is itself a rhetorical activity”. 
 
For these reasons, I used an ethnographic account.  Although I was concerned 
about the validity of the method as I had not used the method in previous studies at 
Masters or professional examination levels it did seem the appropriate tool.  I did not 
want to observe a separate reality form the one I was working in as an executive in 
the NHS.  I did also want to avoid historical research as the longitudinal nature of the 
study had to, as much as possible, concentrate not on who we had been as NHS 
managers in the past, but to look at who we are now and why.  I accept that the 
ethnographic account is necessarily pragmatic and based on my values, but as I 
was trying to draw some general assumptions from explaining the behaviour of my 
peers, I believe it would be a valid research method.  The key reason that this 
method was useful as well as valid for me, is that the realism of the record made the 
account most contemporary and subject to audit by the people being observed. 
 
But what sort of ethnographic account to use?  Ethnography; ethno as in people, 
graph as in to write.  I am clear that I am writing about a people from my perspective.  
My people.  NHS managers.  In my region of the NHS.  Denzin (1997) encouraged a 
creative study of human behaviour with lots of experimental texts and designs.  This 
form of inquiry did not appear to be one I could credibly reproduce.  In reference to 
Bryman (2004) I was able to gain a better idea of the structure of my ethnography.  It 
would include participant observation, but I could say to all participants that my 
exploration was not testing a hypothesis.  I simply wanted to record unstructured 
data, to find a particular case study within this unstructured data (in my case it 
turned out to be cleanliness in hospitals) and to add some interpretation to the 
 10
decisions being taken.  Watson (1994) considered an ethnographic study that gave 
an insight into the way that managers worked, their thoughts and concerns.  Watson 
(1994) contrasted this approach to the numerate and standardising work that he saw 
typified much managerial research.  The key method that Watson (1994) had was to 
discover what management is like by understanding identity rather than observing 
the managerial task as if it was meant only to help to deliver a successful 
organisation. 
 
1.4  The effect of the patient and the politician upon NHS managers 
 
I was aware from my literature review that part of the ethnography would most likely 
observe the effect of the patient and the politician on managerial autonomy in the 
NHS manager.  I therefore mapped out key players in the NHS and the links to 
evidence based management as shown in table 1 (paragraph 2.4).  So, in this 
dynamic environment what else was it legitimate to add to my ethnography to make 
sure it passed the ultimate test of an ethnography; that you should be able to 
recognise the place at that point in time once you have read it?  Myers (1999, p2) 
who wrote an advisory note on ethnographic research in information systems, gave 
a helpful distinction “in a case study, the primary source of data is interviews, 
supplemented by documentary evidence such as annual reports, minutes of 
meetings and so forth.  In an ethnography these data sources are supplemented by 
data collected through participant and non-participant observation.  Ethnography 
usually require the researcher to spend a long period in the field”.  The ethnography 
had to produce something meaningful not only to the reader though, but also to this 
group of NHS managers who were having to react quickly to patients and politicians.  
Morgan (2007, p48) was helpful in adding to Bryman (2004) by saying that what I 
interpreted could be “from the perspective of the meaning, members of that society 
attach to their social world”.  Importantly, in this unstable environment of reactive 
management, Morgan gave permission to “render the collected data intelligible and 
significant to fellow academics and other readers”. 
 
The ethnographic account was also seen as a useful way to improve the 
performance of current and future NHS managers by feeding back and discussing 
the way decisions were made.  Establishing a link between individual organisational 
effectiveness (and individual executive effectiveness) and the quality of evidence 
used by managers in the East Midlands was problematic.  On the other hand, the 
cohort studies were consistently assertive (about themselves and others) that 
individuals leadership and effective individual performance would make a substantial 
(differential) impact on organisational delivery.  This delivery would cover 
compliances with the metrics used by inspectors and the Government, but also 
better clinical performance.  There was little opportunity to reflect on the 
effectiveness of their behaviour as individuals or to share learning as a group, 
however.   Therefore this ethnographic study was welcomed to audit and articulate 
what worked today and also to see whether generalisable themes could be found to 
plan for future good performance (Yin 2008). 
 
Some senior (former) NHS managers such as Learmonth (2000) oppose the 
scientific method and suggest that management is not an automatically good thing 
as it is believed to involve the exercise of power and the exploitation of others.   
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Swan (2005, p920) said “the majority of studies in this field (of the politics of 
networked innovation) have tended to focus on the more overt forms of political 
influence, including the role of managerial coalitions political tactics and the micro-
politics of self-interest amongst decision makers (Pettigrew, 1973; Brass and 
Burkhardt, 1992; Jones et al, 2001).  The emphasis has been on the ability to 
develop power over other groups, through the mobilization of resources (eg financial 
resources, information, and staff).  The negative connotations of a focus on 
hierarchically coercive power have tended to steer research of innovation away from 
deeper analysis of the dynamics of power (Hardy, 1996)”.  Swan concludes (2005, 
p938) “Dougherty and Hardy (1996 p1146) argue that for organisations to become 
innovative they must ‘reconfigure the power embedded in the organisational system 
– in its resources, processes and meanings’.  The findings reported here provide 
support for the view of the politicality of innovation processes”.  
 
Learmonth (2000) discourages the use of the scientific method due to exclusivity, 
but he needs not worry if managers themselves cannot or will not use the scientific 
approaches.  Perhaps the answer is less about what numerics to use and move 
about what research can tell us about successful leaders in successful organisations 
and the management tools that they used. 
 
The links between the better use of research and improved organisational 
performance are key to answering the question of ‘why don’t we use more evidence 
more often?!’  So why does this link prove so elusive to find within this paper?  The 
DBA itself includes a literature search – not quite a meta analysis, but thorough and 
completed as document 2 before any quantitative or qualitative analysis is done.  
The conclusions were that evidence is rarely objective, rarely is it widely available to 
all NHS managers simultaneously and it is never free (requiring either cash or 
significant opportunity cost to trawl).  Worst of all, it is usually contextually created 
within the market for management consultancy within the NHS that was, in 2008/09 
worth £350 million or 0.3% of the total NHS budget (Department of Health 2009 b).  
In summary, there is not yet any empirical evidence about evidence itself that 
demonstrates without prejudice its effectiveness. 
 
The following quotation from Giddens (1987, p310) explains how policy is related to 
research: “Evidence based policy is not simply an extension of evidence based 
medicine: it is qualitatively different. Research is considered less as problem solving 
than as a process of argument or debate to create concern and set the agenda. 
During the 1980s and 1990s this view was extended to a more interactive model 
based on a close dialogue between researchers and policymakers in which 
knowledge is considered to be inherently contestable”. 
 
The implication of accepting this is that policymakers have to get something out of 
research if they are to use it. It is necessary, therefore, to consider which arguments 
are likely to be useful or gratifying to which policymakers. Researchers have to 
accept that their work may be ignored because policymakers have to take the full 
complexity of any situation into account. They need to recognise that the other 
legitimate influences on policy (social, electoral, ethical, cultural, and economic) 
must be accommodated and that research is most likely to influence policymakers 
through an extended process of communication. 
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In this section it is possible to conclude that there is a tension between politicians 
and managers in the running of the National Health Service.  It is possible to 
conclude that a similar tension exists between taxpayers, patients and politicians in 
the running and funding of the NHS.  None of the parties are inherently trusting of a 
link between research and improved organisational performance.  An ethnographic 
account will help the reader and researcher to understand why this is. 
 
1.5  A changing definition of management and professionalism 
 
Our knowledge base is changing.  A definition of a ‘profession’ as people reserving 
the right to judge the quality and appropriateness of their services is over.  (Bonnell 
1999).  It is clear that the politicians believe the bond of public trust to be broken.  
The reason we get politicians using targets and based numerics in a heavy and 
dogmatic way is that the assumption of professionalism has lost the confidence of 
politicians.  (Morris, 2002).  At the same time the complexity of the NHS system 
means that simple-easy to communicate – policies are seen as the antidote to 
complexity.  Not the use of evidence! (Paniagua, 2009). 
 
The linkages between research and other forms of knowledge are important to 
understanding ‘who’ the NHS manager is and how this affects the production and 
use of evidence.  Senior NHS executives must – according to their job descriptions – 
have a professional qualification, a masters degree level education (or equivalent) 
and at least five years significant NHS experience at Board level (Appendix G).  This 
collective experience means a starting point for research and scientific enquiry that 
cannot only be forensic and analytical, but will also be experimental and, to an 
extent, based on story-telling and anecdote.  Secondly, the leader will have won the 
post at a meritocratic interview within a public domain following advertisement of the 
post and an extended competition.  This means that the structural analysis of who 
they are and how they use evidence, must consider that the process of arriving at 
being a leader is within a social/political context.  That their skills make them capable 
of using evidence is clear from the competence requirements of their job description 
– but there is every chance this skill will atrophy after appointment as other attributes 
are developed. 
 
1.6 Using my professional role to validate academic insight 
 
In my professional life I am a planner and purchaser of Emergency Ambulance 
Services.  So I spend a great degree of time analysing and considering data about 
performance of ambulance responses to emergencies, the most efficient ways to do 
things and looking for insights that will either improve quality for the same price, or 
get me the same quality for a lower price.  What I buy is affected by the reasons that 
people call for ambulances – dangerous personal behaviours, the frailty of the 
human body in times of extreme weather (heat and cold), biological factors such as 
disease or the contra-indicators of drugs, age and disability.  In the response to a 
particularly difficult performance period it became clear that “falls” were a key reason 
for the despatch of ambulances.  Although few trials have been carried out in the 
UK, the prevention and management of falls in the older population is a key 
government target in reducing ill health.  This is a key target of the national service 
framework for older people (2001).  “Reduce the number of falls which result in 
serious injury and ensure effective treatment and rehabilitation for those who had 
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fallen”.  (Department of Health 2001) is the direct mission statement of this particular 
national service framework. 
 
My professional roles gave me validity and made it acceptable to be an explorer.  
When an academic explores the NHS and attempts to codify behaviour or establish 
a theoretical schema, their study may exhibit a certain formality and quality.  But the 
ultimate product is not useful to practicing NHS leaders in proportion to the resource 
deployed.  (Baker, 2009).  The implementation of conclusions fully is unlikely.  This 
is not some problem with the epistemology that the academic displays.  It is that 
their exploration is that of a tourist within the NHS.  My validity means that any 
generality I observe will have to be tested in the challenges we as a cohort of NHS 
managers face in the future. 
 
Two academics explored this problem.  (Gill 2002 and Yin 2008).  Gill (2002, p5) 
said that “research in the United Kingdom comparing attitudes towards research of 
managers revealed that managers believed research was initiated by academic 
researchers often insufficiently familiar with the managerial culture and so lacked 
credibility.  For the most part, managers seemed to believe that management 
research was not cost effective but also, more critically, largely irrelevant to the 
problems they faced.  Many managers confessed that they did not know how to use 
research findings and that clearly utilisable research would be more helpful to them”.  
Yin (2008) broadens this helpfully, by saying that if the researcher intensively studies 
one or a few entries a case researcher is likely to develop deep insights of a 
phenomenon from which hypotheses may be generated.  Following Yin (2008), my 
ethnography may lead to conclusions about the NHS in the East Midlands that are 
credible hypothesis in other parts of the NHS. 
 
I wanted to complete the analytical quantitative part of my study of evidence based 
management by looking at East Midlands Ambulance Service (EMAS), as the only 
clinical service organisation that covered the whole of the East Midlands.  EMAS 
also provides services in the South Humber areas of North and North East 
Lincolnshire which is outside the definition of East Midlands used elsewhere in this 
project.  When I talk of the East Midlands in regards to ambulance service I will be 
talking about the area co-terminus with the East Midlands Strategic Health Authority 
and the Government Office for the East Midlands, not the whole of the service area 
covered by EMAS including South Humber.  EMAS provided emergency and urgent 
care, patient transport, call handling and clinical triage services.  EMAS employ 3000 
staff and have 70 locations they operate from and an annual budget of £137 million 
in financial year 2008/09. 
 
As well as the quantitative study of EMAS, I wished to do an in depth qualitative 
study.  Investigating the criteria used to assess the quality of a decision is a key 
objective of the research presented here.  The way in which evidence is assessed is 
closely related to the perceived status and credibility of the evidence itself.  It is 
possible to provide an idea of some broad areas the respondents seemed to take 
into account when assessing the quality of the evidence.  I chose to focus on a 
particular decision.  The cohort being followed were charged with conducting a deep 
clean of clinical areas in the NHS in response to high profile media and political 
concerns about infection rates and the effect they were having on patients.  For 
those with poor health and reduced immunity due to a range of factors (age, diet, 
morbidity) proximate exposure to these infections would in fact kill them.  That much 
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was agreed by the cohort but the decision was around the way they approached the 
instructed solution of a ‘deep clean’, and the extent to which the assessment of the 
quality of evidence is used in that decision.  A subset of this observation is the extent 
to which the use of evidence is seen as intuitive decision making rather than the 
systematic application of criteria. 
 
1.7  Conclusion 
 
I wanted a better understanding of the NHS that lead to better management (and 
especially executive) performance.  The key was to have an intelligent system that 
was also simple to read and understand.  I wanted to observe the most actively used 
algorithms for decision making by these managers (even if they didn’t recognise it as 
being something as sophisticated as an algorithm) and to understand which 
algorithms they thought most deeply about before applying them to their decision.  
The codification of all of this needed to be something that would make sense to the 
participants in meetings and boards, not simply in an abstraction of their day to day 
experience.  
 
 
 15
CHAPTER 2 
 
 
Context 
 
Purpose 
 
To represent schematically the relationship between policy makers, managers, 
clinicians and patients with respect to the use of evidence.  To represent 
diagrammatically the reasons evidence is (or is not) used by managers in the NHS 
and by those who fund, provide and receive NHS care. 
 
Key Arguments and Conclusions 
 
2.1  Evidence encompasses codified and non-codified sources of knowledge 
 
Kovner and Rundall (2006 p3) said “The sense of urgency associated with improving 
the quality of medical care does not exist with respect to improving the quality of 
management decision making.  A more evidence based approach would improve the 
competence of the decision makers and their motivation to use more scientific 
methods when making a decision”.  Kovner (2006, pp3-22) conducted a study of 68 
US based health service managers and found a low level of evidence based 
management behaviours.  From the findings, Kovner (2006) suggested that 
evidence based decision making should focus on strategically important issues and 
to build a management culture that values research.  What I find compelling about 
Kovner’s study is that it understands that there is a bias in terms of describing ‘good’ 
management in health care in terms of what individuals know about their jobs, rather 
than describing a ‘good manager’ as one who uses research.  Against all of the good 
work to improve the use of evidence, are pre-existing management cultures and 
scepticism about the transferability of findings of research. 
 
Evidence based healthcare management (EBHM) refers to using research evidence 
in making management decisions. Defined narrowly it describes using evidence from 
randomised controlled trials investigating the effectiveness of management 
decisions.  For example evidence about the effectiveness of representations of 
service (case management or team work), or about changes to organisation 
(changing skill mix or merging two organisations) or about new financing 
arrangements (e.g. primary care purchasing), or about public health or health 
promotion programmes. This accommodates a more flexible concept of evidence of 
effectiveness which can include the opinions of stakeholders if gathered using 
accepted systematic methods.  
 
In its broadest sense EBHM describes using any “acceptable evidence” to make 
better informed management and policy decisions. Such evidence could be a survey 
of opinions about the likely value of a change or new policy, or an internal data 
gathering project to collect service statistics and assess their validity for informing a 
decision. An example of this concept is research informed management or  
“Evaluation-informed management” defined as “making more informed management 
decisions by using research evidence and evidence from research”. 
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In considering the way that individuals apply evidence to the decision making 
process, of particular interest is the underlying assumptions about the career of the 
NHS manager and the life stages they go through with regard to autonomy.  The 
way in which individuals define the use of evidence is important in that it shapes 
their perceptions about who should be free to use judgement and who needs to 
concur with the evidence base (and indeed seek out the evidence base) before 
making a decision.  From the responses and the recordings  (described in depth in 
Chapers 5 and 6) it is clear that a variety of individual decision making methods are 
in use and there is no general consensus about the nature of evidence in decisions 
by individuals within the NHS.  What is clear though is that rather than being a 
restrictive or indeed exclusionary practice of some NHS managers, there is a body 
of support for evidence based decisions, with the right evidence by the right 
individuals in the right context. 
 
Even champions of evidence-based practice acknowledge that the approach has 
limits.  “Some things can’t be tested in randomized trials, and some things are so 
obvious, they don’t need it”, says Dr. Paul Glasziou, director of the Centre for 
Evidence-Based Medicine in Oxford, England.  (2007 p3) “There have never been 
randomized trials to show that giving electrical shocks to a heart that has stopped 
beating saves more lives than doing nothing, for example.  Similarly, giving 
antibiotics to treat pneumonia has never been rigorously tested from a scientific 
point of view.  It’s clear to everyone, however, that if you want to survive a bout of 
bacterial pneumonia, antibiotics are your best bet, and nobody would want to go into 
cardiac arrest without a crash cart handy”. 
 
2.2 There is a recognised corpus of knowledge for NHS managers 
 
There is a managerial challenge, somewhere at the axis between clinicians and the 
NHS manager, that is about somebody making a decision about what the facts are 
going to be.  The dialogue is between a claim for example about speedier recovery 
and the research evidence that confirms or denies this.  This will inevitably clash 
with custom and practice.  Equally, it will clash with entrepreneurs/innovators who 
have a penchant for change and experimentation that is not evidenced.  Such 
entrepreneurs can be clinical or managerial.  (Littlejohns, 2003 p862).  “Most new 
interventions in health care are driven by entrepreneurs who have great faith in their 
project.  They may not be capable of standing back and taking a dispassionate view 
of the cost effectiveness of the interventions.  In this case, the implications  of an 
emerging policy that was encouraging modular systems – that is, pharmacy and 
radiology that could be linked rather than fully integrated – were not fully 
assimulated”. 
 
Muir Gray (1997 p615) has said “management in health care is a young discipline 
without the trappings and traditions of medicine. Is it, though, more of an art than a 
science? Resistance to change may be less, but the increased rigor required could 
be much greater. Furthermore, in management and policy making the anatomy of a 
decision is very different from a clinical intervention. Deciding whether to invest in a 
further cardiothoracic centre in a health region or to move five vascular surgical units 
to one site, even if evidence were available, is a complex process. It can involve 
managers, professionals, local interest groups, politicians, the media, and the public. 
At times, social systems will undermine the science. For example, how often have 
we seen a decision changed late in the day by a bravura performance in committee, 
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based on emotion?” The National Institute for Clinical Effectiveness (NICE) has been 
created to help to create a more evidence based climate and to avoid the emotive 
response noted by Gray.  The work that NICE is involved in attracts the attention of 
many groups, including doctors, the pharmaceutical industry, and patients. NICE is 
often associated with controversy,  (politics.co.uk, 2010) because the need to make 
decisions at a national level can conflict with what is (or is believed to be) in the best 
interests of an individual patient, and because there is an inherent need for rationing 
in the NHS. From an individual's perspective it can sometimes seem that NICE is 
denying access to a potentially life-saving treatment. NICE has been criticised for its 
over-reliance on evidence-based medicine, which it is argued privileges certain kinds 
of econometrically derived types of studies over others. NICE has also been 
criticised for being too slow to reach decisions. Some of the more controversial NICE 
decisions have concerned beta-interferon for multiple sclerosis, imatinib (Glivec) for 
leukaemia, and trastuzumab (Herceptin) for breast cancer. The process aims to be 
fully independent of government and lobbying power, basing decisions fully on 
clinical and cost-effectiveness. There have been concerns that lobbying by 
pharmaceutical companies to mobilise media attention and influence public opinion 
are attempts to influence the decision making process. A fast-track assessment 
system has been introduced to reach decisions where there is most pressure for a 
conclusion. 
 
There are obviously a number of other ways that this management task of resource 
gathering and allocation can take place.  I would like to continue with the theme of 
the Learmonth approach to NHS management before moving on to other studies.  
Learmonth (2003) returns to the areas he had covered previously in suggesting that 
much of the established work in health services management research takes for 
granted managerial assumptions that are not consequently subjected to sustained 
critical examination.  Learmonth maintains that this veneer of research credibility 
reinforces a view of management in the NHS that appears to be neutral and 
disinterested, but actually supports elite interests. 
 
Harries (1999) on the other hand acknowledges the importance of developing an 
NHS where practice and policy is more evidence based.  Harries’ paper is based on 
a qualitative study which aimed to identify factors which facilitate or impede evidence 
based policy making at a local, rather than, national level in the NHS.  Harries drew 
conclusions about the importance of influences and commitment in facilitating 
evidence based change.  Harries actually did what Learmonth accuses the NHS of 
not doing and moved beyond the rhetoric of evidence based policy by conducting a 
series of in depth interviews with lead policy makers and analysis of project 
documents to see if and where and why evidence based management exists in the 
NHS. 
 
Further to Harries; Pearson (2007) took on Learmonth by conducting a re-
consideration of what constitutes evidence in healthcare.  Pearson offers the Joanna 
Briggs Institute version to illustrate the broader definition of what works as evidence 
and therefore challenges Learmonth.  Pearson (2007) says that the whole concept 
of evidence can be described fairly and without prejudice.  This is not to say that 
Learmonth is entirely without foundation in his belief that management styles can be 
imported without evaluation.  Enthoven (2000) says that previous reforms of the 
NHS were quite limited in effect because the essential conditions for a market to 
operate were not fulfilled.  Enthoven ascribes the management tasks of innovation, 
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improving efficiency and driving good customer service as absent from NHS 
management and recommends the market as the best stimuli to improve the quality 
of management in the NHS with little or no evidence other than replication of what 
Enthoven saw elsewhere. 
 
Hamlin (2001) presents arguments in support of evidence-based healthcare 
management, drawing on organisationally based empirical research, set within an 
NHS Trust Hospital in the UK. The research focuses on identifying the criteria of 
managerial effectiveness applying at the middle and front line management levels of 
the organisation, using critical incident technique and factor analysis methods.  The 
findings suggest the existence of generalised criteria of managerial effectiveness, 
supporting the notion of the ‘universally effective manager’.  
 
Davis (2007) has made comparison studies of the functioning of health policy in 
Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the United kingdom, to understand the 
incentives, rewards and penalties that might make players in a health system 
allocate resources efficiently.  Boufford (2002) has written about the importance of 
teaching evidence based healthcare in universities to pre and post qualification 
healthcare managers.  
 
There is a structure, albeit an informal one, for the implementation of management 
research in the National Health Service. The National Institute for Health Research 
(NIHR) was created in 2006 “to create a health research system in which the NHS 
supports outstanding individuals, working in world class facilities, conducting leading 
edge research focused on the needs of patients and the public” (Department of 
Health 2008). The NIHR is a virtual organisation, which provides a new framework 
for the Department of Health to work with its key partners involved in the different 
elements of NHS research.   Also noteworthy is the West Midlands Health 
Technology Assessment Collaboration between universities and academic groups 
mostly based at the University of Birmingham, United Kingdom. It produces reviews 
and evaluations for a variety of national and regional clients, undertakes 
methodological research on health technology assessment, and provides training in 
systematic reviews and health technology assessment. The Service Delivery and 
Organisation (SDO) Research and Development Programmed aims to produce 
research evidence directed at improving the organisation and delivery of health 
services, and to promote the uptake and application of that evidence in policy and 
practice. The SDO Programme is one of NIHR Programmes. 
 
 The Cochrane Collaboration is an international not-for-profit organisation that helps 
people make well informed decisions by preparing, maintaining and promoting the 
accessibility of systematic reviews of the effects of health care interventions. The 
major product of the Cochrane Collaboration is its database of systematic reviews. 
Most reviews are prepared by health care professionals and published in the 
Cochrane Library. The activities are supported by staff in Cochrane Centres 
(Department of Health 2005 a) around the world.  Centre for Reviews and 
Dissemination (CRD) was established in 1994 to provide the United Kingdom's 
National Health Service (NHS) with important information on effectiveness of 
treatments, delivery and organization of health care. CRD is a sibling organization of 
the United Kingdom Cochrane Centre and is part of a network of academic 
departments and research centres at the University of York concerned with teaching, 
research and consultancy in health and public policy.  
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Evidence-based medicine categorises different types of clinical evidence and ranks 
them according to the strength of their freedom from the various biases that beset 
medical research. For example, the strongest evidence for therapeutic interventions 
is provided by randomised, double-blind, placebo-controlled trials involving a 
homogeneous patient population and medical condition. In contrast, patient 
testimonials, case reports, and even expert opinion have little value as proof 
because of the placebo effect, the biases inherent in observation and reporting of 
cases, difficulties in ascertaining who are an expert, and more. Evidence-based 
healthcare management is an emerging movement to explicitly use the current, best 
evidence in management decision-making. Its roots are in evidence-based medicine 
and as such is a quality movement to apply the scientific method to management 
practice. 
 
2.3 Those who comment on the NHS don’t use evidence to do so 
 
Strathern (1997) says that any economic relationship which is used for policy 
purposes ceases to be valid.  The paper gives an anthropological comment on what 
the writer calls the ‘audit explosion’ meaning the proliferation of procedures for 
evaluating performance.  Strathern (1997) notes that audit does more than monitor, 
it actually has an effect on the behaviour and performance of the organisation that is 
being audited.   
 
Recent Institute for Public Policy Research/Ipsos Mori survey work indicates that 
only around a quarter of the public thinks that the availability of drugs and treatments 
should be determined by cost and effectiveness (Brooks 2006).  There are legitimate 
concerns about the cost and effectiveness of new drugs and treatments, and about 
the role of private companies in stimulating demand for their products, and these 
require a robust and transparent regulatory response. We certainly need a system 
that allows a rational pattern of expenditure rather than focusing disproportionate 
resources on specific treatments when they hit the headlines.   
 
Conversely Clarke (2004, p28), Director of Finance at the Homerton University 
Hospital NHS Foundation Trust, has insisted that ‘most people running hospitals 
know how to run them, and there is no universal solution available from the 
commercial sector’. In any case, with around 70% of costs set nationally, hospital 
management teams have only limited discretion – something the government’s 
‘turnaround teams’ have been finding out. Parker (2004, p29), chair of the King’s 
College Hospital NHS Trust, stressed that NHS managers are often being asked to 
manage ‘dysfunctional systems’, with a lot of perverse incentives. ‘We are managers 
but we’re being asked to act like civil servants, each time the government screws 
things up.’ 
 
Crawford (2009) wrote of a time when, in the role of Chief Executive Officer there 
was a heated argument as to whether loss-leader items led to greater sales.  As 
CEO he could have made the decision based on his own opinion but that's not what 
happened.  Crawford said, "Let's not argue, let's find out."  They proceeded to do an 
experiment to see if shoppers buying sale items also bought enough other items to 
justify the sale. (They didn’t).  This is a great example of the attitude of inquiry.  
Crawford, (2009). 
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An attitude of enquiry would include questions such as “what are the assumptions 
behind this?” “what evidence do we have that things may go wrong?”  Advocates 
come into a meeting with an opinion they wish to defend.  Bertelli (2008) employed 
count regression techniques to find out what MPs said about issues of wait times 
and resource allocation in the NHS.  Bertelli (2008) showed that political careerism 
goes a long way to show whether MPs tabled any questions in this area.  Advocacy 
was consistently used in the defence of high risk individuals, but MPs showed no 
appetite for discussion about more general health risks that may be a clue to an 
attitude of enquiry. 
 
2.4 A way to represent this as a diagram 
 
The decision to use evidence to distribute the resources of the NHS would be, of 
itself, a political act.  Clinicians, patients, politicians, all use Politics to distribute the 
NHS resource.  Derbyshire PCT, where I work, is only the eight largest PCT in the 
country, and yet still distributes £1.1 billion of taxpayer’s money on healthcare.  
(Department of Health, 2009c).  The problem is not with the evidence based 
approach itself.  The problem is that good evidence based decision making with an 
evidence based organisation of knowledge at its heart can be slow.  Decisions 
based on evidence can be full of checks-and-balances and be open ended.  The 
calm evidence based approach gets overtaken by an urgent desire to claim and 
distribute a significant part of this huge economic resource available from the NHS.  
It will be helpful to draw this issue diagrammatically.  This way the researcher can 
frame within one picture or table the reasons why evidence is (or is not) used by 
managers in the NHS and by those who fund, provide and receive NHS care. 
 
I conclude that the cohort will use clinical evidence, I think managers are very much 
into the development of clinical pathways, working with clinicians and doing the best 
things in the best way.  But as to how the NHS works, the sort of infrastructure, 
where services are located, how they’re delivered, I don’t conclude that they do use 
evidence.  I observe there is some, scientific evidence in there, they’ll look at journey 
times, and they’ll look at volume, populations and the needs of that population (not 
been done very well until fairly recently).  So they’ll do that sort of thing, but a lot of 
the decisions that are made, seem to be based more on history, on the views of 
politicians and key stakeholders, which are often not really evidence based.  
 
In our efforts to continually refine the body of knowledge, guidelines exists for where 
evidence is and is not appropriate.  There is a culture of target hitting, self-regulation 
and rooting out dangerous clinical practice that has it’s origins in criminal and unsafe 
clinicians such as Harold Shipman.  But there is also a fear of evidence that 
pervades any hope of a structural response to the issue.  There is also as we have 
seen far more complexity in the NHS.  We have pressures to avoid all clinical hazard 
whatever the opportunity cost is.  We have pressures and incentives for institutional 
growth over best patient care.  We have consumerism and we have pre-occupation 
with financial costs over economics or ‘whole system/whole life’ costs. 
 
Part of the problem in the discussion about evidence is that the players in the 
National Health Service can be difficult to follow if your primary perspective is the 
flow of patient pathways through the clinical experience.  This gives a sense that 
there is a linear NHS with one purpose and a clear objective.  Consider the diagram 
of the NHS as it is represented and it is possible to see a complex multivariate 
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organisation within which each player has a different requirement of and/or rejection 
of the opportunities afforded by an evidence based approach.  (Table 1, below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
 
An alternative diagram considered was the structured system analysis and design 
method (SSADM) piloted by Downs (1992). This is a registered trade mark of the UK 
treasury and therefore deeply embedded within the UK public sector.  This type of 
modelling involves recording and documenting how data moves around an 
information system.  This also involves significant dialogue with users and complex 
mapping and is a pinnacle of the rigorous document approach to system design.  
Although the investigative nature of this diagram is helpful in constructing a diagram 
it has two drawbacks that mean I favour my alternative.  Primarily it is that SSADM is 
a waterfall method in which progress is steady through the phases of conception to 
construction and use.  It is also problematic in that whilst SSADM may be useful in 
implementing evidence in a single organisation, it is contextually limited for those 
influencing, but not part of, the NHS. 
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The rational decision making diagram amongst its many assumptions assumes a 
single optimal solution.  If, however, we opt for a diagram of ‘bounded’ rationality 
then my diagram makes sense.  The decision maker takes the decision or is 
assumed to choose a solution that is good enough within the limited freedom and 
autonomy they have.  All of the agents in the box makes assumptions about their 
perfect knowledge but all are aware that alternatives are limited by the other players 
in the box.  Document 2 of the DBA (the literature review) discussed this point in 
more detail. 
 
SSADM highlights that my diagram, as a faithful representation of the NHS, has a 
static nature and it may be that SSADM should be thought as the best way to 
enhance the “evidence based organisation of knowledge” at its core.  This links with 
the next section in that I have so far described the existence of evidence as if it were 
a given, and the only question is therefore, whether or not it is used.  Chapter 3 will 
discuss in more depth this issue of a “high quality knowledge base” and whether – if 
a decision was taken to be evidence based – the manager/politician/patient would 
find an “evidence based organisation of knowledge waiting to be tapped into”. 
 
Knowles (2008) says: Although the term “command and control” is used negatively 
in the current target-driven healthcare environment there is a coherent case for it 
being a more valid diagram than my evidence based approach.  “Commonly held 
views about command-and-control are that it smacks of everything that is bad about 
those at the top telling everybody else what to do.  However, with many years of 
‘shared situational awareness’ (within the NHS) we may think of this as being clear 
about what is expected of oneself and one’s colleagues and using one’s initiative.  It 
is about communicating a plan and ensuring it is understood”. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
Concepts and Conceptual Framework 
 
Purpose 
 
To understand the on-going debate over whether the use of evidence should 
improve organisational effectiveness. 
 
Key Arguments and Conclusions 
 
3.1 The primary use of research is in shaping ideas not in the solution of 
immediate problems. 
 
The National Institute for Health and Clinical Evidence (NICE) is a division of the 
NHS set up to consider not only the comparative clinical benefits, but also the cost-
effectiveness of alternative technologies and services.  Unfortunately, as Chalkidou 
(2009b, pp4-8) says “NICE typically does not, however, encourage evidence 
generation through prospective research into existing uncertainties.  To the extent 
that evidence for new technologies is more readily available than for old.  (Existing) 
Service-delivery models are much less frequently the subject of economic analyses, 
which further biases the whole process to new technologies.  Local systems often 
lack the analytical capacity, resources, time and information and may overlook any 
resource use implications beyond the marginal pricing cost”. 
 
Chalkidou (2009a) studied the experience of senior technical and administrative staff 
in setting up what she called ‘comparative effectiveness research’ centres in Britain, 
France, Australia and Germany.  Chalkidou was a member of NICE (the NHS 
version of these ‘comparative effectiveness research’ centres.  Using website 
access and informal interviews with key stakeholders, she was able to determine the 
mechanisms that typified their operation.  She concluded “they have adopted a core 
structural, technical and procedural principles.  Including mechanisms for engaging 
with stakeholders, governance and oversight arrangements and ‘explicit 
methodologies for analysing evidence’ to ensure a high-quality product that is 
relevant to their system” (my emphasis points). 
 
What do writers conclude about evidence and the nature of evidence?  Guven-Uslu 
(2006) was able to ask whether the nature of papers written upon the consideration 
of evidence based management were qualitatively different from those of other 
management disciplines.  Guven-Uslu (2006) reviewed the literature of the NHS at a 
time when it was encouraging clinicians and managers to work together in networks 
to improve performance and the writer concludes that “evidence based 
management” is not so much a tool of decision making, as it is a state of mind.  The 
incorporation of evidence based management into decision making is not at the 
decision point – it is the entire continuum of the philosophy of management.  It 
becomes a credo wherein all decisions are taken in a structured and methodical 
way, and to some extent, trading timeliness for accuracy. 
 
Rousseau (2006, p256) quotes from a wealth of resource available to guide effective 
execution of evidence based management “goal setting and feedback (Locke & 
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Latham 1984); feedback and redesign (Goodman 2001); health care managements 
greater orientation towards scientific evidence (Lemieux-Charles & Champagne 
2004)” and says that the continued wide variation that we observe in how 
organisations execute decisions is remarkable.  I have written in tabular form, the 
nature of the discourse contained in Rousseau’s literature so that a wealth of writing 
can be synthesised, in paragraph 3.3 and again in 5.9.  
 
The Cochrane Centre was established as part of funding in 1992 by the NHS ‘to 
facilitate and co-ordinate the preparation and maintenance of systematic reviews of 
randomised control trials of health care’.  The national level institution has been 
supplemented in the intervening years by National Service Frameworks (2000) and 
the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) (2001).  Other bodies 
such as Kings Fund, Nuffield Trust and the US Institute for Healthcare Improvement 
have been active in producing research and disseminating knowledge about the 
organisation and delivery of health care. 
 
A company that embraces evidence-based management sees their company as a 
laboratory.  Crawford (2009) ran an experiment to answer a specific question.  Many 
businesses could do the same.  Wherever there are multiple units – multiple stores, 
warehouses, production lines or branches – the company can run experiments to 
find out what works.  This simple idea, “the company as a laboratory” is powerful 
one. 
 
Sutton (2009) says “Last week I spoke to a group of MBA students (the Santa Clara 
University Executive MBA class of 2007). Their comments and questions gave me 
food for thought. For starters, is evidence based management anything new? Is it a 
movement that should be enthusiastically promoted, or simply a day-to-day activity 
that people should be encouraged to do? And what should it be called (assuming it 
even needs a name)? Sutton (2009) wishes to avoid using “data-driven” as a 
substitute, because evidence doesn’t always arrive in the form of hard data. 
Likewise, he says not to call it “fact-based” management, because not everything 
can be reduced to a set of objective facts. Sutton (2009) thinks “research-based” 
management is a decent description, but worries that it that might trigger “the 
dreaded MEGO (My Eyes Glaze Over) response”. 
 
What each of the writers in paragraph 3.1 have done is provide a sense that 
evidence based management or “decision based on a careful appraisal of the best 
evidence available” is not only possible, but empowering.  Whilst it has at its heart 
an inquiring style of management, it is not cautious in approach.  If the manager 
were, say, the executive director in charge of twenty clinics, each with varied 
performance, the manager might reasonably conclude that the performance 
differences were due to something about the clinics or their administration.  The 
executive director might even combine that presumption with a professional 
background in clinical or business disciplines to draw conclusions.  What these 
writers have told the NHS manager to do instead, is to look for systematic attention 
to local facts (ie, the best evidence available) and plan their response accordingly 
which may mean looking at patients, building stock, transport or public health, but to 
look at them quickly! 
 
The debate is evolving from managers use of ‘knowledge about knowledge’ in the 
private sector (Bailey and Clarke, 2000) to a broader NHS and health care 
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discussion (Kovner 2006, 2009).  The debate is also evolving from one about 
managers strategic uses of knowledge to secure competitive advantage for the 
organisation (Hamblin 2001) to an alignment between researchers and managers to 
apply evidence to a broad range of other uses (Alexander 2007).  There is as yet, 
little empirical research evidence to inform efforts to develop models in real world 
settings and the debate is typified by academic rather than practitioner dispute 
(Learmonth, 2006 and Rousseau, 2006). 
 
We can observe the substance and discipline behind the evidence based culture; 
two writers Lomas and Rist are found in the literature with a number of lessons that 
they prescribe for anybody wishing to understand whether the public actually want 
their decisions to be made on the basis of best evidence.  As a simple rule book this 
part of academic practice can be helpful in shaping an understanding for the later 
documents of how policy, public preference and management decision making come 
together.  The writers make some bold statements as follows: 
 
The relation between research and policy depends on the arena and, thus, the 
policymakers. Research evidence is more influential in central policy than local 
policy, where policymaking is marked by negotiation and uncertainty. Thirdly, the 
use of research depends on the degree of consensus on the policy goal. It is used if 
it supports the consensus and is used selectively if there is a lack of consensus. 
Fourthly, many researchers are politically naive. They have a poor understanding of 
how policy is made and have unrealistic expectations about what research can 
achieve. And, fifthly, policy-making is not an event but is “ethereal, diffuse, 
haphazard and somewhat volatile”.  (Lomas 2006, p1-6).  The consequences of 
failing to understand this are clear: “So long as researchers presume that research 
findings must be brought to bear upon a single event, a discrete act of decision 
making, they will be missing those circumstances and processes where, in fact, 
research can be useful”.  (Rist 1994, p546). 
 
3.2 Managers integrate data with other forms of knowledge 
 
In the NHS in the East Midlands senior managers can embrace a dialogue about 
evidence and, at the same time, lead organisations that actually perform well.  They 
are genuinely more interested in improving health care and organisational success 
than in power, prestige and being right.  Unfortunately, despite their penchant for 
inquiry and observation the decision making box (2.4), the Rousseau model (3.3) 
and the critical single piece of evidence (4.3) show that their acceptance of evidence 
based decision making does not translate into practicing it.  They feel compelled to 
act quickly and with direction in response to policy and the opportunity to consider 
evidence is ignored or lost. 
 
Williamson (2000) acknowledges that knowing seems to be “highly sensitive” to such 
factors as justification and reliability.  Taking each of these factors into consideration.   
 
Justification: the meetings of the Senior Managers (Appendix C) took on board the 
empirical experience of the room, the authority of the speakers and logical 
deduction.  Unfortunately, where evidence did occur within this rational sphere, it 
would be immediately discounted.  If the evidence does not improve the 
organisations standing – suppose for example that the evidence was that 
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accountants cost more than they save in terms of the opportunity cost of health care 
foregone it was ignored. 
 
Reliability: the managers do attempt to make generalisable conclusions that will be 
reliable across many scenarios and organisations – for example, that the public want 
quicker and safer health care – but chose these scenarios in a culturally biased 
manner.  So evidence that staff need to work flexible hours to achieve this is 
discarded in favour of having more staff in the NHS. 
 
So it is possible to see an NHS that does use knowledge, but could still discount 
evidence.  
Rousseau (2006 a, p1091) continues to address why evidence-based management 
is timely and practical.  An “evidence orientation” according to Rousseau shows that 
decision quality is a direct function of available facts, creating a demand for reliable 
and valid information when making managerial and organisational decisions. 
Improving information continues a trend begun in the quality movement giving 
systematic attention to discrete facts, indicative of quality (Rousseau 2006, p1091).  
“This trend continues in recent developments regarding open-book management 
(Case,1995; Ferrante & Rousseau, 2001) and the use of organizational fact finding 
and experimentation to improve decision quality (Pfeffer & Sutton 2006).  In all the 
attention we now give to evidence, it helps to differentiate what might be called Big E 
Evidence from little e evidence. Big E Evidence refers to generalisable knowledge 
regarding cause-effect connections derived from scientific methods. Little e evidence 
is local or organisation specific, as exemplified by root cause analysis and other fact-
based approaches the total quality movement introduced for organisational 
decision”. 
Evidence, according to Rousseau (2006, p1093) refers to data systematically 
gathered in a particular setting to inform local decisions. “As the saying goes, “facts 
are our friends,” when local efforts to accumulate information relevant to a particular 
problem lead to more effective solutions.   Rousseau distinguishes evidence with a 
little e from Evidence with a big E.  Although decision makers who rely on scientific 
principles are more likely to gather facts systematically in order to choose an 
appropriate course of action fact gathering (“evidence”) doesn’t necessarily lead 
decision makers to use social science knowledge (“Evidence”) in interpreting these 
facts”. 
 
There are commentators on EBHM (Steward (2002), Paton (1999), Walshe (2001)) 
who say lack of evidence and lack of benefit are not the same, and that the more 
data are pooled and aggregated, the more difficult it is to compare the patients in the 
studies with the patient in front of the doctor — that is, EBHM applies to populations, 
not necessarily to individuals. In The limits of evidence-based medicine Tonelli 
(2001, p1435) argues that “the knowledge gained from clinical research does not 
directly answer the primary clinical question of what is best for the patient at hand.” 
Tonelli suggests that proponents of evidence-based medicine discount the value of 
clinical experience.   
 
The emergence of evidence based medicine in the early 1990’s led to some 
clinicians challenging managers and policymakers to be equally evidence based in 
their policymaking.  (Black (2001), Haines (1998), Raine (1998)). This demand was 
shared by some health policy analysts: “At a time when ministers are arguing that 
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medicine should be evidence based, is it not reasonable to suggest that this should 
also apply to health policy?  If doctors are expected to base their decisions on the 
findings of research surely politicians should do the same …. The case for evidence 
based policymaking is difficult to refute” (Ham, 1995, p71). 
 
The need to be seen to be making evidence based decisions has permeated all 
areas of British public policy.  The government has proclaimed the need for evidence 
based policing, and the 1998 strategic defence review introduced evidence based 
defence.  In the health sector, the concept of evidence based policy has gained 
ground, and a journal has been launched devoted to this challenge (journal of 
Evidence Based Health Policy and Management). 
 
Walter (2004) is committed to developing and promoting evidence-based knowledge 
about good practice in social care. Understanding how research is used and how to 
improve its use is crucial for our work and the work of other organisations. This 
knowledge review focuses on the use of research by social care staff and how the 
use of research can be promoted in social care practice. It examines effective ways 
of promoting research use in social care, explores models of research use that 
include staff at different levels and settings in social care, and looks at what 
organisational structures are needed to realise the aim of using research to improve 
practice.  
Four key conclusions emerged from the review Walter (2004) conducted on using 
knowledge to support social care:  
 
• There is much activity to promote the use of research in social care, but this needs 
to be coordinated to avoid duplication and to ensure best practice is shared.  
• The diversity of the social care sector, in terms of service delivery organisations, 
client groups and the workforce, demands that a variety of actions are used to 
promote the use of research. These actions also need to take into account 
multiagency and multidisciplinary working.  
• Robust evidence of what works in promoting research use in social care is limited 
and tends to focus on the professionally qualified workforce.  
• A whole systems approach, where the use of research involves a collaborative 
effort between organisations and individuals, would be a positive way forward.  
 
Ham (2007) said that “Experience and available evidence from Europe, New 
Zealand and the US indicates that in no system is commissioning done consistently 
well.  To be sure, there are examples of innovation in all systems, but equally there 
are examples of the limits to effective commissioning and the barriers that have 
inhibited commissioners from negotiating on equal terms with providers. As a review 
of New Zealand experience noted: Purchasing health services is inherently difficult 
in publicly financed health systems since purchasers are continually faced with the 
multiple and frequently conflicting explicit and implicit expectations of politicians, 
central government officials, managers, clinicians, patents and the pubic for the 
health system”, which  indicates how little of the NHS management task is 
understood in its international context. 
 
I have a paper by David Transfield and Ken Starkey (1988, p341-353) that 
emphasises the link between theory and practice and links to a craft versus 
engineering view of management.  A quote they have is from Whitley (1984). 
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 ‘the nature of management problems, as distinct from some manager’s problems, 
receives little attention…yet if management research is to be more than technical 
trouble shooting for current incumbents of dominant positions this distinction 
needs sustained analysis.  Considering management research as the study and 
improvement of co-ordination and control of human activities necessitates taking 
current structures and goals as problematic.  This view implies some framework 
in which existing arrangements can be conceived as needing improvement and 
some conception of what constitutes improvement.  It therefore has to transcend 
current beliefs and practices rather than reproduce them in formulating its 
problems and intellectual goals’ (p369). 
 
The need for evidence to shape organisational structure was promoted by Ham 
(2009) when he said “because of the importance of local context, the CQC should 
focus on the outcomes achieved by NHS organisations and local authorities and 
then use its leverage to stimulate partnership working where it can help to improve 
outcomes. Organisations that achieve poor or modest outcomes, and which function 
independently, should be challenged to work in partnership.  The outcomes used to 
assess the effectiveness of local public services can be drawn from the 
comprehensive area assessment framework developed by the Audit Commission 
and the Vital Signs approach promulgated by the Department of Health. 
Improvements in health and wellbeing, and in the quality of health and social care 
services, are the outcomes that matter most, and the regulator should focus on 
these in its assessments of performance”; and in this he is consistent with Transfield 
and Starkey.  Ham has offered real leadership in this area by leading a detailed 
publicly funded study of the role of Medics in Management, Ham (2008) said in the 
research proposal “the research will provide practitioners and policy makers with a 
better understanding of:  
 
1) The types of structures which exist across England for engaging medical 
professionals in management and leadership;  
2) How different structures are associated with different patterns of working and 
relationships between doctors, nurses and managers in the triumvirate; and  
3) How different structures, roles and behaviours relate to organisational and 
directorate performance.  
 
3.3 A Model to frame this narrative 
 
So the problem is, how do I frame this rich narrative resource in a meaningful way?  
I propose to use a synthesis of the Rousseau model. 
 
In paragraph 1.2 I quoted Morgan (2007, p48) who said that ethnography should 
also “render the collected data intelligible and significant to follow academics and 
other readers”.  My reasoning for selecting the Rousseau model as method is as 
follows.  It explains why managers might feel unable to move to an advanced state 
of evidence based manager.  It then says clearly that such an adherence to the 
status quo will stop the manager being a great manager in a great company.  The 
conclusion of the Rousseau model is that managers using evidence based decisions 
are better managers.  I am not accepting that conclusion by using this method.  I am 
using the tool to make the data intelligible.
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After Rousseau: A synthesis from the literature of Rousseau (2006 a, 2006 b) on the 
practice of Evidence Based Management. 
 
Management Issue With advanced knowledge of 
effective implementation of 
Evidence Based Management 
For evidence avoiding status 
quo 
The supervision of 
employees 
Managers acquire a systematic 
understanding of what productivity 
gains are most appropriately 
cultivated from their staff 
A manager may misuse threats 
and punishments or overuse 
positive encouragement with no 
reference to the outcome of 
either style or organisational 
performance 
Information available to 
managers on the 
consequences of their 
decisions 
Appropriate evidence and data base: 
perceptual gaps and 
misunderstandings are significantly 
reduced so that post implementation 
review is a valuable part of improving 
management 
Information is poor as data and 
evidence is not collected so that 
experiences are likely to be 
misinterpreted 
The delivery on 
promises to the public, 
employees, 
stakeholders/taxpayers 
customers and others 
Decisions are based on systematic 
causal knowledge conditioned by 
expertise.  Decisions are legitimised 
by being made in a systematic and 
informed fashion more readily 
justifiable in the eyes of stakeholders 
In such settings, managers 
cannot learn why their decisions 
may have been wrong, nor what 
alternatives would have been 
right.  The public challenges 
decisions in the search for 
transparency 
Management style Managers have an understanding of 
the powerful impact their decisions 
have on the fate of their firms.  
Managerial competence is 
recognised as a critical and often 
scarce resource 
Evidence based management 
seems to threaten managers 
personal freedom to run their 
organisations as they see fit 
Approach to academic 
research 
Managers read the academic 
literature regularly and the 
consultants who advise them are 
likely to do so also.  There is a 
recognition that this research exists 
Despite the explosion of 
research on decision making, 
individual and group 
performance, business strategy 
and other domains directly tied 
to organisational practice, few 
practising managers access this 
work 
Management culture Supervisors and managers respond 
to a belief system probably 100 years 
old, as far back as Fredrick Taylors 
structured methods for improving 
efficiency were classified under 
scientific management 
A belief that good management 
is an art - !the romance of 
leadership” school of thought 
where a shift to evidence an 
analysis connotes loss of 
creativity and autonomy 
In conclusion Managers have evidence on which 
to base their decisions and 
consequently what is at stake 
should the decision or 
implementation fail 
Managers are prevented from 
real learning by fads and 
falsehoods 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
The NHS manager must also consider the circumstances of the decision and the 
ethical concern that the management decision may provoke.  For example, 
immediately prior to a general election is not an easy time for an NHS manager to 
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promote the idea that the NHS might improve its efficiency by paying cash incentives 
to drug users to attend Methadone clinics but to deny the ability of a woman to top-
up her cancer treatment by co-payment for drugs.  Whilst both decisions may be 
made by contemporary NHS Chief Executives on the basis of a developing evidence 
base relevant to effective management practice neither decision alone (and 
definitely not when they are juxtaposed) will be considered appropriate to the 
circumstances of an election nor ethically appropriate when portrayed by the media.  
So I would be more blinkered about finding out what parts of the ‘time’ horizon it is 
appropriate to take a Rousseau type decision in.  In this way, it is important to 
remember that my “After Rousseau Model” is only describing an hypothetical NHS 
organisation that uses Evidence Based Management.  Wildly in contrast to the same 
organisation as a hospital provider where Evidence Based Medicine will most likely 
actually exist.   
 
Is the method replicable but in a different situation?  It is important to ask the 
question as this document does not have a tightly controlled experimental design but 
the method should be generalisable to the wider NHS otherwise the conclusions 
cannot be tested again.  In all parts of the NHS there will be a cohort that can be 
reviewed individually and in groups to observe the use of evidence in decision 
making.  Critically there will always be a number that is accepted without refute – the 
single piece of evidence – that is applied differentially, not at all or even wrongly (in 
contravention of the evidence) and it will be possible to conduct a field study of why 
that is so.  Successful policies from repeated application of the method necessitate 
an NHS archive of the type typified by NHS evidence (www.evidence.nhs.uk). 
 
Would the model need to be different if considering a different part of the public 
sector?  I am not so confident that it could be considered ‘best practice’ and used 
again in, say, Adult Services of the local authority.  There are two reasons.  First, 
evidence based management is possible to juxtapose within the NHS with a 
prevailing demand for evidence based medicine.  In this way there is some prior 
organisational support for the principles and methods.  Second, the NHS has a 
unique governance structure within which there is no elected political representation 
at a locality level.  All managers may understand best practice – not all have the 
NHS freedom to experiment with evidence.
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
Research Methods 
 
Purpose 
 
To explain why I have chosen both a qualitative and a quantitative method of study. 
To identify two possible bias in the method – literature questioning the nature of the 
NHS manager and the potential scenarios within which managers answers may be 
vulnerable to gaming. 
 
Key Arguments and Conclusions 
 
4.1 The production of evidence to support my findings will include participant 
observation 
 
In paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2 I quoted Frankfort-Nachmias (1996), Denzin (1997), 
Byrman (2004) and Morgan (2007) to explain my method of participant observation, 
that I classified as an ethnography.  The method will include a large amount of 
qualitative data about managers.  Swan (2002, p494) said that “when confronted by 
the demands of a radical, networked innovation process.  Lacking the power to 
direct such a process, managers at (the PCT) adopted instead, the role of systems 
builder, working in an improvisational way across professional and organisational 
boundaries”.  The key thing I believe Swan is pointing out here, is that my research 
method may be susceptible to bias from managers who adapt their behaviour in 
response to being watched.  The key will be to classify as per Rousseau (2006) 
(paragraph 3.3) but mindful in reference to Swan (2002) of the “shift in management 
strategies and practice associated with innovation” during the observation.  Swan 
(2002, p477). 
 
Alexander (2007, p152) said that “evidence based management assumes that 
available research is consistent with the problems and decision making conditions 
faced by those who will use the evidence in practice”.  This method explores without 
hypothesis, the studied environment of NHS management.  The observer is part of 
the studied environment – having the same experiences as those being observed, 
but at the same time, taking a record (sometimes recorded by machine) of the 
process being undertaken.  The problem with this method is that it produced a large 
amount of data which is difficult to analyse in an unbiased way.   
 
I tested this assumption out by participant observation.  An additional method would 
be to take a single hypothesis about a single decision – for example the 
implementation of an instruction that is nationally mandated simultaneously and to 
review the effectiveness of the response to that instruction at all places in the NHS 
at the same time.  It would not be possible to have a randomised control trial of 
those who chose to implement the decision without evidence and to look at the 
harm/benefit that ensued because of the constraints of politics and time, but it has 
been possible to find a proxy for that task in the East Midlands.  So I did that as well.  
This aspect of participant observation is explained further in 4.3. 
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The cohort I have studied; I conducted interviews and group observations in 2007 
and 2008 with (Appendix A and B) Chief Executives, Strategic Health Authority 
Directors, Directors and Managing Directors of organisations within the East 
Midlands NHS.  Notes were not taken in the meetings, but a recording machine was 
left on the to take a verbatim transcript of the meetings.  Structured, but limited 
questions were used in the interviews and all respondents were encouraged to 
engage in a free discussion of the subjects without being re-directed.  Observations 
normally took two to three hours as did interviews, although no strict time limits were 
set. 
 
The East Midlands is one of the regions of England and consists of most of the 
eastern half of the traditional region of the Midlands. It consists of the combined area 
of Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Rutland, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire and most 
of Lincolnshire. Its main settlements are Nottingham, Leicester, Lincoln, Derby, 
Northampton, Mansfield and Chesterfield. Leicester is officially the largest city in the 
region, although the largest conurbation is the Nottingham Urban Area. For the 
purposes of this study the East Midlands represents a significant border for the 
division of delegated responsibility of the Department of Health. NHS East Midlands 
provides strategic leadership to NHS organisations in the counties of Derbyshire, 
Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire and Rutland. These 
organisations have a total NHS budget of £4.1bn, and serve a combined population 
of 4.3 million. This study will concentrate the practical elements of the research on 
the East Midlands NHS.  
 
The writer is a participant in the National Health Service, the author holds a senior 
management position in the National Health Service.  The National Health Service 
being under transition affects the individual philosophically, professionally and 
individually, therefore there is a subjective bias in the analysis of change in the NHS.  
 
The study is a selected sample of subjects representing a spectrum of Executives in 
the NHS from different professional backgrounds including doctor, accountant, 
academic professor, statistician and nurse.  Subjects were recruited from the cohort 
of people working in the NHS in the East Midlands through personal contacts and in 
one case, referral by other subjects.  A preliminary interview schedule was 
developed and two pilot interviews were conducted with people from outside the 
cohort to test this method.  
 
The overall aim of this research is to enhance good practice in the craft of 
management in the NHS. To achieve this aim my objective in this piece of qualitative 
research is to conduct a systematic investigation into current perceptions of 
evidence based management including perceived barriers to its use and also 
including perceptions of good practice in the use of evidence based management.  It 
was also necessary to begin to ascertain perceptions of skill deficits in this area and 
factors viewed as contributions to these deficits.  The effect of the researcher as an 
observer is unknown.  It could have an effect on the interviews and it may inhibit 
parties who participated in the review of meetings.  A further limitation of the study is 
that I only included leaders from within the NHS East Midlands and it is possible that 
NHS regions may be more or less equipped to engage in a discourse about 
evidence based management.  The strength of this study is that observation and 
participation with individuals and the groups by the researcher on an ongoing basis 
in the NHS in East Midlands increase the credibility and trustworthiness of the 
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findings.  Bryman (2009, page 3-4) says of the usefulness of triangulation “do not 
deny the potential of triangulation, instead they depict its utility in terms of adding a 
sense of richness and complexity to an inquiry.  As such, triangulation becomes a 
device for enhancing the credibility and persuasiveness of a research account”.  
Although Bryman does acknowledge that “it (triangulation) is sometimes accused of 
subscribing to as naive realism that implies there can be a single definitive account 
of the social world”.  I am happy that my results can be triangulated and that this 
does not imply a single definitive account. 
 
Individuals or the chairs of the groups to be recorded were initially contacted by 
email with a very prompt follow up by telephone.  I outlined the nature of the project 
and the contribution I felt the individual or group could make to my initial piece of 
qualitative research.  I explained that all interviews would be taped, but that the 
material gathered would be considered confidential by me, with no identification of 
individuals except by some implicit membership of the taped group meetings.  All of 
the individuals I approached were happy to help with this piece of the project, many 
suggesting this was an important discussion in the NHS that warranted further 
investigation.  All of the interviews were conducted at the interviewees’ work place.  
The meetings that were recorded happened at normal monthly meetings with the 
agenda of the previous months meeting including an explicit discussion about my 
authority to record the events verbatim. 
 
4.2 The Interviewees, the groups and the meetings 
 
A preliminary interview schedule was developed and two pilot interviews were 
conducted with people from outside the cohort. The meetings that were recorded 
happened at normal monthly meetings with the agenda of the previous months 
meeting including an explicit discussion about what I was doing and my authority to 
record the events verbatim.  Five in-depth interviews were held with leading 
managers in the NHS and three meetings of senior managers in the East Midlands 
were also recorded.  Four focus group meetings were held (three of them prior to the 
main meetings) as part of the process to understand the nature of the study I was 
involved in and any pre-conceived notions or approaches to evidence based 
management.  The results were triangulated by feeding back to the original five 
interviewees.  Seven people who were senior managers in the NHS, but not part of 
the original interviews read the results to test for reasonableness.  Finally, I fed back 
to five group meetings the preliminary  results to test for reasonableness. 
 
 For the purpose of 
pilot 
For the purpose of 
data collection 
For the purpose of 
checking my understanding 
Interviews 2 5 7 
Focus Groups - 4 - 
Recorded Meetings -  3 5 
 
Table 3 
 
4.3  The method must be aware that in the literature review, some writers 
would question whether the studied cohort are managers or autocrats 
 
Collins (2001) labels ‘level 5 leadership’ as the ability to combine individual 
competence with unwavering resolve to confront the facts head on, fierce ambition 
(for the organisation) and personal modesty.  All these are needed because once 
the evidence is assembled, the only way of creating a customer-orientated 
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organisation is to make it face the customer, not the leader.  Paradoxically, the only 
way for leaders to gain control of the system is to give up the idea of controlling 
people through authority and hierarchy (the leader-facing organisation) and enable 
customers and frontline workers to jointly reconfigure the system to deliver what 
customers want rather than what politicians specify.  As Robert Pfeffer and Jeffrey 
Sutton note in Hard Facts, Dangerous Half-Truths and Total Nonsense: Profiting 
from Evidence-Based Management (2006, page 187), if decision are made on facts, 
then everyone’s facts must be equal, but you don’t need ‘transformational leaders’ to 
do it.   
 
In a 2006 work informed by the work of French geographer Henri Lefebvre 
Learmonth (2006) suggests that in the long term the very study of evidence based 
management is likely to inhibit rather than encourage, a fuller understanding of the 
nature of public services.  The author critically evaluates the phenomenon of 
‘evidence based management’.  He goes on to suggest that the current approach, 
broadly informed by the pursuit of evidence based medicine, is misguided.  The 
reasoning behind this approach from Learmonth is that there is a weakness at the 
heart of evidence based management.  There is, quite simply, a deep debate to be 
had about the nature of ‘evidence’ within the discipline of management studies.  
Ultimately Learmonth moves to the conclusion that the pursuit of evidence based 
management has less to do with improving organisational effectiveness than it has 
to do with the transfer of certain management styles to the public service in spite of 
theoretical problems with their derivation. 
 
Learmonth is important not only because he is an academic and former NHS 
Manager, but because work like his 2006 piece are part of a continuum of 
investigations by the author into managerialism and NHS managers stretching back 
to his own doctoral thesis soon after leaving the NHS.  Learmonth (1997) presents 
the results of empirical work examining public attitudes towards UK NHS managers, 
with the author discussing possible explanations for the findings that there is a 
strong lack of sympathy for managers.  The preferred explanation is that NHS 
managers as a group, tend to share an ideology about the nature of the NHS and 
the role of management within the NHS which is at odds with the belief held by most 
members of the public on these matters.  Learmonth explores the origins and nature 
of managerial ideology (managerialism) in the NHS.  In both his 2006 and 1997 
papers, Learmonth suggests that management styles are being imported to the 
NHS, based on little effectiveness and that his 2006 identification of the symptom is 
evidence based management.  Winyard (2003) agreed with Learmonth and further 
added that the introduction of general management in 1984 created new fault lines 
between doctors, managers and politicians. 
 
Midway between these two dates of Learmonth lay the 2002 introduction of a code 
of conduct for NHS managers (Department of Health, 2002).  The idea of the code 
was developed in the aftermath of high profile scandals around the management of 
clinical safety (Bristol) and dignity of the treatment of the body parts of deceased 
children (Alder Hey).  The code set out the ethical and behavioural standards 
expected of managers.  Breaches were to be viewed as gross misconduct leading to 
dismissal.  Serious breaches such as financial fraud, supplying false information and 
negligence towards patient safety would result in the offender never being employed 
in the NHS again.  Nigel Crisp, the then NHS Chief Executive said “the vast majority 
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of managers in the NHS are highly principled and value driven people who will 
welcome the code.  But we must deal with failure”. 
 
4.4 Using a critical single piece of evidence as managers to undertake a 
quantitative study 
 
The organisation within the NHS that the manager works in will be a variable 
construct of the history of rebuilding and redefining the NHS that will vary region to 
region and even county to county.  Despite this limit it is possible to ask the 
question, “faced with a verifiable piece of peer reviewed evidence that is relevant 
and significant to your organisations context and is nationally constant – what do you 
do with this as a manager?” 
 
Consider the following table and graph. 
 
Falls in the Elderly Population 
 
 
Table 4 
 
Falls in the elderly population represent a serious and increasing issue in the UK 
and the subject area is attracting increased attention in current government policy 
development across different departments including health, social care and housing.  
In January 2008 the Department for Communities and Local Government released a 
report entitled “Lifetime Homes, Lifetime Neighbourhoods” (2008).  This report 
highlights the following statistics: 
 
• One older person dies every five hours as a result of a fall 
• Falls in older people cost the NHS around three quarters of a billion pounds 
each year 
• 1.25 million falls a year result in hospital admissions. 
 
Ambulance services have a key part to play in tackling this issue.  The Department 
of Health Pathways for Older people with Complex needs (2007) states that: 
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In summary, evidence suggests that a significant percentage of those who fall are 
elderly and that following transportation to hospital their support networks and 
infrastructures are switched off – hence they tend to be admitted to hospital.  On a 
practical level, the falls co-ordination services provided and commissioned by PCTs 
do not co-ordinate well with EMAS and fail to recognise that a) EMAS is the first 
responder in most cases, b) fewer of these cases are Category A calls.  The method 
will study the context within which a response to this evidence data is possible for 
NHS managers. 
 
4.5   The method must be aware of a bias possible in responses because some   
 outcomes of the study may be perceived as less fortunate than others 
 
The NHS likes to league table.  Organisations are scored and re-ranked, then 
ranked against different criteria and all of this makes the validation of what is 
working difficult to say within the business cycle of a given year.  The key role of the 
performance and accountability framework in ensuring that this is used to explain 
why the bottom of the table finished bottom, rather than why the top finished top.  
The reality is that within the performance framework (that holds that the complex 
organisational reasons for failure can be attributed to one Chief Executive) there is a 
tendency to use evidence to criticise others rather than to understand the success of 
leading (league tabled) organisations. 
 
So what would happen if I came out clearly in favour of more evidence based 
decision making?  The effect on operational management of this would be: not all 
NHS organisations would be successful.  Failures of delivery occur within all 
organisations within all sectors of the economy.  The consequences range from 
minor inconveniences (a surgery opening late) to major catastrophe (the failure to 
vaccinate an entire population).  On the other hand, accepting that evidence and the 
iterative application of evidence, refreshed by trial and context, would prevent 
repeated service failures of the same type.  There will be an improvement in 
management.   
 
This would effect a medium term review of resource allocation.  A key part of public 
expenditure (fiscal) control is congruence between policy priorities and money given 
to priorities.  Implied is the sense that evidence would take place in a lengthy 
(continual) process in which the treasury is engaged in funding a range of policies 
aimed at meeting the health needs of the population: more significantly, the 
Department of Health would recognise that all of their policies for the NHS have 
financial implications and that the evidence base to back up these policies has to be 
justified and monitored. 
 
This would lead to a new evaluation of strategy.  Evidence would enable the debate 
about the NHS to mature.  Are the goals set by the department being achieved or 
not?  If the evidence suggests they are, then decision makers should be 
acknowledged and applauded.  If the evidence suggests this is as a result of using 
evidence then this should be communicated to public media and in the weekly Chief 
Executives bulletin.  If the evidence being collected suggests that strategy 
implementation is struggling, the traditional NHS response has been continual 
organisational and structural change.  The problem has been that the solution itself 
was not evidenced, piloted or given a priori evaluation that it would solve the 
diagnosed problem.  The transformational leap would be for senior NHS managers 
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to see a shift that meant that what could be learned from strategic planning was 
always discussed and written down to make the next strategic plan more evidence 
based and efficient. 
 
4.6  The analytical methods used to provide a robust and valid interpretation 
 of the data 
 
Waring (2008) says that “Template Analysis makes use of codes and coding of data.  
The complete analysis process of organising, connecting and corroborating/ 
legitimising is used to analyse large quantities of rich data collected from qualitative 
research using semi-structured, unstructured interviews or story telling data 
collection methods”.  The process involves; creating a code manual, hand or 
computer coding the text, sorting segments to get all similar text in one place and 
reading the segments and making the connections that are subsequently 
corroborated and legitimised. 
 
Template Analysis normally starts with some pre-defined codes to help guide 
analysis.  In my case, the code was the use of the Rousseau model and the 
conversion of the management issues in the Rousseau model to letters A to E.  The 
code also included letters F and G for management culture and conclusions 
respectively, although it soon became clear that these letters in the scheme were 
redundant or repetitious (paragraph 5.10 explains further).  Rousseau was useful, 
not only as a synthesis of literature themes, but because it contained neither too 
many codes (blinkering the data) nor too few codes (which would lead to an 
overwhelming classification and coding of all of the rich and unstructured data). 
 
Waring (2008) notes that “Template analysis is now well embedded in healthcare 
qualitative research (Kind, 2004: Crabtree and Miller, 1999).  However, it is not so 
well established in Business Management research and this is innovative yet 
challenging in itself, when applied to this different context.  Traditionally business 
research has emerged a positivist paradigm”.  The reason this project uses 
Template Analysis can be found in a deep dissatisfaction with the NVivo software 
package.  As Waring (2008) says “(although) the software might allow a more 
comprehensive approach, we would argue that immersion in the data is an essential 
part of the interpretive process and use of technology can often act as a substantial 
barrier”.  That is not to say that NVivo did not have some merits; in the discussion on 
neuro-semantics (paragraph 6.3) and conclusions (9.4),some useful correlations 
were made, but in the heart of the data interpretation Template Analysis using the 
Rousseau model gave a richer, more complex and ultimately more useful tool than 
NVivo. 
 
The benefit of using Template Analysis – with a highlighter pen and post-it’s, 
reading, re-reading and cross referencing lengthy transcripts – is that it recognises 
that the Rousseau themes were not hiding in the qualitative data waiting to be 
“discovered” the way the NVivo tool suggested.  The coding arose from my 
engagement as a researcher with those texts.  As such, it enabled the Rousseau 
model to act as a pragmatic tool to give a classified account of the data.  The 
classification would be meaningful to external readers and, just as importantly, to the 
cohort who participated in the data collection themselves. 
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Having completed the first stages of Template Analysis (creating a Rousseau code, 
hand coding the text and sorting the segments) the ultimate state is corroboration to 
independently verify the relationship between the data and the coding. Independent 
scrutiny of the data was used when directors and assistant directors of NHS 
Derbyshire County were formed into an “expert panel” to challenge different 
readings and aspects of the data over their own conclusions.  Further the classified 
data was returned to the five in-depth interviewees, not for correction of transcript 
but to acknowledge the consistency of what they had said with the Rousseau 
classification. The Rousseau model, as well as being a coding system, also enabled 
the material to be presented in a reader-friendly form. 
 
Template Analysis was a useful analytical method that encouraged reflexivity.  
Comments from the independent scrutinisers helped to reflect on the questions or 
assumptions being made by the researcher (me, especially as I am also a part of the 
population being reviewed).  Keeping an audit trail of the highlighted documents, 
their annotations and the unused text, forced me to be explicit about the conclusions 
being made.  Template Analysis was particularly useful in moving data from 
Document 3 of the DBA to Document 5, when it had to be re-read and re-checked 
prior to inclusion again in Document 5.  Waring (2008) concludes that “I firmly 
believe that writing-up (using Template Analysis) should be seen as a continuation 
of the interpretative process.  In my experience the process of accounting for your 
analysis to your readers deepens your own understanding of your data”.
 39
CHAPTER 5 
 
 
Research Findings 
 
Purpose 
 
To record the awareness of a need for evidence and the collection and evaluation of 
such evidence.  Where an interview is quoted, I have put a notation in the corner of 
the box denoting the letter in Appendix F.  Appendix F says more about who these 
people are. 
 
Key Arguments and Conclusions 
 
5.1 How to use evidence to enable staff 
 
Jbilou (2007, p185) concluded that “decision making in the health sector is affected 
by general elements such as economic constraints, political agendas, epidemiology, 
managers values and public environment”.  The paper explored the determinants of 
“research-based-decision-making” as a personal behaviour among managers and 
professionals in health administration in Canada.  The results suggested that “further 
research is needed to identify and evaluate effective incentives and strategies to 
implement so as to enhance RBDM adoption”. 
 
I framed a direct question to a Chief Executive of an Acute Hospital to try and get 
some specific answers to the question of how to use evidence in a way that is not 
threatening or coercive.  The responses indicate that sometimes leadership has to 
determine whether the individual has the capacity to understand. 
  
Can I explore one of those, and I’m not challenging what you say, it’s just this 
-  say the rule book, say the rule was the piece of evidence based practice, and 
the manager is just coming up against that, you know, the person that, are just 
not getting it as anything other than a limiting factor, what do they do with 
that?  Do they respect the evidence and back off, or do they try and work 
round it, or…….my guess, I’d say it depends on their capabilities, it’s a bit like one 
of these things in this document they’ve sent me – if you want to be a manager, get 
yourself educated in something, then get a job, just don’t pretend it will teach you to 
be a manager, I mean, it’s a bit like, don’t pretend that world class commissioning 
will teach you to be a commissioner.  Ok.  So, a good person would be able to see 
the sense in that situation, people without good sense had better just follow the rules 
‘cos they’ll be safer, do you know what I mean? I don’t know, it depends on the 
rules!...........it’s interesting about that, that follow the rules, because I think, a lot of 
that is a proxy for evidence based medicine isn’t it?  It’s the, you know, look, the vast 
majority of you will not be as good as the best, so follow the rules, and then the 
outcomes will be better for everyone.          RESPONDENT A 
 
Returning to the theme of the need for evidence.  The macroeconomic environment 
and political context for the NHS is changing.  Growth (in excess of GDP grown) for 
the NHS will not be able to be afforded without some changes (Wanless, 2008 b).  
So, if change is necessary, then the task is to identify new evidence and new 
information upon which to base management practice and management education.  
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The National Institute for Health Research’s Service Delivery and Organisation 
Programme (part of the NHS) is undertaking primary research (ref NIHR, Km 259) 
which will inform and extend knowledge about management practice to facilitate best 
practice and best use of resources.  Working within the programme, observers and 
researchers seek to generate creative processes for identifying, representing and 
accessing evidence of what evidence based practice is used. The objective is to 
ensure that management practice remains responsive to the changing financial and 
economic situation. 
 
But there must be a limit to the extent within which a rule becomes an end in itself.  
As the following statement from a clinically trained leader says, the key is to develop 
dialogue and understanding. 
 
And I have no problem with that, because what it tends to do is it generates a 
coherent conversation, you know, I mean for us; a lot of the rule following is very 
wasteful, labour intensive, and there are plenty of people who know the answer, 
without having to follow the rules, but there are a lot of people who don’t; and the 
good thing about rules is it encourages conversation, you know if we want to 
prescribe a drug that’s not on the protocol or the pathway, someone says, hey, this 
is what I want to do, and this is why I want to do it, a few great minds come together 
and will probably make what is the right decision, whether it follows the rules or not. 
RESPONDENT B   
 
5.2 The need to quantify risks and benefits of using evidence 
 
Some blocks to shared understanding about the usefulness of evidence are the 
blocks to a shared quantification of the risks and benefits.  The key here is that the 
accountants, the board, the matrons, everyone, must have some shared 
understanding that there is a risk to not using evidence and a shared understanding 
of the benefit of being evidence driven.  The Chief Executive of a Acute Trust, the 
same trust for many years gives an explanation of the importance of a shared 
understanding. 
 
For a manager to be accepted as something other than an irritation, getting in the 
way of clinical work, they have to demonstrate that they’re in it for the long haul 
themselves, and that’s very hard, and after the first three or four managers have 
gone your chances of making it as number five are really quite small.  But there’s a 
down-side to this longevity thing as well, and it’s this sort of practice being 
entrenched, that once, you know, we’ve done it this way for the last ten years, so 
you’re not going to change what we do, and also, the culture becomes quire 
unhealthy because of the longevity sometimes.       RESPONDENT C 
 
So the very longevity of managers that enables clinical participation is seen as a 
limiting factor when getting clinicians across the East Midlands to lead and support 
required configuration and productivity improvements.  Here is the same Chief 
Executive again, talking about how a new to the NHS executive uses clinical 
evidence to provide an antidote to organisational inertia and antipathy towards him 
as an individual. 
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He just rolled his trousers up, put a knotted handkerchief on his head and said, ‘look 
– what do you want?  This is evidence based medicine, here’s the evidence, what 
are you all talking about?’  And still, it made a big impression, it got a lot of laughs, 
but it takes that, sort of real challenge, before a lot of that out of date evidence is 
discarded.  So evidence base – it’s sort of important, but it’s almost a culture rather 
than a reality sometimes.         RESPONDENT D 
 
That’s fascinating, and nobody’s mentioned, so, old evidence becomes dogma, so 
it’s established on an evidence base, and this is not just relevant to medicine, so it’s 
not just established on – it’s established on an evidence base, but then that 
becomes dogma which in its self evaporates over time and then the evidence isn’t 
refreshed, is that………         RESPONDENT B 
 
And even more telling was an acknowledgement that there was no post-
implementation work done to evaluate the success of the initiative. 
 
Which of all the measures here, we have introduced, has worked because our 
infection rate has reduced……..I don’t know, if I’m honest, I don’t much care so long 
as it’s happened, it’s a number of things we’ve thrown at it.  I could play the 
experimental – I could take that one out and see if it makes a difference, but I’m not 
interested, it has had the desired effect.      RESPONDENT A 
 
5.3 The NHS is a complex structure that makes informed decisions difficult to 
       make 
 
And then there are some direct and lengthy quotations given by an individual in a 
group situation that are worthy of inclusion as individual quotes.  I like the one here 
that says the NHS is complex and cannot be easily modelled, but makes no 
reference to evidence. 
 
I do believe that most people can understand that that’s the world we work in, most 
people can understand that there isn’t a text book on the shelf of how to do this job, 
and most people in my experience, if you spend the time talking to them, will 
understand that, all we’re trying to do is what we believe to be the best, taking 
account of what everyone’s telling us, and from my perspective, in my job, it’s not 
opening holiday brochures, reading the small print and looking it up on the website, 
it’s talking to people, and you know, should we regrade nurses in surgery they’d say 
no, you ask some of the surgeons they’d say no and if you do I’m going on strike, 
and you know, you ask some other nurses and they go, well yes, fair enough, 
whatever, you get a whole wide variety of views, and you somehow have to make 
sense of it.             RESPONDENT E 
 
But the individual view is that there is sufficient evidence to make information and 
informed decisions that we can rely on. 
 
I don’t think evidence takes time to mature, evidence is there from when it’s 
presented .. ...it’s then assessed, folk law, takes the time to mature, so I think 
evidence can come and be there, I think in management terms, new evidence rarely 
comes to light, but I think evidence itself, becomes evidence from the day it’s 
presented, it’s just a question of what category and what quality it is.  RESPONDENT F 
 42
The problem as ever, again quoted in a group context, is that politicians and 
information do not fit nicely together. 
 
Yes, it is really, I said to my board, just the other day, you know, working in the NHS 
is like living the world’s biggest experiment, and it is, you know, we’ll twiddle this, 
and I always used to think, particularly when we had Alan Milburn, I used to imagine, 
you know, the man stood in front of this big complex machine with fan belts and nuts 
and bolts, and cogs and things, turning the spanner in his hand, just kind of diving in 
and just loosening a bit, or tightening a bit, taking a bit off or adding a bit on, and 
going, oh, that didn’t work, we’ll have another go, you know?              RESPONDENT C 
 
5.4  The use of evidence to improve financial management 
 
It is clear that strong financial control is valued by executives, but in the following 
discussion by a leader who is no longer in finance, two things are worthy of note:  
the absence of the word evidence in any reference to accountants in the NHS and 
(despite appreciation of their corporate contribution) a question mark hangs over 
their ability to influence group decision making. 
 
I think it depends on what sort of an accountant you are, I mean, I don’t think it was 
my natural bent to be honest, and I was heartily glad to get rid of it, because it was 
too precise for me.  But it taught me some things, it taught me a balance sheet is 
only balanced when it balances to zero.  Which is a good discipline; these people 
who go……..well, that’s about right! taught me you can approximate, but you need to 
know how you’re approximating, you know, when you round to the nearest million, 
you know what you’ve lost don’t you.  It doesn’t mean you have to mess around with 
pennies, it just means you need to know what you’re not taking account of.  It taught 
me some good practice around delving in the detail, which is not my natural bent, 
and for people that are, they do struggle to make good strategic decisions, and I 
have watched accountants struggle to do that; I’m not suggesting you’re one for a 
minute, but I have an ability to get into detail when I need to, in a way some people 
just can’t, and it’s given me an understanding in money that’s essential if you’re 
trying to do my job, it really is.  And there are many, many, many times, no 
disrespect to ‘B’ who’s been a great Director of Finance here, there are many times 
when we’re kicking numbers around, and it’s me who goes, ‘but hang on a minute, 
you know, if that’s going to drive that, and that’s that and that’s got to go there, then 
surely we’ve got a problem here’, and you can kind of see everyone going oh-yes!  
And I couldn’t do that probably, if I’d been a Physiotherapist.  Ok, so your 
profession has been a tool that you’ve been able to use on an ongoing 
basis……..yes, hugely.  Ok.        RESPONDENT C 
 
But, the decision making by accountants was not the only one group to fail the 
executive test of reasonableness – so to the matrons.  Consider this Chief Executive 
of an Acute Trust. 
 
I went in very, very hard with the matrons last April about their cleaning audits, 
because what they were telling me back in March/April was that we were going to 
fail the health care commission standards, when we had all the matrons in, I said, I 
know it’s not like that, you know it’s not like that, what are you playing at.   
          RESPONDENT A 
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Sacket (1996) said that some fear that evidence based medicine will be hijacked by 
purchasers and managers to cut the costs of health care, McKeon (2009) said that 
nurses and doctors need to understand how NHS finance works, and Nolan (2006) 
says we must deal with funding the balances between quality and cost in healthcare.  
What section 5.4 says, to juxtapose the literature, is that without an evidence based 
attitude towards costs and quality, the clinical model will be insufficient to deliver the 
sustainable cost and quality improvements required.  Instead of systems to improve 
the quality and reduce the cost of care, what is missing is an evidence based 
approach to improve the value of care. 
 
5.5 The effect on organisational performance 
 
The effect of evidence on organisational performance was considered by Hovmand 
(2008).  They started their discussion by reference to administrators of mental health 
services who “may expect evidence based practices to offer strategic benefits”.  
Concentrating on clinical research and randomised control trials, they drew a 
conceptual framework for considering how implementation affects organisational 
performance.  Although not strictly with the context of evidence based management, 
so much as organisational compliance with evidence based medicine, they still draw 
a useful conclusion.  That: “results from the simulations shows how gains in 
performance depended on organisations initial inertia and initial efficiency and that 
only the most efficient organisations may see benefits in organisational performance 
from implementing EBP”. 
 
Although Hovmand (2008) is referring to efficient organisations, I believe the 
quotation is still relevant for my study of effective management behaviour.  This is 
because in a publicly funded, cash limited, health system the output (efficiency) of 
number of patients treated is differentiated from outcome (effectiveness) of the 
number of patients for whom health improves after treatment.  The difference is a 
result of short term versus long term attitudes to evidence.  The difference between 
efficient and effective is not semantic – the former being concerned with performing 
tasks with reasonable resource, the latter with the extent to which objectives are 
met.  On the other hand, they are two of the three legs of value-for-money (economy 
being the other) and the inclusion of this quotation is still valid. 
 
So finally, two quotations should be examined about the apex ‘group’ of the 
organisation: the board itself.  The decision making in the boardroom is expected to 
be, demonstrated to be, cognisant of evidence based decision making.  Both of the 
quotations below are from organisations that would be efficient (according to 
published ratings) and we can apply the Hovmand (2008) criteria. 
 
Imagine you’re in a boardroom and it’s one of those, where for some reason, you’re 
still in there at seven o’clock at night, and you know you’ve got locked into 
something, and you need to make a decision before the morning, and somebody 
says, shall we have a look at what the evidence says – is that a good thing to do at 
that moment, because it is a distraction and the evidence isn’t in the room; imagine, 
taking my scenario, the evidence isn’t in the room, so there was no reason you 
should have used it before, do you take a break and go and look for the evidence or 
do you say, no, we have sufficient skills to understand the context and 
consequences – in this room, of getting the decision right or wrong – we don’t need 
any evidence, what we need is a decision.  I would be shocked if the evidence 
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wasn’t already there, and I would want to have the evidence if there was some 
evidence around, I certainly would want to know it was there and on certain 
decisions I would want the ‘show-me test’ as well.  On big things I want to see it.  So 
I would stop – go to the evidence, then consider the evidence in the wider context of 
the decision we’re making.        RESPONDENT D 
 
And, this is true even when the whole board might be agnostic about the approach. 
 
Oohh, I think one or two of them would react positively, I think one or two of them, 
would I think not understand what I meant…ok…..and the rest would be agnostic in 
the middle.  But, I do think that self perception and review of one’s performance is 
something which leaders sometimes get a bit blasé about, and don’t do!   
          RESPONDENT C 
 
At a particular point in the conversation this rejection of the rules, this acceptance in 
the executive that rebellion was a tool in the chief Executive’s armour, was 
becoming clear so I asked an explicit question.  
 
Ok.  Do you think we back off, from the implementation of the rules 
sometimes?  I think we do, yes.  Well they are sort of political; some of it is a 
genuine means to an end, and I can see that: the reason we brought the private 
sector in and allowed them to be paid stupid amounts of money, is to get them in, 
and maybe the same as with practice based commissioning, now they’re talking 
about paying them tariff, albeit the same tariff at the very low end complex work, I 
suppose it’s a step in the right direction, but we usually do it because we’ve fallen 
flat on our face, rather than we ever had a grand plan.   RESPONDENT D 
 
5.6 The next part of these findings is to consider those who see “risk”, who 
      aren’t insiders - how does the NHS identify these outliers and what they 
      are saying? 
 
The sequence begins with the chair asking, prompted by me recording the interview, 
whether evidence would help at all.  On discovering that the group is willing to 
accept that the NHS is far from an ideal organisation, he asks some questions that 
get a more radical response than some of the strategic platitudes normally classified 
by the same individuals as ‘assurance’.  The chair continues a light cross 
examination as well as inserting a supportive and friendly narrative throughout.  The 
Chair’s role was didactic – in order to get to what the people were saying the 
conversation was nurtured – on only one occasion did an individual specifically 
announce that he wanted to ask a question. 
 
The following is an example of when an ‘outsider’ (an off protocol doctor) is 
encouraged to move back into the fold of the use of evidence.  In the end, an 
absence of evidence was taken as a lack of legitimacy (by managers) to practice. 
 
And there will be occasions, you know, medicine’s instinctive, and there will be 
occasions, I think, where you don’t follow the protocol, because you don’t know why 
you don’t follow it, but you must have seen a patient somewhere similar; you 
wouldn’t expect it to be the norm, but you should be able to justify in your own mind 
why you’ve not followed best evidence, what you should never do is not follow best 
evidence.  If I take an example, we had here an anaesthetist prescribing some pain 
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relief some years ago, and the evidence on it was no where near conclusive, no 
where near conclusive at all, and this was in the early days of clinical movements, 
and we looked at all the pros and cons, we looked at all the evidence, and in the 
end, we said to the anaesthetist, you will not prescribe.    RESPONDENT G 
 
The effect of evidence on individual and group decision making.  Evidence at the 
individual level can be sufficient or insufficient and the conversations showed that 
this affected perceptions and motivations about the use of evidence based decision 
making.  It was not possible to say whether this had any direct effect on individual 
performance.  It is reported though, that perceptions of the task of senior leadership 
did not correlate with high use of evidence.  On the other hand, where a group was 
making a decision based upon a joint co-operation of members (rather than simply 
attempting to provide confirmation to a recommendation) there was a strong desire 
to work with evidence and perception that group performance outperformed what it 
would have been without evidence. 
 
There is an explicit acceptance that the NHS cannot change without exploring the 
boundaries of the NHS.  In the following quotation there is a direct challenge to a 
doctor who believes that the NHS has attained an evidenced optimum. 
 
To what extent would evidence help you at all, or is it………it does a lot, it does a lot, 
there’s loads of things we use, I mean, to me, you know the job is a simple job, I 
always say to people, you know, that’s where we are now, that’s the NHS today, and 
that’s where we’re trying to get it, and I’ve only had one person in my whole life say 
‘it’s perfect now’, only one person – a pathology trainee I was talking to a Keele 
University, clearly, a strange man!       RESPONDENT H 
 
Let’s consider something that I want to reflect back to the managers.  The following 
is an extract from a 10 minute journey where a senior group of executives are trying 
to find the way to speak the unthinkable.  It is worth knowing from the start that this 
discussion starts with trying to find a way to consider the proposition that nurses in a 
particularly poorly performing hospital (on quality and economic performance) are 
not a solution to but a cause of the problem.  The outsider nature of this debate, 
challenging years of acquired cultural parameters about nurses is revealing.  What is 
interesting in the following quotation is that the outsiders in the following group 
meeting don’t use evidence to describe the need for change.  What they choose to 
explore are scenarios.  Much like a health economist they start off with an 
assumption. 
 
But let’s assume there’s a journey to be made, right, and you can begin to describe 
what’s in this future NHS, it’s less wasteful, there’s no healthcare associated 
infections, shorter waits, greater satisfaction, more motivated, you know, nicer 
buildings, better equipment, all the new drugs, whatever.  RESPONDENT I 
 
Further, this is picked up by the next person in the group.  Again, what the outsiders 
are trying to explore……or rather, what the NHS manager in a protected 
environment within which they can think of the future……are scenarios. 
 
And my job is to take this organisation on that journey, but it’s not just a simple 
more, more, more thing, as I think we all understand, and we all do that all the time 
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at home, we’re all trying to get the best for our family, we have a limited income, we 
have circumstances, we all live in England – it’s cold!    RESPONDENT J 
 
Scenarios are by definition, alternative, plausible pictures of the future.  Scenarios 
are created that are definitely not forecasts but are free from organisational 
constraint. 
 
You know, so you’ll say, we’ll have a holiday a year, and I’ll make sure I have central 
heating, and I can afford to keep paying the gas bill, and keep buying trainers for the 
retched kids feet that grow six inches every week, you kind of make those decisions 
to make that journey at home.        RESPONDENT K 
 
The scenarios are written in a deliberately provocative style to tease out the 
differences between the different pictures of the future.  The previous speaker was 
describing steady interactive change.  The following speaker, although using a 
comforting style and collegiate language is painting an alternative scenario which is 
clinically relevant but more challenging. 
 
And we have just the same to do at work, and we’ve kind of coined the phrase at the 
moment particularly about  best care and best value, it’s not just one, and it’s not just 
the other, it’s not just saving money at the expense of quality, it’s not pursuing 
quality, spending money we haven’t got, it’s got to be about best care and best 
value, and I think people can relate to that.      RESPONDENT J 
 
Then another more detailed description is ventured by the next reader.  Scenarios, 
as I said are alternative plausible pictures and the next readers picture should be 
read side-by-side with the others to understand the differences. 
 
‘With you so far’ they’ll say, as a tax payer, as a user of the service, of course I want 
it to be as good as it can get, if we’re wasting money seeing ten patients in a clinic 
when we could be seeing 20, somebody is missing out on something aren’t they – 
that’s an opportunity cost in terms of health gain.     RESPONDENT H 
 
Until finally, we craft an answer to the problem.  The staff can accept the analysis 
when applied in the abstract the actual implementation of the answer struggles when 
“the light is shown” on the problem.  Only at the very very last moment is the 
evidence stated…..’overpaid compared’.   
 
So, people are with you there, I mean, I’ve done lots of staff briefings and they’ve all 
left happy, what’s got them is when you’ve then pointed the light from the two towers 
into their department and said what’s more, you’re all overpaid compared to grades 
in other Trusts.          RESPONDENT I 
 
My understanding of this whole conversation is that the evidence that was there all 
the time is not used by the very people who need to use this evidence to win the 
‘outsider’ debate! 
 
5.7  Managers will only use evidence if it is persuasive 
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To start with consider three responses from the interviewed cohort that show that 
evidence based decision making must not only be factually correct, it must also 
move people to a response based not only on fact, but also emotion.  To an extent 
persuasion is more important than evidence. 
 
The doctors’ view is, ok, 20 years ago, when you were building this hospital 
(because we’ve been here for 20 years, not 10 minutes), 20 years ago we said to 
you, the design of this wonderful new PFI was wrong, you’ve got too many beds for 
the footprint, so the beds are too close together, you get cross contamination, you 
can’t clean round the beds. Because there aren’t enough beds, you’ve got too faster 
through put, so people with infections are moved around the hospital.   
          RESPONDENT E 
 
I don’t know who they asked, they picked the wrong things, but it kind of doesn’t 
matter, do you know what I mean?  If they are wanting to change perceptions, you 
know, if they said, paint your hospitals pink and it will deal with infection, we might 
have said what a load of crap, but if the public believed that pink hospitals were less 
likely to give them MRSA, it would have the desired effect.    RESPONDENT A 
 
I mean, I had this very argument with my technical directors, look, I said, look, if 
people will believe painting the hospital pink will make them safer, then we’ll do it.  I 
don’t care, that’s what we’ll do. (What is interesting here is that ‘painting the hospital 
pink’ has quickly and previously entered the groups language as a shorthand for any 
method chosen to deal with this problem that is organisationally robust, but evidence 
weak).         RESPONDENT C 
 
In the following quotation the use of a term pendulum is slightly confusing, as the 
respondent is making a point about the effort taken to persuade about the benefits of 
evidence being closely correlated to the impact of the change.  The metaphor 
pendulum may also be taken to be a subtle reference that once the persuasion stops 
the centre of gravity is the same in all cases. 
 
I think in organisational change type evidence around management tools, 
techniques, where the evidence can often be seen to be quite a subjective set of 
evidence, or the context when it was developed, might have been different from 
today – yes you know, the evidence around change management is, there’s lots of 
articles, lots of books and lots of research around change management, in my mind 
they come down to two things, one is it’s like a pendulum, you push it bloody hard 
and it will finish up where you want it, or the other way you just gently nudge it to 
where you want it.  Now, they are two total extremes, but you can find the evidence 
for both approaches.         RESPONDENT D 
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5.8  A practical example of the difference that using evidence would make in 
       the NHS 
 
Consider this single piece of data: the EMAS response to falls 
 
 
EMAS Responses to Falls in Over 65s: Type of Pick up Location 
Sample of data from 2006/7
Residential/Care Home
16.7%
Non-Residential Address
15.6%
Residential Address
67.7%
Table 5 
 
The sample set was 2700 records taken randomly from all EMAS calls received and 
non-residential address includes things such as “outside”, “shops”, “pub”, as 
identified by the caller and where the location was clearly non-residential, such as 
outside a named business or factory.  What fascinated me was that people fell in 
their own homes.  Consistently and evidentially people fall in their own homes.  As a 
proportion of the population who live in residential care homes more people may be 
falling than those who live in their own home but, as an organiser of ambulance 
services, the evidence tells me we should start with what people are doing in their 
own homes not anywhere else.  So why the pre-occupation with everywhere else in 
the study of falls?  It became clear that the study of falls was time and again about 
the reason for falling or the avoidance of admission to Accident and Emergency 
Departments.  Close (1999) analysed individuals presenting at A&E following a fall; 
Crotty (2002) looked at the best medicine and treatment to get fallers home quickly; 
Tinetti (1999) looked at improved daily living skills to prevent falls and developed 
work done by Ebrahim (1997) and only Pardessus (2002) considered the 
modification of environmental hazards that might affect the propensity of an 
individual to fall.  I was therefore presented with a very simple piece of evidence that 
mattered in the planning of ambulance services, specific to the actual rather than 
theoretical experience and it told me something that we weren’t considering.  Whilst  
undoubtedly there was an issue of people falling in the street, if we wanted to look at 
the reasons that the ambulance was called – in absolute rather than proportionate 
terms at least – then the answer for falls lay in peoples own homes. 
 
Ambulance calls are triaged from Category A (see immediately, danger to life and 
the individual) to Category C (traumatic to the person but requiring quick rather than 
immediate attention).  There is also an acknowledgement in the work that NHS 
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Direct do that communicating in a way that is sensitive to gender norms may also 
facilitate adherence to interventions that improve health or avoid ill health.  So two 
reports were run as below. 
 
EMAS Responses to Falls in Over 65's by Call Category 
April 2006 to March 2007
CAT A
9.4%
CAT B
49.8%
CAT C
40.9%
           Table 6 
 
 
 
Table 7 
 
These two pieces of data turned into information are really important because the 
context here is ambulance services not the general planning of falls.  Consider this 
quote from the NHS Direct website, (so this is the NHS talking about itself).  “Falls 
often result in serious injury, often to bones and joints and there are many fatalities 
particularly amongst older people ……. An estimated 1000 older people die each 
year from a fall on stairs.  Falls cause the most deaths and long-term health 
problems amongst older people”.  But for emergency ambulances as part of the 
NHS less than 10% of the work collecting falls is Category A (NOW!) and Category 
C (quick, but okay to wait) is over 40%.  However important falls are to the NHS, the 
Ambulance Service needs a different gradient to policy response for falls to other 
parts of the NHS.  An evidence based response to falls in the East Midlands 
Ambulance Service in 2006/07 would be – to paraphrase the NHS direct quotation 
above – “Falls often result in serious injury, often to bones and joints ….. but in most 
cases this will not require or receive a blue light response of a fast ambulance once 
EMAS Responses to Falls in Over 65's: Gender 
April 2006 to March 2007
Female
65.8%
Male
34.2%
Unknown
0.1
%
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we have assessed the comfort and risk of the fallen patient”.  I then engaged the 
question about whether this was a gender issue.  Were there any issues that 
affected falls related to sex?  The figures showed that 2/3 of the responses were to 
women.  In an NHS where gender equality affects the general consideration of 
health status in the population the simple use of data analysed and identified a 
service with a specific gender bias and yet little or nothing was being done to identify 
this as a “women’s issue” in the say that, say, breast cancer was (predominantly but 
not exclusively a female condition). 
 
This all matters to the wider use of NHS policy.  Some very rudimentary queries 
using data coding, already available in the minimum data set for ambulance call 
outs, was throwing up evidence for one region in one year that lead to different 
conclusions about the nature of service delivery than a planner might have had 
based on national policy alone.  Let me consider for a moment five truly admirable 
things that NHS Direct tell us about falls as they affect the NHS: 
 
1. Physical activity improves balance and prevents falls. 
2. Older people respond to life events such as retirement or becoming a 
grandparent in adjusting their perception of the need to manage risk to  
prevent falling. 
3. People like to work in groups on falls prevention, but these can be demanding 
if your hearing, sight or short-term memory isn’t the best. 
4. Self-management is better than dependence on professionals. 
5. Advice can be tailored using websites.   
 
Of these five, only one really mattered in the analysis of the EMAS response to falls, 
that in the over 65’s the effects of aging are critical.   
 
It has not been difficult to get access to a “body of knowledge” for East Midlands 
Ambulance Service.  A years data is stored and easy to access and operational 
procedures are clear.  It is clear from the EMAS dataset that concepts such as 
‘choice’ and ‘customer’ do not easily fit into falls management.  Unfortunately, choice 
and a speedy response govern much policy and planning of the NHS.  EMAS on the 
other hand is a 10% glamour Category A service, but by majority it is an old lady 
who has fallen and calls 999 because she did, but can wait. 
 
5.9  Using the Rousseau model to classify the responses received from 
       Managers in a systematic way 
 
My intent was to hold up a part of the mirror to the “us” that I belong to (NHS 
managers in the East Midlands). I see that we draw upon our own experiences and 
the experience of generations of practitioners.  The sad thing is that much of our 
decision making has no real evidence base on which to justify various things that we 
do in the name of leadership. This diminishes the sense that we are engaged in 
professional practice. We do not have a gathered body of well organised knowledge. 
On a personal level nothing can be identified that eliminates unsound or excessively 
risky practices in favour of those that have better outcomes except my training as an 
accountant.   
 
The discussion of evidence based management is a valid question but it is not liked 
in the higher echelons of management, linked as it is to the notation that 
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management can easily merge into administration when considering white collar 
tasks. 
 
5.10 I will not be considering management culture in my Rousseau 
 classification because it would only be a synthesis and repetition of 
 points made elsewhere 
 
Management culture would be a synthesis or repetition of points made against the 
other Rousseau criteria.  Before I began this study, I was interested to know whether 
Chief Executives would consider evidence based decision making to be a luxury or 
an indulgence.  This is consistent with what I call Management Issue F (a belief that 
good management is an art) so the intention would have been to look also at culture.  
During the interviews however, I noted that there was not necessarily a degree of 
convergence between the leaders despite the fact that they were working in the 
same health market, with the same policy framework and were using each other as 
reference points for acceptable norms of behaviour. 
 
Let me explain why I will not be considering management culture because it is a 
synthesis of Issues A to E: whilst it is not credible to say that the NHS is unique, and 
indeed none of the respondents said this, there is a particular refrain that it does not 
compare to any other business.  Even if this manager or executive is relatively new 
to the NHS, it does not take long for this cultural reference point to represent itself in 
their behaviour.  The essential contradiction with reference to evidence based 
management is that, for example, the Chief Executives do value somebody holding 
the detail (Issue B), somebody having a handle on what is going on (Issue A, Issue 
C); but they themselves like to set direction with autonomy (Issue D).  Each of these 
issues – delegation, attitude to details, management discretion – are the elements of 
culture, so it is possible to say that Issue F (culture) will be seen in the analysis of 
results A to E rather than separately. 
 
I also consider management culture would be a repetition of points made under 
Issue A to E: Chief Executives and managers make it clear that they are skilled 
enough at organisational cascade to make it look like the final evidence based 
management is palatable, without making it happen.  In order to steer a successful 
course without recourse to evidence they need to be all or some alchemy of the 
following – politically astute, decisive and networked.  All of these are attributable 
characteristics that are by definition attributed by others.  They are also a repetition 
of the elements of culture so again it is possible to say that Issue F (culture) will be 
seen in the analysis of the results A to E rather than separately. 
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First let me reproduce the table “After Rousseau” from Chapter 3. 
 
After Rousseau: A synthesis from the literature of Rousseau on the practice of 
Evidence Based Management 
 
Management Issue With advanced knowledge of 
effective implementation of 
Evidence Based Management 
For evidence avoiding status 
quo 
The supervision of 
employees 
 
A 
Managers acquire a systematic 
understanding of what productivity 
gains are most appropriately 
cultivated from their staff 
A manager may misuse threats 
and punishments or overuse 
positive encouragement with no 
reference to the outcome of 
either style or organisational 
performance 
Information available to 
managers on the 
consequences of their 
decisions 
 
B 
Appropriate evidence and data base: 
perceptual gaps and 
misunderstandings are significantly 
reduced so that post implementation 
review is a valuable part of improving 
management 
Information is poor as data and 
evidence is not collected so that 
experiences are likely to be 
misinterpreted 
The delivery on 
promises to the public, 
employees, 
stakeholders/taxpayers 
customers and others 
 
C 
Decisions are based on systematic 
causal knowledge conditioned by 
expertise.  Decisions are legitimised 
by being made in a systematic and 
informed fashion more readily 
justifiable in the eyes of stakeholders 
In such settings, managers 
cannot learn why their decisions 
may have been wrong, nor what 
alternatives would have been 
right.  The public challenges 
decisions in the search for 
transparency 
Management style 
 
D 
Managers have an understanding of 
the powerful impact their decisions 
have on the fate of their firms.  
Managerial competence is 
recognised as a critical and often 
scarce resource 
Evidence based management 
seems to threaten managers 
personal freedom to run their 
organisations as they see fit 
Approach to academic 
research 
 
E 
Managers read the academic 
literature regularly and the 
consultants who advise them are 
likely to do so also.  There is a 
recognition that this research exists 
Despite the explosion of 
research on decision making, 
individual and group 
performance, business strategy 
and other domains directly tied 
to organisational practice, few 
practising managers access this 
work 
Management culture 
 
F 
Supervisors and managers respond 
to a belief system probably 100 years 
old, as far back as Fredrick Taylors 
(1911) structured methods for 
improving efficiency were classified 
under scientific management 
A belief that good management 
is an art - !the romance of 
leadership” school of thought 
where a shift to evidence an 
analysis connotes loss of 
creativity and autonomy 
In conclusion 
 
G 
Managers have evidence on which 
to base their decisions and 
consequently what is at stake 
should the decision or 
implementation fail 
Managers are prevented from 
real learning by fads and 
falsehoods 
 
And this is what we find. 
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In the matter of: 
 
Using the Rousseau or After Rousseau model.  This is what we conclude about the 
nature of evidence based decision making within the NHS in the East Midlands 
during 2007-08.  I have notated a + to mean that the quotation favours an evidence 
based approach and a – to mean that the quotation means the lack of an evidence 
based approach to decision making or an = sign to say that it neither favours one 
conclusion or the other. 
 
In the approach to academic research 
 
An evidence based approach would conclude that managers read the academic 
literature regularly and the consultants who advise them are likely to do so also.  The 
alternative conclusion is that few practicing managers access this work. 
 
- “get yourself educated in something, then get a job, just don’t pretend it will 
teach you to be a manager” 
- “it’s a bit like practice based commissioning, you know, I mean they invent 
it as a concept because it seems to be a means to an end, the end being 
whatever it is we all want” 
+ “And sometimes reading things, I prefer talking to people really and I talk 
to a lot of management consultants who kind of say things, it’s not that it 
tells you something new, it’s just that it allows you to relate things in a 
different way” 
- In conditions which predispose to hospital acquired infection “you wont do 
any of the things of which there’s a very good evidence base that it would 
make a difference, and so your first engagement with us, is to come and 
tell us to do something for which there is no evidence that any infection 
has been prevented, anywhere in the world – ever, by doing this and you 
think that’s the most important thing that we should do” 
- “If I say to you academic evidence?  I think it makes me feel, you know, 
chance would be a fine thing” 
- “It will never be that developed in this experiment that is the NHS” 
+ “So places which have a worse winter than we do don’t have this, they 
have a little bit more mortality but not much and it’s all down to poor 
housing policy, benefits, insulation, social care, primary care access, all of 
these things” 
= “I think they’ll use clinical evidence, I think managers are very much into 
the development of clinical pathways, you know, working with clinicians 
and doing the best things in the best way, but as to how the NHS works, 
the sort of infrastructure, where services are located, how they’re 
delivered, I don’t think they do use evidence” 
- “No!  We almost steadfastly refuse to accept that it might possibly work 
and it was worth considering because it didn’t fit the positive framework of 
choice and competition” 
 
In the supervision of employees 
 
An evidence based approach would conclude that managers acquire a systematic 
undertaking of what productivity gains are most appropriately cultivated from their 
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staff, in the alternative a manager would have a style with no reference to its 
outcome or organisational performance. 
 
+ “I went in very, very hard with the matrons about their cleaning audits, 
when we had all the matrons in, I said, I know it (the evidence) is not like 
that, you know its not like that, what are you playing at” 
+ “We had a doctor here say to us, we don’t have to comply with the Health 
Care Commission standards because we’re not a hospital!  What’s that 
about?  Certainly wasn’t about better patient care” 
= “My next Chief Execs column in the staff newspaper, urging them to write 
to me, and I will reply, and I will go and meet them” 
+ “You work up through your career (and to begin with) you have to be more 
and more evidence based because you haven’t built up the wealth of 
experience, the wealth of knowledge, the falling over, the making 
mistakes, to make the judgement call in the same way” 
+ “I think the processes that are used by administrators should have an 
evidence base for doing them, and a rationale defined by evidence, I think 
managers should use evidence in reaching their decisions and evidence 
based leadership I think would go the same” 
 
In the information available to managers on the consequences of their decisions 
 
An evidence based approach would conclude that there was appropriate evidence 
and data, a significant reduction in perceptual gaps and post implementation review 
is valued.  The opposite is, that information is poor and evidence is not collected. 
 
- “Old evidence becomes dogma.  So it’s established on an evidence base 
but then that becomes dogma which in itself  evaporates over time and 
then the evidence isn’t refreshed”  
- “Balanced scorecards.  It’s not foolproof.  I think it lulls you into a false 
sense of security.  A&E, not the wrong side of the line, my dashboard 
would say ok, but we tried to fill a post there, we shortlisted the people and 
one turned up, and that means it’s going to be breaking down some time in 
the future, it (the balanced scorecard) is not proactive enough again” 
- “I think world class commissioning, if we’re not careful, will give us a 
rigorous discipline on investment issues, even going down to an actuarial 
type approach.  And I think that’s actually quite dangerous because 
context and consequences are two things that a manager and a leader 
need to continually take into account, the consequences of one decision 
on another set of decisions” 
= “I’d prefer things to be explained but things like that are very difficult to 
move in an organisation of 7,000 people, if they don’t very shortly 
afterwards appear on paper so you can do something with it” 
= “Taught me you can approximate, but you need to know how you’re 
approximating,  you know when you’re approximating you know what 
you’ve lost.  But I have an ability to get into detail (the evidence and the 
data) when I need to in a way that some people just can’t” 
= “I don’t think you’re ever totally crass to consider an evidence base, but to 
use it solely for decision making I think is crass in most situations.  I think 
it’s good in scientific situations, when I was a chiropodist, when it came 
down to the amount of chemical I put on to destroy something – there were 
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tables of evidence about what was most effective, that was, to go outside 
of those, I can think of little context to go outside of those.  When it comes 
to an investment decision, or even a personnel decision, you know, you 
can use the evidence of whatever, that’s behind that decision, but if you 
don’t understand the people, the place, the politics the environment, you 
can make a bad decision; so for instance, be it an investment decision 
around upgrading or changing a hospital, or buying or not buying a 
service, you need to understand the wider context that’s there; be it the N 
in National for NHS, the national targets, national regime, be it the local 
context around who was denied a drug six weeks ago, and now you’re 
spending £60,000 on people that seem to be more spurious – even if the 
evidence for one is nil and the evidence for an investment in district 
nursing is high” 
- “The doctors’ view is, ok, 20 years ago, when you were building this 
hospital (because we’ve been here for 20 years, not 10 minutes), 20 years 
ago we said to you, the design of this wonderful new PFI was wrong, 
you’ve got too many beds for the footprint, so the beds are too close 
together, you get cross contamination, you can’t clean round the beds. 
Because there aren’t enough beds, you’ve got too faster through put, so 
people with infections are moved around the hospital”  
 
In the delivery on promises to the public, stakeholders and others 
 
An evidence based decision making would conclude that decisions are based on 
systematic causal knowledge conditioned by expertise.  Decisions in an evidence 
based conclusion would be systematic, informed and readily justifiable.  In the 
opposite environment the public challenges decisions in the search for transparency 
and managers cannot learn why their decisions may have been wrong nor what 
alternatives would have been right. 
 
- “Politicians, do politicians want evidence based decision making for the 
NHS?  No, they want to be elected and that’s the bottom line and as long 
as you remember that, then everything they do is completely 
understandable!” 
- “Nice (the National Institute for Clinical Excellence) is a construct of a 
political approach to the NHS by a government that hasn’t changed 
political party and yet we don’t seem to be any closer than we were when 
we started” 
- “And what we always find is every time they introduce one set of priorities, 
another set emerges because they’ve been ignored by the first set” 
- “Yes, I think the public as body public, would expect evidence based 
decision making, and quite rightly expect that, and would want it as well.  I 
think the public as Joe-individual probably would expect, would want it, but 
when it came to them, would probably bring in other subjective 
assessment criteria.  I think politicians are a bit different, and I don’t think, 
whilst they would probably in a purer discussion say, of course we do, I 
think they will always, and evidence is always driven by context, they 
would always want their policy implemented – evidence or not” 
- “Pseudomonas is going to become an important infection.  Vancamycin 
resistant enterococci are going to become, TB is going to become one.  
Because all of these infections are being ignored, because everyone’s 
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focusing on MRSA” 
- “And we don’t even look at the vast of MRSA infections, we don’t look at all 
the MRSA infections that don’t get bacteremia, all the joint infections, the 
skin infections, you know, the ulceration that people get, we don’t look at 
the damage that that causes in the community.  So we’re looking at the 
tiniest tip of the smallest iceberg here” 
- “you clearly identify yourself as wanting to give the public confidence in 
you being a good custodian of their health service, versus the method that 
would do that is not really evidence based” 
 
In the matter of management style 
 
In a conclusion erring towards evidence based decision making about the NHS, 
managers would have an understanding of the powerful impact of their decisions 
and managerial competencies would be recognised as critical and scarce.  The 
opposite conclusion would be that evidence based decision making seems to 
threaten managers personal freedom to run their organisations as they see fit. 
 
= “You know I mentor a lot of people and a lot of them are Directors in PCTs 
and over the years I’ve watched them do fantastic things, and I’ve watched 
them being stopped from doing fantastic things, because some rule book 
says it’s not allowed; do you know what I mean?  Yes.  I find it sad, I 
mean, and the big picture is probably, you know, progress, the little picture 
depressingly irritating backwards steps” 
+ “So there was no reason you should have used it before, do you take a 
break and go and look for the evidence or do you say, no, we have 
sufficient skills to understand the context and consequences – in this 
room, of getting the decision right or wrong – we don’t need any evidence, 
what we need is a decision.  I would be shocked if the evidence wasn’t 
already there, and I would want to have the evidence if there was some 
evidence around, I certainly would want to know it was there and on 
certain decisions I would want the ‘show-me test’ as well.  On big things I 
want to see it.  So I would stop – go to the evidence, then consider the 
evidence in the wider context of the decision we’re making” 
= “One of the things that’s happened of course to FTs is that they’ve 
attracted a different calibre and type of Chief Exec, arguably.  I think, you 
know, we’ve advertised for two director posts lately and there are a lot of 
people who want to work for an FT…..ok………there are a lot of people 
moving out of Trusts that wont make it to FT status, so you could say, what 
we’ve been doing is sapping the best management resource out of the 
non-FTs to maintain the performance of the FTs.  We’ve also attracted, I 
think,  some quite different people in Non-Executive roles and Chair roles; 
the Chairs of FTs, a lot of them are, like the freedom bit, like the get on 
and do run a business thing” 
- “I’m interested you’ve chosen evidence based management and not 
evidence based leadership, because I think there’s a difference between 
leadership and management.  I suppose, there’s something about 
management based around evidence and management decisions based 
around evidence, which might be different from evidence based 
management.  It depends how you define management, and evidence 
probably as well” 
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- “Well, he reminded me what the end was, that’s what he ultimately did, he 
kind of made me think about what they were trying to do, yes they did it in 
a cack-handed, stupid, I wouldn’t have done it that way, kind of a way, but 
given that that’s what they were trying to do, it was really not helpful for us 
to jump up and down and say ‘there’s no evidence for this’, because it 
undermines the whole investment programme they’ve put in place, which 
wasn’t adding any value to anybody, it was just making it wasted money, 
instead of possibly purposeful money” 
 
So in Summary My Conclusion is 
 
In the matter of the approach to 
academic research (Against!) 
 
 
 
In the matter of supervision of employees 
(For!) 
 
 
 
 
 
In the matter of the information available 
to managers on the consequences of 
their decisions (Against!) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the matter of management style (No 
preference either way) 
 
 
 
 
 
In the matter of the delivery of promises 
to the public, stakeholders and others 
(Against strongly!) 
 
There is a bias against using academic 
research by NHS managers in the East 
Midlands.  This is by no means universal, 
but is consistent in its presentation. 
 
There is a very strong preference for 
using evidence based decision making 
amongst the cohort of East midlands 
managers and use an appropriately 
cultivated management approach to 
support evidence based decisions. 
 
There is a bias against evidence based 
decisions.  Decisions have insufficient 
data and evidence for decision making, 
and little value is attached to post 
implementation review.  Some managers 
are neutral towards this subject but few, if 
any, show a preference for evidence 
based decision making informed by the 
consequences of their decisions. 
 
There is only an inconclusive result in the 
area.  There is no preference.  Some 
managers have a preference for 
evidence it seems but equally same 
would discredit it as a viable and realistic 
approach. 
 
Of all the areas this is the one where 
there is next to no examples of evidence 
based decision making, but there are 
multiple strong, lengthy and cross-
referenced examples of decision making 
that is neither systematic nor developed 
by causal knowledge.  Decision making 
is opaque to the public and frequently 
challenged. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
Research discussion 
 
Purpose 
 
To understand how the research fits with what is happening in this field of study, the 
policy context of the study and the message that comes from this research. 
 
Key Arguments and Conclusions 
 
6.1 Adoption of innovation and research is a complex and often drawn out 
process 
 
An American (Stanford University) website in this field www.evidence-
basedmanagement.com exists with categories of “academic research”, 
“management practice” and “beliefs and assumptions”, attracting regular bloggers 
(contributors) to an on-going discussion about evidence based management.  Run 
by Jeff Pfeffer and Bob Sutton, it includes five principles of evidence-based 
management in its homepage/masthead that encourages people to tell the truth 
even if it is unpleasant and being committed to getting the best evidence and using it 
to guide actions.  This site also includes a research and practice archive which is 
accessible and lengthy, but a couple of years out of date – an unfavourable 
comparison with the bloggers – and useful hyperlinks to relevant material and other 
evidence based movements. 
 
Maybe a way to view this is that rather than viewing evidence based practice as 
squeezed out of the prevailing value set of NHS managers, it is anticipated that 
evidence based decision making may become the mainstream approach of the near 
future.  There is a need therefore to review how the NHS managers accept or reject 
challenges that don’t fit the prevailing value system, how do values adapt?  If the 
NHS is living through an era that does not favour one or more potential methods of 
decision making this may be temporary.  How does NHS management introduce 
alternative approaches and consider whether they may become acceptable and 
even desirable?  Can the NHS managers allow themselves to have a critical account 
of their own management?  The record of the interviews says that this self critique is 
happening, but at the same time, the overall picture is one of the forces of orthodoxy 
maintaining the “status quo” (as portrayed in the Rousseau model).  Whilst it is 
possible to see that the NHS managers may be disposed to accept challenges that 
fit the value system, it is part of the natural balancing.  None of the managers 
expressed a desire to explore the ‘eccentric’ (or abnormal) values that challenged 
the prevailing orthodoxy but they were willing to be flexible and accept challenges 
when they could point to something particular that prompted the change. 
 
The policy context of the study; I described the NHS in the East Midlands as if it was 
a single coherent organisation.   The point is that it is fractured into an internal 
market that splits the buyers and providers of health care from each other – and 
providers themselves are organised into a range of devolved and legally 
autonomous governance models that give them independence and usually some 
form of monopoly within a single urban area or county.  So where we talk of ‘joined-
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up’ application of evidence and management recognising that complex problems 
transcend organisational boundaries, we are expecting a cross-sectional response 
at odds with the financial incentives of the payment by results regime.  This is the 
main problem when trying to look at the general phenomena of evidence in NHS 
East Midlands – that the policy is predicated on unstable organisational competition 
and local monopolies. 
 
Falls in the elderly population (EMAS 2008) represent a serious and increasing issue 
in the UK.  This is gaining increased recognition in current government policy across 
different parts of government including social care and housing as well as the NHS.  
The reason the executives in the NHS respond to this is because it is NHS Policy 
and Practice.  The key though is that at the very strategic level the NHS response 
via policy is, in this case, evidence based.  The report by the Department for 
Communities and Local Government released in January 2008, named “Lifetime 
Homes, Lifetime Neighbourhoods” highlighted the following statistics: one older 
person dies every five hours as a result of a fall; older peoples falls cost the NHS 
around three quarters of a billion pounds each year and 1.25 million falls a year 
result in hospital admissions.  The role of the individual executive in respect to 
evidence and with respect to EMAS in particular should be to ensure that however 
big these absolute numbers seem they should get an evidence based and 
proportionate share of resources. 
 
There is an implied pattern of policy making in all of this.  The essence of which is 
that evidence based management for the NHS is in conflict with policy making.  The 
nature of this conflict is essentially one between an NHS based solution founded on 
evidence and the politicians decision made in the context of taxpayer revenues, the 
maintenance of electoral authority (not losing votes) and consistency/precedent.  In 
order to resolve whether there is a conflict between politicians and managers view of 
an effective National Health Service the literature seems to direct us not to whether 
the conflict exists, but the extent to which this conflict is played out. 
 
What is the implied pattern of policymaking? In essence, protagonists assume that 
the relation between research evidence and policy is linear; a problem is defined and 
research provides policy options. Research is used to fill an identified gap in 
knowledge. This is consistent with both a positivist pattern of science and 
professional dominance, in which the views and priorities of healthcare professionals 
(and doctors in particular) dominate healthcare policies. It assumes research 
evidence can and should influence health policy. Lomas has suggested that the 
pattern is viewed as “a retail store in which researchers are busy filling shelves of a 
shop-front with a comprehensive set of all possible relevant studies that a decision-
maker might some day drop by to purchase.” 
 
Turning to a respondent who is a clinician who moved to management early on in 
their career, talking about whether infection control should be governed by policy or 
evidence. 
 
Who should determine the evidence, I mean, you used a very, almost, the answer’s 
in the library approach, is that right, is it people who are skilled in research 
techniques, is it academics, who is it that gathers the evidence?  Well I think the 
evidence does tend to be gathered by academics, but then there’s a body of 
evidence which is experiential and gathered up by the individual.   RESPONDENT B 
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What he is saying is that the answer to deep clean might be something that 
universities can be equipped to design solutions for.  Remember here we are talking 
about ‘deep cleaning’ to rid hospitals of deadly bacteria – a decision more closely 
related to laboratory control than most clinical interventions and yet the sense that it 
isn’t quite the whole picture prevails. 
 
6.2 The adoption of research evidence is not a single discrete event 
 
One of the objectives of this project is to hold a mirror up to the cohort (of which I am 
a member) to identify perceptions of good NHS management practice.  Within this I 
wished to look at how the group (when it worked collectively) would make decisions.  
It is amusing that interviewees found it easier to identify bad practices in the working 
of the group than highlight aspects of good practice.  The issue of the right 
environment within which to make an evidenced decision emerged as being 
something managers needed to ‘get right’.  It does not exist as a natural state in the 
group.  Describing and reflecting on the appropriate place and circumstance to make 
an evidence based decision as a group was highlighted by many of the cohort.  
Good practice in relation to the presentation of evidence and the use of evidence 
involved on ability to engage this group, to be persuasive and to be credible despite 
limitations of data and knowledge.  There is a caveat however, in that the very 
diversity of group structures makes universal interpretation problematic. 
 
Clinicians were widely reported as helping negotiate quid pro quo deals to 
consolidate services such as stroke, trauma and maternity across sites.  But they did 
this for managers who had years of NHS experience more readily than newly 
introduced managers. 
 
You know, if somebody took a senior member of your team, if they came to you with 
an idea or a solution, would you rather they had it on paper or they were able to 
explain it to you in a conviction way.  I’d rather they explained it to me, but I think, 
what I usually say to people, and there’s a lot of people that kind of knock on your 
door and say …neh, neh, neh I’ve been thinking and neh , neh, neh when you 
haven’t got time to listen to it………ok……..  doesn’t really help, I’d prefer things to 
be explained, but  things like that are very difficult to move on in an organisation of 
7000 people, if they don’t very shortly afterwards appear on paper, so you can do 
something with it.  So personally, I prefer the conversation, but practically to 
progress it, it needs to extend beyond jabbering on the corridor or whatever’s going 
on.            RESPONDENT C 
 
Note that the word evidence never appeared in the above quotation at all, but then 
the manager was talking about a member of their team.  Conversely when another 
executive talks about their own decision making (below) the word evidence appears 
time and again. 
 
 61
I think to be successful, you’ve got to be instinctive, you’ve got to make the 
decisions, you can’t think about it – right or wrong decision – any decision is better 
than no decision, you then have to back your decision to the hilt, you have to be big 
enough to say you’ve dropped a ullock if you’ve got it wrong and change it if 
necessary.  And probably every decision I’ve made I could retro-fit on evidence, but I 
didn’t make them on evidence at the time.   
I don’t think you’re ever totally crass to consider an evidence base, but to use it 
solely for decision making I think is crass in most situations.  I think it’s good in 
scientific situations, when I was a chiropodist, when it came down to the amount of 
chemical I put on to destroy something – there were tables of evidence about what 
was most effective, that was, to go outside of those, I can think of little context to go 
outside of those.  When it comes to an investment decision, or even a personnel 
decision, you know, you can use the evidence of whatever, that’s behind that 
decision, but if you don’t understand the people, the place, the politics the 
environment, you can make a bad decision; so for instance, be it an investment 
decision around upgrading or changing a hospital, or buying or not buying a service, 
you need to understand the wider context that’s there; be it the N in National for 
NHS, the national targets, national regime, be it the local context around who was 
denied a drug six weeks ago, and now you’re spending £60,000 on people that 
seem to be more spurious – even if the evidence for one is nil and the evidence for 
an investment in district nursing is high.      RESPONDENT D 
 
Note that there was no consistent base for saying the decision was evidence based, 
but there is clear reference to ‘evidence’ being the field or environment within which 
personal decision making takes place.   
 
6.3 Managers will only use research that improves the organisation’s standing 
 
The message that comes from this research is that the use of evidence has to, in 
some way, improve the organisation’s standing.  It may be a function of the 
negotiated use of evidence.  Earned autonomy is a function of years of experimental 
learning that means the executive can trust the judgement call of the individual.  The 
hierarchical nature of the organisation and the relative distance from politicians will 
affect the use or flow of research evidence.  If you are junior and/or new and/or 
clinical you have less earned autonomy.  This organisational demarcation reflects 
the sharing of evidence. 
 
But I do think that you work up through your career, you have to be more and more 
evidence based because you haven’t built up the wealth of experience, the wealth of 
knowledge, the falling over, the making mistakes, to make the judgement call in the 
same way.           RESPONDENT D 
 
And earned autonomy through understanding the ‘culturally correct’ way to respond 
to the signals being given by operational managers. 
 
Yes, well, depends how you set yourself up really, I mean, you know, I and other 
managers get criticised a lot for not being out on the shop-floor enough, and indeed 
I’m not, but you pick up limited information about what’s going on on the shop-floor if 
you stay close to the people running the business, they can be clinical or 
managerial, they will, you know, they will tell you what they’re fretting about, they will 
say, ‘oh my goodness, we’ve now got five vacant posts in A&E and when this lot 
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leave I don’t know what we’re going to do’, that’s what you need to know, but you 
also need to create a culture in which that happens, because, we were talking about 
this the other day actually, we’ve imported some new managers from another trust 
not far from here, and they had this alarming habit of telling you everything’s alright, 
when it isn’t!          RESPONDENT C 
 
But broadly a consensus is achieved that evidence/science applies predominantly to 
clinicians and is a luxury few managers can afford. 
 
I think they’ll use clinical evidence, I think managers are very much into the 
development of clinical pathways, you know, working with clinicians and that’s fine, 
doing the best things in the best way, but as to how the NHS works, the sort of 
infrastructure, where services are located, how they’re delivered, I don’t think they 
do use evidence, I think there is some, some scientific evidence in there, they’ll look 
at journey times, and they’ll look at volume, populations and the needs of that 
population not been done very well until fairly recently, but they are doing that.  So 
they’ll do that sort of thing, but a lot of the decisions that are made, seem to be 
based more on history, on the views of politicians and key stakeholders, which are 
often not really evidence based.        RESPONDENT A 
 
Equally it was possible to distinguish a large amount of individual autonomy that 
would be given to and/or earned by people who worked even for some quite direct 
and authoritarian managers. 
 
And if somebody passionately believes that the answer’s right, then what I’ll never 
do to them is say ‘you’re wrong’; what I’ll say is, ‘well, just go away and have a think 
about this again’ and then sometimes you find they do come back and they’ve 
modified their view.  But I’m a big believer that when you put somebody in a position 
of, you know, authority to deliver, as one of your senior managers, you’ve got to give 
them their head, what you can’t allow them to do is to go off the edge, and I think 
one of the products about being at a place a reasonable amount of time, is that 
people know how to read you as well – this works both ways.   RESPONDENT B 
 
So the question remains about whether the NHS approach to evidence is borne of a 
desire to reproduce by template expected behaviours or is capable of changing 
through transformational leadership.  One answer is: 
 
You know I mentor a lot of people and a lot of them are Directors in PCTs and over 
the years I’ve watched them do fantastic things, and I’ve watched them being 
stopped from doing fantastic things, because some rule book says it’s not allowed; 
do you know what I mean?  Yes.  I find it sad, I mean, and the big picture is 
probably, you know, progress, the little picture depressingly irritating backwards 
steps.           RESPONDENT L 
 
In summary, this section, whilst leading to few conclusions about the use of  
evidence does suggest that if evidence based management is to blossom in 
managers in the NHS it will have to be given a foreign label, taught on management 
courses and lead to the same conclusions the boss wanted it to. 
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The bare below the elbows thing – ok – I was in a Board meeting with my Chairman, 
where he was adamant we’d got this letter from Alan Johnson saying that all hospital 
workers should be bare below the elbows, so they shouldn’t have watches and rings 
on and things like that, so that it would promote hand washing and it would reduce 
infection, he was adamant that, this is what the Health Secretary says therefore it’s 
policy, and we must do it, and he wanted us to write out to every clinician telling 
them that we’re going to do this and we’re going to come in and do spot checks in 
hospitals.  (Our eminent doctor (Respondent B), rebuts the policy that his own boss 
is using,  demonstrates a deep despondency with his bosses response to politicians 
and glumly reflects on the lack of evidence for the policy!). 
 
This paper has explored literature and data on evidence based decision making.  
The rhetoric of evidence based management serves an essentially ideological 
function, obscuring the real difficulty in securing effective and sustainable change.  
As considered earlier in this paper, the data exists, even with a simplistic analysis 
like mine to point to changing policy imperatives and a different prioritisation by 
age/sex/location of ambulance services.  In organisations with deeply engrained 
power structures the PCTs must only attempt to implement the evidence based 
approaches to EMAS when they meet collectively on a monthly basis.  Otherwise 
these ‘numbers’ I have found will not survive the challenge of an NHS hierarchy in a 
climate of turbulent change.  
 
To conclude this research discussion and its overall message, I would like to 
consider some neuro-semantics. 
 
Let’s consider some key words or phrases that are quoted in the interviews and 
taped group meetings.  To the left I have put them in their stated form and in the 
right, whether this was used frequently, infrequently, positively or largely negative.  I 
have also been clear where the phrase is used more than once but with no clear 
agreement about its value between managers. 
 
Evidence Based 
Management 
Frequent positive associations.  Seen as a good thing, 
but struggling for a consistent definition. Juxtaposition 
with Evidence Based Management easily understood. 
Evidence Based 
Administration 
Used only once.  A potentially semantic definitional 
distinction but very powerful when used by the 1 
respondent.  This is a metaphor for an idea expressed 
by many that the freedom to stray from evidence 
increases the higher up the organisation you go.  
Distinguishes managers (higher) from administration 
(lower).  
Evidence Based Leadership Used occasionally.  Very negative associations.  Seen 
by some to be an oxymoron.  Seen to be an expedient 
at best and part of a value set that evaporates when 
applied to politicians. 
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Evidence Based Decision 
Making 
Used often, but not surprising given my questions.  
The phrase ‘administration’ in this table above is key to 
distinguishing its positive and negative usage.  Seen to 
be cumbersome and more relevant to juniors than 
executives. 
Evidence Based Resource 
Allocation 
Occasional use.  Very positive associations.  Given 
that resource allocation is considered a rare, but 
significant strategic action by leaders the supportive 
evidence for this is seen as crucial.  Most persuasively 
used in gaining autonomy from the DH. 
Evidence Based Reporting Occasional use.  Mostly negative.  Seen to be a by-
product of ‘administration’ rather than ‘management’ 
and much less importance in performance 
management than policy targets. 
Evidence Based Argument Occasional use.  Mostly negative.  Seen to be an 
insufficient basis upon which to make an acceptable 
decision.  Where it is used it is almost pejorative in its 
diminution of the quality of the argument.  
Evidence Based Learning Frequent positive association.  A clear value exists in 
the attempt to learn from the evidence.  To foster a 
culture with due regard to evidence is viewed as an 
overwhelming positive. 
Evidence Based Knowledge Frequent positive associations.  The organisation, 
communication and maintenance of knowledge are all 
seen to be ways within which the hierarchy of evidence 
is vital.  
 
These examples show most importantly the differences between managers in the 
way they respond to concepts.  The following concepts have no agreed definition. 
 
Information:  used to mean everything from public communication to a  
   relevant set of managerial numerics. 
Data:   seen as collected for purpose and objectively or the  
   arcane desire to count by bureaucracies that generates 
    meaningful information. 
Interpretation: seen by some as a meaningful contextualisation of the 
   evidence or by otherwise savvy managers as a means to  
   discredit the evidence or source. 
Protocol: 
Best Practice: From an attainable counsel of perfection to a normative  
   standard for all. 
Culture:  positive and enabling, stifling and disempowering 
   transformations only allowing reproduction. 
NHS:   An organised system of tax funded healthcare or just one  
   big experiment in political authority and social cohesion.   
   The backbone of the political offer or the basis of a  
   random importation of foreign fractions in healthcare  
management without necessary debate or evaluation. 
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6.4 Sharing the theory in a calm and authoritative way 
 
Subject to examination crediting this method, then I will take the following steps.  In 
the spring of 2010 I will present the results to the East Midlands Chief Executives 
Forum (EMLET) with summary and graphical information and a hard/full copy stored 
on an accessible sharepoint drive.  I will then follow the reactions wherever they take 
me – reacting to who is intrigued or dismissive by/of the conclusions.  I have already 
shared drafts with my peer directors in the East Midlands and tested the 
methodology and theory with the rest of the Executive Team in Derbyshire and my 
seven direct reports.  All have suggested modifications along the way. 
 
In this paper I have tried to convey accurate detail to influence the credibility of my 
arguments.  There are no superlatives about this paper – it is meant to be subdued 
in tone to give a quiet confidence that the tentative conclusions are neither obvious 
nor extreme, but worthwhile of consideration all the same.  If I had believed that I 
had found something extravagant and remarkable, I would have said so, but I do 
believe that my proofs do justice to the conclusions.  I wish to persuade, rather than 
excite, about the possibilities that arise from studying a small community of NHS 
managers. 
 
When I started this doctorate in 2006 the field of evidence based management was 
evolving, but had been growing out of the field of behavioural science for about 
seven years (taking Harries (1999) as the starting of a distinctly NHS management 
consideration of the subject).  Indeed, the first Wikipedia reference in 2006 was a 
simple paragraph with one or two references that were three or four years old.  The 
page now has reference to two dozen references.  On the other hand, this is not an 
area of ferocious and dynamic debate.  The authors, Learmonth, Rousseau, Kovner, 
Pfeffer, Sutton and Rundall are still the same people who were actively engaged in 
2006, so the statements made in this doctorate are sufficiently contemporaneous 
with the debate as it is today. 
 
The issues this had raised for managers is to open up the dialogue.  Who asks the 
“why” question if it is not the managers themselves?  Especially in a field such as the 
NHS where management and simple ‘administration’ of public policy can become 
increasingly blurred.  What the debate about evidence based decision making says 
is that we need a vision about who we want to be in the NHS.  Do we want to be 
leaders in health policy and leave a distinct legacy – and do we want the decisions 
we made to be remembered?  If evidence and the use of informed data represents a 
characteristic we aspire to – and I think we do, even when we don’t practice it – then 
we need to remember that things like my study stop us from straying from who we 
want to be. 
 
An overview of the governance of the NHS has been shown diagrammatically (2.4, 
table 1) and this shows that evidence cannot exist without influencing the 
governance model in all its corners.  Without serious effort to address the social, 
economic and political aspects of the NHS, then the managerial consideration of 
evidence will amount, even at its best, to a form of patching-up of the quality of 
decisions made.  At the moment, there does not appear to be an effective arena for 
discussion between politicians – the public – medics – managers over how and 
whether we can be evidence based managers.  This is a governance weakness. 
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The effect on NHS policy will be negligible unless there is a listening exercise.  This 
cannot be the traditional castigation of opposite ends of the management structure 
as bigots or with the rendition of the “how can we get them to listen”.  The problem is 
that all too often, the debate concentrates on the ‘them’ in the phrase rather than the 
listen.  Managers talk of doctors as ‘them’, politicians talk of managers as ‘them’.  
This is no way to consider the implementation of evidence on a system wide basis.  
The environment of the NHS provides its own set of tensions between participants.  
So the listening exercise must cover three areas: do doctors believe that managers 
are using appropriate language to advance evidence based management.  Is the 
language inclusive or a barrier to interpretation?; is the message being delivered to 
the public in the right context – do the public tell you they hear this as part of a 
compelling and consistent message that evidence is used to improve patient care; 
and do you listen to or dismiss the politicians understanding of the NHS?  Politicians 
know the NHS as a parliamentary funded system where evidence must 
accommodate their mandate to govern. 
 
6.5 Conclusions of the field study and published material since I completed 
the field study 
 
So what is evidence based management?  The short answer, is the belief that it 
makes sense for managers to act primarily on the facts about what works out there.  
It is an explicit relegation of other forms of knowledge and a rejection of memory and 
ideology as management styles.  It is alien to the National Health Service.  In the 
NHS in the East Midlands, it is only part of the decision making process.  “I would 
want to have the evidence if there was some evidence around, I would certainly 
want to know it was there on certain decisions” and the telling “I’m interested you’ve 
chosen evidence based management and not evidence based leadership, because I 
think there’s a difference between leadership and management” – the closing 
remarks of two of the most experienced Chief Executives in the East Midlands. 
 
When and where is evidence based management used? 
 
There is a belief that up to middle management levels, evidence based decision 
making is useful, but not at more senior levels.  Senior managers approve of 
evidence as it gives them a systematic view of what their staff are qualified to do and 
a requirement for evidence based decision making is part of the scheme of 
delegation.  As the best quote said “you work up through your career (and to begin 
with) you have to be more evidence based because you haven’t (learned) to make 
the judgement call in the same way”, said a Chief Executive who started as a 
clinician. 
 
How is evidence based management perceived? 
 
There is a bias against using academic research by NHS managers in the East 
Midlands.  Even where academic research can be found to recommend and justify 
an alternative course of action, and this evidence is supported by a senior clinical 
manager the forces of conservatism limited implementation opportunities.  In the 
matter of the information available to managers on the consequences of their 
decisions, there is a bias against evidence based decision support and little value is 
attached to post implementation review.  Within the NHS East Midlands there is no 
preference – some managers would value an evidence based approach, but the 
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same numbers would not see it as viable or useful.  The craft of management is 
valued more through creativity and autonomy than in a response to evidence.  “No! 
we almost steadfastly refuse to accept that it might possibly work and it was worth 
considering because it didn’t fit with the positive framework of choice and 
competition” was my favourite quotation. 
 
I recognise this: If the question was written not as ‘Why should we use evidence”, 
but “why shouldn’t we use evidence?” then we are nearer to the heart of this thesis.  
Evidence based medicine is a prevailing organisational culture so in the study of the 
management culture of the same organisation, it is reasonable to see whether we 
are following fad or fashion.  They key is not to be swept along or swamped by this – 
let me use a surfing metaphor of “riding the wave”.  Instead of being drowned by the 
energy of the sea, you use a simple tool (a surfboard) to harness the energy of the 
ocean to transport you quickly.  The key is to see whether evidence based 
management is a surfboard that is harnessing the energy of the prevailing evidence 
culture in the NHS.  McDaniel (2009) says that “Facilitating meaningful conversation 
in health care organisations is often difficult, but it is important for making effective 
change (Jordan et al 2009).  Rather than applying evidence as indicated per an EBM 
model of organisational change, health care managers should rely on evidence to 
start creative, locally relevant dialogue.  Evidence from management research 
should be used to open the door to new conversations that can be used to propel 
organisations along positive paths of managerial action.  This would be significant if 
we want managers to make a difference”.  Paragraph 2.4 (table 1) suggested that 
managers have a limited opportunity to make a difference, bounded as they are by 
those who fund, use and provide clinical care in the NHS.  To facilitate meaningful 
conversation would enable the managers to talk coherently with politicians and the 
public about the best way to make difficult decisions and whether evidence would 
improve the acceptance of, and satisfaction with, the decision in the public domain.  
There is a prevailing evidence based medicine culture, the conversation would be 
whether management can take the opportunity this creates to be more evidence 
based too. 
 
Some additional reading on the subject highlights the following since I completed the 
field study – Arndt and Bigelow (2009) say that caution should be expressed about 
the use of evidence based management in healthcare.  In an illuminating discussion 
they say that “We raise a cautionary note about the assumptions underlying the calls 
for evidence-based management. Given the complexity of decision making and of 
the health care environment, as well as differences among health care 
organisations, decisions do not necessarily lead to expected outcomes, and results 
may not be replicable across organisations.  Moreover, evidence is an artefact of 
social interactions and limited by the difficulties inherent in studying complex 
organisational phenomena.  Research is needed into the diffusion of evidence-
based management in health care and into the results achieved by organisations 
that used the practice compared with organisations that did not.  Managers should 
use all available information and data when planning and implementing decisions, 
and evidence from research should play a role in that. At the same time, in a 
turbulent and uncertain environment, creativity and risk taking also will be important, 
and unanticipated outcomes may result from, among other factors, limits on human 
cognition, unknowable differences in initial conditions in organisations, and adaptive 
responses to change as it is implemented”. 
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What I fundamentally disagree with Arndt and Bigelow (2009) about is that they 
claim their note for caution to be unique against a prevailing orthodoxy that “urges” 
us to adopt evidence based management as new and exemplary.  I think they 
overstate the ground of support for evidence based management and they ignore 
that writers such as Kovner and Rousseau were aware of the same caveats when 
they wrote.  So we see a developing debate in 2009 between the scale and pace of 
implementation.  Also, this study is not just happening in the NHS.  Nutley (2009) 
writes about how important this is for research utilisation in social care – “This article 
draws on both a cross-sector literature review of mechanisms to promote evidence-
based practice and a specific review of ways of improving research use in social 
care. At the heart of the article is a discussion of three models of evidence-based 
practice: the research-based practitioner model, the embedded research model, and 
the organisational excellence model. The article concludes that the ideas contained 
within each of these models are likely to be appropriate at different times and for 
different service settings. There is a need to build on such models to develop a 
coherent framework for strategies to promote research use.”  She says that this 
needs supporters and intermediaries to make it happen “developing a culture that 
supports research use – these kinds of activities might include developing 
appropriate leadership and management practices; collaborations between 
researchers and research users; the creation of specific research brokering posts; 
and membership of intermediary organisations that aim to get research into 
practice.”  Ultimately, Banaszak-Holl (2009) is able to both commend and critique 
Arndt and Bigelow and say that although Arndt/Bigelow offer some useful caveats, 
they are actually providing arguments to progress, rather than halt, the debate about 
EBM in healthcare.  “Hence, the authors of Evidence-Based Management in Health 
Care Organisations: A Cautionary Note (Arndt and Bigelow, 2009) should be 
applauded for their timely contribution to raising critical issues in how to advance the 
field of evidence-based management in health care organisations (HCOs) while the 
evidence base is still in the early stages of evolution.  At this point, such criticisms 
should be raised because they help inform plans for systematically analysing, 
disseminating, and applying management evidence.  We, however, believe that the 
issue raised in the cautionary note provide compelling arguments for moving forward 
with developing EBM albeit in a manner that leads to the formalisation of both a 
better framework for discourse about our evidence base and a public knowledge 
library allowing greater sharing of management evidence across HCOs”.  
 
 69
CHAPTER 7 
 
 
Issues for practice 
 
Purpose 
 
To develop a practical model for policy makers and managers on how and where 
evidence is used appropriately. 
 
Key Arguments and Conclusions 
 
7.1 Senior managers are close to department policies and use evidence less 
 
Senior managers are concerned about a volatile policy framework – where policy is 
either unclear strategically or unclear in the operational impact within the 12 month 
business cycle.  Uncertainty in this context negates a primary use of evidence to 
inform decision making. 
 
And that’s kind of inevitable, but the way I kind of play managing this Trust, you 
know, if I see a journey, the way policy works, it’s seemingly, you know, I think we’re 
going there, the government says we’re going there, and all of a sudden, we’re off 
up here, or we’re off up there, or we’re going down here, and we’ll probably go back 
up there and then we’ll go down here.     RESPONDENT H 
 
You know, my job I always think is to translate policies, a bit like a pendulum, know 
where it’s going to settle, and it, you know, somebody keeps bashing it and it’s 
swinging around, you know where it’s going to settle, and the trick is I think, to 
describe what’s happening, which may seem a little strange, you know, introducing 
competitions, subsidising competition.       RESPONDENT E 
 
I can justify that to my organisation, in terms of it being the government wishing to 
give people choice, wishing to drive up quality, yes it’s tough, yes it has very difficult 
set of issues for us to handle, but they’re doing it because they want care to be 
better, and so you’re always describing the end point, and trying to make sense of it 
and what’s more trying to use it to get you to that point, and sometimes that means I 
sort of half ignore things I’ve been asked to do, or I throw myself at them with 
absolute huge enthusiasm because they seem to be going in the right direction. 
          RESPONDENT C 
 
According to supporting documentation from the NHS issued at this time, this would 
be consistent with an evidence based culture. This code of conduct could be 
contrasted with how models for organisation and management in health care over 
the last 20 years had been based on popular trends and fads rather than research 
on organisational and management practice. Strategic decisions, it was maintained, 
typically follow the recommendations of consultants with the information upon which 
these are based remaining unchallenged. As evidence based healthcare was 
popularized among health care professionals there would be increasing recognition 
that these ideas should be adopted in management. Management innovations that 
were not evidence-based included the use of organisational mergers in tackling 
service quality; decisions on the optimal size of organizations for capacity or 
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financial viability; substitution of doctors with other health professionals and the 
move towards home care as an alternative to hospital inpatient care. 
 
Managers in particular in this project, described a situation where their own control 
over the decision making process had been to some extent, lost through the 
requirements of audit and the promotion of certain themes consistently in the NHS.  
Executives have to be seen to be performing in an overt and accountable way and 
their work must be visible and subject to audit and inspection.  A model of 
performance management is contrasted with maturity of thought and debate over the 
use of evidence.  The external pressure for conformity and consistency is seen to 
result in high quality decision making tainted by group think.  Managers cannot 
always dwell on particular topics or pursue the evidence base for what they are 
doing (or being told to do).  There is a pressure to be overtly productive in the 
presentation of solutions rather than consideration of evidence.  The interview and 
meetings material touches upon some of the complex relationships between 
established management culture, career needs of the managers themselves and the 
conduct of evidence based decision making.  The pressure to obtain recognition for 
both themselves and their organisation may encourage a pursuit of more credible 
‘target hitting’ and leaves insufficient time for a consideration of the evidence in 
shaping organisational structure.  In general, as described in this qualitative material, 
the current organisational form may discourage evidence based decision making 
and the need for reproduction will be perceived as less risky. 
 
Fashion.  The simple arcane practice of following the latest trend or idea, of 
importing behaviours from other societies was seen as damaging to an evidence 
based NHS.  In a way it is believed that evidence is crucial to an acceptance of 
organic (internally generated) change within the NHS, but even higher than evidence 
in the hierarchy is novelty or importation from other systems. 
 
7.2 Middle managers are more directly involved in supporting the uptake of 
research on effective management 
 
Let me start this section with a quotation from somebody who swapped between 
clinical and management roles. 
 
I think my need for an evidence base would have been different at different stages in 
my career; the fact I’ve come up the clinical route, I hope I’ve use an evidence base 
for my clinical work previously.  I’ve sought an evidence base for the interventions 
I’ve made to make things work and happen differently throughout my career, 
because it seems to me, if it’s worked somewhere else, ie, there’s evidence it’s 
actually helped somebody else gain objective or reach an objective, it’s probably 
worth trying here.  So the evidence might not be gold standard evidence, but there is 
some evidence base to what I do.  So I think that probably never peaked, but since 
I’ve been in management roles, I think I’ve always had, and considered evidence for 
the way I operate and what I do.        RESPONDENT G 
 
I think evidence based administration, to me administration is the application of 
processes to achieve an end, to me, that’s what an administrator is doing, with a 
small degree, often no degree of latitude or ability to make changes.  Management, 
managers have the ability to make changes to those processes, and leadership I 
think, is different.  I think leadership is about achieving an organisational goal, and 
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taking the whole organisation forward to achieve corporate objectives.  So I do, 
evidence based administration, I think I would struggle with that, because I think the 
processes that are used by administrators should have an evidence base for doing 
them, and a rational defined by evidence; evidence based management, I think 
managers should use evidence in reaching their decisions, and evidence based 
leadership I think would go the same as management.   RESPONDENT D 
 
So what we see revealed is that evidence is a consistent part of the framework of 
executive leadership, but the latitudes to err from the evidence or to even create the 
evidence afresh is denied to lower levels of manager – deemed to be administrators. 
 
Most fundamentally, detail and the use of detail in decision making was seen to be a 
product of where you were in the hierarchy.  In fact, detail was seen to positively 
inhibit the executive function. 
  
Different managers agreed that clinicians, their staff and indeed the politicians 
(perceived to be the source of this objective) needed to be exposed to multiple 
interpretations of why this decision was made.  Conversations with politicians 
concentrated on what was going on ‘out there’ in the media and the public discourse 
of the problem/decision.  Conversation with clinical staff often concentrated on the 
issue of the perception about what had caused this decision and differences 
between professionals interpretations of the solution/causes of the decision.  The 
decision did lend itself to evidence, but the conclusion from the views expressed is 
that consideration of the evidence was both vital and in fairly short supply.  There 
was a thematic response that any evidence used in the decision should derive from 
both an outline theory of the nature of the problem, but relate closely to the practice 
of NHS management.  That means that given the potential lack of general 
management expertise in the area, any evidence ought to be accessible to NHS 
managers.  
 
 
7.3  The relationship between autonomy, pedantry and the use of evidence 
 
Referring back to earlier conversations it is possible to see quotations that talk of a 
negotiated use of evidence through acquired years of experiential and experimental 
learning.  This leads to the oft sought for “earned autonomy”.  The best quote to 
demonstrate this was the one that said “because you haven’t built up the wealth of 
experience, the wealth of knowledge, the falling over, the making mistakes, to make 
the judgement call in the same way”.  One of the conclusions of the project has been 
that at low levels of autonomy you use evidence a lot and at high levels of autonomy 
you use evidence a lot again if you can avoid the politicians (table 1 refers) but 
somewhere in between it gets much more difficult.  The two quotations which 
summarise this are “it’s a yes and no.  If I am brutally honest, if you take them in an 
enclosed ecosphere when there are no consequences to their decisions.  Then they 
will always go with the evidence, then you put them back in the real world and….” 
Plus “a lot of decisions that are made, seem to be based more on history and on the 
views of politicians and key stakeholders, which are often not really evidence 
based”.  
 
Consider the definition of a pedant.  A person who is overly concerned with 
formation and precision and who makes a show of learning.  The corresponding 
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notion is that the person is also a source of instruction or guidance.  The term can 
typically be used with a negative connotation indicating someone overly concerned 
with minutiae and whose tone is perceived as condescending but when it was first 
used by Shakespeare in 1588 it simply meant teacher.  Some people take pride in 
being pedantic and may preface a sentence as such.  Therefore I believe there is a 
boundary where pedantry is an accepted form of evidence based decision making 
and that this is consistent with the amount of autonomy and status the individual 
has.  So if a table is drawn to show the relationship between pedantry, earned 
autonomy and a detailed use of evidence based management it would look 
something like this: 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                              Level of  
                detailed use 
                of EBM            
Table 8 
 
I have quartered the box not by quadrants but by triangles to show that this structure 
to an extent overlaps and is about occupying different zones of the autonomy/detail 
axis.  The key is that there are four zones.   
 
1. “Participative leadership”.  Experienced at all levels of autonomy, NHS 
managers try to use some degree of Evidence Based Management but they 
never explore it to its full extent.  The best they ever get is a ‘halfway’ 
experimentation with evidence.  Indeed it is possible to make decisions 
without evidence at all. 
 
2. “Zone of pedantry”.  Evidence is used to develop and control the organisation 
but the manager never rises above the middle tier of autonomy.  Note the use 
of phrase autonomy rather than “authority” or “power” as even a powerful 
individual may find themselves in the zone of pedantry when working in a 
group because their autonomy is diminished in the meeting so that the use of 
evidence is seen to be picky or fussy in tone.  In this zone a very detailed 
application of evidence based decision making correlates negatively with 
autonomy – if you have to use a lot of detail to make a decision you don’t 
have much autonomy. 
Level of 
Autonomy 
Zone 
zone 
Zone o f 
 
Zone of 
efficacy 
 
Zone of 
participative 
leadership 
Zone of 
effective 
evidence 
Zone of 
pedantry 
The Evidence Based Box of 
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3. “Zone of efficacy”.  The decision will use varying degrees of evidence in 
getting things done.  What is effective is not necessarily efficacious.  The 
efficacious decision is the one that produces a desired amount of the desired 
effect and the success in achieving a given goal.  It is imperative to note that 
in this zone, the complete acceptance of rejection of evidence based decision 
making are polar opposites but exist in their purest form where the manager 
has the ultimate autonomy. 
 
4. “Zone of effective evidence”.  The manager uses some, at least half of the 
available evidence based management insights at all levels of autonomy.  At 
lower levels of autonomy the manager does, or is compelled to, use a quite 
sophisticated level of detailed evidence to guide them as manager.  At higher 
level of autonomy the manager is not coerced by concerns of politicians and 
as the quotation says “then they will always go with the evidence”.  As we rise 
up the scales of autonomy we see two forces that push the detailed use of 
EBM backwards – one, the manager is not compelled to use evidence and 
can further explore a “romance of leadership” school of thought and two, 
decisions are increasingly made as a quotation says “on the views of 
politicians and key stakeholders” instead. 
 
7.4  The decision must be acceptable as well as efficient 
 
It is established by respondents that they have the technical skills to undertake 
evidence based decision making and to write a coherent ‘evidence based’ story.  
The managers were also able to demonstrate that they understood the importance 
of reflexivity as a management competence.  Managers were not happy that the 
collection and evaluation of data was sufficient to help decision making.  The 
collective and evaluated information may go some way to enhance the quality of 
NHS management.  But the technical task of the assimilation of information may not 
be able to go far enough to convince NHS managers to move without a sceptical 
evaluation.  More generally it was also asserted that there will always need to be 
more resources in order to carry out training in the evaluation of information. 
 
I think World Class Commissioning, if we’re not careful, will give us a rigorous 
discipline on investment issues, even going down to an actuarial type approach, and 
I think that’s actually quite dangerous, because context and consequences are two 
things that a manager and a leader need to continually take into account, the 
consequences of one decision on another set of decisions.    RESPONDENT F 
 
So somebody has done some research, however subjective, to actually say those 
who scored highest on health commission scores, those who had most financial 
balance, those who were actually achieving the most important government targets.  
What was common about them?        RESPONDENT I 
 
The cohort is efficacious.  By efficacy I mean that the effect of a given managerial 
intervention has to not only be economically efficient it must be ‘acceptable’.  
Acceptable in the political and public context of the NHS.  The impact of an 
intervention by the Chief Executive or senior manager has been thought before the 
decision has been unleashed in the real world NHS.  Acceptable in that this decision 
is at least as good as any other. 
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Referring back to earlier conversations we see quotations that talk of a negotiated 
use of evidence through acquired years of experiential and experimental learning.  
This leads to the oft sought for “earned autonomy”.  The best quote was the one that 
said “because you haven’t built up the wealth of experience, the wealth of 
knowledge, the falling over, the making mistakes, to make the judgement call in the 
same way” (RESPONDENT D). 
 
7.5  Conclusion 
 
From my findings it is possible to say that evidence based management has an 
identified and discernible impact on NHS management but it is not common and is 
certainly not in good health as a prevailing philosophy.  It is not the managers who 
will keep it alive and any implementation of evidence based management on a wide 
scale will require the importation of external skills and political will to implement.  
Davies (2009 pXV) said that senior managers only react to external policy direction 
“targets have ruled the roost, pushing organisations to the edge, often to the neglect 
of patient care.  The past ten years have seen a plethora of incoherent initiatives and 
policy reviews, decreasing the ability of senior managers to display leadership, think 
and positively effect the delivery of services; and left governance confused and void 
of focus.  The autonomy associated with a business-like framework means nothing if 
all it is used for is finding more innovative ways of meeting central targets”. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
Issues for Management 
 
Purpose 
 
Does the use of evidence equate to developing a high quality knowledge base that 
should improve organisational effectiveness and to what extent can variations in the 
NHS be explained by differing uses of evidence? 
 
Key Arguments and Conclusions 
 
8.1 What is used is determined by what is planned to be used by the 
organisation to co-ordinate 
 
The accumulation and the use of the following skills is necessary to use the 
available evidence. 
 
Thinking – if NHS management is to be evidence based at all, then it needs to spend 
time thinking about how evidence is used.  In particular, the management in the NHS 
must think about evidence and whether it reduces financial and delivery risk.  The 
key will also be to consider where evidence is relevant at the individual, 
organisational or pan East Midlands level. 
 
Reflections – managers in the East Midlands must have the skills (and time) to take 
a retrospective look at current decision making structures and question the reasons 
for doing things this way.  In a command and control structure where one of the key 
skills in organisational success is for the leader to correctly diagnose and horizon 
scan Department of Health indicators, this type of reflection is difficult. 
 
Research interpretation – the key here is to be impartial in the use of evidence as a 
means of finding truth.  Many topics are the subject of highly politicised dispute, but 
that does not mean there should be a bias towards the politically expedient solution.  
The ability to interpret research and be clear when you are biased in judgement 
despite the evidence, is a key competence for leaders in the NHS in the East 
Midlands. 
 
Persuasion – this is not in short supply.  The leaders have shown themselves by 
reason of appointment and track record of delivery, to have a persuasive 
management style.  The adoption of that competence to individual or group based 
evidence is necessary if the available evidence is to be used for decision making. 
 
8.2 Evidence is not the primary or defining tool in successful NHS 
organisations 
 
The implication of blind prejudice for the objective of enhancing good practice in 
NHS management are profound.  What we perceive as ‘good practice’ itself is called 
into question.  This would imply that there was error in the NHS managers 
themselves rather than the context in which they find themselves.  Whilst there will 
be a blurred distinction between heuristics and prejudice the term ‘blind prejudice’ 
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might most usefully be applied to ignoring any conformity with accepted good 
practice.  Where evidence to inform the decision is simply not sought out.  The use 
of blind prejudice in this context is usually driven by a desire to succeed in the 
political context – it is simply an exercise in power.  There are many potential 
decision makers out there, but only so many posts, awards, organisations and years 
in a career and in the competition for resources and power, blind prejudice is simply 
a rejection of evidence where it does not enhance the standing of the individual 
decision maker.  The individual is required to be a strong leader, not an evidenced 
decision maker. 
 
If evidence based practice is seen as something separate and distinctive from day to 
day decision making, then the prevailing management culture works against basing 
decisions on evidence.  On the other hand, evidence based practice may entail 
rejecting the accepted management orthodoxy and creating a separate quasi-
autonomous enclave of interested practitioners.  It is not ‘evidence base’ alone that 
determines the value set and the discourse – it is the extent to which the evidence 
base is taken down through organisational views to a granular level before a 
decision is made.  In paragraph 5.9, I noted that senior managers valued an 
evidence based decision making model in their middle managers.  This does not 
equate to an application of the evidence based method themselves, nor an implicit 
sourcing of and funding of evidence for these middle managers to use. 
 
We must ask: not ‘do you understand the answer’? but ‘do you even know what the 
question is’. 
 
So, let’s compare that to the earlier discussion about deep cleaning of hospitals.  
Managers found peace with the need for a structured political response by David 
Nicholson but here, in the case of winter death, he was avoiding even asking the 
question because the public wasn’t asking the question.  I therefore asked if that 
meant they thought Nicholson rejected evidence where it said uncomfortable things 
about subjects the public weren’t asking about.  The response: 
 
I would suggest that he uses an evidence base for what he’s done and how he’s 
moved things forward, along with a set of personal beliefs, so I feel comfortable with 
that.            RESPONDENT B 
 
8.3 Evidence is only part of a general method used to horizon scan 
 
In the organisation and planning of ambulance services in the East Midlands there is 
an inextricable link between organisational performance, organisational 
effectiveness and leadership.  Ambulance services and the importance of the 
ambulance response to older people who have fallen, has historically been poorly 
recognised within the wider NHS.  Ambulance clinicians are in a unique position of 
attending this group of patients in their own home and as a result, are able to 
observe not only the condition of the patients, but also their living conditions 
including hygiene, diet etc.  In order to transform the service that EMAS provides to 
falls victims and those at risk of fall, the Chief Executives of both EMAS and their 
Commissioning Primary Care Trusts, the transformational leaders, need to adopt an 
evidence based approach to the data collected by EMAS itself.  Instead of a total 
focus on specific organisation objectives that is typical of the existing contractual 
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relationship with EMAS, the management style should place an emphasis on 
evidence as a basis for innovation and a rationale use of resources. 
 
By using the evidence available about how falls should best be managed, how the 
use of ambulance resources can be maximised and the effects that an aging 
population will have on calls to ambulances the leaders in the NHS can help the 
public to navigate the system in a different way, but still be confident that the system 
will be delivered in line with NHS standards and values.  The key is to respond to the 
evidence that has been collected, to park the targets of today (as their assistant 
directors and operational managers will achieve this) and to shape the targets of the 
next decade in line with the Ambulance clinicians.  
 
Some concepts are judged by the participants to have poor credibility.  If 
quantification, consistency, industrial level adoption and rigour are indicators of 
credibility then in our understanding of evidence based decision making it is possible 
to recognise items that have credibility.  Credibility is not validated by the researcher 
it is expressed as a judgement made by the participants.  Judgements of credibility 
are also seen to be influenced by particular (political) contexts so that what 
constitutes credible may change from period to period.  In the specific context of the 
evidence based manager, there was a strong correlation between credibility and one 
word/phrase – “NHS” and a poor correlation between “politics” and credibility.  I have 
included one quotation to illuminate that at the heart of this conflict is the role of the 
executive and whether they are agreed to be system leaders or system managers. 
 
Consider that since 2000/01 the government decided to increase public spending 
and the proportion of public spending spent on the NHS significantly, and this was 
sustained for 7/8 years and yet politicians were given lots of negative associations 
such as the politician below, who is considered to be motivated by electoral majority 
not the NHS role in ‘reduce inequalities’ or even the NHS managers role in ‘best 
value for money’. 
 
He’s an MP like the ‘X’ guy, who isn’t local doesn’t know the area, he’s in for the 
ballot box, he’s in for the re-election; you take someone more local like ‘AB’, who’s a 
local lad, worked in one of the local schools, will always live in this town, he’s got the 
mix, because he’s precariously seated because of the ballot box, because despite 
the fact he’s been in twice, this is not a natural one party community, and at some 
stage it will move again.         RESPONDENT A 
 
Whilst as a researcher I was able to ask for clarification of particular aspects of the 
application of EBM, the elite manager must feel that a codification of EBM is not just 
adulterated into a form of Pedantic Control.  The traits that the Chief Executives and 
Senior Managers demonstrated were strong leadership, setting a good example, 
negotiating and navigating the future and co-ordinating disparate strands of policy 
into one coherent whole.  In order for EBM to rise above the charge of pedantry into 
a system wide learning method it would have to enhance the ability to lead, 
negotiate, navigate and co-ordinate.   
 
The Chief Executives are demonstrating intelligence.  The elite has shown the ability 
to interpret policy and understand the business but they are relying on heuristics to 
drive solutions.  The reason this is good is that leadership is visible, to an extent 
charismatic and essentially a valued commodity.  In order to steer a successful 
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course without recourse to evidence they need to be all or some alchemy of the 
following – politically astute, decisive, hardworking on networks. This demands in 
turn that they are perceived to be young in outlook, flexible/pragmatic, energetic and 
experienced.  All of these are attributable characteristics that leaders cannot acquire 
themselves – they are by definition attributed by others.  Crucially they are also 
consistent with the characteristics a Chief Executive or Senior Manager will want 
attributing.   
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CHAPTER 9 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
9.1  Messages from the field of study 
 
Cultural and altitudinal change is required 
 
Researchers and academics should be invited into the management process (5.9, 
6.1) and we should be looking for evidence of what works to do the most optimal 
thing with our limited resources (5.5, 6.4).  The key here is that the management role 
is enhanced by the use of evidence based management and in such a way that the 
credibility and development of the subject area is enhanced. 
 
Develop a cadre of managers with the skills needed to use evidence more effectively 
 
Managers rely on the use of data.  But they are unlikely to be happy with data that 
has unknown interrelations (5.7, 6.3).  An unavoidable consequence of asking the 
sort of what-if questions is that it can lead to adverse reaction amongst managers.  
Unlike performance data it may expose uncomfortable relationships between 
perceptions of excellence in the NHS target performance – attributed by others – 
and truly superior operational delivery (5.6, 6.5).  The use of evidence prompts in 
longitudinal studies would only be possible were the competence of managers to 
use this evidence effectively developed also. 
 
Looking for evidence of success of evidence based decision making would be an 
innovation itself 
 
Evidence might be called the economic (opportunity) cost of the current solutions we 
use.  Looking for evidence based enablers of the ‘central targets’ to be hit should 
also be pursued and we should not use targets as an excuse to avoid evidence 
based attitudes (5.2, 5.4, 5.8).  Managers and policy makers have been prominent 
advocates of evidence based clinical practice, but have not been quick to apply the 
same principles to their own decision making.  NHS Evidence should undertake this 
task with managers (3.4, 6.2). 
 
As an avoider of data the politician can still have the opportunity to identify key 
business processes and target opportunities 
 
The politician will not push for a multivariate analysis of the data (5.1, 5.3) and 
ultimately the problem is that the politician is concerned with abdicating control (8.3).  
The politician fears contradictions with policy, false-positives or results that are good 
for the NHS but no use for the politician at all (8.1, 8.2). 
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9.2  Inferences from theoretical and other researchers perspectives 
 
Learmonth said (in my introduction) that managerialism was an imposed doctrine, 
and that evidence based decision making typified managerialism.  At the end of my 
journey I disagree.  (2.2, 4.4 and 6.5).  Alexander (2007, p152) said that “evidence 
based management assumes that available research is consistent with the problems 
and decision making conditions faced by those who will use evidence in practice”.  In 
his conclusions he notes that researchers must learn to think more like managers if 
their research is to be relevant and managers must learn to more effectively 
communicate their issues within the research community and frame their problems 
in researchable terms (4.1).  There is an on-going nature of the debate about 
managerialism and evidence.  The debate is evolving from managers use of 
‘knowledge about knowledge’ in the private sector (Bailey and Clarke, 2000) to a 
broader NHS and health care discussion (Kovner 2006, 2009).  The debate is also 
evolving from competitive advantage to an alignment between researchers and 
managers, but there is little empirical evidence to inform efforts to develop models in 
real world settings (3.1).  Walter (2004) says that a whole systems approach, where 
the use of research involves a collaborative effort between organisations and 
individuals, would be a positive way forward.  This is contradicted by Knowles (2008) 
in “command and control” to allocate resources; but both are consistent with the 
Rousseau Model (3.3).  Ultimately, the conclusion to be made from theory and other 
researchers, is that if you want to, you have tools available to do a Kovner (2009) 
style action research project, but that will not matter if the government is 
interventionist.  In this context – whether you are a Learmonth, Alexander or a 
Kovner – the key to using evidence or rejecting the use of evidence is the leader’s 
own decision to take charge of their destiny (7.5). 
 
Of all of my references, the most important to me has been Kovner (2009).  In his 
methods, he always espoused academic rigour.  When talking to managers in the 
field of healthcare he always took time to properly frame research questions, obtain 
evidence as to why intervention might/might not work in various contexts, evaluate 
evidence with a balance of viewpoints represented and consider when further 
evidence was needed to support a decision.  If Pfefer (2006) is the consolidation of 
evidence based management in healthcare as a distinctive specialism in its own 
right, then Kovner (2009) is the place within which the specialism gains its first 
manual for operating in a field environment. 
 
9.3 Messages for the user of the study 
 
As to how the NHS works, where the services are located, how they are delivered I 
don’t find that managers use evidence.  I observe that there is some fact in there – 
for example in the use of joint strategic needs assessment, to inform decisions about 
need, but a lot of their decisions are based on history, politicians and key 
stakeholders and are not really evidence based (2.4).  I have drawn a model of the 
NHS with an evidence based organisation of knowledge that shows that NHS 
managers use decision making tools that reflect managers place as only one 
quadrant of the NHS structure.  If this diagram (2.4, table 1) is to be useful, it is to 
show that an NHS that moves on evidence based organisation of knowledge only to 
NHS managers, it will ignore the other players in the NHS – the politicians, patients 
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and clinicians.  The NHS manager must also consider the circumstances of the 
decision and the ethical concern that the management decision may provoke.  
Managerial freedom must also be considered when implementing an evidence 
based decision if it is likely to impact on the political cycle (3.4).   
 
If evidence based practice is seen as something separate and distinctive from day to 
day decision making, then the prevailing management culture works it. On the other 
hand, evidence based practice may entail rejecting the accepted management 
orthodoxy and creating a separate quasi-autonomous enclave of interested 
practitioners.  Finally from my increased understanding and interpretation of findings 
it is possible to say that evidence based management has an identified and 
discernible impact on NHS management but it is not common and is certainly not in 
good health as a prevailing philosophy.  It is not the managers who will keep it alive 
and any implementation of evidence based management on a wide scale will require 
the importation of external skills and political will to implement.   An alternative 
approach is a willingness to take an evidence-based approach – and to use the bad 
news it brings as a stimulus for improvement.  For managers, looking at a service 
organisation for the first time from the customer’s point of view is a shock.  Typically 
they discover that the organisation is ticking all its boxes and still providing hopeless 
service to customers and citizens.  And from this comes another sobering revelation: 
the management methods used up to now are the problem, not the solution. 
 
9.4   Relationships between variables 
 
From paragraph 6.3 it is possible to construct the following simple table. 
 
“Evidence Based” 
Followed by the 
following word 
Is there a common 
agreement between 
NHS managers of the 
definition? 
Associations with this 
word or phrase  
0 being most negative, 
10 being the most 
positive 
Frequency of use of 
this word or phrase 
0 being very rarely, 
10 being very often 
Administration No 7 1 
Allocation Yes 9 3 
Argument No 3 3 
Decision Making Yes 4 9 
Leadership Yes 2 2 
Learning Yes 8 7 
Management No 7 8 
Reporting Yes 2 2 
 
So it is possible to say that the key pairings of evidence based are with learning and 
with management – although management itself is not clearly defined.  The most 
positive association is with evidence based allocations – the frequency of “decision 
making” may have been increased by my line of inquiry, but is the most common 
term. 
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Frank Blackler (2006) published in the Guardian Newspaper, his synopsis of what 
was good/bad in the political and managerial models of control in the NHS.  Taking 
that as a template, it is possible to say whether he was right or wrong from what I 
found in this project. 
 
Agree 3 or disagree x 
The present system of politically lead 
targeting is wasteful 
3  An analysis of EMAS data shows an 
age bias in classification of patient 
need away/against the elderly (4.3) 
Targets are based on mistrust of 
managerial autonomy 
X It is a product of the managers not 
answering the ‘how do we know what 
we know’ consistently (3.1, 2.2) 
The NHS has enjoyed substantial 
increases in public funding and 
politicians are anxious about how the 
money is used 
3 The craft of care has transformed 
into the machinery of the NHS supply 
system (8.3) 
Managers need to be treated with and 
behave with confidence 
3 Otherwise, there will be a clash 
between prerogatives (7.1) 
Distinguish the strategic objective of a 
policy from day to day implementation 
X Targets are a political model, but the 
NHS is politically funded (2.4) 
Management in the NHS is not hard, it is 
why we have NHS management 
3 The use of evidence is an exercise to 
control knowledge and choices (5.9) 
 
9.5  To finish 
 
If I were writing a note for the next Secretary of State for Health, the message I 
would give about evidence based management is: 
 “Dear Sir, as of today, there are 24 organisations that make up the NHS in the 
 East Midlands.  This ignores Government departments and refers only to 
 those organisations that are statutorily accountable and therefore, have a 
 Chief Executive.  In a three year study of this group, I have found them 
 capable, experienced and wise.  In the matter of making their decisions on 
 the basis of the evidence available to support their decisions the picture is 
 unfortunately, mixed.  The diagnosis of this is that elected parliamentarians, 
 the treasury and the public prefer to command the NHS to act in response to 
 NHS policy, rather than devolve to those Executive leaders the autonomy to 
 act upon evidence about the matter at hand.  The result is that we have an 
 NHS that is increasingly good at practicing evidence based medicine, but an 
 NHS in the East Midlands where managers are ambivalent about using 
 evidence based management.  Some clinicians may make a great of this fact 
 to you.  Ignore them, the governance structure of the NHS does not allow 
 managers to be evidence based even if they wanted to”. 
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quotations were collected and existed.  That the emails were sent and responded to.  That people 
knew this work was going on.  That my peers, colleagues and superiors trusted me enough to also 
take part in this research willingly and at cost of their time.  Always with candour. 
 
 
Julie Acred – CEO Derby Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 
Tracy Allen Derbyshire County PCT 
Terry Allen Notts City PCT 
Terry Alty Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 
Paul Badger Derbyshire County PCT 
David Black Derbyshire County PCT 
Kathryn Blackshaw Derby City PCT 
Lee Bond Sherwood Forest PCT 
Maggie Boyd Derbyshire County PCT 
Derek Bray – CEO Derbyshire County PCT 
Brian Brewster East Midland Ambulance Service 
Paul Briddock Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 
Lisa Bromley Bassetlaw PCT  
Jayne Brown – CEO Doncaster PCT  
Andy Buck – CEO Rotherham PCT 
Danielle Cecchini Derbyshire Mental Health Services Trust  
Paula Clark – CEO Burton Hospital NHS Foundation Trust  
Nigel Clifton CEO – Doncaster & Bassetlaw  
Philip DaSilva NHS East Midlands  
Kate Davies Nottingham County PCT  
Cathy Edwards NORCOM  
David Goodall Doncaster & Bassetlaw PCT  
Catherine Griffiths – CEO Leicestershire County & Rutland  
Barbara Hakin NHS East Midlands 
Mike Harris Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust  
Sue Hitchenor NHS East Midlands 
Peter Homa – CEO Notts University Hospitals  
Brenda Howard NHS East Midlands  
Chris Kerrigan Notts County PCT  
Chris Linacre Sheffield Teaching Hospital  
David Lowe Derbyshire County Council  
Dave Marsden NHS East Midlands  
John McIvor – CEO Lincolnshire Teaching PCT 
Martin McShane Lincolnshire PCT  
Phil Mettam Bassetlaw PCT  
Eric Morton – CEO Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS Foundation Trust  
Oliver Newbould Leicester City  
Louise Newcombe – CEO Bassetlaw PCT  
Nigel Nice NHS Direct  
Kevin Orford NHS East Midlands;  
Paul Phillips East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust 
David Pitt Derbyshire Mental Health Services NHS Trust  
Neil Priestley – Sheffield Teaching Hospital  
Tim Rideout – CEO Leicester City  
Wendy Saviour – CEO Nottinghamshire County PCT 
Mike Shewan Derbyshire Mental Health Services NHS Trust  
Prem Singh – CEO Greater Derby PCT 
Chris Slavin Lincolnshire Partnership NHS Trust  
Nikki Tucker Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS Foundation Trust  
David Walker Regional Director of Public Health  
Sarah White Derbyshire County PCT 
Martin Whittle Derbyshire County PCT 
Jeffrey Worrall – CEO Sherwood Forest  
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APPENDIX B 
 
LETTER OF INVITE: 
 
 
Dear Colleague 
 
Help!   
 
I am currently undertaking a Doctorate of Business Administration.  Yes, I know all 
the typical “get a life” things you say, but the NHS is deeply engaged in the practice 
of Evidence Based Medicine and I wish to consider the extend to which evidence 
based practice is a norm or an ideal for daily professional management in the 
National Health Service.  To what extent do we, as practicing NHS Managers think 
Evidence Based Healthcare Management is an appropriate tool to resolve problems 
and what do we actually use?  (A copy of the full research outline is attached should 
you wish to understand my objectives in more detail). 
 
My reasons for writing to you are that I wish to make this more than a dusty 
academic treatment of the subject.  It is my hope to work with my NHS colleagues 
over the next couple of years in making this a project that listens to and informs our 
experiences as leaders in the NHS today. 
 
You can contribute in a number of ways.  By replying that you do or do not want to 
participate – even a positive “no” is very helpful to me in shaping cohorts to 
correspond with.  If you are a “yes” then would you like to participate in the following 
ways: 
 
• As part of a focus group that will meet 2 or 3 times in the next 18 months 
involving 8-10 people with a semi-structured agenda? 
• As a face to face 1:1 interviewee for about 2, 2 hour sessions over the next 
18 months? 
• As an e-mail and written responder to a structured set of questions a couple 
of times in the next 18 months? 
• Any of the above? 
 
I look forward to your replies. 
 
ps  If you can think of anybody else who you think would really enjoy getting involved 
in this, I would love to have their names. 
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APPENDIX C 
EMAIL FOR 1:1: 
 
 
 
Thanks for agreeing to give me some 1:1 time as part of my qualitative research 
towards my doctorate.  You don't need to do anything in preparation and will be one 
of a number people I am interviewing this autumn and winter.  In addition, I will be 
analysing a verbatim transcript part of 3 significant NHS meetings - most likely the 
Directors of Commissioning for the East Midlands, the East Midlands 18 Week group 
and either the Board or the Executive Management Team of Derbyshire PCT.  
Through these methods I hope to gain some observations on the nature of 
"Evidence Based Management in the NHS".  I would expect to circulate the attached 
structured interview questions that I am using with you (the questions - not your 
answers) to a wider cohort of NHS leaders in the East Midlands for their written 
responses but only if our 1:1 interview(s) are a success. 
 
In Case you need reminding, this is the essential reason I am doing this doctorate.  
Over the last few years I have been in a quandary about something and that is 
whether the notion of being a manager could be, within the NHS, grouped within an 
evidence based organisation of knowledge.  I made 20 years as a moderately 
successful NHS manager, having qualified as an accountant with the NHS.  On the 
one hand the discipline of the ‘balance sheet’ gave a respectability to the 
performance management methods used by me to help shape the patient care, but 
the use of that tool was necessarily shaped by the business and value model upon 
which it is based.  Not all companies that employ accountants are successes so 
where was the equivalent for an ‘evidence base’ within the literature? 
 
Anyway, in summary……a big, big thanks for giving up your time and I look forward 
to listening to you. 
 
Regards 
 
David 
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APPENDIX D 
QUESTIONS: 
 
 
A synopsis of Evidence Based Management for this meeting 
 
What is already known in this research area? 
 
Learmonth, an academic and former NHS manager, suggests that in the long term 
the very study of evidence based management is likely to inhibit rather than 
encourage a fuller understanding of the nature of evidence based management.  
Pfeffer has managed to write a definition of evidence based management and says 
that this is not how managers make decisions but that they instead focus on their 
own thoughts.  Rousseau is entirely supportive of Pfeffer and, after exploring the 
promise that research offers for improved practice concludes that at present, it falls 
short.  Elliot in a study of NHS managers provides some explanations for the 
constraints upon managers that prevent the use of research evidence. 
 
What each of these writers say, is that the most successful NHS organisations would 
share one common strength – outstanding use of knowledge acquired through 
research (evidence).  They would produce evidence the way that they need in order 
to inform decision making by management.  Using an expertise with evidence they 
would make the best decisions, minor and major, everyday. 
 
Opposing theoretical and methodological approaches to this research area? 
 
Pearson takes issue with Learmonth and says that the whole concept of what 
constitutes evidence is itself, full of inequality and prejudice.  Murphy, Mintzberg, 
Soltani may be taken as a direct challenge to the whole concept of evidence based 
management.  In any case, they argue that there is a reason for the craft of 
management and personal experience to supplement evidence based management 
in context specific ways.  Malterud manages to deconstruct the whole notion of a 
scientific approach to the knowledge of medicine. 
 
Writers such as Delbanco, Davies, Dopson and Mitten propose that organisational 
effectiveness is not a result of effective management process or people but instead 
a combination of both.  Issues such as organisational culture, leadership, total-
quality management philosophies and innovative ways of budget setting are all 
claimed to have at least as great an impact on organisational outcomes as well 
researched decision making. 
 
Karl suggests that in adversarial process advocates seek to prevail through the 
enjoyment of power, rather than through evidence based solutions and develops an 
alternative practical model of collaboration through join fact finding is proposed.  
Smith supports the search for alternatives because, in the author’s view, uncritical 
reliance on performance data can lead to a number of unintended and adverse 
consequences and Pearson says that evidence gathering is too slow to properly 
influence policy.  
 93
APPENDIX E 
 
 
My interpretation of SDO research and my connection to it. 
 
The National Institute for Health Research Services Delivery and Organisation 
Programme (NIHR SDO, commonly abbreviated to its shorter form SDO) has 
commissioned research on several themes concerned with management practice in 
health organisations.  Their overarching strategic aims are to “add to the evidence 
base that is relevant to the practice of managers” and  “the development of links 
between academic institutions and NHS organisations in this area”.  
(www.sdo.ishtm.ac.uk/ecashome.html).  
 
Since April 2009 the management of the SDO programme has now transferred to 
the National Institute for Health Research Evaluations, Trials and Studies Co-
ordinating Centre (NETSCC) based at the University of Southampton. 
 
There are six distinct research projects as follows: 
 
Reference Lead Researcher Duration Title 
 
08/1808/242 Professor Sue Dopson 1 July 2009 - 
31 July 2012 
Increasing the motivation 
and ability of Health Care 
Managers to access and 
use management research 
08/1808/241 Dr Paula Hyde 1 January 
2009 –  
1 July 2012 
Roles and behaviours of 
middle and junior 
managers: managing new 
organisational forms of 
health care 
08/1808/243 Professor Christine 
Edwards 
1 January 
2009 –  
2 March 2012 
Explaining Health 
Managers’ information 
seeking behaviour and use 
08/1808/244 Professor Jacqueline 
Swan 
1 January 
2009 –  
31 December 
2011 
Evidence in Management 
Decisions (EMD) – 
Advancing knowledge 
utilisation in healthcare 
management 
08/1808/236 Professor Chris Ham 1 March 2009 
– 28 February 
2011 
Models of medical 
leadership and their 
effectiveness 
08/1801/220 Professor Ewan Ferlie 1 October 
2008 –  
31 January 
2010 
Research utilisation and 
knowledge mobilisation – A 
scoping study 
 
 
My organisation is the field study for project 244 lead by a team from Warwick 
University with the principle on-site researcher being Emmanouil Gkeredakis.  The 
Lay Summary of this project is: 
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Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) receive the bulk of the NHS budget to allow them to 
commission health services for their local populations. They are charged with 
ensuring that healthcare provided to patients is "World Class." 
 
However commissioning decisions are very complex. They involve different kinds of 
experts (commissioning and finance managers, public health experts) and many 
different criteria (quality, cost, patient benefit), all of which have to be carefully 
weighed up when coming to agreements about the best evidence upon which to 
base decisions. There is a great deal of unexplained variation in 
the ways in which managers in different PCTs actually commission health services. 
 
Within the NHS, and internationally, a lot of thought and effort has gone into 
producing resources for managers so that they have the knowledge and information 
they need to commission services effectively.  
 
In this research SDO will undertake in-depth qualitative research (case studies and 
observations of decisions) to discover how, why, and when managers in different 
roles use knowledge and information in NHS commissioning decisions. SDO will use 
the findings from this stage of the research to design a survey to test findings on a 
wider sample of NHS managers. 
 
The results will be of direct relevance to the daily work of managers throughout the 
NHS, and of direct relevance to the public for whom services are commissioned. 
SDO will be better placed to identify the barriers and facilitators (organisational, 
cultural, and practical) to evidence-based practices in NHS management. 
 
SDO will disseminate their work widely in order to inform policymakers and 
managers. The aim is that managers can be best equipped to make good decisions 
for the health of their local populations. 
 
My organisation also supported an application for project 242 lead by a team from 
Keele University working with GPs in North Derbyshire and Chesterfield Royal 
Hospital which was ultimately unsuccessful.  This has been pursued as an internally 
funded consultancy project.  The lay summary of project 242 is: 
 
Despite much work on how clinicians use and enact clinical research which is now 
well known, there is less on health care managers' use of management research 
and how this might be evolving. Previous research has suggested that health care 
managers often lack the skills to access and process research findings and play a 
marginal role in the R&D area. It is possible that these findings are now dated and 
that a better-developed research base and culture is now emerging within health 
care management. We believe that this novel idea requires further investigation. 
Specifically, we wish to investigate under what circumstances and how do managers 
(both general managers and hybrid-clinical managers) access and use management 
research based knowledge in their decision-making. 
 
The design of the study uses mixed methods, having a linked, three-stage design 
which deliberately explores the boundary between management research and 
practice. The deliberate exploration of knowledge utilisation process in settings 
critical to the 21st century health economy will provide new research data to help 
policy makers and managers broadly defined, and benefit use
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The Interviewees What sort of person are they? What is their Profession? Period in the East Midlands 
A 
Paragraph 5.1, 5.2, 5.4, 5.7, 6.3 
 
Male, 50’s 
 
Accountant 
 
East Midlands 10 years + 
B 
Paragraph 5.1, 5.2, 6.3, 7.2, 8.3 
 
Male, 40’s 
 
Doctor 
 
East Midlands 3 years +  
C 
Paragraph 5.2x2, 5.5, 5.7, 6.2, 
7.1 
 
Female, 50’s 
 
Accountant 
 
East Midlands 10 years + 
D 
Paragraph 5.2, 5.7, 6.2, 6.3, 7.2 
 
Male, 50’s 
 
Medical 
 
East Midlands 3 years + 
E 
Paragraph 5.3, 5.7, 7.1 
 
Male 50’s   
 
Doctor 
 
East Midlands 10 years + 
F 
Paragraph 5.3, 7.4 
 
Male 40’s  
 
Marketing and Supply chain 
 
East Midlands 3 years + 
G 
Paragraph 5.6, 6.3, 7.2 
 
Male 40’s  
 
Doctor 
 
East Midlands 10 years + 
H 
Paragraph 5.6, 7.1 
 
Male 40’s   
 
Law 
 
East Midlands 10 years + 
I 
Paragraph 5.6, 7.4 
 
Female 40’s 
 
MBA 
 
East Midlands 10 years+ 
J 
Paragraph 5.6 
 
Male 40’s.   
 
MBA 
 
East Midlands 3 years+ 
K 
Paragraph 5.6 
 
Female 30’s.   
 
Accountant/Audit 
 
East Midlands 10 years + 
L 
Paragraph 6.3, 8.4 
 
Male 50’s.   
 
Scientist 
 
East Midlands 10 years + 
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1.    A Theoretical Model to Apply 
In June 2009 I received the following notice – 
“In England, the majority of decisions about the organisation and provision of local 
health services are made by Primary Care Trusts (PCTs).  PCTs receive a significant 
proportion of the overall National Health Service (NHS) budget, which they use to 
commission health services for their local populations.  In this stud, we aim to 
understand how NHS managers make decisions about commissioning health 
services.  We want to know what information they use to make these decisions and 
whether NHS management can become more “evidence-based”.  By doing this we 
hope our findings can be used to inform the practice of commissioning in the future.”  
Emmanouil Gkeredakis – University of Warwick. 
It was rewarding to see that others were joining this field of study.  It is reassuring to 
see that this type of qualitative analysis is still worthy of study in the NHS, almost 
three years after I began my project.  What I think the Warwick study fails to 
understand and what I have based most of my study on, is the fundamental 
importance that the role of executive leaders have in setting organisational outcome 
in the NHS.  I therefore feel vindicated as I complete document 6 and reflect on my 
learning journey that my thesis had something important to say.  
1.1  Metacognition 
J. H. Flavell first used the word "metacognition" (1976).    
The reasons this has been important to me in my study is that I have been looking 
for a model that describes my learning process before and during this doctoral study 
The benefit of the metacognition model is that it helps me to understand the use of 
knowledge in my executive role in the NHS.  Executive management processes 
involve planning, monitoring, evaluating and revising one's own thinking processes 
and products. Strategic knowledge involves knowing what (factual or declarative 
knowledge), knowing when and why (conditional or contextual knowledge) and 
knowing how (procedural or methodological knowledge). Both executive 
management and strategic knowledge metacognition are needed to self-regulate 
one's own thinking and learning (Hartman, 2001). 
A significant issue during my DBA has been a metacognition one.  It has been 
difficult (and sometimes I have not been able) to distinguish between the why and 
the how of what I do as a manager in the NHS.  I thought that this part of the journey 
was very helpful at this stage in my life.  Halfway through a 45 year NHS career if it 
all goes to plan, I was making lots of decisions and here for the first time, thinking 
about why.  At Masters level, I described systems in a reductionist way as being 
passive, but the why was much more human and difficult to deal with.  This gave me 
the option to go different ways in different scenarios and managed to engage my 
passion for the NHS as well as being intellectually challenging. 
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1.2 Working in Groups or Alone 
Converse to the individual journey, I did not find working in groups to decide on a 
course of action at all revealing.  The cohort were all competent at debate and 
interaction and explaining the positions taken, but there was little collaboration 
except to retrace the ‘audit trail’ of the decisions we made to arrive at our choices.  
Possibly because I switched from cohort 7 (where I was struggling to keep up to 
time) to cohort 8 (where some group structure pre-existed my introduction) the 
experience I had of group work was magnified. 
I found the tutorials useful in thinking about how I got an answer.  In the NHS much 
of the data I receive is collected, graded and sifted before I see it.  Given the right 
algorithm to turn this data into information, I just write down the answer.  But, if you 
have to go right back to describing your method for data collection, you really do 
have to understand how you got your answer.  A novelty. 
The revelation to be honest, is that I am terrible at working with others.  It is not that I 
can’t do the team-player mindset at work (my 360° survey by peers, seniors and 
direct reports, suggests I am accessible and trusted and participate well) it is just that 
I like to be in the ‘me’ shell.  Sitting in a North American airport with six hours to kill to 
work on a DBA on my own is a treat and the time flies too quickly.  It is almost as if I 
feel that anything other than 1 to 1 conversation on part of the DBA (after the formal 
lecturing finished) is cheating me of time I could be doing something more interesting 
on the DBA. 
Throughout much of this study I have contemplated the nature of the lone research 
practitioner.  Individually I have found this a fascinating journey but it has caused me 
to question whether it was possible to do anything worthwhile whilst immersed in 
such an intensely personal topic. 
Adrian Bejan, a professor at Duke’s Pratt School of Engineering, argues that while 
the trend at major universities is the creation of large research groups focused on a 
particular problem, the individual researcher will not disappear.  
There is only one thing I can do about all of this.  That is to have courage and trust.  
To join a learning set of like minded individuals about evidence based management, 
or just management.  To engage often and maybe aim to be the positive one.  There 
is a real danger that my lethargy makes the group lethargic, so I resolve to be the 
project core not the periphery.  This should be more dangerous, more fun and in 
opening up my skills and opinions to greater and regular scrutiny, the quality of my 
academic work should improve too.  I realise that working with others is a start on 
the way to achieving my true potential. 
1.3 Being positive and actually writing the Doctorate 
The biggest learning for me is the need to be able to work with positive people.  If 
you have ever sat in a seminar doing some group work on an easy task then you 
know that nothing is worse than working with lethargic people.  The level of 
‘unmotivation’ in the room is stultifying.  The taught element of a DBA is the complete 
opposite.  You find yourself just as inspired as people around you.  In that kind of 
environment, I love group and partner work.  So the thing I am going to do differently, 
because of this DBA, is always to be the project enthusiast.  Encourage the group to 
put effort into what we are doing and, if the task is easy, re-define the group effort 
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into something along the same lines, but that is able to inspire the talents of the think 
tank assembled for the next fifteen minutes.  My opening line now is and will be 
“you’ll find yourself having a lot more fun if you simply go with the flow and let the 
creativity flow”.  In addition, my own contribution will be higher quality. 
Kamler and Thomson say this:  
“Writing the dissertation lies at the centre of doctoral education. It is through writing 
that students make their findings known to the public and develop a sense of 
themselves as authorised scholars. Yet, in many universities, writing is treated as 
ancillary to the real work of research - as the invisible and taken for granted labour of 
the doctorate (Kamler and Thomson 2001)”. 
The hardest part of this doctorate for me has been the writing.  It is clear that without 
help from my tutors the ideas and analysis would never have got to paper.  
Furthermore, I must complement my tutors on trying to make what I write an 
authentic form of what I say. 
As a successful student at professional, undergraduate and masters level, this has 
been a vital part of the doctoral journey. 
2.    Where the Research Question came from 
2.1  The Initial dilemma 
There was an episode of the BBC TV programme ‘Casualty’ on a couple weeks ago, 
and I caught a bit of it while working on some projects around the house. As I 
watched it became pretty clear that every episode is built around solving a complex 
medical problem. And 90% of the show is spent learning about the problem, finding 
new pieces of information, and testing incorrect assumptions.  
I think this is a pretty good description of lots of a lot of projects I’ve worked on as an 
NHS manager and project manager. Lots of doctors and managers want to get the 
“Problem Definition” done as soon as possible, and get on to the “real work” of 
solving the problem. But there’s real danger there, it’s easy to define and solve the 
wrong problem.  
I like the system they use in casualty - there’s a central whiteboard which contains a 
description of the problem they’re trying to solve. As the show progresses, the 
problem definition is continuously updated, and the diagnostic team comes up with 
various theories. I’ve worked on projects where we the managers didn’t have a clear 
understanding of the problem, or where our understanding of the problem was 
months and months out of date.  
The result was that we built the solutions and policies that solved the wrong problem, 
or in the best case, answers that solved the right problem in the wrong way. Either 
way, what we built fit the user stories we got for that iteration, but wasn’t “well 
designed” in terms of solving the core problem. In both cases, it was very clear as I 
talked to the patients, doctors and nurses, that we could have spent less time, and 
built better policies if we’d just had a clear and up to date picture of the clinical world.  
The National Health Service (NHS) is the "public face" of the three publicly funded 
health care systems of Great Britain (Northern Ireland does not use the title) and the 
full title of the national public health service for England. The NHS provides the 
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majority of healthcare in England, from general practitioners to Accident and 
Emergency Departments, long-term healthcare and dentistry. It was founded in 1948 
and has become an integral part of English society, culture and everyday life: the 
NHS was once described by Nigel Lawson, former Chancellor of the Exchequer, as 
"the national religion". Private health care has continued parallel to the NHS, paid for 
largely by private insurance, but it is used only by a small percentage of the 
population, and generally as a top-up to NHS services. NHS services are largely 
"free at the point of delivery", paid for by taxes; the NHS's budget for 2006–07 is £96 
billion.  Employing over 1.3 million people, the NHS is the largest employer in Europe 
and one of the largest employers in the world, (believed to be third or fifth, according 
to different commentators).  So the NHS requires lots and lots of people to run it.  
Within this I have been a manager and as a manager you can “administrate” and 
electively hide or be a proper manager and change things. 
Over the last few years I have been in a quandary about something and that is 
whether the notion of being a manager could be, within the NHS, grouped within an 
evidence based organisation of knowledge.  On the one hand the discipline of the 
‘balance sheet’ gave a respectability to the performance management methods used 
by me to help shape the patient care, but the use of that tool was necessarily shaped 
by the business and value model upon which it is based.  Not all companies that 
employ accountants are successes so where was the equivalent for an ‘evidence 
base’ within the literature? 
2.2  Getting in amongst the players 
The author holds a senior management position in the National Health Service.  The 
National Health Service being under transition affects the individual professionally 
therefore there is a subjective bias in the analysis of EBHM in the NHS. This issue of 
being a player in the system under review will qualify the judgements and 
interpretations of the researcher.  Significantly the researcher has been a player in 
the National Health Service system since 1987, during which time many theoretical 
and practical models have been applied to the NHS.  The National Health Service is 
an organisation that continues to deliver services.  As with all socio-economic 
models, it is not possible to hold the day to day experiences of patients and the 
public frozen, therefore it is not possible to experiment with the system which will 
affect people’s lives just for the purposes of observation. The organisation that 
employs the individual is part-funding this research, therefore the NHS has a 
discernable desire to achieve a piece of management information. 
Remembering that part of my essential purpose was to hold up a mirror to NHS 
managers in the East Midlands, what did I see in that mirror about myself?  What did 
I learn on a personal level about my response to evidence based management?  I 
learned that I was only capable of a low level of accommodation in response to 
changes in my environment.  My culture within this organisational culture had meant 
that I experienced a low level of assimilation.  Information from the wider 
environment would be accepted and processed, but it was never sought or 
accessed.  Any desire or awareness of the need to modify how things are currently 
done came as a response to a policy imperative and heavy central directions.  The 
appropriate environmental response was not to evidence, but policy and within that a 
forensic level of policy compliance.  So why did I do this?  My conclusion is that of 
two parts.  Part one is that, consistent with other senior managers, the NHS in the 
East Midlands did not contain the necessary knowledge from which to choose a 
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more adaptive response and the prevailing group culture discourages attaining that 
knowledge.  Part two is that on a personal level, the culture had strictly punished me 
when my particular responses had been more adaptive.  At job recruitment, my 
answer of “the answer is in the library” as opposed to “my experience of answering 
the problem is” was deemed insufficient to get the job! 
I have worked high up and low down in the management hierarchy and my 
experience of EBM was that it faced/faces being squeezed by two forces that both 
oppose its very existence in the NHS management lexicon and toolbox.  Unlike 
Medicine and Nursing in the NHS, management is not a profession.  Put crudely, it is 
considered a task or an overhead.  With the exception of Finance roles there is no 
established legal or cultural requirement regarding education or knowledge for an 
individual to become a manager the way there is for Doctor, Nurse, Physiotherapist, 
Podiatrist, etc.  This does not mean that NHS managers are not legion in their 
BSC’s, their MBA’s, even their Doctoral qualifications but it does mean that no formal 
disciplinary body or professional pressure exists to promote use of evidence by any 
manager who refuses to do so.   
2.3  Science or ambiguity: how I take decisions at work 
Are decision making tools disciplined or does it follow the hopes of the managers?  
The reason for reviewing this particular question in the literature is the juxtaposition 
of science and management.  This is important for the NHS because the practice of 
medicine is bounded by the scientific method.  Medical progress, the development of 
pharmaceuticals, the review of outcomes following a randomised control trial and 
even public health interventions are progressed using a cycle of observation-
recording-discourse and conclusion.  If that is true for the medicine then what of the 
management system that manages the medicine?   
The desire for managers in public services to portray that they know all they need to 
know to make decisions for the public, is very persuasive.  Ambiguity and research 
leading to conclusion may not be the model preferred by the public even if the NHS 
manager were to express such a preference.  Starting with the possible methods for 
conducting this literature review, I myself am demonstrating some of the bias 
inherent in NHS management to precise rather than deliberating decision making.   
Significant writers in the study of NHS management and evidence based 
management such as Learmonth and Rousseau are studied and a conceptual 
framework “The Evidence Based NHS Box” is discussed and used to reference 
ideas about the subject.  The key outcomes of the NHS such as improving health, 
value for money, wellbeing and better experience of care are taken as givens but the 
management responses to this problem are compared from the views of those who 
propose and oppose evidence based management. 
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2. 4 The role of the tutor in shaping this problem with me 
Preparation:  My preparation was poor for the DBA and for the individual documents 
within the DBA.  My goals were often poor and it was occasionally a struggle to fit 
clearly within the marking guidelines without help.  I say this not as a confessional, 
but because of something it taught me.  If you are not clear what you want out of the 
project, it is difficult to be clear about what you think is your bottom line.  This would 
have made it easier for me and my tutors to be clear about the point when I could 
offer no more.  It would have made it possible to be much clearer about which parts 
of the study I was willing to walk away from or even to be clear when we were in a 
stalemate position. 
The opportunity, both in and out of work, to spend time thinking about one’s work, 
one’s growth and development as a manager, and one’s growing edges was a novel 
and positive experience for all me.  I found that the space and time that was created  
allowed me to slow down and process, and be able to present different ideas.  The 
personal journal of learning (Cantwell & Holmes, 1994) provided an effective place 
for me to reflect on the multiple layers of my experience.  At the beginning of the 
doctorate I was reticent—and even unwilling—to keep a journal, yet, in the end was 
genuinely surprised at how helpful it was in keeping me focused on my own growth, 
and personally meaningful.   It was more than just an outlet for my reflections, it also 
became the vehicle by which I learned to be self-reflective, to struggle to identify and 
express one’s thoughts and feelings regarding my own development as an 
academic.  My tutor was incredibly useful in helping me to see the experience of 
study as important to my final thesis. 
2.5  How EBM has affected my working life 
Evidence-based management (EBMgt) is an emerging movement to explicitly use 
the current, best evidence in management decision-making. Its roots are in 
evidence-based medicine, a quality movement to apply the scientific method to 
medical practice. 
Evidence-based management entails managerial decisions and organisational 
practices informed by the best available scientific evidence. Like its counterparts in 
medicine (Sackett 2000) and education (Thomas & Pring, 2004), the judgments 
EBMgt entails also consider the circumstances and ethical concerns managerial 
decisions involve. In contrast to medicine and education, however, EBMgt today is 
only hypothetical. Contemporary managers and management educators make 
limited use of the vast behavioural science evidence base relevant to effective 
management practice (Walshe & Rundall, 1999; Rousseau, 2005, 2006; Pfeffer & 
Sutton, 2001). 
I now understand that as an NHS leader I respond slowly to changes in the 
environment of the NHS.  Without the study of the Masters and DBA I would be – 
and will have to avoid being in the future – closed to options other than the status 
quo.  NHS culture is (despite my professional and academic training) slow to 
respond to information from the environment or does not accept the data into the 
decision making model.  When it comes to evidence based management (the core 
subject of my thesis) the biggest problem was there is no desire or awareness of the 
need to modify how things are currently being done.  As a government department in 
the midst of major economic turmoil you might think that taking the time to ask “what 
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works best?” would be vital, or at best valid.  The leadership and organisational 
response to this problem has been frustratingly slow. 
Critical theorists have raised objections to the movement (Learmonth & Harding, 
2006; Learmonth, 2006). In particular, it has been criticised for treating "evidence" 
and "scientific method" as if they were neutral tools. From this perspective, 
"management" is not necessarily an automatic good thing - it often involves the 
exercise of power and the exploitation of others. Efforts have been made, however, 
to include a balanced treatment of such issues in reviewing and interpreting the 
research literature for practice (Rousseau, Manning & Denyer, 2008). 
Some of the publications in this area are Evidence-Based Management (Pfeffer & 
Sutton, 2006), Harvard Business Review (Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006), and Hard Facts, 
Dangerous Half-Truths and Total Nonsense: Profiting From Evidence-Based 
Management (Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006). Some of the people conducting research on 
the effects of evidence-based management are Jeffrey Pfeffer, Robert I. Sutton, and 
Tracy Allison Altman. Pfeffer and Sutton have recently opened a web site dedicated 
to the movement. 
On a personal level I have tended to lead successful teams of high performing 
individuals and usually inherited maturing or well established teams but have rarely 
been asked to establish new organisations when the NHS goes through its periodic 
regular re-organisation.  So a pattern emerges throughout my 20 year career in the 
NHS of being the director who succeeds the first Chief Executive in an organisation, 
the team player who replaces the first team leader when they leave and so on.  I 
have worked in parts of the NHS that used EBM sparingly.  For example the 
recruitment of leaders is supported by the evidence that it is possible to assess 
future leaders through competency based extrapolation of their past performance 
and also by evidence that emotional intelligence correlates with predictions of 
successful leadership.  EBM has existed in two ways, as a self critique by managers 
that some of the decisions or assertions are just plain errors which would improve if 
based on evidence of what works, and as an exploration of the differences in culture 
that exist between NHS doctors who are increasingly evidence based and NHS 
managers who are seen to make little progress in adopting the concept.  
2.6 Peer Approval 
Watching one’s peers work was helpful to me for a variety of reasons.   For one, 
observation was a way to learn new skills or techniques, and also provided a chance 
to compare one’s own style of working to another’s.  On an emotional level, watching 
others work was both calming and anxiety-provoking depending upon the 
perspective of my own work and the perception of the peer I was observing.    
The diversity within the group of NHS managers I studied with regard to age, 
race/ethnicity, level of experience as therapists, and theoretical orientation was also 
identified as an important facilitator of reflectivity. Diverse backgrounds allowed for 
multiple viewpoints and perspectives to be shared and discussed and often spurred 
further reflection in students’ journals.   
The attitudinal stances that I took were important factors in whether I could be 
reflective. It was easy for when I was being confident, self-efficacious, open to 
learning, and non-defensive about my work to be reflective.    For my tutors who 
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were motivated by the challenges of the course rather than overwhelmed and 
defensive, being reflective seemed to come naturally.     
Personal difficulties, at times, played a role in encouraging reflective practice.  Life 
events such as the breakup of a significant relationship, a low grade on module 2, 
adjusting to a new city, becoming a parent, or struggling with parenting issues, 
tended to focus energy on an internal process of self-reflection.  In addition, my 
personal difficulties with anxiety, doubt, and struggling with one’s professional choice 
or not feeling competent stimulated a desire to be increasingly aware of one’s own 
approach to other NHS managers with a deeper understanding and empathy for the 
difficulties presented.     
There were some constraints within the training context that hindered me from being 
reflective.  Some of these are consistent with the cognitive demands inherent in a 
DBA program in general, which places significant demands on students in terms of 
time and workload.  Sometimes I found the workload to be too great and left too little 
time to be reflective about one’s own growth.    As a less experienced student, the 
facilitator’s “hands-off style” was a factor that made it easy for me to maintain a 
reflective stance with my peers. 
3      What worked and didn’t work 
3.1 Worked: The literature review: conceptual framework and literature search           
drew me into a much wider community 
Accountants do not traditionally deal with qualitative data such as whether a patient 
was happy or sad or whether it looked like to him, that his father would die when a 
patient brought him to the emergency service.  Qualitative data is not objective.  It 
cannot be reliably verified.  Quantitative data can often be verified – you can see the 
evidence on paper that it is correct.  Accountants like myself, like things to be clear 
and unambiguous, for there to be no doubt, for the amounts presented to be clearly 
verifiable.  In the literature review and throughout document 3 and document 4, I 
followed a reflective journey concerned with the need to be more flexible, more 
willing to embrace new sources of data from qualitative sources.  There is still a 
problem that I face through traditional research designs that usually rely on a 
literature review leading to the formation of a hypothesis.   
I am drawn to the notion that the ultimate goal of the DBA is a blog and a facebook 
page, where I will join a community of like minded practitioners and that the DBA is 
the entry requirement for a journey rather than the end in itself.  The key to all of this 
is that the presence of trust is essential to the creation of this and I intend to shake 
the hands of as many of the participants as possible.  I do believe that as the NHS 
works through the next three to five years of a much harsher macro economic 
climate, then the creation of such an endeavour will fit nicely into the broader range 
of academic centres well able to support more formal knowledge exchanges.  The 
unique selling point of my facebook group, if there is to be one, will be to be clear 
about the bad knowledge. 
3.2   Didn’t Work: Making my new knowledge trusted and shared by my 
management colleagues 
The academics are best at the distribution of good knowledge, but there is a place 
for suitably qualities and trusted networks to run their/our own hierarchy of evidence 
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within the cadre of NHS managers.  The question of whether the knowledge 
available to us is valid within our experience and needs as NHS managers, isn’t one 
that can be settled easily, because we have too little time to do it and anyway, 
experts themselves disagree.  Instead, we can run our own hierarchy by using our 
job positions to take some actions ourselves to test the validity of the knowledge.  
Evidence-based-management within the NHS will therefore be grounded in an 
emergent process of continuous learning that leads both to better choices and a “fail 
fast” culture that exposes the practices that are least able to improve things. 
The literature review offers the following insights. 
Discourse analysis (1952) is defined as “concerned with the interrelationships 
between language and societies and as concerned with the interactive or dialogic 
properties of everyday communication”.  To this are added two subdivisions – genre 
and ideology.  All of this is relevant in my study of management in the NHS because 
of genre and ideology.  What is vital for the reader to understand as we progress on 
to the analysis of a specific decision, is that, without retro-fitting onto my material 
there was something that I hadn’t anticipated, that a real human narrative evolves 
and in the conclusion I use the Rousseau model to reveal that however the manager 
feels about ‘evidence’ as useful in their day to day behaviour they think they are 
playing a different game. 
So what does this tell me about the nature of knowledge?  The thing about the DBS 
is that it creates learning sets and tutorials and that is the thing that I found hardest 
to fit in with.  I acknowledge that knowledge flourishes in connections and 
relationships.  Part of my qualitative study was about the nature of facet or craft 
knowledge.  Different to explicit knowledge (that can be accessed and shared 
through many channels), this facet knowledge is shared by trusted colleagues 
showing a reciprocal desire to exchange knowledge with each other.  So the learning 
for me is that I must make the building of connections and relationships a priority and 
the challenge will be to network the conclusions of this DBA.  Tony Kovner told me to 
spend less time worrying what I said in my DBA thesis and more time figuring out 
how I was going to give it a presence afterwards. 
4     The personal Journey 
4.1 Personal Commitment – occasional and inspirational 
Personal commitment was a real issue throughout the doctorate.  I had planned for 
the doctorate to take me about 1200 hours or 8 hours a week x 50 weeks a year x 3 
years.  Would that it had been that simple to stick to the plan with work, family, 
redundancy and travel. 
Fulfilling obligations to the rest of my life as well as the doctorate were complicated 
when I had to move jobs, but I was my own problem maker, when in 2007 I was co-
opted to run an all ages football club in Nottinghamshire.  In the end though, the 
doctorate was the respite from the rest of my life. 
Proper training and explicit planning are the signs of a successful athlete and team, 
so I applied the same logic to the doctorate and it seems to work.  Early morning 
starts before the family had gotten up, proper diary management so that everyone 
knew when the doctorate deadlines were and always having my paperwork with me 
when I was sent away in hotels and on aeroplanes by work, broke the task down into 
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the consumption of those hours.  At no time did I doubt my personal commitment, 
but I had to prioritise it by applying sports planning. 
Motivated by commitment to the NHS, this was what meant that the endeavour 
remained a pleasant, even fun, experience.  I am American by birth, indeed, still am 
a citizen of the USA, yet the thing that makes the UK better than the USA is the 
National Health Service.  The problem remains though how should we deliver rising 
standards of healthcare in a taxpayer-funded, free-at-the-point-of-use system, in 
which treatment is provided to all in the basis of need not ability to pay.  So I always 
felt that my doctorate would help contribute to the answer. 
Motivation and commitment to the doctorate came best when I had the protected 
time to do the work and think about what I was doing.  But is was a rare moment of 
alchemy that made the work progress – I remember 6 hours in a New York airport 
and one time when I just had to get up at 3.00am to write something I had been 
thinking about, as times when the time, the inspiration, the material and the 
conclusions all came together. 
Confidence and change within the DBA study programme was very slow.  All I ever 
managed to do was follow a steady linear line upwards, knocking off the tasks one 
by one, module by module, document by document.  The whole process will 
hopefully make more sense looking backwards, but whilst I have been in it the task 
has been harder than my other degrees or either of my professional qualifications, 
although the time frame has been similar for all of them. 
4.2 Changes in my personal life 
Some changes in my life during the doctorate hit my emotions very hard.  If I had 
known that I would go through two family deaths, redundancy, divorce, a new baby 
to add to my teenage children and moving house whilst doing the doctorate, I am not 
sure I would have thought it the best time to do a DBA.  Throughout it all though the 
timetable was always a couple of months behind, time I never caught up from the 
beginning, but never getting further behind either. 
Making decisions in my life and having some other things thrown at me, never 
stopped the sense of purpose that this was the right window of opportunity to be 
doing this particular type of study.  In the end my kids have remained supportive of 
the endeavour and my boss has kept writing the annual contributions to my tuition 
fees.  So I have been lucky with the level of external support I received.  It might be 
deep to call it all “tolerance and compassion” but that is the way that I think I have 
felt my family, friends, work and even my tutor have dealt with the DBA task as the 
rest of my life threw up myriad challenges.  I think they have helped me to re-
prioritise things and also understand when the final product delivery reflected 
multiple overlapping and competing objectives. 
Beliefs and culture play a large part in the attitude to education.  If you come from a 
tradition that values study as a form of leadership or even prayer, then it is 
philosophically much easier to find the time in the “noise” of life to continue with a 
doctorate.  I am lucky that I come from such a tradition. 
4.3  My Changing Value Set 
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I have seen a lot of things and read a lot of things during the time of this study that I 
don’t want to be "tacking on" of some extra and dispensable information, but rather 
an integral part of the learning experience. I have been given the opportunity to 
rethink and refashion my beliefs as I confront a dilemma, without fear of any 
authoritative imposition of beliefs from others. As a student who has experienced a 
diversity of alternative ideas I have begun to develop a more global viewpoint and be 
able to consider different aspects of a problem.  Now I see that ethical thinking is 
neither a matter of pure intellect nor of gut feelings and prejudices. What is important 
here is one's reasoning and critical thinking skills. Thus, by strengthening and 
expanding these skills, I have been able to view our ever-changing policy world from 
a new perspective, and not be limited by the past or previous belief-systems.  I now 
understand my decision making to be something like the following and that my 
values adjust accordingly. 
1) What are the facts?  What is available at this time? 
2) Identify and define the ethical problem:  
3) Who are the stakeholders in the decision?  
4a) What options do you see are available to resolve this dilemma?  
4b) Which options are the most compelling? Why?  
5a) How would you resolve the dilemma?  
5b) What values did you rely on to make your decision?  
6) What consequences (if any) do you see your decision has on the others involved?  
7) Could you personally live with this decision? Remember that no decision is 
immune to pressures of time and how we feel either.  
5.    Where this all fits 
5.1 Anthony Kovner 
Approach and Methods.  Let me be clear. Tony is a professor, his wife is a professor, 
his daughter is a professor, his son-in-law is a professor.  Tony is not an academic 
lightweight.  He is published and quoted and re-published.  Yet in amongst all of the 
people I read, Tony was the one who had a lifetime of being an administrator, 
researcher and teacher, so his perspective on the world of healthcare (even though 
he is regarding America) was the nearest I found to somebody “holding up a mirror” 
to themselves and their peer group.  Put simply, he takes a position on the current 
state of healthcare management, board governance and the importance of research 
in management practice.  In particular, he notes that decision makers would like 
evidence that is more applicable to their actual decisions, includes information of 
what needs to be done, is more easily accessible and that researchers and decision 
makers should consider long-term collaborations to help identify topics for and 
parameters of evidence development.  He has encapsulated all of this in a book – 
but one that retails in paperback at £50 a time.  After 20 years of looking at this issue 
of evidence based management, I would say that he has come to the following 
conclusions: that the case for evidence based management in healthcare remains a 
political judgement and that the return on investment calculation has not been, but 
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could be, reliably made by any healthcare system.  It is important to note that his 20 
years of study are characterised by an increasing belief that hospital boards do not 
review the quality of managerial decisions, so would never know whether things 
need improving.  Underlying all of his way of working is an almost iconoclastic belief 
in the widespread use of evidence to shift power away from senior towards junior 
managers.  Tony was widely respected, that much is clear, but even in the NYU 
Wagner school within which he taught, his ideas were not necessarily mainstream.  
Finally though, in his methods he always espoused academic rigour.  When talking 
to managers in the field of healthcare, he always took time to properly frame 
research questions, obtain evidence as to why intervention might/might not work in 
various contexts, evaluate evidence with a balance of viewpoints represented and 
consider when further evidence was needed to support a decision. 
5.2 Confidence and Change 
 
First we must create awareness of the need to change. What are the compelling 
reasons to move away from the familiar and comfortable and move to something 
different and perhaps uncomfortable? 
 
In today's deficit funded NHS, more and more people are becoming aware of the 
need for improving the way or the NHS works. However, if we really want to turn up 
the heat on change, we must discuss internally the specific challenges facing the 
NHS.  
 
Who is our benchmark? What are they doing? What new products and services are 
they adding? Is the public support for the NHS expanding or contracting? What are 
our costs and revenues per employee versus other countries? Will our products be 
subject to new environmental controls? What will rapidly expanding 
telecommunications technology mean to us and our existing work processes? Can 
we reduce our overhead expenses to match those considered best in the world? 
Could we really become "paperless?" How could we reduce our basic work process 
by 10 steps this month? How could we improve turnaround time by 90%? 
 
It is my opinion that the more productive an organization is, the more creative it must 
be in creating the appropriate challenge. One Chief Executive I worked with wanted 
to increase the rate of implementation of employee involvement, which for several 
years had been painfully slow.  What, I asked myself, would provide some motivation 
for these people to move forward? 
 
How I am linking into on-going research in EBM.  Support for diffusion fellows and 
academics is developing, but the key is the consistency of the key players.  If one 
were to consider that Kovner and Billings are at Wagner NYU and that Billings works 
closely with the Nuffield Trust in the UK, that Ham is at the HSMC in Birmingham 
and is a writer for Nuffield Trust and latterly has re-joined the Kings Fund, the same 
Kings Fund that was lead by Jo Boufford of Wagner NYU.  A pattern emerges that a 
grouping of these organisations, plus my favourite Rousseau of Carnegie Mellon and 
Pfeffer and Sutton of Harvard Business School would very quickly present a 
comprehensive coverage of the subject as it could be presented to the NHS.  It is my 
intention when the DBA is (hopefully) passed and completed, to email these key 
players with a simple question of whether they think the NHS provides a unique 
grounding for further study of this subject and whether they would each be willing to 
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give me an hour of their time.  Some I have met already.  Only Rousseau is a 
logistical challenge to meet, but then Pittsburgh, PA is not that far away from my 
normal travel routes.  At the very least, I intend to present the answer to the question 
in the British Medical Journal and the widely read, but less academic Health Service 
Journal in late 2010/early 2011. 
 
5.3  Changing myself 
 
I learned something very useful about the nature of reflection.  I started off keeping a 
diary – as advised at the start of the DBA, it would help when it came to write 
Document 6.  This enabled me to record what was learned whilst the experience was 
very fresh (and in one lunchtime immediate).  This was necessarily collected 
chronologically.  What I learned though was that the most useful thing was not to try 
to make sense of all this until much, much later.  Collecting my observations together 
within the themes I set for Document 6, has given me much more insight into the 
learning experience, than if I had tried to make sense of this in the same 
chronological order that the observations were made (my previous or inherited 
learning form was like this).  When reading about this issue, I came across a thing 
called the eportfolio system which I will use to help me emphasise this type of 
learning in the future.  The eportfolio system should help me to build more of a 
retrospective about what I learned.  The reason that this is useful and significant, is 
that I am a qualified accountant and necessarily complete a mandatory cpd 
(continuing professional development) requirement each year.  This eportfolio 
system will enable me to describe my cpd, not as a series of task-and-finish 
seminars, but as a rounded reflection of the last one and last three years.  I will also 
be able to note where my competence acquired was actually different to what I 
thought it was when the learning experience was very recent. 
 
Becoming a broker between research and practice, I feel that I have found myself in 
a positive and comfortable slot where I am not an advocate (more of which below), 
but a potentially trustworthy broker.  I have shown in this DBA that research can be a 
powerful tool to improve the structure and practice of management in the NHS.  It 
can be argued that the emphasis on targets in the NHS is affecting decision making 
(and decision makers) by increasing the demand for evidence on the effectiveness of 
various strategies for hitting these targets.  But as the broker, I do not hold with that 
argument.  In an era where the NHS is driven by the twin forces of performance and 
accountability, not much has been asked of management research.  The policy is 
centrally directed and the management task to deliver the target is as discretionary 
and varied as the accountable officer wants it to be.  So there is a space to broker in 
some academic content and research.  On the other hand, I have seen in my 
brokerage role that even ‘engaged’ managers have oversimplified the problem about 
translating research into evidence for/about management practice.  My brokerage 
role is therefore, also to promote a realism about what research evidence can do.  
The assumption that research is useless or that alternatively, evidence can simply 
tell managers what to do are commonly held – diametrically opposed positions.  Both 
are wrong.  Brokerage will close the gap. 
Not being an advocate.  Evidence based management is just another tool.  It is not 
the only tool.  It is not the toolbox itself.  So I say “lets try it” – the alternative is to 
follow another fad or fashion that doesn’t fit with the organisational culture.  
Learmonth would probably accuse me of hijacking the prevailing (superior) medical 
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ethic and superimposing my own managerialist culture on the organisation, but he 
would be wrong.  In no way have I become an advocate for evidence based 
management in healthcare.  But then neither have the people I have read and 
enjoyed.  What supporters, if you can call then that, of evidence based management 
in healthcare say, is that there is a theoretical application of EBM to improve 
management decision making and that it is worthy of field study.  After all, the role of 
an advocate would be to intercede on behalf of EBM and it is not always clear how 
and when this opportunity would arise.  What I can be said to be, is a conspicuous 
follower and an intrigued supporter of the concept, who will offer this positively if 
asked to debate the matter. 
A development of my wider USA/International perspective has taken place in my 
working life.  The department I head up was chosen to be a year long study in how 
we use evidence.  Working with Warwick University and a grant from SDO (the NHS) 
it has been possible for our meetings, our 1 to 1’s, our phone conversations, our 
emails and our interviews to give qualitative data for the researchers to collect.  This 
will be classified into the tools that we use to make decisions and how we make 
decisions.  Researchers have been given organised and co-ordinated (but free and 
unrestricted) access to a department of 200 people and as much time as they 
wanted with senior people. 
Joining the Nottingham University CLAHRC (Collaboration for Leadership in Applied 
Health Research and Care) was also a significant event, as it entailed committing 
PCT funds of £180,000 over four years to become a member.  The CLAHRC has the 
remit to develop new approaches to healthcare research and to enable research to 
be implemented in ways that bridge the gap between the academic and the 
practitioner. 
5.4   In Conclusion 
In conclusion.  The DBA worked for me because the location of the university, the 
reputation of the course, the method of study, the resources invested by me and the 
university, the personal commitment of the tutor and the quality of supervision were 
all perfectly able to accommodate my needs.  For anyone undertaking this DBA I 
would say that by the time you have a clear idea of the research you wish to 
undertake, you will find you are in the right place, but figuring out your own research 
agenda may be as hard as the research itself.  There was a particular problem in my 
situation in that the NHS had significantly funded half of the DBA which was the 
result of an exit payment from a senior post in the NHS.  So although the NHS had 
implicitly recognised the benefit of a DBA to the NHS, the NHS as a sponsor had not 
had to make the decision on the specific organisational issue they wished me to 
develop and research solutions for.  So I would recommend that anybody in my 
position again, gets themselves an internal sponsor or champion within the NHS to 
work with as well as the course tutors.  There is no doubt that a DBA was much 
better at exploring the organisational question of evidence in NHS management than 
a Phd, but I think the NHS organisation is more experienced in dealing with Phd’s.  
Ironically, Manchester Business School (Manchester Metropolitan) open up their 
DBA with a unit of evidence based management which says “in this unit you consider 
the case for research-informed management practice.  You review current evidence 
based practice in management, considering developments in other disciplines and 
establish understanding of processes and levels of such practice” 
(www.ribm.mmu.ac.uk).  But I still think I chose the right DBA course for me. 
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